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PREFACE  TO THE FIRST  EDITION 
THIS  volulne is the outcome of  studies which were turned 
Ln  the  direction  of  constitutional  history  partly  by  my 
appointment to a chair with that title at University College, 
London,  in  1903,  and more  specifically by  my  election in 
1908  to a fellowship at All  Souls'  College, Oxford, on con- 
dltion of  pursuing researches  suggested  by  the late F.  W. 
Maitland.  The first  sketch of  this essay took  the form  of 
six public lectures delivered in London in Lent Term 1913, 
which  were  expanded  into  fifteen  lectures  given  on  the 
Goldwin  Smith foundation  at Cornell  University  and else- 
where  in  the United  States in the  following  spring.  The 
manuscript was  completed,  save for some notes and refer- 
ences, in August  1915,  when  the increasing  tension  of  the 
war put a stop to remoter studies. 
During these seventeen years the history of  the English 
parliament  has  attracted  the  labour  of  several  learned 
historians, and particular acknowledgement  is  due  to Pro- 
fessor  C.  H.  McIlwain's  High  Court  of  Parliament,  which, 
coming  into my hands  at the end  of  1912,  confirmed the 
trend of  my investigations and supplied me with fresh ideas 
and illustrations.  Another American book, Professor Bald- 
win's King's Council in the Middle Ages, published in 1914, 
threw  valuable  light  on  a  collateral  subject.  But  the 
starting-point for all of  us has been Maitland's  introduction 
to the Menzoranda  de Parliarnento, which  he edited for the 
Rolls Series in 1893, the most original and suggestive essay 
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that has ever  been  written  on  the medieval  English  par- 
liament.  There would have been less reason for this book, 
had that essay, which  is still on sale in its original limited 
edition, not been buried in the Rolls Series, excluded from 
disinterment  in  Maitland's  Collected  Papers, and  generally 
ignored  by  English  instructors  of  youth  for  nearly  a 
generation. 
A  student  who  is  mainly  versed  in  the history  of  the 
sixteenth  century  must, however,  if  he  trespasses  on  the 
middle  ages,  be  ready  to  face  prosecution  with  all  the 
rigour  of  medieval  lore;  and  this  volume  cannot  escape 
criticism of  its lack of  technical knowledge in many details. 
My  excuse  for  the  trespass  is  that,  being  engaged  on  a 
study of  the Tudor constitution, I could not understand it 
without seeking answers to preliminary problems which had 
not been solved;  and historical curiosity combined with an 
academic interest in politics to expand an introduction  to 
the constitutional history of  the Tudor period into an essay 
on  the  place  of  parliament  in the  past,  the present,  and 
the future of  the English  state.  The last two  chapters  at 
least  of  this volume are not history;  but I doubt the logic 
and the  expedience  of  the  contention  that it is  only  the 
business of  those who have not studied the past to discuss 
the present or the future. 
The book is less a history of parliament than a suggestion 
of  the lines  upon  which  it should  be  written,  and rather 
an indication of  the research  that is still required than of 
that  which  has  yet  been  done.  Few  of  the  conclusions 
here  tentatively outlined  can  be  established  without  pro- 
longed research by many scholars ; but happily the prospect 
of  a school of  historical research is not so distant as it was. 
Meanwhile,  I have to express my  deep  obligations  to the 
fellow-workers who have attended the formal  and informal 
held at University Collcge during the last six years 
to  discuss  various  problems  of  historical  research,  and to 
whom I owe  many suggestions, references, and corrections. 
A  list  of  acknowledgements  would  be  long and invidious, 
but  I  cannot  repress  a  word  of  thanks  to  Miss  Jeffries 
Davis,  Lecturer  in  the  Sources  of  English  History  at 
University College, whose contribution to the value of  those 
discussions has been  crowned by a card-index of  references 
to the materials  for  English  parliamentary history,  which 
is  available  for  all  who  care  to consult  it.  It is  not,  of 
course,  complete ; and  possibly  its most  fruitful  function 
may be  to indicate the need and value  of  similar registers 
of  historical materials already printed or preserved in British 
archives. 
A. F.  POLLARD. 
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THIS  volume has been out of  print for nearly two years 
and the demand for its reappearance has been sufficient to 
impose upon its author the alternatives of  simply reprinting 
or  making such  revision  as would  entitle  the re-issue  to 
be  called a  second edition.  The cost  of  setting the type 
afresh and lack of  leisure to re-write the book suggested the 
easy course of  a mere re-impression, and both were reinforced 
by the inadvisability of  attempting to convert an introduction 
to the constitutional  history  of  the Tudor  period  into  a 
history of  medieval English parliaments.  On the other hand, 
such attention as I have been able to give to the topics dealt 
with herein made it difficult to seprint it without reference 
to the modification or confirmation which those subsequent 
studies have suggested.  The result has been some correction 
of  errors,  some  addition  of  facts, some  notes  on  kindly 
criticism, and a rather lengthy appendix on parliamentary 
representation in the fourteenth century. 
These  fall  far short  of  what  I  could  have  desired.  I 
should like to have responded to Mr.  Crump's invitation' 
and attempted to add that chapter "  to tell what 'law' is, 
and how  it is related to parliament,"  and to have argued 
that, since the "  king's grace " was needed  to turn parlia- 
mentary  petitions  into acts of  parliament, it is  not  easy 
to  divorce  it from  statutes or  statutes from  the "  law." 
But the chapter would have run to at least one inconclusive 
History, April 1921,  p. 47. 
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volume;  and, if I read  him  aright, Professor Holdsworth's 
seven  have  shown  the  impossibility  of  any definition  of 
"  law "  which will meet historical difficulties.  It  is, perhaps, 
the  greatest  of  those  "  no-constants "-I  had  almost 
written  non-constats-with  which  historical  students have 
to grapple.  I should like to have ventured also upon the 
minor  mystery  of  the "  statute-book " and  the  relation 
between rolls of  parliament and statute-rolls ; but these are 
problems for more expert hands than those  of  one whose 
fate  or fortune it has been to spend more time in facilitating 
the research of  others than in pursuing it himself. 
I have, however, been  able to use for this edition some 
works which I ought to have used, but did not, before.  The 
war and even the first years of  peace were not conducive to 
historical  scholarship,  and  monographs  published  abroad 
during that period tended to escape the notice they deserved. 
But my regret at having failed to read M. Pasquet's singu- 
larly acute and lucid Essai sur les origines de la Chambre des 
Communes (1914),  and  Professor  A.  B.  White's  scholarly 
articles on that and cognate subjects  before I wrote this 
book is tempered by satisfaction that so many of  my more 
heterodox  conclusions  should  have  been  independently 
reached  by more  expert  authorities.  But  not  even  the 
war  will  excuse the inadvertence  which  neglected  Riess's 
Geschichte  des  Wahlrechts  zzlm  englischen  Parliament 
published as long ago as 1885, and his article on Der Urs$rung 
des englischen Unterha~ses.~  I  need hardly refer students to 
Professor Rait's Parliaments of Scotland, published last year ; 
and I have made no attempt to anticipate myself  or others 
by expanding the sections of  this volume which  deal with 
the Tudor period. 
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Apart  from  two new  appendices the book  remains sub- 
stalltially what it was.  Such corrections as could be inserted 
disturbing  the type have  been  made  in  the text 
and  will  not  be  noticed  except  by  the critics  and  corre- 
spondents to whom  they are due.  Others which required 
some  discussion  have  been  relegated  to  an  appendix  of 
notes, and reference to them has been  made by letters of 
the alphabet to distinguish them from the numeric references 
to the footnotes. 
A.  I?.  POLLARD. 
Institute of  Historical Reseavch, 
Sefitcmbev 24, 1925. 
P.S.-Since  this preface was written  a second edition of 
M.  Pasquet's  treatise  has  been  published, in English and 
with  additional notes, by  the Cambridge University  Press. 
A detailed criticism of  one or two points relating to medieval 
parliamentary  elections has  also been  contributed by  Mr. 
J.  G.  Edwards  to  Studies . . . presented  to  T. F.  Tozlt 
(Manchester, 1925) : I hope  to deal  with  it  in  the April 
number of  History. 
Finally, I have to thank  the Society of  Antiquaries and 
Miss Ivy M. Cooper, who  has been  working for some years 
on  the  topography  of  Westminster  Palace,  for  the  last 
illustration here  for the first  time reproduced. 
Aqnevican Historical Review, xvii. 12-16,  xix. 735-50. 
Hist. Zeitschrift,  1888. CONTENTS 
CHAP. 
I.  THE  PLACE  OF  PARLIAMENT  IN HISTORY . 
11.  THE  HIGH  COURT  OF PARLIAMENT  . 
111.  EDWARD  I'S  PARLIAMENTARY  MODELS  . 
IV.  THE  MYTH  OF THE  THREE  ESTATES 
V.  THE  FICTION  OF THE  PEERAGE  . 
VI.  THE  GRO\\'TII  OF THE  HOUSE  OF  COMMONS  . 
VII.  PARLIAMENT  AND  NATIONALISM  . 
VIII.  THE  GROWTH  OF  REPRESENTATIOX  . 
IX.  PARLIAMENT  AND  LIBERTY  . 
X.  PARLIAMENT  AND  TIIE  CIIURCH  . 
XI.  TIIE  GROWTH  OF SOVEREIGNTY  IN  PARLIAMENT 
XII.  THE  SEPARATION  OF POWERS 
XTII.  TIIE  CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT  . 
XIV.  THE  COUNCIL  IN  PARLIAMENT  . 
XV.  TIIE  PEERS  IN  PARLIAMENT  . 
XVI.  THE  COhlMONS  IN  PARLIAMENT  . 
XVII.  TIIE  STATE  IN  PARLIAMENT  . 
XVIII.  TIIE  BRITISH  REALMS  IN  PARLTAhIRhT  . 
APPENDICES--I.  PICTURES  OF PARLIAMENT  .  . 
11.  PARLIAMENTARY  REPRESENTATION 
THE FOURTEENTH  CENTURY . 
111.  NOTES  AND  REFERENCES  .  . 
INDEX.  .  .  .  .  .  . 
xiii 
PACE 
.  I- LIST  OF  ILLUSTRATIONS 
PARLIAMENT  IN  158  j  .  .  To  face page  I z I 
~ARLIA~~ENT  IN THE  SEVENTEENTH  CENTURY  .  ,,  ,,  I63 
PLAN  OF TI-IF,  PALACE  OF WESTMINSTER  TOWARDS  THE  END 
OF THE EIGHTEENTH  CENTURY  . Between pp. 332 and  333 THE  EVOLUTION  OF 
PARLIAMENT 
CHAPTER  I 
THE PLACE  OF  PARLIAMENT  IN  HISTORY 
IN  the best-known life of  one historian by  another there 
IS a  passage  which  combines the views  of  two  writers  of 
genius on  the modern  value of  parliamentary institutions. 
"  He spoke much,"  writes Froude  of  Carlyle, "  on  politics 
and the character of  public men.  From the British Parlia- 
ment he was firmly persuaded that no good could be looked 
for.  A democratic Parliament, from the nature of  it, would 
place  persons  at the head  of  affairs  increasingly unfit  to 
deal  with  them.  Bad  would  be  followed  by  worse,  and 
worse by worst, till the very fools themselves would see that 
the  system  must  end.  Lord  Wolseley,  then  Sir  Garnet, 
went with me once to call in Cheyne Row, Carlyle having 
exprcssed a wish to see him.  He was much struck with Sir 
Garnet, and talked freely with him on many subjects.  He 
described the House of  Commons  as '  six hundred  talking 
asses, set to make laws and to administer the concerns of 
the greatest  empire the world  had  ever  seen,'  with  other 
uncomplimentary  phrases.  When  he  rose  to go,  he  said, 
'  Well, sir, I am glad to have made your acquaintance, and 
I wish you well.  There is one duty which I hope may be 
laid upon you before you leave this world-to  lock the door 
of  yonder place, and turn them all about their business.' " 
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Cromwell  himself  was  not  infected  with  his  biographer's 
contempt  of  parliamentary institutions, and  Carlyle  repre- 
sents the Homeric age of  historical science.  Hero-worship 
is  impatient  of  constitutional  government, and its votaries 
are unfitted by temperament to measure the value of  parlia- 
ments.  But  the critics  are  not  confined  to  the  ranks  of 
archaic admirers of  force, and the permanence of  the British 
parliament itself is doubted by advanced students of  modem 
politics.  English publicists have speculated without horror on 
the abolition of  the house of  commons, and Americans have 
described  the  sovereignty  of  parliament  as  a  phantom. 
" It may well be doubted," writes one, "  whether the doctrine 
of  Parliamentary sovereignty, in any form that means much, 
can long survive the triumph of  democracy. . . . When the 
Referendum really comes, the sovereign Parliament must go. 
But whether for good or for evil, the Referendum, in principle 
at least, seems to be  coming."  To the advocates of  the 
referendum  and  the believers  in  the sovereignty of  force 
must be added the bureaucrat and the syndicalist; and the 
life of  parliament might seem to depend upon that mutual 
antagonism  of  its enemies  which  destroys  the cumulative 
force  of  their  attacks.  But  even  extinct  monsters  have 
their scientific interest, and if  it were true that parliament 
has run its course of  public utility, that fact would make it 
all the easier to determine its place in history. 
It  is  possible,  however,  that  a  re-examination  of  the 
various functions which parliament has fulfilled in the past 
may lead to a less pessimistic view  of  its future, and that 
the  dissolution which  seems  so  patent  to some  observers 
is  no  more than a  transfiguration.  If, indeed, we  regard 
parliament  as having been  a fixed institution and apply to 
it architectural metaphors  like foundations,  corner-stones, 
and so forth, signs of  change must need appear to be symp- 
toms  of  decay.  But fortunately for itself  parliament  has 
never attained that rigidity, which appeals to the artist in 
bricks and mortar but strikes the student of  life as a proof 
of  death; and has eluded all efforts to stereotype its con- 
1 McIlwain, The High Couvl of Parliament, p, xv. 
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stitution which, if  successful, would have had the effect of 
encasing  a  living heart  in  plaster  of  Paris.  For  political 
institutions that stand the test of  time are organisms sub- 
sisting  upon  their  adaptability  to their  environment  and 
ever changing with the conditions of  their existence.  Parlia- 
ment  is  not  bound  up with  any  political  theory  or  any 
transient  constitution;  it has been  the tool  of  monarchs, 
of  oligarchs,  and  of  democrats;  it  has  been  the  means 
of  opposition  as  well  as the  instrument  of  government, 
the  preventive  of  revolution  as  well  as the  promoter  of 
reform.  It has been,  and is still to some extent, a  court 
of  law,  a  council, and a  legislature;  and its forms, which 
were  used  by  medieval  kings, have been  found still more 
effective  by  modern  ministers.  Its elasticity  has  known 
no bounds in the past, and we  have yet to learn that it has 
no  value for the forces of  the future.  The faith of  men in 
what can be done by act of  parliament is assuredly not  on 
the  wane;  and  the  mother  of  parliaments  has  seen  her 
progeny  spread into every civilized. quarter of  the globe. 
Parliamentary  institutions  have,  in  fact,  been  incom- 
parably the greatest  gift of  the English people to the civi- 
lization of  the world.  Civilized man has drawn his religious 
inspirations  from  the  East, his  alphabet  from  Egypt, his 
algebra from the Moors, his art and literature mainly from 
Greece,  and his laws from Rome.  But his political organ- 
ization he owes mostly to English conceptions, and constitu- 
tional systems all over the world are studded with words and 
phrases  which  can  only  be  explained by  reference to  the 
medieval  English  parliament.  Other  nations  have  had 
their  indigenous representative  systems, but they have all 
been abandoned or profoundly modified under the influence 
of  English  ideas;  and  reichstag  and  duma,  riksdag  and 
storthing,  sobranje  and  meiljiss  are  none  of  them  the 
purely native products their names would imply.  Here and 
there the grafting has not  been  successful, but the failure 
of  parliamentary  institutions in  semitic and negroid  com- 
munities is proof, not  of  the defects of  parliaments but of 
the  political incapacity  of  those  who  cannot  work  them. 4  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
As  a  rule  the  political  genius  of  a  nation  may  fairly  be 
judged  by  the success of  its representative  system. 
And  this is a  valid  criterion  because  parliament  is  the 
only expedient by which any degree of  self-government can 
be  combined  with  the  organization  of  a  national  state. 
The cities of  ancient Greece and of  medieval Italy governed 
themselves  without  the assistance  of  parliaments  because 
they were small enough for direct popular participation  in 
the sovereign functions  of  administration,  discussion, and 
legislation.  But when the ancient city state expanded into 
the empires of  Alexander and Caesar,  self-government dis- 
appeared, because  representation  had not  been  developed, 
and multitudinous peoples could not appear in person.  It  is 
a  small  community  that  can govern itself  without  repre- 
sentation.  Great  states can exist without parliaments, but 
without them their people cannot govern themselves.  City 
states can enjoy popular self-government without representa- 
tion, but  they cannot  expand  without  losing their liberty; 
and the threadbare theme that a democracy cannot govern 
an  empire  only  holds  good-like  other  classical  gibes  at 
democracy--of  popular  rule without  representation.  It is 
one of  the ironies of  politics that those, who have derived 
from the study of  ancient history a prejudice against demo- 
cratic government, should often be so anxious to reproduce, 
by means of  the plebiscite and referendum, that direct and 
commonly thoughtless popular action which was responsible 
for the prejudice.  For it was by the growth of  parliament, 
which  the  referendum  would  undermine, that  the  incom- 
patibility  between  irnperiurn and libertas was removed, the  , 
oscillations  of  popular  passion  corrected  or  checked,  and 
the  ancient  indictment  of  the  schools  against  democracy 
rendered obsolete. 
Parliament,  indeed, has been  the means of  making the 
English  nation and the English  state.  It is really co-eval 
with them both.  There was, it is true, an England centuries 
before there was a parliament, but that England was  little 
more  than  a  geographical  expression.  It  was  hardly  a 
nation, still less a state ; and Edward I was the first English 
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king of  an English people that  could be  described  as cven 
prtially  united  and  conscious  of  its  unity.  The  un- 
blushing patriotism  which  discovered  in  Alfred  the  Great 
the founder of  Oxford university was not less historical than 
the crude Teutonism which  saw in the Anglo-Saxon  period 
the golden  age of  English nationality, and pictured before 
the  Norman  Conquest  a  free,  self-governing  people,  com- 
bining the vigour of primitive  strength with  the virtue of 
radical  principles.  Alfred himself  was a Saxon king  who 
was hardly made English by the conquest of  half the English 
kingdom of  Mercia.  The fyrd was the people in arms, but 
the people  were  tribal  folk who  fought for  the most  part 
against  their  Anglo-Saxon  neighbours;  the  duty  of  self- 
defence was a Iocal  and not  a national obligation; and, so 
long as it lasted, the fyrd  could not be summoned to serve 
beyond the shire unless it was  paid  by the king for doing 
what was not considered the business of  the people.  Down 
to the time of Henry I1 law was not English law, but the law 
of  Wessex,  the  Mercian  law,  and  the  law  of  the  Danes. 
Politics,  too,  were  local  and  provincial;  the  people  who 
lived  in  England  regarded  themselves  as  West  Saxons, 
Mercians,  or  Northumbrians,  and  even  to-day  the  older 
natives of the Isle of  Wight speak of  immigrants from the 
adjacent  Hampshire  as  "  foreigners."  Kings  could  not 
make  bricks  without  straw,  and  the  material  means  for 
creating  a  national  state  were  wanting.  Roads  hardly 
existed,  communications were  scanty,  and  administrative 
organization  was  undeveloped.  The  consciousness  of 
nationality, without  which  there can be no national state, 
does not grow out of  nothing;  it needs substantial nourish- 
ment, and its provision was  beyond the means  of  Anglo- 
Saxon chieftains. 
The Norman Conquest, despite the vehement protests  of 
Anglo-Saxon historians, did in a real sense mark the begin- 
ning  of  English history; and  it is  no  mere  quibble  that 
reckons the kings of  England @ost  conquesturn (a).  Absolute 
origins are not, of  course, to be  found in historical records, 
and  for them  we  have  to  go  back  beyond  the conquest 6  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
of  Britons  by  Angles  and  Saxons as  well  as  beyond  the 
conquest of Anglo-Saxons by Danes and Normans ; and the 
sources  of  English  nationality,  like  those  of  great  rivers, 
are shrouded in  glacial  veils.  But  the English state and 
the  English  nation  have  been  moulded  on  a  framework 
provided  by  Norman  and  Angevin  rulers.  Even  English 
liberties appeared in an alien guiseJ1 and there is hardly a 
word  or  a  phrase  in  the  law  and  custom  of  the  British 
constitution that is Anglo-Saxon in origin.  To the "  liberty 
of the subject "  the Anglo-Saxon tongue has only contributed 
the article and the preposition ;  and "  vote," "  franchise," and 
"  suffrage " are all  extraneous terms.  Court,  council, and 
parliament, judge  and jury, inquest and verdict, alike come 
from abroad; and the Englishman cannot perform a single 
civic or  legal duty, or  exercise a  single political function, 
from parish council to parliament, without using a word  or 
expressing a thought unknown to his Anglo-Saxon forbears. 
It was this vast importation that made it possible to con- 
struct our English state out of  the raw material of  Anglo- 
Saxon tribes. 
The process was  slow and painful enough.  The work  of 
the Normans and Angevins was not to introduce feudalism 
into England, but to organize the feudal forces already at 
work.  This meant simultaneous construction and destruc- 
tion; for  the  more  feudalism  is  organized, the  more  it 
disappears.  Feudalism, it has been said, implies the negation 
of  all that we  mean  by  the state;  it involves local  and  . 
class  association, but  national  dissociation.  Villeins  were 
bound to the lord  of  the manor,  but  almost  cut  off  from, 
the king of  the realm and, what is  more important,  from 
the  villeins  of  other  lords.  There  was  little  in common, 
because  the  lord  intercepted  communications;  and  this 
privilege  of  intercepting  communications  was  the  lord's 
franchise, his "  liberty"  and his "  honour."  It varied  in 
Cf.  G.  B.  Adams,  The  Origin  of  the  English  Constitution, p.  3  n. : 
"  the thesis of  this book  is that this English national constitution  . . . 
is a  direct outgrowth  of  the earlier feudal constitution of  the State "; 
Pollock and Maitland, History of  English Law, 1895, i. 63. 
H. W.  C. Davis, Medieval Europe, p. 93. 
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degree and extent; sometimes the lord  could  exclude the 
king's sheriff, take the royal writs he bore, and carry them 
out himself;  sometimes he  could  exclude the king's  writs 
altogether.  It was  one of  the points  of  Magna  Carta that 
the king should hold no communication with a lord's villeins 
which  might  turn  to  the  lord's  disadvantage; he  must 
neither tallage them nor hear their complaints against their 
lord; against  him  they  had  no  locus  standi in  the king's 
court  or  before  the  king's  judges.  The  franchise was  a 
petty kingdom which its lord sought to render independent, 
and  his  notion  of  liberty  was  irresponsibility  in  the 
management  of  his  own  domains. 
This sectional dissociation was no worse than the Anglo- 
Saxon parochialism which  it replaced, and against it must 
be set the association enforced by the Norman kings when 
they insisted upon the liability  of  every tenant-in-chief  to 
attendance at the king's court and in the king's army.  But 
this form of  association tended to accentuate the dissociation 
of  class from class which  became  stereotyped  in the con- 
tinental  systems  of  estates.  In  England  it  was  chiefly 
marked by differentiation in matters of  taxation and juris- 
diction.  There was no national taxation in the twelfth and 
early thirteenth centuries; each class paid its own  peculiar 
kind  of  imposition.  The  military  tenants  rendered  their 
feudal services and aids and occasivnally paid a special tax 
on land  called  the danegeld and afterwards the carucage; 
the merchants paid their customs; and the villeins paid in 
work  or in kind  the dues they owed  their lords.  But the 
exactions of  the period were for the most part of  the nature 
of rent or legal fines and not of  taxes ; they arose from men's 
relations with their landlords rather than with  their  king. 
Feudal aids were only due from its tenants to the crown, and 
tallage  was  owed  by  villeins to  their  lords.  It was  with 
rent  and  not  with  taxes  that Magna  Carta  is  concerned, 
and it represented the greatest and most successful "  tenant- 
right " campaign in  English  hist0ry.l 
1 It  should be almost superfluous to refer students for this subject to 
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The Great Charter was wrested from John by a momentary 
coalition of various classes provoked by exceptional tyranny, 
and its historical importance lies in its anticipation of  the 
means by which common action afterwards checked despotic 
tendencies.  But it required parliament to focus centrifugal 
forces and perpetuate common activity.  Its principal value 
in  the middle  ages  did  not  consist  in  the ability  of  its 
members  or in the wisdom  of  their  legislation, for parlia- 
ment  produced few  able men  before  the sixteenth century, 
and its acts were  initiated, framed, and eniorced by  king 
and council rather than by  "  estates."  Its value was less 
direct  but not less great; it fostered and formed a  public 
opinion, without  which  there  can  be  no  self-government. 
By  its means  shire  was  linked  with  shire,  borough  with 
borough, and class with  class;  and the dissociation of  the 
feudal system was bronght  to an end.  In the absence of 
a  vernacular  literature  and  of  all  those  means  by  which 
nations are to-day made conscious of  their identity, the only 
means  of  producing  a  common  feeling  was  by  personal 
contact;  and  it  was  the  personal  intercourse  of  their 
representatives in  parliament that made the Northumbrian 
and the West-Saxon realize their common bonds and common 
aspirations,  and  led  baron,  knight,  and  burgess  to  merge 
their  social distinctions  in  common  political action.  Just 
as common law  was hammered out in the courts at West- 
minster  and transmitted throughout the land  by  itinerant 
justices,  so a common political sense was evolved from the 
communion  of  class and locality in  parliaments, and com- 
municated  by  slow  degrees  through  members  to  their 
constituencies.  The infiltration was facilitated by the very 
defects  of  medieval  parliamentary  practice.  For  parlia- 
ments, while they sat for only a fortnight or  three weeks, 
were chosen afresh two or three times a year, and members 
were rarely re-elected; but only residents were chosen, and 
it followed that far more Englishmen served as members of 
parliament  then  than  now.  In  a  borough  with  a  small 
constituency,  it  might  easily  happen  that  almost  every 
constituent  had  at one  time  or  other  been  sent  to  West- 
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minster.  The member  would  not  be  an expert  politician, 
but the constituency would  have a high average acquaint- 
ance with Westminster politics;  and  in  politics the general 
intelligence of  constituencies is as important  as the excep- 
tional  capacity  of  representatives.  Probably  in  medieval 
England it was more essential that a large number of  local 
burgesses  should be  brought  occasionally into  touch  with 
the heart of  national  government, than  that a few should 
become  expert,  regular,  and  professional  members  of 
parliament. 
Parliament  has  thus  been  the  peculiar  means  through 
which  the English people achieved their unity and nation- 
ality, and that is perhaps  the reason  why  the nation has 
always  excelled in  politics.  There  are  various  means  by 
which  unity  has  been  stamped  upon  the  peoples  of  the 
world.  In  primitive  times  and backward  communities it 
has been simply a matter of  race.  Sometimes unity has been 
achieved through religion;  and  Mohammedanism has been 
the  most  successful in  this respect,  though  for  a  time  it 
seemed as though the papacy might by means of  the catholic 
religion weld the west of  Europe into a unified ecclesiastical 
state.  The  Romans  impressed  unity  on  their  empire  by 
force of  arms and the genius of  their law.  Other peoples 
have  owed  their impression of  unity to their  literature or 
their art.  But in none of  these ways did the English people 
find  their  national  salvation,  though  the Hundred  Years' 
war and the literature  of  the ages of  Chaucer and Shake- 
speare powerfully aided the growth of  national sentiment. 
But  these  stimulants  to  communion  were  preceded  by 
parliaments, and it may  be  doubted  whether, without  the 
financial assistance of  parliaments, the Hundred Years' war 
could  have been  fought  at all,  and whether,  without  the 
impetus of  parliaments to common thought, Chaucer would 
have found a public for which  to write. 
English  nationalism  cannot,  indeed,  be  assumed  before 
the reign of  Edward I.  The cry against aliens was loud in 
the land under  Henry  111, but it was  raised  by  men  who 
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Englishmen would resent an influx of  Russians or Germans 
into the  Indian  civil service, but  their  resentment  would 
not  be  due  to  their  Indian  nationality.  Magna  Carta 
is  claimed  as  a  triumph  of  English  nationalism,  and 
men  talk  of  a  national  church  in the thirteenth  century. 
But  the  popular  claim  for  Magna  Carta  would  be  more 
convincing,  if  there  could  be  found  a  single  thirteenth-, 
fourteenth-, or fifteenth-century  version  of  the  charter in 
the English language ; and it would be easier to believe in a 
national  church  if  its bishops  and abbots and friars  had 
been less foreign and if  the tongue they used had been that 
of  the flocks they tended.  But it is not easy to grasp the 
meaning of  a  nationalism attributed to a  people without a 
native literature, a native church, a native government, or 
even  a  native  opposition;  and English  nationalism  oniy 
emerged with parliaments under Edward I. 
It is  parliament,  too,  which  transforms  medieval  into 
modern  liberty,  and the "  franchise " of  the feudal baron 
into  universal  suffrage.  The  extent  and  rapidity  of  the 
change that is wrought by parliament  in the conception of 
liberty is strikingly shown by a comparison of  Magna Carta 
with  a  little-known  petition  sent  up by  the  commons  in 
1348.  The liberties for which the authors of  Magna  Carta 
clamoured  had  become  anathema  to the  commons  four 
generations  later : "  whereas,"  they  complain,  "  liberties 
have been  so lavishly granted by our lord  the king,  that 
the whole of  this realm  almost has been  enfranchised-to 
the  great  oppression  of  the  people  and hindrance  of  the 
common  law-may  it  please  our  lord  the king  to refrain 
from  such  concessions  in  the  future."  l  One  man's  food 
may be another's poison, and the baron's  liberty consisted 
in the servitude of  his villeins;  his franchise was irrespon- 
sible dominion over his tenants, and it involved a negation 
of  common  law.  The more  numerous  and the wider  the 
franchises, the narrower the scope of  the common law and 
the  greater  the  means  of  private  oppression.  The  chief 
claim of  Magna Carta is that those who possess these fran- 
1 Rotwli  Pauliarncntovl~nt,  ii. 166 b 
chises shall be exempt from the royal or national interference. 
Liberties were as great an oppression in 1215  as in 1348, and 
as stubborn an obstacle to the common law; but in 1215 
there was no parliament to voice the common opinion or to 
interpret  the  real  meaning  of  Magna  Carta.  There  were 
more "  liberties " in the sense of Magna  Carta before  par- 
liaments existed than there have been since or are likely to 
be again; for one of the greatest historical services rendered 
by parliaments has been to abolish the liberties of  the Great 
Charter,  and  transform "  liberty " from the  privilege  of 
the  baron  into  the  common  inheritance  of  the  English 
people. 
The  conversion  was  not,  of  course,  accomplished  by 
Edward  I nor  even  by the commons  under  Edward  111. 
But Edward I did something by his quo war~anto  inquiries 
into the titles, by which the barons claimed to exercise the 
despotic  authority  called  their  liberty; and  he  did  more 
when he  brought  his "  commons " into the high  court  of 
parliament, and provided therein a hearing for suitors  who 
had  their  constituents'  purses  to  back  their  petitions. 
Again, it was  their  collective action  that gave strength to 
their demands for redress.  The timorous individual gained 
courage in the crowd; and the personal supplication swelled 
to higher note in the common petitions of parliaments.  But 
political  education  comes  slowly to a  people,  and it was 
long before the locally-minded burgesses learnt that popular 
power depends upon a capacity to sacrifice local aspirations 
and  particular  interests  in  the  pursuit  of  common  ends. 
The will to achieve a common liberty was weaker than the 
will to grasp a local advantage ; and boroughs were only too 
willing  to abandon  their  part  in  national  politics,  if  they 
might  thereby  escape  the  expense  which  representation 
involved.  Parliament  might  complain  of  the  lavish  dis- 
tribution of  liberties, but it lacked the force of  public opinion 
to ensure the observance  of  its petitions;  and to the  end 
of  the middle  ages, the liberties of  the lords remained  the 
curse of the body politic.  It was  not  till  Henry VIII, by 
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into the hands of  a national sovereign, that national liberty 
at last got under weigh. 
It had  still a stormy voyage before it.  The absorption 
of  feudal liberties by  the crown  gave rise to a  monstrous 
growth in the liberties of  kings, and the Stuarts went down 
in  defence  of  free  and  independent  monarchy.  Freedom 
and independence became a common cry without becoming 
a  common  cause.  King,  lords,  commons,  and  law-courts 
all demanded liberty; but it was their  own, and not  other 
people's liberties, of  which they were enamoured, and when 
the crown was smothered by the Whigs, the two  houses of 
parliament  each  claimed  an  irresponsibility  as  complete 
but not as divine as that asserted by Charles I.  To report 
their speeches or to publish  their votes was an infringement 
of  their rights,  and  parliamentary  privilege was  the latest 
growth of  the medieval notion of  liberty.  But unlike the 
crown and the barons, parliament was the means of  reform- 
ing itself; it abandoned its irresponsibility, and transformed 
its exclusive liberty into its duty to its constituents.  If  its 
function has not been to make all things common, it has at 
least created a common liberty. 
Political communism is, indeed, the keynote of  parliamen- 
tary history, and the house of  commons has been the essential 
factor in the growth of  parliament.  "  Commons " is a form 
of  "  communes " or communities ;  and as early as the four- 
teenth century, the official handbook to parliaments lays it 
down that the king can hold a parliament with the "  com- 
munity " of  his  realm  although  no bishop, earl,  or  baron 
attends, but that without the "  community " no parliamept 
can be held, though bishops, earls, and barons, and all their 
peers are present with the king.l  To express the common 
sense of  the community has always been  the function of 
English parliaments, and the predominance of  the layman 
has ever appealed  to  the  English  mind.  The  expert has 
seldom  been  at home  in  the  atmosphere  of  parliament, 
and from first to last  its communal  organization has  for- 
1 Modus  Tenendi Parliamenturn  in  Stubbs, Charters, ed. 1900,  p. 512. 
See below, p. 80, and Appendix 111, note  (i). 
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bidden  its  separation  into  "  estates."  Its description  as 
" three  estates"  arose in  the fifteenth  century  out  of  a 
mistaken French analogy, and the phrase was never a true 
definition of  an  English  parliament.  The  whole  concep- 
tion of caste implied in the word  was  alien to English law 
and English politics;  and every man's  place  in  parliament 
was  determined by  tenure and not  by  status, by  writs  of 
summons  and  not  by  class  distinctions.  The  "grades " 
or "  estates,"  of  which we  read  in  the fourteenth-century 
parliaments, were  many  and not  merely  three in  number, 
and they were not matters of  birth.  The judges  are called 
an estate, and so are the clerical proctors; yet the one was 
con~posed  of royal nominees, and the other of  representatives 
whose birth  might be noble, gentle, simple, or base.  There 
was  no  distinction  of  caste between  the baron who  had a 
special writ and the baron who sat for a shire;  both might 
be barons and  both might be knights, and every priest was 
at least a "  lord."  l So far from the English parliament being 
a  system  of  three  estates,  it was  the  difference between 
such  systems  and  the  English  parliament  that  enabled 
parliament  to  survive  and  grow  while  every  system  of 
estates dwindled away and died.  Their division into estates 
was  fatal to their permanence  and power;  parliament was 
saved  by  the  community  of  thought  and  action  which 
averted  social  schism  and  made  our  English  state. 
The communion of  parliaments led to the estrangement 
of  the  church  in  the fourteenth  cantury  and  to the  vic- 
tory of  parliament  over  it in the sixteenth.  Convocation 
was  not  merely  composed  of  clerics;  it was  also  elected 
by  them,  and it represented  nobody  else.  The  commons 
represented the nation, except for its clergy.  No  organized 
class is long successful in English politics; whenever a class 
acts as a class in politics, whether clergy or doctors or manual 
workers,  it  betrays  a  lack  of  political wisdom;  and  the 
most  prudent  as well  as the most  ambitious claim  of  the 
labour  party is to  represent  all  those who work  for  their 
"  Domine " might be used as an address almost as widely as "  Sir " 
is to-day.  See below, p.  72, and Appendix 111, note (k). THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
living  and  not  merely  those  who  toil  with  their  hands. 
For the English  people, assisted by  parliaments, have laid 
hold  of  the Aristotelian  maxim  that the  best  judge  of  a 
dinner is not the cook but the diner, and the best judge  of 
a performance in music or the drama is not the performer 
but  the public.  The issue  between  church and state was 
one between expert and layman, and the claim of  the poli- 
ticians  who  effected  the  Anglican  reformation  was  that 
religion  should  be  the  affair  of  the  people  and  not  the 
domain  of  the  priests.  Doctrine,  they  held,  could  be 
defined by national authority, prayers should be "  common," 
and the vehicle of  religion should be the vernacular tongue; 
and these things could only be done by acts of  parliament. 
In Scotland the case was different : no Henry I1 had there 
created  a  common  law,  and  no  Edward  I  a  house  of 
commons.  The Scottish estates were more like the French 
estates  than  the English parliament,  (b)  and  the Roman 
citadel fell before blasts from  the trumpets of  Knox  and 
his  fellow-churchmen.  The  kirk  they  established  was 
based on lay as well as ecclesiastical representation, and its 
general  synod  was  a  better  exponent  of  public  opinion 
than  the secular  Scottish  parliament.  The  union  of  the 
English  and  Scottisll  parliaments  was  facilitated  by  the 
fact  that Scottish national  sentiment  was  reflected in  the 
kirk which retained its autonomy; and Scotland took little 
stock  in  parliaments  until  in  the  nineteenth  century the 
kirk  had  suffered disruption  and  ceased  to embody  Scots 
public  opinion. 
It has  been  said  that  the supreme  achievement of  the 
Reformation  is  the modern  state,l and it is true that the 
destruction  of  the medieval  liberties of  the church paved 
the way  for  the "  omnicompetence " of  parliament.  The 
doctrine  of  parliamentary  infallibility,  which  emerges 
under  Henry  VIII, was  seriously adopted even by royalist 
judges under Charles I.2  Modern catholics like Lord Acton 
Figgis in Cambridge Modern History, iii. 736. 
Letters and Papcrs of  Hcnvy  VIII,  XX. ii. p. 345 ; Gardiner's Docu- 
111r  zts,  ed. 1889, p. 54. 
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have regretted the fall of  the church on the ground that it 
is the natural guardian of  liberty against the encroachments 
of tile  modern  state;  but  where  the  church  retained  its 
liberties, as in France, Spain, Austria, and Italy, the gain to 
popular freedom was not apparent, and the reason was that 
the clergy stood, as a rule, for their own  and not for other 
people's  liberties.  It was jurisdiction, irresponsibility, and 
power for which they contended against the state ;  and their 
failure in England was not fatal to popular liberty because 
the victorious parliament stood for representation and public 
opinion.  The  forces  it  represented  against  the  church 
enabled  it later  on  to repress its monarchical allies;  and, 
while  monarchy was  severely checked in 1688, sovereignty 
was  strengthened  and  developed.  The  state has gone  on 
from  strength  to  strength  because  its  parliamentary 
organization provided for an ever-widening national  repre- 
sentation, and  government  became  increasingly the affair 
of  the English people. 
The  fear,  which  haunted  de  Tocqueville  in  the  earlier 
half  of  the  nineteenth  century,  that democracy involved 
weak  government,  has  since  given  way  to  alarm  at the 
despotism  of  the  state;  and  it  is  clear  that  the  power 
wielded  by  modern  governments  is  out  of  all  proportion 
greater  than  that  of  medieval  or  even  Tudor  monarchs. 
Their puny  budgets  and casual armies rendered their  rule 
little  more  than  a  struggle  for  existence.  They  could 
hardly keep peace at home or maintain war abroad because 
both  peace and war were regarded as their affairs and not 
the affairs of  their people, and parliament did not consider 
itself  responsible.  It  was  always  the  opposition  and 
never the government ; and even to-day a prolonged sojourn 
on benches to the left of  the Speaker's chair impairs a party's 
sense  of  responsibility.  Parties  are  only  restrained  from 
faction by  the  prospect  of  having  themselves  to manage 
affairs;  and that prospect  was  never before  the eyes of  a 
medieval parliament.  Supplies had to be wrung from the 
commons  by  all  sorts  of  impossible  promises,  because 
supplies were regarded as personal gifts to a king and not I 6  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
as the means of achieving a common purpose.  It was only 
a  parliamentary  government,  responsible  to an electorate, 
that could raise the funds required to foil a Louis XIV or a 
Napoleon  and to  create  a  British  empire.  Its one  great 
disruption was due to neglect of  the truth that the strength 
of  a  government  depends  upon  its sense  of  responsibility 
to those whom it governs ; and the North American colonies 
were lost because George 111's ministers believed they could 
tax them  against  their  will.  The omnicompetence of  the 
modern  state has grown  out  of  the comprehensiveness  of 
its  representative  parliament,  and  every  self-conscious 
political element excluded from the franchise is a source of 
weakness to the government. 
Parliament, however,  could not  comprehend  all the self- 
conscious communities within  the  British  empire,  and the 
responsibility  of governing  the overseas dominions  of  the 
crown  had to be delegated to other parliaments which could 
react  more  easily  and quickly  to their varying  demands. 
But the habit of self-government made England readier to 
admit the claims of  other peoples.  Imperial Ro~ne  sacrificed 
her provinces rather than nurse them into daughter-states; 
the British  empire has saved its unity  by  multiplying  its 
representative  systems, and the mother of  parliaments  not 
only made  the  English  state, but  reproduced  it in every 
quarter of  the globe.  On  the lines laid  down in  medieval 
English parliaments scores of  legislatures are working in the 
world to-day, solving similar problems of  localism, racialism, 
and class prejudice.  Parliamentary institutions have soft- 
ened the animosities of  French and British in North America, 
and of  British  and  Dutch  in  South  Africa,  and brought 
inveterate enemies on the field of  battle into common action 
in the cabinet.  The force  of  argument has supplanted the 
argument of  force, and in discussion and debate a common 
sense and a  public  opinion have hammered  out a basis  of 
unity  and  supplied  the  foundations  of  national  growth. 
Each dominion has repeated  the experience of  the mother 
country,  and  passed  through  the  various  phases  of 
constitutional  evolution,  from " crown  administration  to 
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institutions,  and  from  representative  to 
responsible  government.  But  the lessons  of  history  were 
not forgotten;  and results which took  the mother country 
centuries  of  painful labour to achieve, were secured by the 
colonies  within  a  generation  and  sometimes  within  a 
decade. 
The  very  completeness  of  its success has suggested  the 
thought  that the  work  of  parliament  has been  done.  It 
has created the nation and educated it in self-government; 
democracy, we  are told, can now legislate for itself, and the 
middlemen  of  parliament  are  superfluous.  Having  sub- 
jected  the expert to common sense, it should itself  submit 
to the referendum, and abandon its sovereign rights to the 
man in the street.  If  lay judgement  is valid, why defer to 
professional politicians i  The question raises a critical issue 
for parliament, whose  future depends  on  the answer.  In 
truth there never was greater need for political experts, and 
democracy has just  as much  use  for the specialist  as any 
other political  system.  He is not the final arbiter, but his 
advice is needed none the less.  The member of  parliament 
is like the doctor of  physic;  the patient is foolish who tries 
to  dispense  his  own  prescriptions,  but he  can  choose his 
medical man and even reject  his  advice,  occasionally with 
impunity.  The responsibility for the adoption or refusal of 
expert advice rests  with  the  patient  because  it is he who 
suffers.  It is the same in political matters; the community 
suffers from  foolish advice and benefits from wise  counsel; 
it should therefore choose its advisers,  and judge  them by 
then works.  If  they  are  good, confidence will  continue; 
if  they are bad, a change of  advice will be sought.  But the 
electors can no  more  do the work  of  parliament  than the 
patient  can  do  his  doctor's.  The  people  are  fairly  good 
judges of  legislation after experience of  its effects;  but they 
are very  bad  judges  of  programmes.  For to forecast  the 
effect  of  legislation  requires  the  deepest  political  insight, 
and is the rarest of  gifts.  It may be argued that the people 
would learn to legislate wisely from the effects of  their own 
legislation : they  might  also  learn  the  properties  of  the 
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whole materia medica from the effects of  their own prescrip- 
tions,  but  the  casualties in  the  process  of  enlightenment 
might  be fatal to the community.  It is more  prudent  to 
employ  the  expert  and  hold  him  responsible  for  his 
advice. 
We  talk,  indeed,  of  democracy,  but  seldom  pause  to 
define it, except in magnificent phrases.  Abraham Lincoln 
spoke  of  "  government  of  the  people  for  the  people  by 
the  people "; but  the  people  have  never  been  able  to 
govern themselves except in the sense of  choosing between 
two  or  more  sets  of  governors  and  two  or  more  party- 
programmes.  When  it  comes  to  matters  of  practice, 
the nearer we  get  to direct  popular rule, the slighter  the 
power we leave to the people.  A parish  council  is allowed 
to  do  little  because  it  is  a  real  parochial democracy;  a 
county council can do more because it is further removed 
from the man in the street; but even it is subject to control 
from a bureaucracy at Whitehall.  No  one would dream of 
entrusting the determination of foreign policy, of  educational 
problems,  or  questions  of  public  health  or  finance  to  a 
referendum, because not  one  in  a  hundred  of  those  who 
would  vote  could  understand  the  issues  at stake.  The 
democracy that is practised, as distinct from the democracy 
that is  preached,  in  England  is a  matter  of  complex  and 
careful  gradation  embodying  other  than  democratic prin- 
ciples.  The  prime  minister  is  more  of  a  monarch  than 
many  kings,  and  the  cabinet  has features  of  more  than 
Venetian oligarchy.  It is only by means of  parliament that 
these undemocratic factors are fused in a popular govern- 
ment, and the secrecy, despatch, and efficiency essential to 
the administration of  an empire are combined with the rule 
of  public opinion.  At present parliament holds the political 
field.  It is liable, as it has ever been, to legitimate criticism, 
and it needs reform; but no proposal for its abolition proceeds 
from  any  sounder  premiss  than  unphilosophic  impatience 
with  the  imperfections  of  human  institutions,  or  than 
thoughtless faith in the wisdom of  the mob.  By means of 
parliamentary government, adapting itself in time to chang- 
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ing  conditions,  the  modern  state  will  have  to  solve  its 
problems for ages yet to come; and there is a practical as 
as  an academic purpose  to be  served by  an inquiry 
into  the  origin, functions,  and  evoiution  of  the  organ  of 
the English people. CHAPTER  I1 
THE  HIGH  COURT  OF PARLIAMENT 
FOUR  ideas, at least, with respect to the foundations and 
functions of  English parliaments have become firmly rooted 
in the popular mind.  One is that their principal object has 
ever been  the making  of  laws;  another is that hereditary 
peerage  and  popular  representation  were  indispensable 
elements in their  original  constitution;  a  third that they 
have always consisted of  two houses ; and a fourth that they 
were based on three estates.  Like all conceptions that have 
been  firmly grasped  by  the  multitude,  these  impressions 
about the history of  parliament are hardly less false than true ; 
and it is the purport of  these pages to show cause for thinking 
that parliaments in their infancy were much that parliament 
to-day is not, and little that it is;  that legislation was not 
the original purpose of  their being ; that they existed before 
they contained any representative elements ; that there was 
a time when, if  parliaments comprehended a peerage at all, 
that peerage was  not in  parliament  by hereditary  or  any 
other right than royal grace;  that parliament  was at first 
a  single  chamber;  that  there  was  no "  house"  of  lords 
until after the close of  the middle  ages;  that the "  house " 
of commons was not an original part of  parliaments, but yet 
is older  than the "  house " of  lords;  and that the notion 
of  three  estates -so  far  from  being  the  fundamental 
principle upon which parliaments were built-was  borrowed 
from abroad and hesitatingly  applied in the third century 
of English  parliamentary history to an institution to which 
it was foreign in spirit and in practice. 
Most  of  the  common  impressions  of  parliament  are, 
indeed,  irreconcileable  with  the  correct  designation  of  it 
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placed at  the head of this chapter (c).  The words are familiar 
enough to those who know  their book  of  common prayer; 
but words have become so cheap that five are often wasted 
where  one would  suffice, and four out of  these five  words 
are regarded as merely ornamental detail added to "  parlia- 
ment " for  the sake of  magniloquence  or  to improve  the 
rhythm  of  the  petitions  in  which  they  occur.  Why  the 
legislature  should  be  called  a  high  court  is  a  question 
which few of  those, who invoke divine direction for its con- 
sultations,  pause  to  ask  or  seek  to  answer.  The  most 
picturesque method of attempting to solve the riddle would 
be  to visit  that gilded ruin  of  the great  council  chamber 
of  parliament  which  we  call  the house  of  lords,  and to 
trace  the  processes  by  which  the  various  objects meeting 
our eye have come to be where and what they are or pretend 
to be.  The house  of  lords  is, however,  still  restricted  to 
purposes  other,  though  not  necessarily  more  useful,  than 
historical  exposition;  and,  relying  upon  those  powers  of 
visualization  which  every  reader  is  bound  to  cultivate, 
we  must undertake in imagination a sort of  geological and 
archzological  survey of  that chamber, with  the hope  that 
in our excavations we may light upon a fossil here and there 
which  may enable us  to reconstruct  an earlier, and in this 
case less glacial, period of  its history. 
The first object to arrest our attention will be the throne, 
a symbolic and material reminder of  the facts that the king 
is  legally  present  in  every  court  throughout  the  British 
empire, and that every act of parliament  is  technically  an 
act of  the king in parliament, just  as every order in council 
is an order of the king in council.  The physical appearances 
of the king in parliament have, it is true, grown so rare and 
become so purely ceremonial that we  may pardon our own 
forgettul~less  of  the incongruity  between  our theory of  the 
house  of  lords  as a  chamber  consisting  of  peers  on  the 
one  hand, and  on  the  other  the  actual  presence  of  the 
king, who  has no peer in his own dominions  and yet is the 
only  person-except  the  lord  chancellor -  entitled  to  sit 
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in  the house  of  lords  without  a  summons.  Nevertheless, 
it is not long since the sovereign was personally considered 
so  essential  to parliament  that  a  demise  of  the  crown 
instantaneously  put  an end to a parliament  and  rendered 
its further proceedings an empty form.  Earlier still, in the 
reign of  Edward 111, and again in that of  Henry V1, it was 
a  matter of  anxious debate  in parliament  and in  council 
whether parliament  could transact any business whatsoever 
without  the  corporal  presence  of  the  king.  Clearly  it 
required  more  than peers  to make a  house  of  lords. 
Not less interesting, from our present point of  view, than 
the presence of  the king upon his throne, is the more frequent 
presence of  members of  the house of  commons who are privy 
councillors upon  its steps.  But their mere presence in the 
house of  lords, at the opening of  parliament or during the 
progress of  an important debate among the peers, is not so 
significant as the fact that they cannot be excluded.  When 
a  peer  listens from the peers'  gallery to  a  debate  in  the 
house  of  commons,  he  is  there  on  sufferance;  and  any 
member can, by "  spying strangers," have the peers excluded. 
That, we shall find, is a relic of  the time when the house of 
commons was  no  part  of  parliament, but  a  more  or  less 
secret  debating  assembly,  of  the  proceedings  of  which 
parliament  had  no  cognizance  until  they  were  reported 
to it by  the Speaker.  The right of  privy  councillors to be 
present  at the lords'  debates illustrates  the fact that the 
house of  lords is the ancient parliament  chamber of  a  great 
council  which  comprised  other  elements  than peers.  We 
are told, it is true, that the throne is not technically in the 
house  of  lords;  but  assuredly  it is in parliament, and we 
are deceiving ourselves by this explanation unless we realize 
that within the parliament  chamber there has been drawn, 
first  an  invisible  line,  and  then  a  visible  rail  to give 
substance  to the theory, separating the peers  from  some 
newer,  but  also  from  some  older  and  more  essential, 
elements  of  parliament. 
Another  object which  we  are told  is  not  technically  in 
the house of  lords is the woolsack, although an act of  1539 
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declares specifically that it is "  in the midst of  the parliament 
&amber."  l  On it sits the lord  chancellor whose presence 
and whose functions are as incongruous  as the king's with 
our  current notions about the house  of  lords.  It  is  true 
that since the reign  of  Oueen Anne the lord chancellor has 
always  been  made  a  peer  if  not  already  one  before  his 
appointment.  But  this  practice  has  been  simply  one  of 
giving him a coat of hereditary paint to make him look like 
his  surroundings.  Historically,  there  was  no  reason  why 
the lord chancellor  should be  a  peer;  he requires  no  writ 
of  summons,  and, in fact,  as lord  chancellor, he  receives 
no  summons.  It was  he  who  summoned  every  one  else 
either by special or by general writs issued out of  chancery; 
he had no need to summon himself;  he was there ex  oflcio. 
Every schoolboy knows that Sir Thomas More was chancellor 
and  that he  never  was  a  peer,  although as chancellor he 
presided over the house of  lords, and took the leading part 
in  its  proceedings.  The  same  functions  were  performed 
throughout  Elizabeth's  reign  by  Sir  Nicholas  Bacon,  Sir 
Thomas Bromley, Sir Christopher Hatton, Sir John Pucker- 
ing and Sir Thomas Egerton, who were no more peers than 
Sir Thomas More; and down to I705 the lord chancellor or 
lord keeper, whose  power had been  declared  equivalent  to 
the lord chancellor's by an act of  1559,  was as often as not 
a commoner.  In the earliest periods of  parliamentary history 
the lord  chancellor had usually been a bishop ; but in  1340 
Sir  Robert  Bourchier  was  appointed,  who  was  neither  a 
bishop  nor  a  baron,2 and he had successors in Sir Robert 
Parning, Robert  de  Sadington, John  de Ufford, Sir Robert 
Thorpe, Sir John  Knyvett  and others, who performed the 
chancellor's  functions  without  being  summoned,  as  peers 
or  in  any  other  capacity,  to  parliament.  Down  to  the 
present  day  a  new  lord  chancellor  takes his  seat on the 
woolsack  before  he  becomes  a  peer. 
These  chancellors  sat  in the  high  court  of  parliament 
71 Hen. VIII, c.  10. 
a  Gike, Cons2itutional  History of  the House  of  Lords,  p. 353  ; cf. Elsynge, 
Modus,  pp. 138-9.  152-3. 24  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
because they were judges  or  councillors;  and other judges 
had their places beside thcm.  A judge is still addressed  as 
"  my  lord " because the high court  of  justice in which  he 
sits is, in spite  of  its removal  from  Westminster Palace to 
the Strand, an historical  part of  the high  court  of  parlia- 
ment,  of  which  the  judges  were  lords.  They  still  are 
summoned  by  special  writ  to  the  house  of  lords,  as  are 
the law officers of  the crown and masters in chancery, and 
as were the serjeants-at-law  until the order of  the coif  fell 
into abeyance.  It is true that for many years these writs of 
summons to king's  councillors learned in the law have not 
been  obeyed,  but their  issue to all the legal luminaries of 
the  country  proves  that  the  constitutional  theory  of  the 
second chamber is different from  the modern practice and 
conceptions of  the house of  lords.  Finally,  a  small  detail 
of  parliamentary usage will serve to emphasize the point : 
in both houses of  parliament, an examination of  the Journals 
in  the  sixteenth century  will show that the word  used  to 
indicate the passing of  a bill is judz'cium ;  every act of  either 
house, public or private, was in fact a judgement, because a 
parliament  was  a  court.  Indeed, had it not been a court, 
it might never have become  a  legislature;  for, as we  shall 
see,  legislation  is not a natural  product  of  juvenile  states, 
and it only develops slowly out of  judicial functions. 
We can now approach, with some hope of  understanding 
its purport, the earliest definition of  an English parliament. 
It occurs in the work of  Fleta, a pseudonymous author who 
wrote in the time of  Edward I or Edward I1  ; and it runs as 
follows : habet eninz rex czhriam sunm in consilio suo in fiarlia- 
megztis suis.l  To  the modern eye with its prejudice in favour 
of  the constitutional  separation  of  powers, this description 
appears  to  involve  a  strange  confusion  of  functions.  In 
"  curia "  we  have  the  judicature,  in  "  consilium "  the 
exccutive, and in "  parliamenta " the legislature ; and they 
are  all  hcre  rolled  into  one.  In substance  this  is  true, 
1 Fletn, lib. ii. c. 2:  Maitland, Memoranda  de  Parlialnento  (Rolls  Ser.), 
p.  lxxxi;  Pollock  and  Maitland,  i.  179 n.;  Baldwin,  King's  Council, 
p. 30s. 
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though the point of view is misleading.  It is not that three 
constitutionaI  functions  have  been  merged  in  one;  it  is 
that  the  comprehensive functions of  a medieval parliament 
have  not  yet been  specialized  and differentiated; and we 
are  dealing  with  a  sort  of  constitutional protoplasm  out 
of which will in time be evolved the various councils of the 
crown,  the  houses  of  parliament,  and  the  courts  of  law. 
There  are  dangers  enough  in  applying  the  analogies  of 
physical science to the development of  political institutions. 
Nevertheless  historical  study  has  to  accomplish  an  in- 
tellectual  revolution  comparable  to  that  achieved  by 
biologists when  they broke down  the idea of  the fixity  df 
species and substituted  that of  evolution.  The separation 
of  powers,  upon  which  many  modern  constitutions  have 
been  established  as though it was  an immutable principle 
of  politics, only represents a stage in constitutional growth ; 
and  we  cannot understand  English  constitutional  history, 
with  its  struggles between  crown,  parliament, and  courts 
of  law, unless we realize that all are descended from a single 
ancestor and are disputing  over  their  respective  shares in 
an inheritance which all had once enjoyed in common. 
Further instruction can be derived from Fleta's statement 
by a closer examination of  its terms.  What does he mean by 
curia? what was the curia regis of  the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries ?  Perhaps  we  may  understand  these  questions 
better by asking a third, what is the court to-day ?  Of  course 
there are courts of  many kinds;  but the court par  excellence, 
the court  which  requires  no  adjective, is  the  court  which 
has its activity recorded  under that simple heading in the 
court  circular.  It has  no  fixed  habitation,  no  definite 
functions, no elaborate organization, no indispensable mem- 
ber except the king.  It is not  a  building, it  is  not  even 
a place; it exists wherever the king oficially is or is deemed 
to  be;  it  is  the  royal  presence,  actual  or  implied.  The 
view is at least  tenable that the curia  regis  meant  nothing 
more;  and  one  might  guess that a  medieval  clerk  wou'd 
translate  our  phrases "  the  crown  in  council " and "  the 
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purliaaiento, but by curia regis in conciiio and curia regis in 
fiurliamefito.  We actually have the  phrases  curia  regis  ad 
scaccarium,  curia  regis  in cancellaria,  and  curia  regis  de 
banco;  and none  of  them can imply much  more than the 
theoretical  presence of  the king  in  these  courts  by  means 
of  specialized  representatives.  Curia re&s  is the  medieval 
latin for  what  we  call  the  Crown. 
This theoretical presence pervades every court throughout 
the British empire at the present time, and it is an attribute 
of  the modern  sovereignty of  the crown  that no  one  can 
hold a court except its representatives and delegates.  Feudal 
theory  and practice,  however,  permitted  franchises  which 
enabled many a baron to hold courts of  his own.  But the 
same vagueness attached to the meaning of  curia, whether 
it was a baron's  or a king's.  It simply implied a presence 
and con~monly  it was the vicarious  presence of  a steward. 
We look in vain for any definite organization of  the original 
curia regis ;  it kept no rolls until Henry  I1  had  made  it a 
court of  law,l and no list of  members or record of  proceedings 
has been discovered.  We have to fall back upon a nebular 
hypothesis, but in time this subtile presence will take a definite 
form, or rather many definite forms, and our constitutional 
system will, by a process of  differentiation and consolidation, 
come to resemble our solar system and comprise a number 
of  planets,  deriving their  vital  energy  from  le  roi  soleil, 
with orbits and circuits of  their own, sustained by the central 
power  of  sovereignty.  Nothing,  indeed,  seems  to  be  a 
curia,  unless  this  individual  presence  is  implicit;  and  if 
the  term  was  applied to the courts of  the  franchises  and 
of  the shires,  it was  because  the franchise came from  the 
crown, and the king was as much present in the persons of 
his sheriffs in the shire courts as he is in all our courts to-day. 
The courts christian implied a jurisdiction,  which came also 
from above;  and a court is not a popular institution.= 
1 The rotuli curiae regis, which exist from 5 Richard I to 56 Henry  111, 
consist of  records  of  the  still undltferentlated king's  bench  and common 
pleas.  From I Edward I they are divided into coram rege and de banco rolls. 
a  Curia seems  to  be  less  readily  applied  to the shire  than  to  the 
hundred-courts, perhaps because the latter were oftener in private hands. 
NO  one is  therefore  indispensable  to a  court  except its 
lord and such of  his officials as are required to transact its 
business.  The  lord's  men  owe  suit  at his  court  and are 
liable to be summoned ; but they have no grievance and no 
remedy if  he dispenses with  their presence.  They  cannot, 
indeed, be tried except in his court;  but that privilege does 
not give the individual vassal any right to participate in the 
trial of  his peers.  The presence of  a single peer, when the 
French king's  court tried a peer, was held sufficient to give 
the court jurisdiction, and a similar rule obtained in England 
when a peer was tried in the court of  the lord high steward ; 
the peers were there as a jury to establish the facts and not 
to give  sentence.l  Their rights  were subject to the same 
limitations as the Englishman's right to trial by jury to-day. 
He cannot be condemned without trial by jury, but he has 
no  right to be  summoned  to serve on any particular jury, 
or indeed  on  any jury  at all.  His  service is a matter of 
duty and obligation,  a liability  but  not a right;  and this 
genera.1 principle pervaded the curia regis and its derivative 
 institution^.^  The baron's  notion  of  liberty was  not  that 
he had a right to attend the curia I  egis and interfere in the 
king's affairs, but that the king had no right to invade the 
courts of  his barons and prevent them from doing what they 
thought fit  with their own.  They only valued attendance 
as  a  means  of  checking  a  king  who  transgressed  their 
franchises, and Magna Carta was designed to secure the local 
independence  of  barons  rather than the national responsi- 
bility  of  kings.  The king, when he holds his court,  is not 
therefore bound to summon any particular persons to assist 
him;  and the phrase curia regis  merely  implies  the  king's 
official attendance  for  certain  important  causes,  mainly 
judicial  in  character. 
The  king's  council  is  perhaps  by  Fleta's  time  a  more 
Luchaire, Institutions Fran~aises,  p. 561 ; Vernon-Harcourt, His Grace 
the Steward and Trial by Peevs, p. 302. 
The writ of  summons  to  parliament  is  a  mandamus:  cf.  Elsynge, 
Modus, p. 19, "  next to the title is considerable the form of  the mandamus, 
how it is to the lords spiritual, and how to the lords temporal and the 
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definite  organization ; but this definiteness lias probably been 
exaggerated,  and it is not  at all clear  whether  Edward  I 
had one,  two,  or three  different  kinds  of  council.  It has 
been usual to assume at least a  plurality  of  councils;  but 
Maitland confessed his inability to discover more than 0ne.l 
The subject is obscured by the absence of  both the definite 
and indefinite articles from the Latin language, and by the 
indifference with which medieval clerks and chroniclers wrote 
concilium or consilium.  Attempts have been made to dis- 
tinguish the two, but without  much  success;  and we  may 
usefully  bear  in  mind  the  warnings  that  while  English 
medieval  clerks wrote  in  Latin, they generally  thought in 
Fren~h,~  and that, if  we wish to interpret aright their Latin 
words, we  must ascertain the French equivalent.  Now  the 
French have only one word, conseil, for the Latin concilium 
and consilium, and for our "  council " and "  counsel " ; and 
it is by no means improbable that where we  see "  council," 
the medieval scribe was only thinking of  "  counsel."  When 
the  draughtsman  of  Magna  Carta says that extraordinary 
aids  are not  to be  levied  sine  communi consilio, and that 
negotium  . . . puocedat  sec~ndum consilium  eorum  qui 
puasentes  fuerint,  it  is  clear  that  by  consilium he  means 
"  counsel "; and  it  seems rash  to assume that, when  he 
goes on to prescribe the machinery ad  habendurn  commune 
consilium, he means "  for the purpose of  holding a common 
council," and not "  for the purpose of  obtaining the common 
counsel "  or ~onsent.~  The common council may perhaps be 
eliminated from the list of  Edward 1's advisory bodies. 
Nor is it easy to adduce contemporary and official evidence 
for the  existence  of  a  magnum  concilium  in  Edward  1's 
reign, and it is tempting to take shelter behind Maitland's 
authority, and assume the singleness of  Edward's councils. 
Nevertheless a magnum concilium had made itself  painfully 
evident  to Henry  111 between  the  Provisions  of  Oxford 
and  the battle of  Evesham.  It had, indeed,  stepped into 
1 Memoranda de Parliamento, Rolls Ser. Pref., p. Ixxxviii. 
1 Prof. Tait in English Hist. Rev., xxvii. 720-8. 
a  Moreover, tenere  and not habeve is the proper word for  "holding " a 
court. 
the  shoes  of  a  "  nlycel-gemot " in  the  time  of  William 
the Conqueror;  and it is clear that, while there may have 
been  only  one  council, it  was  quite  possible  to give  it a 
"arying  constitutional complexion and personal composition. 
The council dear to Edward I was no doubt a royal council 
without any other adjective, a council dependent upon  the 
king and representing only the monarchical principle.  But 
a  council contemplated  by  the barons under  a  weak  and 
obstinate sovereign  would  be  rather  a  magnum concilium, 
a  king's  council  "  afforced " by  a  number  of  magnates, 
representing the barons, and embodying their alternative to 
monarchical  government.  At least it is certain  that while 
we can find little about a magnum concilium under Edward I, 
we  can  read  a  great  deal  about  it under Henry  111  and 
Edward  11.  An  inccmpetent  king  generally  means  an 
incompetent  council;  and  when  the  king's  council  is  - 
incc mpetent,  it  has,  like  an  inadequate  jury,  to  be 
"  afforced." .I 
The  council,  if  there  was  only  one,  was  obviously  an 
elastlc  institution,  as  vague  in  its  composition  and  as 
indefinite in its rules of  procedure as was the cabinet in the 
first quarter of  the eighteenth century.  Like most important 
English  institutions  it  proceeded  from the crown, but was 
not created.  As the cabinet was merely a mecting of  "  the 
king's  servants," the council was  merely  a  meeting  of  the 
k~ng's  counsellors ; and there were no fixed rules determining 
who these servants and these counsellors should be.  No one, 
whatever his  baronial  or episcopal rank, had any inherent 
right  to be  a  counsellor of  the king.  At  least, this is  the 
theory of  the council under Edward I.  Doubtless that royal 
theory  was  not  the conception which underlay the barons' 
attempts to make  an instrument  of  government  out of  a 
magnum concilium ;  but it passes the wit of  man to construct 
a logical basis for a magnum concilium like that indicated in 
the Provisions  of  Oxford.  William  1's  magnum concilium, 
This chapter was written early in 19x3.  Since then Prof. Baldwin's 
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which met on Salisbury Plain, is supposed to have comprised 
all the tenants-in-chief  of  the crown.  But whether  a  vast 
and  tumultuous  council,  organized  on  this  tenurial basis, 
ever  met  again  is  doubtful.  Magna  Carta  says  nothing 
about a wzagnzhm  co~zcilium  or its rights;  if  its consilium is 
a  council at all, it is  a  council to which only  the greater 
tenants-in-chief  were  to receive a  personal  summons;  and 
this differentiation of  summons would enable the crown  to 
discriminate more or less  at will  between  the holders  of  a 
common tenurial qualification.  The inability of  the barons 
to formulate an alternative constitutional principle  in 1258 
reduced them  to the crude expedient of  simply naming the 
individuals who were to affoi-ce the council and control the 
Icing.  Their own leader, Simon de Montfort, was the first to 
discern the weakness of  this scheme, and to set the example 
of  extending  the  franchise  in  order  to  break  down  an 
oligarchical  opposition.  The baronial  "  afforcers " might 
themselves  be  afforced  by  lesser  barons,  knights,  and 
burghers.  Simon's  parliament  can hardly  have  been  de- 
signed for any other object than the curbing of  the magnum 
concilium; and Edward  I  had similar grounds for making 
parliament  a representative institution.  The magnum con- 
cilium  might  be  swamped  in  parliament,  and  the king's 
council be  thus  relieved  of  its  independent  magnates. 
In any case, the council in Edward's reign is freed from its 
great baronial incubus.  In 1305 there are barons, prelates, 
and earls who are not members of  the council, while judges 
and plain magistri are;  nearly  half  the council  is,  in fact, 
composed of  these non-baronial elements1  By the end  of 
Edward 1's  reign  the only  council,  of  which  there  is any 
trace, is a  royal  and  royalist  body  sworn  to  advise  the 
king truly and loyally,  to disclose  his  counsel to  no  one, 
to maintain  the  rights  of  the crown,  to inform  the  king 
1 Maitland,  Memoranda,  pp.  lxxxviii,  cvi.  In  1307,  when  Edward 
desired  the presence  of  two  bishops  on  the  council,  they  had  to  be 
specially sworn.  One was John Salmon, who hat  been bishop of  Nonvich 
since  1299;  and the other,  Robert Baldock,  quem  rex  vult  esse  de 
consilio  regis,"  had been bishop of  London  since  1304  (Rotuli Parlia- 
mentorum, i.  2 18). 
of  all infringements of  his  prerogative, to be no respectels 
of  persons, to reveal to him any ties incompatible with these 
duties,  and  to  contract  none  in  the  future  without  his 
consent. 
This council consisted apparently of  some seventy  members. 
It included  the  archbishop  of  Canterbury, the chancellor, 
the  treasurer,  five  earls,  four  bishops,  seventeen  barons, 
and eight  royal  officials;  there  were  also  twenty judges, 
two deans, three archdeacons, one canon, one notary of  the 
apostolic see, and six who are simply described as magistri, 
and  probably  transacted  the  secretarial  work,  political, 
diplomatic, and legal, of the crown.  It  was too large a body 
for administrative routine, and there is no reason to suppose 
that the seventy often sat together.  Normally they would 
be dispersed for divers duties and scattered in all the quarters 
of  Edward's  dominions.  Earls had their  counties,  barons 
their franchises, bishops their sees to consider;  even when 
employed on the royal business they would be in Scotland, 
or Wales, or across the Channel on military, diplomatic, or 
administrative  affairs rather  than  sitting  in  council  at 
Westminster.  Judges  would  often  be  on  eyre,  or busy  in 
courts  that  were  being  rapidly  differentiated  from  the 
council. 
On  occasions,  however,  which  were  at first  spasmodic 
but tended to grow regular and solemn, the king would wish 
to gather all his advisers together, to hold his court in his 
council;  and  these  full  conclaves  of  his  council  are  his 
"  parliaments."  The earliest form of  parliament is a parley 
of  the council ; and the germ of  these parleys may be traced 
in the joint  sessions of  the  barons  oi  the  exchequer  and 
justices  of  the two benches which  Edward  I  instituted in 
1284  to deal with doubts which might arise with regard to 
the interpretation of  the charters1  "  In the great court of 
parliament,"  writes  Sir  Matthew  Hale  in  the  reign  of 
Charles 11,2 "  at least the figure and model of  the co~zsiliztm 
regis  and the persons whereof it consisted,  are to this day 
Rot. Pu~l.,  i. 225. 
Jurisdzction  of  the Lords'  House, p. 58. 32  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
preserved  in the  lords'  house  in parliament."  This  still 
remains true in parts ;  we have never completely divorced the 
king in council from  the king in parliament, the executive 
from the  legislature.  It is  because  the  king's  council  is 
embedded in his parliament that the king's throne is in the 
house  of  lords,  that  the  chancellor  is  present  ex  oficio, 
that  judges,  law  officers  of  the  crown, and secretaries  of 
state sit on the woolsacks as late as the sixteenth century, 
and that the act of  1539 prescribes  places for the  council 
in the house of  lords, whether they are peers or not. 
We  must  not,  however,  when  vagueness  attaches  to 
czcria  and  conci2ium,  look  for  definiteness  in  the  use  of 
fiavliamelztum.  While  Fleta  speaks  of  consilium  in  the 
singular, he speaks of  pavliamenta in the plural.  Councils 
had  ceased  to be  occasional  assemblies, and had  become 
-a habit.  Parliaments  are  still  in  the  occasional  stage 
of  development  in  which  the  plural  is  more  appropriate 
,  '  than  the  singular  because there is no  continuity  between  ' 
one  parliament  and another, and each may have  its  own 
, individual  constitution.  The word  has been  traced as far 
back  as the  reign  of  Henry  11.1  It  was  certainly  used 
in  France  in  1239,~  by  Matthew  Paris  about  1240, in 
1 The earliest instance I have found of  the use of  the word occurs in 
the phrase  en sun plenier  parlement  of  Jordan  Fantosme,  who  wrote 
towards the end of  Henry 11's  reign  (Chronicles  of  Stephen,  Henry 11, 
and Richard  I,  Iiolls Ser., iii. 226).  Bishop Stubbs uses it, inadvertently 
I think, of  an assembly held at  Gaitington in 1189, but it does not occur 
in the authorities he cites  (Introductions to the  Rolls Series, ed. Hassall, 
p. 407)  In 1244 Alexander I1 of  Scotland  was granted  a  safe-conduct 
"  in  coming  to  meet  the  king  or his  council  in  Northumberland . . . 
and so long as the parliament there sha.11 last," and on August 15 following 
the sheriff  of  Northumberland ,:as  ordered to pay various sums for crops 
trodden  down on account of  the parliament"  held  between  the king 
and the king of  Scotland (Bain, Cal. of  Docs. relating to Scotland, i. Nos. 
1647,  1651-2,  1658; Henry 111 was represented  at this "  parliament" 
by Richard, Earl of  Cornwall).  Here parliamentzlln means no more than 
a  parley;  and in this sense the word was used  as late as the sixteenth 
century.  In 1539 it is applied to the meeting between  Charles  V and 
Francis I (L. and P., XIV. ii. 649). and in 1542 to one between Charles V 
and  the Pope  (ibid., xvii. 1103;  State  Pnpers, ix.  219).  Any  kind  of 
consultation  might  be  called  a  parliament:  according  to  Sir  Robert 
Cotton abbots held  their parliaments  (Cottoni Posthuma, p. 44); so  did 
the Inns of  Court, an?,the  Stannary Court (Cowell, Law Dictionary, ed. 
1727 S.V.  "  Parliament  ; Trans.  Deuon. Association, xi. 302 ;  4 Henry VIII 
c. 8).  See also note (d). 
V,ucliairc,  Insfit~~tio?zs  Frnn~aises,  p. 562. 
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the Provisions of  Osford  of  1258,  and officially from  I275 
But  its meaning  had  not  crystallized  into  its 
modern  sense;  and  the  difference  between  the  English 
parliament, the French parlement, and the Italian fiarlanze?zto 
indicates  the  vagueness  of  an  original  conception  which 
could  specialize  in  such  various  directions.  It  is  clear 
that it implied no sort of  representation, because representa- 
tion  was  never  a  feature of  the  French  parlemetzt  or  the 
Italian fiarlame~~to  ;  and even in England the word is used 
before burgesses or knights of  the shire had been summoned 
to meet  the  council  at Westminster.  As  late as 1305  an 
assembly can still  bc not only a  parliament  but a " full " 
parliament  after every  one--earls,  bishops, barons, as well 
as knights  of  the shire and burgesses--except  members  of 
the council  has been  dismissed.  "  Full " may,  indeed,  be 
one  of  those  mistranslations  of  Latin due  to forgetfulness 
of  the fact that the Latin word is itself  a translation from 
the  French.  In pieno  parlinmento  stands  for  en  plein 
Parlenzent;  but  when  a  Frenchman  says e.n  plein  air, he 
means in the open air, and when the famous Star Chamber 
act of  1487  prescribes  that amercements  shaIl  be  assessed 
I I in plain sessions," it means in open sessions;  indeed, they 
are  called "  open sessions " in another  act of  Henry VII.3 
A  full  parliament  or a  full  county  court  may be  only an 
open parliament or court, and may imply the publicity of  its 
proceedings rather than the amplitude of  its composition (e)  . 
However  that  may  be,  the  application  of  the  phrase 
plenum parliamenturn  to  an  asscmbly  consisting  solely  of 
councillors suggests that a session of  the  king's  council  is 
at first not merely, as Maitland has said, the core of  every 
See below, p. 48, and Pasquet, Essai, pp. 3-4,  60-2,  69. 
', The sitting Signoria had the power of  summoning a  Parlamcnto, or 
gathering  of  the whole  resident  population of  Florence."  (Armstrong, 
Lorenzo  de  Medici, p. 29.) 
rg Hen.  VlI, c.  14.  See my note in Engl. Ilist. Rev.,  xxx. 660-2 
This  phrase is constantly used in the " Rolls "  of  the purely legal sessions, 
a9d  has  no  reference whatever  to  the presence  of  specially  summoned 
barons or generally summoned r~presentatives. Cf. Rot. Parl.. i.  rgb,  3zb. 
In  Rot.  Purl.,  i.  179  we  have " in  pleno  scaccario."  Moreover,  when 
fullness is meant we  have pleinidre  parlenzent  (Rot.  Parl., ii.  232  b) which 
corresponds to the French cour pleinidre.  Cf.  Seldcn, ,[udicature,  p. 105. 34  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE HIGH  COURT  OF  PARLIAMENT  35 
parliament, but the whole parliament, and that the addition 
of  earls, prelates, barons and popular representatives, while 
it added to the taxing powers of  the assembly, added nothing 
to  the  judicial  and  legislative  authority  wielded  by  the 
council in parliament; and it has often been remarked that 
the great legislative enactments of  Edward I were not even 
promulgated  in  a  representative  assembly.  Nor  did  this 
legislative  capacity  of  the king's  "  council  learned  in the 
law"  cease  in the  thirteenth  or  fourteenth  century.  It 
is  true that enactments were to an increasing  extent sub- 
mitted to the representative body  for ratification;  but  as 
late as the sixteenth century the year books of  Henry VII's 
reign show that the main  principles of  his legislation were 
formulated by the judges  in  common  session  before  sub- 
mission  to either "  house " of  parliament ;  l and in Henry 
VIII's reign it was the custom of  the lords in parliament to 
secure copies of  bills  introduced  in the house  of  commons 
and take the opinion of  the judges upon them before they 
were  sent  up from  the lower house.2  "  Do not  gloss  the 
statute," remarked the chief justice to counsel in 1305.  "  We 
understand it better than you, for we made it."  a 
Parliament, therefore, in its judicial and legislative aspect, 
seems to be at first  simply a  talk or parley of  the council 
in  full session.  Soon,  of  course,  it comes  to be used  of 
parleys between the king in council and other constitutional 
elements.  By the Provisions of  Oxford twelve elected barons 
are to meet  the king's council at three parliaments a year. 
Simon de Montfort "  afforces "  the elected barons with elected 
knights of  the shire and burgesses ; and the growing financial 
needs  of  the  crown  promoted  frequent  recourse  to these 
representative  elements  which  alone  could  produce  an 
adequate financial supply.  But this financial business was 
not the original nor the most frequent cause of  parliaments ; 
1 Cf. Vinogradoff, "  Const. Hist. and the Year Books "  in Law Quarterly 
Rev., July 1913. 
2  Letters and  Papers, Henry  VIII,  XI1 i. 901  [39, 401;  English  Hist. 
Rev., v. 568. 
a  Year Books  33-5  Edward I  (Rolls Ser.), p. 82 ;  McIlwain, High Court 
of  Parlianzent, p. 325 ; Baldwin, p. 314. 
and a perusal  of  the earliest "  rolls of  parliament " reveals 
activities  of  a  different  and  comprehensive  character. 
Nothing,  indeed,  is  more  striking  than  the  multifarious 
nature of  the business there recorded.  Page after page reads 
like the register of  the privy council of  the sixteenth 
century; l  there are minute details of  the provision to be 
made  for  the  wars  in  Wales  or  on  the Scottish  borders, 
for Edward 111's campaigns in France, for the regulation of 
prices, and for the administration of  justice.=  The records 
deal,  in fact, with  the doings  of  a  body  which  is at once 
executive, judicial, and legislative;  and the presence of  the 
council in the parliament  is patent in its rolls. 
Mainly, however, the business of  Edward 1's parliaments 
is to deal out justice.  The title-page of  each of  the printed 
volumes of the Rotuli Parliamentorurn indicates its contents 
as consisting mostly of  fietitiones  et  placita;  the memoranda 
de fiarliamento,  which  will  ultimately  expand  into  Lords' 
and Commons'  Journals, when the petitiones  have been  for 
the  most  part  referred  to  other  courts  and  the  $Zacita 
heard  elsewhere, occupy but  little  space.  It is not  until 
late in Edward  111's reign that we  get a regular  series of 
rotuli  parliamentorum;  and some  of  the contents  of  the 
printed " Rolls  of  Parliaments " are suspiciously like  the 
corarn  rege  rolls  of  the king's  bench  which  had hardly in 
Edward 1's reign been differentiated from the king's council. 
The purpose of  parliaments is judicial : "  whereas "  runs an 
ordinance of  the Lords Ordainers in 1311,~ "  many folk are 
delayed in the king's  court  because  the defendants  allege 
that the plaintiffs ought not to be answered in the absence 
01  the king,  and many  also are wronged  by the ministers 
of the king, which wrongs they cannot get redressed without 
common parliament,* we ordain that the king hold a parlia- 
There are half  a dozen entries of  this character on the first page of 
the first volume of  the printed Botuli Parliamentorurn. 
Rotuli Parliamentorurn, i. 295, 350-1.  ii. 108-11,  114-16. 
Ibid..  i. 284 (20).  - , .,- 
a "  sans commune parlement "  has fortunately not been used to prove 
tho existence of  a 'I  Common Parliament," like a Common Council, distinct 
fiom other assemblies.  The phrase  clearly indicates the nature  of  the 
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ment  once  a  year,  or  twice  if  need  be,  and  that  111  a 
convenient place.  And in the same parliaments shall pleas 
that have been  delayed  and pleas about which the judges 
differ be  recorded  and determined,  and in the  same way 
the bills  which  shall have  been  handed  into parliament." 
This  ordinance was  made  in  answer  to  a  complaint  that 
the commons,  who  came  to  parliaments  to  seek  redress 
for  grievances  which  could  not  be  remedied  by  common 
law  or  by any  other way  than  special  process,  found  no 
one to receive their petitions as they had done in the reign 
of  Edward 1.1  Primarily a  parliament  is a high  court  of 
justice. 
In this sense the origin of  parliaments must be traced back 
to Henry 11 rather than to Simon de Montfort or Edward I. 
If  Henry  had  not  made  the  king's  court  the  matrix  of 
England's  common  law, nelther  Simon  nor  Edward  could 
have made it the matrix of  England's common politlcs ;  for 
a foundation of  common law was indispensable to a house 
of  common  pol~tics. Henry had made the courts, held  in 
his  palace  at Weitminster,  the common  resort  for  all  his 
subjects  above  the  rank  of  villeins.?  By  inviting  and 
attracting thereto men from all quarters of  England, he had 
given them a common framework for their ideas of  law and 
liberty.  He  had  made  escape  from  local  trammels  and 
recourse  to  a  national  fount  of  ideas  a  habit  with  his 
people.  Even during the troublesome reign of  Henry 111, 
the  king's court  increased  the number of  forms of  writ or 
judicial process from sixty to over four hundred and fifty : 
and every new process was a fresh nerve developed between 
the monarchy and its subjects, a fresh means of  linking the 
brain with the body of  the community. 
That the main function of  Edward 1's parliaments is to 
continue  and  expand  the work  of  Henry  11's  curia  regis 
will  appear from the briefest  indication  of  their procedure. 
The first step towards the holding of  a parliament, after its 
1 Rotuli Parliamentorum, i. 444. 
"  Le paleys soleit le plus frank leu d'Engleterre " (ibid., i. 155). 
3  Maitland, Collected  Papers, ii. 155  ;  cf. ibid., ii.  476. 
summons had been decided, the writs issued, and the repre- 
sentative~,  if any, elected, was to make public proclamation 
in  the great  hall  of  Westminster  Palace  (for  Westminster 
Hall was  the "  aula " in  which the king, like every feudal 
lord, held his court), in the chancery, in the court of  common 
pleas, in  the exchequer, in the gu~ldhall,  and in Westcheap 
that all who wished to present petitions at the approaching 
parliament  should  hand  them  in  by  a  certain  date.1 
"  Thereupon,"  we  are told by William de Ayremynne,  the 
clerk  of  chancery  appointed  by  Edward  I1  to  keep  the 
metlzoranda  of  the parliament  of  Lincoln  in January  1316, 
"  the chancellor,  the treasurer,  and the justices  of  either 
bench were ordered  to draw up in writing a brief  statement 
of  the suits (negotia) pending  before them  (in suis placeis) 
which could not be determined out of  parliament, and refer 
them to parliament so that right might be done therein."  2 
Receivers and triers of  petitions were next appointed.  The 
receivers were  merely  clerks in chancery;  the  triers  were 
more  important persons, at first mainly  judges,  afterwards 
prelates, earls, and barons.  Their functions have not been 
precisely ascertained.  Sometimes they were called "  hearers " 
of  petitions,  and  their  commission  authorized  them  to 
"  determine " as well as to "  hear " ; but whether a hearing 
and  determination  by  them in parliament  amounted  to a 
hearing  and  determination  by  parliament  is  a  matter  of 
doubt.3  It is well,  pcrhaps,  to remember that  parliament 
is  not  yet an institution  or a  body,  but only a "  parley," 
that  parliamentzcm  and  colloquium  are  interchangeable 
terms, and tllat while the king in his council in parley may 
Memoranda de Parliamento, p. lvii. ; Rot. Parl., i. 182. 
Rot. Parl., i. 350. 
a  Mcllwain,  The High  Court of  Parliame~zt,  pp. 198-202.  The relation  Ef  the " auditores " to the council is also obscure.  In 1314  we read of 
responsiones  petitionurn  Angliz  per  anditores  earundem  fact=  in 
Parliamento " as though  the "  auditores " determined  the petitions and 
not th~  council as  a whole.  But the form of answer is always "  responsum 
est per consilium " (Rot.  Parl., i. 314).  Probably the contradiction is only 
verbal.  Consilium was then no more executive than parliamentum.  The 
executive consisted of  the agents of  the crown, the chancellor, privy seal, 
and so forth ; and azbditores, appointed- by the king, expressed the counsel 
taken on parliamentary petitions. 38  THE EVOLUTION OF PARLIAMENT 
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do  much,  it is hard to  imagine the "  parley"  doing  any- 
thing whatsoever  independently  of  the crown.  We  must 
not consolidate our  nebulae  or materialize our parliaments 
in a hurry. 
The principles and methods of  dealing with these petitions 
in parliament  adopted by the  king in council can  only be 
inferred from the imperfect  records  of  its practice.  With 
some he will decline to deal at all.  Even in the high court 
of  parliament  the king will not yet interfere between a lord 
of  the manor and his villeins.  Canon law and custom do not 
permit him to meddle, even on a clerical petition, with the 
spiritual jurisdiction  of  the courts christian;  and, in spite 
of  the Constitutions of  Clarendon, Edward I will not attempt 
to  enforce  clerical  purgation  after the first  conviction  of 
a  clerk in the  king's  court.  So  far  as  criminous  clerks, 
although  convicted  of  murder,  are  concerned,  while  he 
insists upon judgement, he leaves execution to the indulgent 
hands  of  the  ~hurch.~  Nor  will  the  king  in  parliament 
supersede the common law; as early as 1280  complaint had 
been made that folk  came to parliaments with  all sorts of 
petitions  that  might  be  heard  by  the chancellor  or  the 
judges,  and an ordinance was  issued that none  should be 
brought before the  king and his  council save those which 
could not otherwise be determined.  Frequently the remedy 
consists in the grant of  a writ or a jury;  sometimes advice 
is all that is needed, and it may be caustic enough ; he has 
suffered no wrong so far, a petitioner is told, let him wait 
till he has.3  Some Jews who complained of  forcible baptism 
are informed  that they specify no particulars,  and that in 
any  case  the  king  has  no  mind  to revoke a  christening. 
As  a  rule the king and his council in parliament  prefer to 
play  the part  of  general  practitioners  rather  than that of 
1 Rot. Purl., i. ja. 
a  Ihid.,  i.  41-2; but  when  the  offence  was  counterfeiting  the 
king's seal, the clerk convict was handed over to his bishop  sub poena 
et in forma  quL decet;  quia videtur  consilio  quod in tali casu non est 
admittenda pyygatio " (ibid., i. 40b).  It  seems to have been permissible, 
however.  for  the king's  lieges " to oppose  the purgation  of  a  clerk 
convicted of  murder or felonf(ihid..  i. 100). 
The  vast  majority  of  clients  are  referred  to 
chancery, the courts of  exchequer, or  common  pleas;  and 
this practice of reference was systematized by an ordinance 
of  1291-2.  It was there laid down that the receivers were 
to examine the petitions presented to parliament  and sort 
them into  five bundles, one  for chancery, one for the  ex- 
chequer, one for the judges, one for  the king and his council, 
and  one  to  consist  of  petitions  which  had  already  been 
answered. 
In most of these cases it is clear that the value of  parlia- 
ment to the petitioner  consisted not in the revision or the 
reversal  in  parliament  of  decisions  already  given  in  the 
courts  of  common  law,  but  in the function  it fulfilled  of 
"  moving " those  courts;  and  the "  moving " was  often 
as peremptory as it was necessary.l  Not  infrequently  the 
judges  who had delayed  a decision for years were ordered 
to  reach  one  before  parliament  ended, which  might  be  a 
period of a few days and was never more than a few week.. 
Delay,  too,  often arose  not  out of  the dilatoriness  of  the 
judges,  but  out  of  the  novelty  of  the  case.  Chancery 
would  issue writs  de  curs% for  ordinary suits by  its  own 
authority ; but it would not issue "  original "  writs instituting 
novel  forms ol procedure without being  moved thereto by 
the authority of  the king in council and eventually of  the 
king in council in parliament (f). In  a famous clause of Magna 
Carta John  or his barons had promised  that justice should 
not  be sold or  delayed;  and Bishop Stubbs has said that 
the  Confirnzatio  Cartarunz  of  1297 stood  to  Magna  Carta 
in  the relation  of  substance to shadow, of  performance to 
promise.  With  respect  to the delay  of  justice,  it was  in 
and  by parliament  that some security was afforded for the 
performance of  the promise.  - 
Wnly  petitions  of special  difficulty  or  of  novelty  were 
reserved  for  hearing  by  the  king  and council, and led  to 
6  I placita"  in  parliament.  Some  of  these  might  have 
Previously been heard in some other court;  but it does not 
appear  correct  to interpret  the  phrase  "  high  court " of 
-. 
3  Ihid., i. 46.  '  "  Fiat justitia durante parliament0 " (ibtd., i. 325~). 40  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLJAMENT  THE HIGH  COURT  OF  PARLIAMENT  41 
parlian~ent as  meaning  a  supreme  court  of  appeal.  It 
acted more often as a court of  first instance than as a court 
of error.1  "  High " was perhaps used in the sense in which 
we  speak of  highways in distinction  to byways, and of  the 
high seas in distinction to the narrow seas.  The high seas 
are called high because they are open and common to all, 
and a  parliament  is  called  a  "high " court  because  it is 
LC  p7us  fva+tk  Leu  dJEngleterre, the  most  open  and  free 
of  all  English  courts.  Possibly the freedom of  parliament 
implied  some immunity from the law's  expense as well  as 
from  its   delay^.^  Certainly  in  courts  like  the  later  Star 
chamber  and  court  of  requests,  which  inherited  some  of 
the traditions of  the high  court  of  parliament, justice was 
freely administered;  and there  may  have  been  some  ex- 
travagant hope that the promise of  Magna Carta that justice 
should not be sold meant that no charge would be made for 
its  administration.  That was  doubtless  a  fond  delusion; 
fees were required for royal writs  and other legal expenses, 
but  it seems that no  charge was  made  for  the expedition 
of  suits in parliament. 
Howcver  that  may  have  been,  parliament  was  only  a 
cclurt  of  appeal in  the  sense  that  the  house  of  commons 
or of lords is a court  of  appeal  from its committees.  The 
several  courts  of  the  curia  vegis  were  in  a  sense its com- 
mittees :  in  parliament  the  judges  and  council  sat  in 
common or  joint  session, and there  decided  cases reported 
to them; the whole was held to be greater  than the part, 
in  authority and  legal  wisdom  as  well  as  in  size.  The 
court held coram rege et  consilio  suo  ad  fiarliamenta  szta  is 
greater than the court  held  coram rege et  co~tsilio  suo, just 
as the  latter  is  greater  than  the  court  held  coram  rege. 
This last comes  to  be  the  king's  bench;  from  the  second 
comes  the jurisdiction  of  the king's  council, and from the 
1 Maitland, Menzora~da,  p. lxxxv. 
2  Pruf. Baldwin has since established this supposition (King's Council, 
p. 282). 
In 1348 the fee for a writ out of  common pleas was 7d..  and out of 
king's  bench  6d.; the commons wanted  7d. and 6d. writs for  3d. (Rot. 
Parl.. ii.  170). 
first the supreme jurisdiction  of  the high  court  of  parlia- 
rncnt.l  This  whole,  moreover,  contained  more  than  its 
expert judicial  parts, and the members  of  the council who 
were  not  judges  added to this joint  session  of  the  courts 
a lay element which  represented the common sense of  the 
high court of parliament.  The influence of  this lay element 
upon judicial decisions is characteristic of  the political spirit 
of England, where parliament lays down the legal principles 
upon  which  judges  have  to act.  But it was  certainly  a 
singular by-product of  this  constitutional  maxim when the 
peers in the nineteenth century reduced the judges to insig- 
nificance in the high court of  parliament, and developed the 
practical paradox  that the competence  of  the lay mind to 
exercise  supreme  judicial  authority  depended  upon  the 
accident of  primogeniture.  The only trace, if  any, of  this 
hereditary monopoly of  supreme appellate jurisdiction in the 
time of  Edward  I  is in the presence  of  earls  and barons, 
who  have  as  yet  no  hereditary  right  to a  summons, in 
parliament.  "  The king,"  to quote Fleta once more, "  has 
his  court  in his  council in his  parliaments, in the presence 
of  earls,  barons,  nobles,  and  others  learned  in  the  law, 
where  judicial  doubts  are  determined,  and  new  remedies 
are  established  for  new  wrongs,  and  justice  is  done  to 
every one according to his  deserts." 
Fleta's  encomium  may  be  somewhat  too  generous,  but 
there can be no doubt as to the magnitude and the import- 
ance  of  the judicial  work of  parliaments  under Edward I. 
Two  hundred  and  fifty  petitions  were  presented  to  the 
parliament  of Michaelmas, 1290,  although two other parlia- 
ments  had  already  been  held  that  year,  one  in  January 
and another in ApriL3  Five hundred have been  preserved 
for one of  the two parliaments of  1305; so  that  even  the 
thousands  which  remain  in  the  Record  Office  probably 
Maitland, Memoranda, p. lxxx: Rot. Parl., i.  15, 38, 128. 
a  Maitland, Memoranda, p. lxxxi.  Pollock and Maitland's reading of 
iuvis peritis for uiris peritis  (Hist. of  Elzglish Law. i.  179 n. ')  is adopted 
by  Baldwin;  cf.  Rot.  Parl.,  ii.  I  :  p!acita  coram  domino  reg?  et 
^Onsilio  suo  apud Westm'  in  presencia  ipsius  domini  regis,  procerum, 
et magnatum regni in parliament0 suo ibidem convocato." 
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represent  only  a  fraction  of  the  petitions  sent  up  to 
parliaments  between  the  reign  of  Edward I  and that  of 
Richard  111.  They come  from  all sorts and conditions of 
men and corporate  bodies,  and from  every quarter of  the 
king's  dominions;  a king of  Norway  as well  as a  king  of 
Scotland is found petitioning Edward I in his parliament; 
Edward 1's own daughter Mary is represented, and the king 
himself  prosecutes his suits there by his attorneys.  Earls, 
bishops, and barons ; abbots, abbesses, and abbeys ; shires, 
cities, and boroughs ; judges, royal officials, and foreigners ; 
merchants  and Jews;  the scholars  of  Oxford  and  Cam- 
bridge;  poor men  of  this and that shire or borough;  and 
even  a  body  of  prisoners, all  expect  justice  or  favour in 
parliament.  The  petitions,  indeed,  are  mostly  from 
individual  persons  or  corporate bodies;  they  are not  the 
common petitions of  the people of  England.  Nevertheless, 
if  we  assume  that  on  an  average  a  score  of  persons 
are interested  in  each  petition,  and in  some  the number 
would  rise  to  hundreds,  we  shall  see  that  thousands  of 
people,  many  of  them  influential,  would  be  concerned 
in  the holding  of  every parliament, and would  have legal 
business to transact which could not be settled elsewhere. 
Here we  light  upon  a  motive  for  frequent parliaments 
upon which adequate stress has not been laid.  We assume 
that the  foundation  of  parliament  was financial,  and that 
its growth was due to the necessities of  the king and to the 
control by parliament over the national purse.  No one will 
deny  that  finance  has  played  an  important  part  in  the 
development  of  representative  institutions ; but  there  are 
two reasons  against  regarding finance as the sole factor in 
the foundation of  the English  parliament.  In the first place 
its earliest  function was judicial,  and financial only in the 
sense in which Henry I discovered that jz~stitia  was magnum 
emolume~ztunt. In most  of  the parliaments  assembled  by 
Edward I  and Edward  11, if not  also by  Edward  111, no 
financial  supply  was  asked  for,  and  none  was  granted. 
~~~~ndl~,  the  frequent  summons  of  parliaments  was  a 
measure  required  not  by  the  crown  so  much  as  by  its 
subjects.  It is the barons who in 1258  demand three annual 
it is the Lords Ordainers who insist upon one 
or more sessions a year ; and it is the commons who take up 
the cry under Edward 111.  We cannot believe that barons 
or  burghers wanted to come to Westminster in order to be 
taxed three times or even once a year.  So far as taxation 
went, they would  have gladly surrendered their control,  if 
they  could  thereby  escape  the  taxation.  If  they  desired 
parliaments  at all, it was for the justice  therein dispensed, 
and not for the taxation therein imposed. 
It was to a high court of law and justice  that the taxing 
and  representative  factors  of  parliament  were  wedded ; 
and it was this union that gave the English  parliament its 
strength.  Its absence,  the divorce  between  French  fia~le- 
me~zts  and estates, was fatal to orderly constitutio~lal  develop- 
ment in France.  " Whenever a separation is made between 
liberty and justice,"  said Burke, "neither  is in  my opinion 
safe."  Justlce and liberty were the woof  and the warp out 
of which was woven the web of  the English constitution ; but 
the English people had to endure discipline, law, and order 
before they could safely afford the  luxury of  liberty; and 
the  high  court  of  parliament  comes  before  the  house  of 
commons. 
Rot. Purl., i. 105, 107-13,  225:  Maitland, Mem., p. g. 
a  Oxford, indeed, sent a dozen petitions to a single parliament in 1305 
(Memoranda,  pp. 44-7).  There is also a petition from the judges, barons of 
the exchequer, and clerks for the payment of  the arrears of  their salaries 
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CHAPTER  111 
EDWARD  1's  PARLIAMENTAIiY  MODELS 
ENOUGH  has been said in the previous chapter to indicate 
the inadequacy of  the view which sees in parliament nothing 
but the development of the principle of  political representa- 
tion;  but  before  we  proceed  to  discuss  that  infelicitous 
phrase,  the three  estates, which  has been  commonly  used 
to describe the form that representation took in parliaments, 
it may be well to examine a little more in detail the various 
assemblies  to which  the word  parliament  was  applied  in 
the latter half  of  the thirteenth century.  Hitherto we have 
generalized  mainly  from  the  proceedings  of  one  of  the 
parliaments  of  1305,  the records of  which have come down 
to us in a completer form than those of  any previous parlia- 
ment.  But the importance  of  the subject, and the efforts 
still being  made by the house of  lords to discover the first 
real  parliament  and  to  elaborate  a  principle  of  discrimi- 
nation,  by  which  to  decide  peerage  claims  based  upon 
Edward  1's  writs  of  summons,  justify  an  attempt  to 
elucidate the meaning  of  the word "  parliament,"  to illus- 
trate  the  variety  of  its  applications,  and  to  prove  the 
impossibility of  drawing hard and fast lines.  There is little 
to comfort the committee of  privileges in this investigation ; 
but  the idea, upon  which  peerage-law has been  grounded, 
that  Edward  I  creatcd  or  dreamt  of  creating  hereditary 
peerages  by  special  writs  of  summons  to parliaments  is 
historically  so  fantastic  that  no  historian  need  feel com- 
punction  in  adding  to the  difficulties which  lawyers have 
created  for  themselves  by  their  defiance  of  hist0ry.l 
1 Cf. J. H. Round, Studies in  Peerage and Fanzily History, 1900, and Peerage 
~nd  Pediqree, rgI,p;  Gibbs,  pref.  to 2nd ed. of  G. E. Cokayne's  Complete 
Peerape. u. xiii :  it is impossible to reconcile the facts of history with the 
-  ,A 
Law of  Peerage." 
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, Important historical  questions are, moreover, involved in 
the  discussion, and the  truth about  the origin  of  English 
can never be a matter of indifference;  antiqm- 
ties may be ignored, but not the beginnings of  political or 
of any other form of  life.  All origins are, however, obscure, 
not merely from the defect of  records, but because they are 
imperceptible to contemporary observers ; and it is a shallow 
interpretation  to  regard  parliaments  as  the  creation  of 
Simon de Montfort or of Edward I, or indeed as a creation 
at all.  It is  rather  a  growth  from  roots  stretching back 
beyond  the thirteenth century to a  period  long before the 
summons of  burgesses  or  even  of  knights  of  the  shire  to 
Westminster.  The  issue  of  Simon's  and  Edward's  writs 
did not evoke a new institution out of the void ; they merely 
grafted new buds on to the old stock of the curia regis, and 
it was the legal sap of  the ancient stem that fed and main- 
tained  the  life  of  the  medieval  parliament.  The  species, 
indeed, was  the same,  otherwise  the  grafting would  have 
failed;  for law is  a  branch of  politics, and even the seed 
of  representation was raised in a legal frame.  On the other 
hand,  Henry  I1 had  differentiated law  from  politics  by 
converting  the  cziria  regis  from an occasional  meeting  of 
turbulent barons into a regular court of  expert judges ;  and 
it  was  the work  of  Edward  I  to reunite  these  divergent 
elements in the high court of  parliament. , 
The obscurity  of  this process  of  reunion  is darkened by 
nebulous  terminology,  and the term  parliament  is  applied 
in the latter half  of  the thirteenth century to each  of  the 
two  doalescing  factors  as  well  as  to  the  coalition.  The 
common denominator of  such various values is bound to be 
small, and almost any sort of conference, in which the crown 
was  involved,  might  be  called a  parliament.  But even so 
general  a  word  as " conference " may  acquire  specialized 
characteristics,  and come to be  spelt with a  capital;  to a 
Wcsle~an  Methodist the term "  conference "  means a definite 
body which meets annually and performs numerous binding 
acts  recorded  in  "  Minutes  of  Conference."  So  "  parlia- 
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becomes a, term of  art to others, and acquires in time distinc- 
tive records.  The process is common to England, France, 
Italy, and possibly other countries ; and while the specializa- 
tion  of  meaning  takes  different  forms,  it  seems  probable 
that in  Edward  1's  reign,  at any rate,  there  was  greater 
similarity between the French "  parlement " and the English 
"  parliament " than has usually been supposed. 
At any rate, the use in England did not at first imply any 
notion of  representation or election ; for when Matthew Paris 
first uses it to describe a  meeting in 1246,~  he enumerates 
its constituent parts as "  prelates, both abbots and priors 
as  well  as bishops,  and  earls  and barons,"  and the fact 
that he calls this parliament "  generalissimum," implies that 
an even less comprehensive assembly might have been called 
a "  parliament " with  equal propriety.  The word,  indeed, 
has no special signification for him, because two years later 
he  describes  a  more  general  assembly  comprising  milites 
and clerici  as  well  as  bishops,  abbots,  priors,  earls,  and 
barons,  without  calling  it  a  parliamenL2  In  I251  and 
again  in  1257  he  speaks  of  a  magnunz  fia~liamentum;~ 
but apparently he does not think it worth while to call the 
gathering of  1254-"  an important landmark in the parlia- 
mentary history of  England,"  as Stubbs calls it, to which 
for the first  time two  elected  knights  were  summoned to 
Westminster  from  each  shire  vice  omnium  et  singulovum 
eorundem comitatuum-a  parliament  at all.4  Other writers 
begin to use the word soon after the middle of  the century, 
somc  times  with,  sometimes without  a  qualifying  adjective 
or  phrase.  T. Wykes speaks of  a parliamenturn baronufn in 
1260,~  the "  Annals of  Waverley " of  a fiarliamentum  mag- 
nzun twice  in 1265  and once in 1268,~  and the "  Annals of 
WinchesterJ' of a fiarliamentunz omnium magnatuln in 1270.~ 
"  Parliament " is zlox  et prczterea  nihil;  there is nothing to 
distinguish  it from other  assemblies called  in  pursuance of 
the 14th  article of  Magna  Carta requiring  the special and 
'  Stubbs, Charters, 1900,  p. 328.  a  Ibid., p. 329. 
Ibzd., pp. 330-1.  Ibid., pp. 375-7.  Ibid., p. 333. 
Ibid., pp  335-6.  Ibid., p. 337. 
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general  summons  of  tenants-in-chief  to  give  consent  to 
,xtl-aordinary  feudal aids. 
The vagueness of  this  terminology  persists in the pages 
of the chroniclers throughout the greater part of  the reign 
of Edward  I; and a meeting  of  the king with his prelates 
and barons may be called a parliament whether or not it also 
knights of  the shires or burgesses.  But the printed 
Rolls of  Parliaments" which begin in 1278 (g)  seem to reveal 
a different  conception in the minds of  the clerks and lawyers. 
To them these occasional meetings of  tenants-in-chief  do not 
seem to be parliaments at all;  and down to the end of  the 
century  there  is  nothing  about  their  proceedings  in  the 
" Rolls."  There is, indeed, a complete discrepancy between 
the  "  Rolls  of  Parliaments " and  the  so-called  "  Parlia- 
mentary Writs " compiled by Sir Francis Palgrave as docu- 
mentary  evidence  for  the  early  history  of  parliaments. 
Down to 1300 the word "  parliament " is not mentioned in 
the  special writs  to  prelatcs,  earls,  and barons  or  in  the 
general writs to the sheriffs and mayors ;  they are summoned 
to a colloquiu?~z  or a tractaturn, but not to parliament.  The 
business of  the gatherings to which  they are called  is  not 
recorded in the "  Rolls of  Parliaments " ;  and the meetings 
whose business is recorded therein were not gathered by any 
writs that are extant.  Allowance must no doubt be made 
for defects in  the records  and in their  editing;  but when 
there are between 1275 and 1298 nine assemblies summoned 
by "  parliamentary " writs, and fifteen sessions whose busi- 
ness  is  recorded  in  the  rolls,  and  when  not  one  of  the 
nine coincides with one of  the fifteen, the discrepancy is too 
significant  to  be  explained  away  by  defective  evidence. 
The gatherings convoked by these so-called "parliamentary " 
writs were not parliaments ; and the meetings called parlia- 
ments in the rolls were not summoned by the writs to which 
the name has since been given. 
The  point  may  be  enforced  by  an examination  of  the 
Proceedings of  1290.  In that year there were three "  parlia- 
ments " in the sense in which the word is used by the clerks 
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because these sessions are repeatedly  called parliaments  in 
the records of  their proceedings.  One began on January 25 ; 
the second  began  three weeks after Easter (i.  e.  April  23) 
and lasted until  July  3, and the third lasted for a  month 
from  Michaelmas.  For  none  of  these  sessions  have  any 
writs  been  discovered.  There  are,  however,  writs  extant 
summoning knights  of  the shires to a fourth assembly  on 
July  I5 ;  but this is not a "  parliament " according to the 
" Rolls."  Not merely are its proceedings not recorded, but 
its existence is ignored.  Much of  the business brought before 
the parliament of  April 23 to July  8 is adjourned ad pro.xi- 
mum parliawentunt ;  and the "  next parliament " is always 
assigned to Michaelmas, even though writs have already been 
issued for the assembly on July 15.  The adjourned business 
is taken in  the autumn parliament, and none  of  it at the 
July assembly." 
What, then, were these "  parliaments " of  the " Rolls," 
and what was the nature of  their business?  An  answer is 
suggested by a complaint and an ordinance made in 1280.~ 
The complaint is of  the delay and inconvenience caused to 
the folk who come to "  parliament "  by the great number of 
petitions which might be dealt with by the chancellor and 
justices;  and the ordinance is that only petitions that cannot 
otherwise be dealt with are to comc before the king and his 
council in parliament.  The business is  legal, these  parlia- 
mcnts are "  parliaments of  the council," their essence is royal 
and judicial, and there is little in common between them and 
the occasional gatherings of  tenants-in-chief  summoned  by 
special and general  writs  in  pursuance of  Magna  Carta to 
give counsel and consent to demands for aids.  Their proceed- 
ings  are  naturally  entered  in  " Rolls,"  the  characteristic 
records  of  courts,  and  they  deal  with  "  petitions " and 
"  placita."  Their sessions are regular  and not  spasmodic; 
they do not depend upon the king's financial necessities ;  and 
they are held  three  times  a  year.  The three parliaments 
Rep. on the Dignity of  a  Peer, i. 54. 
Rot.  Parl..  i. 15-45. 
a  Maitland, Memoranda; p. lvi. 
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of  1290  are followed  by  three in  1291,  and there  is little 
doubt that this was the normal practice. 
~ts  antiquity is obscure, but there is no reason to suppose 
that Edward I invented it.  The earliest proceedings recorded 
in the " Rolls " do not give the impression of  novelty;  the 
of  1280  suggests  inveterate  growth;  and  the 
multiplication of  forms of  original writs during the reign of 
Henry  I11 would  lead  us  to infer a  rapid  increase  in  the 
number of  petitioners at Westminster, and the provision of 
means to expedite their suits.  In 1190  Philip Augustus had 
ordered the regents he left behind him to hold three judicial 
sessions a year ;  and the parlement of  Paris, like the English 
"  parliament " of  the "  Rolls,"  was  a  joint  session of  the 
several  chnmbres  or  courts of  the curia regis, to which  the 
name of  "  parlement " was given as early as 123g.l  When 
the English barons in  1258 usurped the position of  regents, 
they arranged for three "  parliaments " a year, though their 
parliaments were to consist, not  in joint  sessions  of  royal 
judges, but in joint  sessions of  baronial councillors. 
The distinction between judges  and councillors must not, 
however,  be  presscd.  Every  councillor  might  partake  in 
judicial  proceedings;  and  these  "  parliaments " of  the 
" Rolls " were joint  sessions of  the judges with the less pro- 
fessional  members  of  the  council.  Prelates,  magnates, 
firoceres,  and  clerks  were  present  as well  as the  justices, 
though probably no magnate or prelate who was not also a 
councillor ; and  in  these  parliaments  the business,  while 
mainly,  was  not  exclusively,  judicial.  In the "  post-pas- 
chal " parliament  of  1290  the statute of  Westminster  I11 
(Quia Emptores) was  passed;  the resolution  to  expel  the 
Jews  was adopted ;  and "  so far as in them lay,"  the handful 
of  magnates  present  granted  pro  se  et  conznzunitate  totius 
regni  an aid  for  the  marriage  of  Edward's  si~ter.~  The 
need  for  further consent  was  probably  the reason  for the 
summons to the knights  of  the shire to meet  on  July  15. 
Moreover, there was no narrow definition of  legal or judicial 
1 Luchaire,  Institutions  Fran~aises,  p. 562. 
2  Rot. Parl.,  i. 258, 410. 
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functions; a  pax  between  the Cinque Ports and Yarmouth 
was  recitata  et  recordata-"  registered "  in  the  French 
parliamentary sense-in  this parliament, and so were similar 
agreements between the bishop of  Lincoln and the university 
of  Oxford, and between "  town " and "  gown " in the latter 
city.l  Even the taxation of  those who were not represented 
was not yet regarded  by Edward I, or by those whom the 
chroniclers describe as his evil counsellors, as being outside 
the  competence  of  the "  council in  parliament "; and in 
the autumn of  1290  it was decided to levy a fifteenth of  their 
moveable  goods  from  universi  regnicola  tan2  clerici  quam 
laici, saculares  pariter  et  religiosi,  without  the  consent  of 
any representative  as~embly.~  Such  exactions  were, how- 
ever,  denounced  and  resisted,  for  in  the  worst  days  of 
feudalism the crown had possessed no power to levy general 
taxation.  The  aids  and scutages  and  even  the  danegeld 
and carucages levied on tenants-in-chief  were in the nature 
of  rent rather than taxes; they were part of  the "  considera- 
tion"  which  the tenants owed  to their  landlord, and the 
mesne  tenants  enforced  similar  claims  on  their  vassals. 
Arbitrary  tallage  was  an incident  of  villein  tenure, which 
was due to the lord whether he was a king or a baron.  But a 
general tax on personal property, like a fifteenth, levied on 
all irrespective of  their  position  as tenants of  the king  or 
other lords was a novelty, indicating the supersession of  the 
feudal  by  the  national  idea,  and  providing  scope for  the 
maxim quod  omnes tangit ab omnibus  afiprobetur. 
This  approbation had been  the normal  function  of  the 
assemblies promised in Magna Carta and frequently held in 
the  thirteenth  century.  It  was  not  the  function  of  the 
terminal sessions of  the council, whose business is recorded 
in the early " Rolls of  Parliaments ";  and so far we have 
had two kinds of  meetings, widely differing in composition 
and character, but  both  described  as "  parliaments " by 
different  authorities.  One kind, which  is so called by the 
Rot. Purl.,  i.  16, 32b,  33.  a  Stubbs, Charters! p.  435. 
a  The  outcry  raised  over  the  imposition  by  tlfe  parliament"  of 
Michaelmas, 1290, may have helped  to suggest the  model"  parliament 
of  1295. 
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chroniclers, is or may be  a large  and tumultuous gathering 
of  tenants-in-chief  summoned by special and general writs; 
and while  its  potential  size  is  reduced  by the practice  of 
permitting from  two  to four  knights  to represent  all  the 
lesser  tenants-in-chief  of  the  shire,  it is increased  by  the 
admission of  representatives  of  cities and boroughs  which 
are  regarded  as collective  tenants-in-chief  of  the  crown. 
The other kind of  "parliament "-so  called  by the clerks 
-is  a smaller, regular  meeting of  the king's  council, con- 
sisting of  some prelates and magnates, most  of  the judges, 
and a selection of  clerks, and dealing mainly with judicial 
business.  The  two  bodies  are  summoned  by  different 
methods, meet  at different  times,  and discharge  different 
functions. 
But during the latter half  of  Edward 1's reign there is a 
process of  amalgamation, and it is this amalgamation between 
"  estates " and "  parlement,"  rather  than his  addition  of 
burgesses to the meetings of  tenants-in-chief, that constitutes 
Edward's claim to be the creator of  a model English parlia- 
ment.  Not  that Edward I  completed  the process;  parlia- 
ment remained for centuries after his time a composite body, 
in  which  judicial  and  representative  elements,  legal  and 
political functions were curiously blended, and it still retains 
the marks of  its original heterogeneity.  The approximation 
made in the reign of  Edward I was confined to summoning 
the two assemblies to the same place at the same time and 
establishing  a  common  session  for  certain  purposes.  But 
ina.smuch  as  this  co-operation  between  "  estates " and 
" parlement "  was the main constitutional difference between 
England  and the rest  of  Western  Europe during the later 
middle ages, the achievement was great enough, and requires 
greater  attention  than  it has  yet  received.  It was  not 
determined  by any large principle or any single dominating 
cause, but by  the cumulative force  of  a  number  of  small 
considerations;  and  the  process  of  adoption  consisted  of 
gradual and almost imperceptible changes. 
The  principal  predisposing  cause  of  union  was  the fact 
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of parliament, in the one to lay before the assembled tenants 
in-chief and burgesses the financial demands of  the govern- 
ment  and to explain  the causes of  their necessity,  and in 
the  other  to  hear  petitions,  move  the courts,  and decide 
cases about which the judges differed or doubted.  It  would 
clearly be a convenience that, when the council was gathered 
together for judicial business i?z pleno fiarllamento, it should 
at the same place and during the same period meet the larger 
assembly surnmoncd for financial and political considerations. 
Further, it must be  remembered  that according  to feudal 
theory  every  tenant-in-chief  of  the  crown  was  liable  to 
suit and service at the curia regis ;  and that not merely the 
joint  session of  the courts in parliament but each individual 
session  ad scaccarium, in bunco,  or coram rege was a session 
of  the  curia, to which  any tenant-in-chief  might  be  sum- 
moned;  and  therefore,  although  this  feudal  theory  was 
obsolescent in Edward's reign, the personnel from which both 
kinds  of  assemblies  were  drawn  might  be  regarded  as 
potentially identical. 
Nor  was this identity merely potential.  The councillors 
and judges who heard and determined the pleas and petitions 
in the terminal  sessions of  parliament  were no doubt com- 
paratively  few  in  number;  but  Westminster  Hall  was 
crowded with "  suitors,"  and "  suitors " includes not  only 
litigants but recognitors, jurors, and inquest.  It is probable 
that in Edward's day a terminal session in Westminster Hall 
was more largely attended and, in spite of  the fact that its 
attendants were not elected, more representative of  all sorts 
and conditions of  men  than any gathering of  the so-called 
"  three  estates."  It was  as a  court  of  justice  and not  as 
houses  of  parliament  that the palace  of  Westminster was 
called in 1302  le plus franc lieu d'Engleterre ;  and the pleas 
and petitions heard before the king in council at Michaelmas 
1290,  provide  a  more  comprehensive  picture  of  national 
life than  the meagre  proceedings of  the Model  Parliament 
of  1295.l  There London petitions for its mayor and ancient 
liberties, and Gloucester against the frequency and severity 
Rot.  Purl., i  45-63. 
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of tallages levied by the "  potentes villa,"  and asks for an 
inquiry  as to  what  had  become  of  the  proceeds;  while 
 amps shire offers £200  to have its lands disafforested.  The 
people of  Appleby beg that they may have a water-mill built 
out of  the  20  marks farm they pay, and offer  to raise  it 
to L20  if  they may levy markct-tolls like  Carlisle.  "  Poor 
men " come from Norfolk, from Lincolnshire, and elsewhere, 
with petitions against various forms of  exaction.  "  Plures 
de populo"  present an awkward request  for a  commission 
to determine when the courts christian are to be bound  by 
prohibitions  and when  they may proceed  notwithstanding. 
"  Multi  de  civitate  Londonii,"  complain  of  conspiracies, 
machinations, and partiality in clerks and ministers of  justice. 
Canterbury  laments  the encroachments  of  its archbishop, 
and London again accuses the clergy of  extorting more money 
by  their  citations  and excommunications  than  all  the  lay 
officers put together.  On the other hand, the abbot of  St. 
Mary's,  York, begs to have his  liberties defined "  propter 
subtilitatem  modernorum,"  while  the  Jews  complain  of 
compulsory baptism.  No  electoral system then in existence 
could  have provided  so  varied  a  bill  of  fare for  a  merely 
political  parliament;  and  when  the  law  court  and  the 
"  estates " coalesced, the  coalition  owed  its popularity  to 
the law and not to the politics in which it dealt.  Recourse 
to  Westminster  Palace  was  a  common  custom  before 
Edward  I  adapted  it  to  the  purposes  of  taxation  and 
representation. 
The main  difference between  the two  kinds of  assembly 
was that the presence of  petitioners at the court was largely 
spontaneous,  unorganized,  and  irresponsible,  whereas  the 
elected knights and burgesses  came in response to official 
writs  of  summons,  elected  and  empowered  to  bind  th2ir 
constituents.  But even this distinction must not be  over- 
drawn.  The  Hampshire  men  must  have  been  authorized 
to offer  £200 for its disafforcstation, and the Appleby men to 
Promise Lzo  a year  for their  market-tolls;  and they must 
have been  elected or  selected by some process  or other to 
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boroughs.  But their appearance was casual and disjointed; 
and soon after accredited representatives  of  the shires and 
boroughs began to be summoned for taxing purposes to the 
presence of  the king in council, the idea must have occurred 
that it would  be  a  saving of  time,  expense,  and travel to 
entrust these representatives  with  the petitions  which  the 
communities desired to present  for legal redress.  The idea 
would, however, be impracticable unless the representatives 
foregathered  at court  in  tempore  parlinmenii.  The  con- 
venience  of  amalgamation  was  common  to both  the king 
and  his  people.  It was  clearly  a waste  of  time  for  the 
magnates,  who  happened  to be  present  in  council at the 
post-paschal  session  of  1290,  tentatively  to  grant  an aid 
quar~tz~m  in  ipsis  est,  and  then  to  summon  in  July  a 
meeting  of  elected  lesser  tenants-in-chief  to  consider  the 
same proposal.  So, too, the connexion between the petitions 
for redress  presented to the council in parliament  and the 
demands for financial aid presented by the king to  elected 
representatives  of  the estates was natural;  a  bargain  was 
inevitably suggested, and the bargaining could only be done 
satisfactorily if  the people empowered to grant the aid were 
also those in charge of  the petitions.  The crown would  be 
less  amenable  to the  pleas  of  petitioners  who  brought  no 
financial powers with them, and representatives who had no 
successful petitions to carry home to their constituents would 
be  less  responsive to the financial pleadings  of  the crown. 
Justitia  magnum emolumentz~m  was  as true in  the days of 
Edward I as in those of  Henry I and Henry 11; and justice 
and  finance  were  the  two  principal  ingredients  in  the 
parliament compounded by Edward I. 
Edward's financial necessities, which arose from his wars 
in France and Scotland and culminated in 1297, drove him 
in  this direction;  but the compounding  was  not  achieved 
in  the  Model  Parliament  of  1295.  That  assembly,  which 
met  on  November  27,  was "  model " only  in so  far as it 
completed  the  representative  character  of  the body  sum- 
moned to give consent to the levying of  taxation ;  and even 
in that respect it may have been anticipated by the assembly 
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of  1275.l  It was not " model " in the sense of  exemplifying 
that fusion of  "  parlement " and "  estates,"  of  justice  and 
finance, which was the essential basis of  the English parlia- 
ment.  The regular  terminal  sessions had been  concluded 
before the "  model "  parliament met;  the  only one in that 
year,  of  which  any records  have  been  preserved,  met  on 
~ugust  15  and sat till the 30th ;  and though various parties 
were referred for further hearing to a following session a die 
Sancti  Michaelis  in unum melzsem,  there is no reason to 
suppose that this Michaelmas term was  prolonged beyond 
its normal month, so as to coalesce with the session of  the 
"  estates " at the end of  November.  The Model Parliament 
of November-December apparently received no petitions and 
heard  no pleas;  its business was  merely  to vote supplies; 
and  there was  no scope in  it for  those  judicial  functions 
which  made  parliament  the highest  law court  in the  land 
and gave it a framework  and  organization  strong  enough 
to save it from the  shipwreck  that  overtook  mere  repre- 
sentative bodies everywhere else. 
It was in 1298,  after the crisis of  1297,  that we have the 
first  comclusive  evidence  of  a  simultaneous  session  of  the 
representative and judicial bodies.  Edward returned from 
Flanders in March;  at a terminal session of  the council held 
about  Easter,  it  was  ordained  that  the  exchequer  court 
should be held  at York  on  the morrow,  and the common 
pleas on the octave of Trinity Sunday, that is to say, on the 
and  and  9th  of  June  re~pectively.~  A  week  earlier,  on 
May  25, representatives  of  the shires,  cities, and boroughs 
were also to meet at York, and corresponding writs were sent 
to the prelates and magnates, though not, it appears, to the 
lower  clergy.  From this time  onwards to the end  of  the 
reign every session of the representative body coincides with 
a terminal parliament of the judicature,  although of  course 
the latter are more frequent than the former, and it was long 
before the judicial parliamentary sessions were restricted to 
the brief  periods during which the representatives were kept 
English  Hist. Review, xxv. 231-42. 
"Rot.  Pavl., i. 132-42.  a  Ibid., i.  143. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
together.  The next representative assembly was summoned 
to meet at London  on March  6, 1300,  and it is significant 
that now they are summoned in the writs "  ad parliamen- 
tum "; for in March  1300  a "  parliament " in the sense of 
the "  Rolls " was being held in the capital.  Knights of  the 
shire were  summoned  to York  in the following May;  and 
although there are no records of  a judicial session held there 
at that time in the "  Rolls of  Parliaments,"  there is in the 
following year  an interesting  reference to the "  male  and 
female " merchants  and burgesses of  York who had been 
brought  before  the  justices  of  common pleas  during their 
session  in  that  city.  For  the  well-known  parliament  at 
Lincoln in January  1301,  there are both writs summoning 
representatives and "  Rolls "  recording judicial proceedings ; 
and the same holds good for the Michaelmas parliament  of 
1302,  and the Lent  parliament  of  I305  NO records  of  a 
judicial  session  of  parliament  for  1306  are printed  in the 
" Rolls,"  but  it  is  practically  certain  that one  was  being 
held  in May  when  knights  and burgesses  were  summoned 
to Westminster; l and records of  both  kinds of  session are 
extant for Edward's  last  parliament  which  was  at Carlisle 
in January  1307. 
The presence of  these specially and generally summoned 
prelates,  magnates, knights, and burgesses at the time and 
place  of  the legal sessions has its effect upon the " Rolls of 
Parliaments."  This legal record is no longer confined to pleas 
and petitions ; and the clerk of  chancery who keeps account 
of  these  legal  proceedings takes over  the clerical work  of 
the "  estates."  In I305 the presence of  these intruders into 
the court and their dismissal is mentioned in the " Rolls " ; 
in 1307  the names of  those who received a special writ, and 
of  the proxies they appointed, are entered, and note is made 
of  the fact  that  general  writs  had been  addressed  to the 
sheriffs directing  the election  of  knights  of  the  shire  and 
burgesses.  All are said to have been summoned ad  parlia- 
me~tfurn,  and their business  is  ad tractandunz sufier  ordina- 
fione  et  stabilitnte  terra  Scotz'a,  necnon  et  aliis  megotiis 
1 Thcre is an adlou111111cnt  of  a case to May  1306 (Rot. Parl., i. ~Soa). 
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dicitlv~  regenz  et  statum  regni  sui  specinliter  tangentibzts. 
~t is  true  that the name "  parliament " is  applied  in the 
~011s  " to these  assemblies, not  because  they  contain  a 
complete representation of  "  estates,"  but because they are 
also sessions of  the king's  council in parliament;  and they 
will  be  called  $Lena  and  genernlia,  not  merely  after  all 
save members of  the council have departed, but when they 
have  not  been  summoned  at all.  The  parliament  which 
met on September 15, 1305, is none the less a parliament to 
the keeper of  the " Rolls " because it deals with only judicial 
business  and is  not  attended by  any elected  commons or 
specially summoned  magnates.  But politicians  have been 
admitted to parliament, and politics have been recorded on 
the  Rolls;  in time they  will  almost  expel  the judges  and 
usurp  the  name  of  parliament;  and  the  word,  which  is 
originally used in the "  Rolls " of  meetings in which  there 
werc no representatives, will be restricted to those in which 
representatives will be the predominant factor. 
In  Edward  1's  reign,  however,  the  intrusion  of  the 
"  estates " was only an episode or an incident in the life of 
a  parliament,  an  episode  which  might  last  no  longer 
than  a  few  days,  and  rarely  extended  over  three  weeks. 
On February 28,1305, a parliament was begun; on March 21 
not  only  the  knights,  burgesses, and clergy, but  also  the 
prelates and magnates who were  not  of  the king's  council 
were  dismissed.l  But the parliament  still  continued :  on 
April 5, in the presence of  bishops and other prelates, earls, 
barons, justices, and other noble clerical and lay councillors, 
"  generali parliamento tunc existente ibidem,"  letters from 
the pope were  presented to Edward; and on  April  6 the 
king  in  pleno  parliamento  forbade  his  chancellor  to  issue 
certain letters of  protecti~n.~  This practice continued into 
the reign of  Edward 111.  A parliament began on Monday, 
March  17,  1332;  on  thc  following  Saturday the  knights, 
citizens, and burgesses  were  dismissed, but  the "  prelates, 
earls,  barons,  and gentlemen  of  the  king's  council " were 
1 Cf. Maitland, Memoranda,  p.  xxxv. 
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retained, and the proceedings en pleyn parlement continued 
in  the  following  week.l  It  is  clear  that  the  prelates, 
magnates, knights,  and burgesses who obeyed the writs of 
summons  to parliament did not constitute a  parliament or 
even  make  a  parliament  plenum  or  generale.  They  were 
summoned to something that was a parliament  apart from 
their  presence.  The  essential  presence  is  that  of  the 
council;  nothing was  called  a  parliament  from which  the 
council  was  absent;  parliament  is,  in  fact,  a  parliament 
of  the  council, and a  plenum  or  generale parliament  was 
simply a general and full  (or public) session of  the council. 
Fleta knows nothing of  elected representatives ; they are an 
accretion  not  yet  recognized as indispensable  to the com- 
position of  a parliament, a sort of  slip-carriage or series of 
slip-carriages which  may be detached  at any point  in the 
journey  of  the parliamentary  train.  The essential factor is 
the engine of  the council, which supplies the motive force 
and travels all the way. 
The  organization  and  business  of  parliament  were  as 
composite as its personnel, and the contents of  the "  Rolls " 
reflect the varied nature of  its proceedings.  Its machinery 
was, however, purely legal in origin, and down to this day 
the technical details connected with the issue of  parliamen- 
tary  writs  and  other  business  are  suggestive  of  those 
employed in the law courts.  Chancery supplied the presid- 
ing officer and the clerks of parliament, issued the writs of 
summons and examined the returns, provided  the methods 
of  proceeding by  petition  and bill, and kept  the records; 
and at times parliament has the appearance of  being nothing 
but  chancery turned to political purposes.  It was natural 
that the inorganic "  estates " should fall under the manage- 
ment  of  the organic court of law with its regular sessions, 
coherent  personnel, and expert clerks, when once  the con- 
nexion  between  the two  assemblies had been  established; 
for  the " estates " had developed  no  organization  and no 
records of  their own before they came into contact with the 
organized terminal sessions of  the council;  and it was not 
Rot. Purl., ii. 64-6. 
until the  later development  of  the "house " of  commons 
that we  discover in the Speaker a parliamentary official who 
has no essential connexion with the law. 
But there were no "  houses " in Edward 1's reign, and the 
trace of  the  organization  of "  estates " apparently 
consists of the clerks of chancery who  seem  to have  been 
allocated to the different groups of representatives to assist 
them  in  drafting their  replies  and perhaps  to keep  some 
record of  their attendance, upon which the writs de expensis 
were  issued  when  they  were  dismissed.  Even  this  is  a 
development of the reign of Edward 111, and while separate 
deliberation  by  different groups  may perhaps  be  inferred 
for that  of  Edward  I, there  is  no  evidence  of  it  in  the 
"  Rolls  of  Parliament."  All  that we  can  say is  that the 
"  estates " were  called  into  the  presence  of  the  council, 
presented petitions as individuals rather than as a corporate 
body  or  bodies,  heard  a  statement  of  such  of  the  king's 
intentions  as  he  thought  fit  to reveal,  and gave assent, 
perhaps  by  silence,  to  his  demands  for  money.  These 
brief  and  one-sided  interviews  between  the  council  and 
"  estates " suggested and required little organization.  They 
did not sit together, for the commons, at least, stood in the 
presence of  the king and council, and the attitude of  Edward I 
was somewhat patriarchal.  They probably took a less active 
part in parliament than the audience does in a public meeting 
of to-day;  the council sat on the platform, and the business 
was cut-and-dried.  The commons, at least, were summoned 
not to decide, but to consent to decisions;  and the object 
of  their presence  was not to tie the hands of  the council, 
but to unloose the pockets of  their constituents. 
This was the political business of a parliament; but its first 
purpose  was  judicial,  and  before  the  estates  assembled, 
proclamation  was  always  made  in  Westminster  Hall  and 
elsewhere that all who had petitions to present should present 
them by a certain date.  Individual prelates, barons, knights, 
and burgesses may have attended to support the particular 
petitions in which they were interested;  but there were few 
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personal import ; and it is unlikely that the audience for the 
hearing of  others was large.  Apart from the grant of  money, 
and the discussion thereof, in which the commons took but 
a  humble  part  at first, the "  estates " had little to do  in 
parliament ;  and it is small wonder that they were commonly 
dismissed after a few days or a week or two.  Their import- 
ance as a deliberative assembly grew slowly with their gradual 
realization of  the fact that their individual petitions, arising 
spontaneously from different localities, dealt with grievances 
common to all and might  well  be fused into common peti- 
tions.  When that took place, parliament became a political 
arena  rather  than  a  court  of  law;  for,  while  individual 
grievances are matters of  law, national grievances are matters 
of  politics.  The  one  requires  merely  judicial  action,  the 
other  calls for  legislation.  But  this  was  a  slow  develop- 
ment of the icurteenth century, dependent upon the growth 
of  a  common  consciousness  among  the  locally-minded 
delegates or petitioners whom Edward I dragged or invited 
into the presence of  his council in parliament. 
CHAPTER  IV 
THE  MYTH  OF THE  THREE  ESTATES 
WHILE the  high  court  of  parliament  was  the  correct 
and official  description  of  the two  houses in the  sixteenth 
and  seventcenth  centuries,  the "  three  estates " was  the 
more  popular  and inaccurate  designation  applied  to them 
in  the  eighteenth  and  nineteenth;  and  the  phrase  has 
become  so deeply  embedded in historical terminology  that 
it  is  accepted  as  synonymous  with  parliament  without 
any  critical  examination  of  its real  relevance.  There has, 
it  is  true,  been  some  divergence  of  opinion as to whether 
the  three  estates were  king, lords,  and commons, or  lords 
spiritual, lords  temporal,  and  commons;  but  the  former 
definition of  the term,  which  was  common in  eighteenth- 
century  parliamentary  oratory,  has  been  frightened  even 
out  of  school-books by  the contemptuous ridicule of  nine- 
teenth-century  historians.  The error, if  an error at all, is, 
we  shall see, not quite so flagrant as it has been represented; 
and in any case, it is only a detail compared with the fact 
that the more we realize the importance and the permanence 
of  parliament  as a  high  court, the less ready shall  we  be 
to  accept  the  three  estates  as  a  complete  or  even  a 
plausible  indication  of  its  essential  character  and  consti- 
tution.  Judicature is not a function of  estates;  and where 
three  estates have really  existed, as in  France,  they  have 
had  little  or  no  connexion  with  fiarleme~zts.  Yet  as late 
as  the  reign  of  Henry  VII,  half  the  time  of  parliament 
was  occupied  with  purely  judicial  functions; l  they  were 
discharged  by  parliament  centuries  afterwards  in  passing 
'  The reason  still given in 1485  for  the appointment of  receivers  and 
triers of  petitions is "  ut  justitia conqueri volentibus possit celerius adliiberi " 
(Rot. Pad., vi.  267). 
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acts  of  attainder  and  indemnity,  and  are  still  performed 
by the house  of lords, which  exercises them solely because 
it is a branch of  the high court of  parliament. 
Parliament,  however,  is  obviously  more  than  a  high 
court;  it is  an  assembly  of  national  representatives,  and 
an  inquiry  into  the  principles  upon  which  that  system 
of  representation  has  been  based  is  a  matter  of  some 
importance.  The prevalent theory seems to be that during 
the formative period of  parliament  the English nation con- 
sisted  of  three "  estates"  or  orders,  and  that  Edward  I 
carefully  and deliberately organized parliaments in  such a 
way  as  to  represent  these  estates.  They  were,  we  are 
told, firstly  the church,  secondly the nobility,  and thirdly 
the commons; the king could not be an estate of  the realm 
because  he  was  an individual  and not  a  class.  The  first 
estate  was  accordingly  represented  by  the spiritual lords 
in  parliament, namely, the bishops, some abbots, and one 
or two priors;  the second estate by the earls  (and  subse- 
quently  the dukes,  marquises,  and viscounts  as well)  and 
barons;  and the third  estate  by  the  knights  elected  for 
the shires and the citizens and burgesses for the cities and 
boroughs. 
Two  general  criticisms of  this theory at once occur.  In 
the first place, we have been taught by Maitland and others 
that  there  is  little  about  status  in  the  English  law  of 
the  thirteenth  century,  but  a  great  deal  about  tenure.' 
The  most  important  body  in the community  consisted  of 
the military tenants-in-chief  of  the crown;  but this tenurial 
distinction  did  not  correspond  with  any  social  or  class 
division.  A military tenant-in-chief  was, no doubt, often a 
magnate, but he might be a poor man also ; and as early as 
the first quarter of  the twelfth century we find men holding 
by military tenure-in-chief fiefs so exiguous that the knightly 
service can  only be  expressed in vulgar  fractions, such  as 
one  twenty-fourth  of  the  service  of  a  single  fully-armed 
knight.2  On the other hand, a  sub-tenant may be  a  rich 
and  powerful  person,  holding  many  fiefs  of  rrlany  lords. 
1  MaitIand,  Collected Papers, i. 206. 
2  Pollock and Maitland, Hist.  of  English Law,  i.  230-52. 
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A socage tenant, again, may be rich or poor, and so may a 
tenant by grand or petty serjeanty.  The same individual, 
moreover,  may  hold  at once  different lands  by  all  these 
different forms of  tenure;  and all  forms  of  tenure  shade 
off  into one another by almost imperceptible degrees.  The 
possession  of the smallest estate in chief of  the crown will, 
indeed, subject  the tenant  to certain  liabilities;  the king 
will  claim  wardship  over his  heir,  the right  to dispose of 
his heiress in marriage,  and custody  of  his lands during a 
minority;  but assuredly his tenure-in-chief  will  not entitle 
him to sit in parliaments in person or to vote for the  earls 
or  barons  who  are summoned  by  special  writ.  We  may 
think him a member of  the second estate, but if  he is repre- 
sented in parliaments  at all, it will be by a member of  the 
third.  The most striking feature, in fact, of  English society 
in  the early  middle  ages  is  the  confusion  of  classes;  but 
there can be no system of  estates where nothing is based upon 
status;  for status is  the Latin for estate;  and Edward I 
was the last man to have thought of  organizing a parliament 
upon a theory which had no foundation in law. 
Secondly, neither Edward nor any one else in the England 
of  the thirteenth  and fourteenth  centuries seems to have 
had any clear conception of  what was meant by an "  estate." 
The  word  has  not been  traced  back  beyond  1307,  when 
the famous letter of  the barons to the pope speaks of  Z'estat 
du roialme and tous ces  estats de prelacie;  and  its  use  in 
the fourteenth century is  almost as vague  as it is to-day, 
when  we  can speak of  a  man's  estate, meaning either his 
property or his manhood.  Indeed, the word was less deter- 
minate then than now, for we have differentiated "  status,'' 
estate,  and state, which  were  all  the same in  origin.  No 
one, it is true, talks about the "  state " in the middle ages; 
for that  is  a  modern  conception.  But  it  might  help  to 
clarify our  ideas if, instead of  speaking of  the three estates 
of the realm, we talked of  the three states of  the realm, and 
remembered that "  state " is the English form of  "  status." 
When  politicians and publicists talked in the sixteenth and 
Rot. Purl., i. 219;  the Latin record which follows the French petition 
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subsequent centuries about preserving  the state, they often 
meant the "  status quo."  The  state was something estab- 
lished by  law  or  by  custom,  something that could  not  or 
should not  be  changed.  Any  fixed  order or species might 
be a  state, and the  word  implied  something fundamental 
by the  law of  God  or of  nature.  It was  characteristic  of 
the ages in  which  men  had  some notion  of  social statics 
but none  of  social dynamics, some desire for order but no 
conception  of  progress. 
That  there  was  something  natural,  if  not  also  divine, 
in  the  separation  of  mankind  into  three  classes  seemed 
as clear to medieval  philosophers as it did  to nineteenth- 
century railway companies.  The idea was as old as Plato ; ' 
parliament  itself  in  1401  speaks  of  a  trinity of  estates; 
and Wycliffe writes of  the "  state of  priests, state of  knights, 
and state of  commons."  This corresponds to a  common 
philosophical distinction of  priestly,  military, and plebeian 
orders,  though another  division was into fighters,  council- 
lors,  and labourers.  There  is a  vague  similarity  between 
these theoretical classifications and the division into church, 
lords,  and  commons,  of  which  parliaments  embodied  a 
rough  representation.  But  it is  a  long  step  from  this 
analogy  to  the  theory  that  parliament  was  organized 
upon the basis of  three estates;  and in practice there was 
little  in  common  between  the  two.  The first  estate  was 
the church ;  but in parliaments, after the reign of  Edward I1 
at any rate, the church is represented only by the bishops, 
some abbots, and one  or  two  priors;  and they  are sum- 
moned, or rather, are liable to summons, not because they 
represent  the  church,  but  because  they  hold  land  pev 
baroniam, by military tenure-in-chief  of  the crown.4  They 
1 Repzcblic, ii.  370  sqq.  a  Rot.  Purl.,  iii.  459b. 
8  English  Works, ed.  Arnold,  iii.  184.  Cf.  also  Hallam,  Middle  Ages, 
iii.  105-6,  and Stubbs, Const. Hist., ii. 172  n. 
4  See Pike,  Const. Hist. of  the  House  of  Lords, pp.  155-6,  219.  It is 
inaccurate to say that they were summoned because  they held  baronies, 
for many who held  baronies were not summoned at all.  They were sum- 
moned because the king desired their counsel ;  and their baronies gave him 
a lien on their suit and service at  his court.  The crown was not prevared 
to atmidon the bishops to the papacy, and they were expected to be ;oyal, 
as well as papal, courtiers. 
are, in fact, barons as well  as prelates, and Henry I1 had 
laid  it down  in the Constitutions  of  Clarendon  that  they 
were  liable  to suit  and service,  like  other  barons,  in  the 
king's court;  and Edward 111's answer to the prelates who 
complained of  taxation in I341 unmistakeably implies that 
they were  summoned to parliaments  because they  held  by 
barony.' 
This view has been disputed, and a spiritual right to be 
present  in  parliament  has  been  asserted,  mainly  on  the 
ground  that  during  the  vacancy  of  episcopal  sees,  the 
guardian of  the spiritualties who did not hold per  baroniam 
received  a  special writ of  summons like a bishop.  But hc 
received this summons because  of  the pramunientes  clause 
it contained, requiring him, as the on&  person  capable  of 
so  doing,  to cause  proctors  to be elected for the clergy of 
the diocese of  which he had temporary charge, and not  for 
the  sake  of  securing  his personal  presence in  parliament. 
Certainly no  abbot  ever  sat  by a  spiritual title, and  the 
ground upon which many of  them sought to evade .the duty 
ef  attendance, was  always an allegation that they held  no 
land 9er baroniam and therefore were not liable to a summons. 
The force that brought spiritual and temporal lords together 
i~to  one  house  of  lords  was  clearlv  not  their  common 
membership  of  the  same  estate,  fbr  en.  kypotlzesi  they 
belonged  to  two  sharply  distinguished  orders,  but  their 
common  receipt  of  a  special  writ  of  summons  based  on 
their  common tenure-in-chief  from  the  crown.  " Comme 
ercevesques et evesques," plead  the prelates themselves  in 
parliament  in  1352, "  tiegnent  lour  temporaltes  du roi  en 
chef  et par tant sont pieres de la terre comme  sont autres 
countes et barons."  2  If  the house of  lords is an estate at 
all, it  is  an artificial  estate  created  by  the action  of  the 
piown out of  heterogeneous  elements gathered from all the 
three  normal  estates of  theory-bishops  and abbots  from 
Rot. Parl.,  ii.  130.  The prelates "  qui tiegnent  du roi par baronie et 
deyvent veilir au parlement par somonse " are told that they must pay a 
ninih; while  clergy  "qui  ne tiegnent  rien par  baronie ne  ne sont pas 
acoustumes d'estre  somons au parlement " need  only pay a tenth. 
*  Ibid., ii.  245; my Wolsey, p.  50;  Wolsep, who was  an  exception to 
most  rules, sat as custos  spiritualium of  York  on  five days in  February 
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the first, earls and barons from the second, and councillors, 
judges,  and secretaries from the third. 
Nor was the second estate more satisfactorily represented 
in  the house of  lords  than  the first.  The theory of  three 
estates would seem to imply that each member of  an estate 
is  entitled  either  to be  present  at the estates-general  in 
person  or  to vote for the election  of  a  representative;  at 
any rate, that was the interpretation adopted at the great 
assembly  of  the  estates-general  of  France  in  1789.  But 
no  one--save  its  ex-oficio  members,  the  chancellor,  the 
treasurer,  and so  forth-has  ever sat in the house of  lords 
except  in response to a special writ of  summons;  and the 
vast  majority  of  the  military  tenants-in-chief  received  no 
special writ, and were represented in the house of  commons. 
If  there  was  ever  a  noble  estate  in  England,  it  was 
unceremoniously cut by English monarchs into two unequal 
sections, the  smaller  of  which  was  called to  the house  of 
lords, while the  larger was relegated, in the persons of  the 
knights  of  the  shire,  to  the  third  estate in  the house  of 
commons.  For  the knights  of  the shire were barons,  the 
barones minores who, according to Magna Carta, were to be 
summoned  to give their advice by general writs addressed 
to  the  sheriff  and not  by  special  writ  addressed  to  the 
individual baron (h).  The house of  lords is not an estate of 
the  realm;  if  it represents  estates  at all it is  a  royally 
compounded mixture of  fragments of estates. 
Least of  all  is  the house  of  commons a  third "  estate." 
It is no mere assembly of  bourgeois like the old tiers dtat in 
France.  Its most important and turbulent  element in the 
middle  ages  consists  of  the  knights  of  the shire, barones 
minores, mililes, or chivalers,l as they are called, who were 
tenants-in-chief  of  the crown, who  often called themselves 
"  nobles,"  and who belonged by the theory of  estates to 
1  We should  be inclined  to regard miles and chivaler as synonymous, 
were it not that a  knight of the shire is sometirncs described  as miles el 
chivaler in the "  Official Return of  Members of  Parliament."  Nor must we 
identify  milites  with  barones  minores,  since  even  an  earl  was  often 
a knight as well (cf. Magna Carta Essays, Royal Iiist. Soc., pp. 46-77,  100). 
a  The "  nohility " in  England down to the sixteenth century included, 
as it did in France,  the petite  noblesse. 
the second and not to the third.  It was their combination 
with  the  city  and  borough  members  that gave the house 
of  commons its singular  strength  in  the  middle  ages  and 
made it unique among representative  institutions.  But it 
was  no  estate of  the realm;  it was a  concentration of  all 
the communities  of  England, shires,  cities,  and boroughs; 
and  it  consisted no  more  than they did of  a  single  class. 
If it  represented  one  estate more  than  another,  it repre- 
sented  the second rather than the third;  for  the knights 
of the shire were often nominated by its magnates, and the 
same magnates  sometimes  controlled  the  elections for  the 
boroughs on  their  domains.  Lastly, in  a  system of  three 
estates  there  is  no  natural  or  logical  place  for  the  large 
official  and legal  element which  we  find throughout  in the 
high  court  of  parliament. 
These facts, or some of  them, have been generally recog- 
nized  by  historians,  who  nevertheless  accept  the  funda- 
mental truth of the theory of three estates;  and the incon- 
sistency between that theory and the facts is explained by 
the  contention  that the  English  have  never  been  logical, 
and that parliaments represented only a rough approxima- 
tion  to the orthodox theory.  If  a  clerk  of  a  fourteenth- 
century  parliament  writes  of  the judges  or  merchants  as 
being " estates,"  or  refers in  a  hazy way  to half  a dozen 
or  more "  estates,"  the  reference  is  regarded  as a  slip  of 
the pen, a loose use of  the phrase,  or a mental aberration.] 
The difficulty is, however, to discover the evidence for the 
nonn, fron which these exceptions depart.  Exceptions no 
doubt will  prove a rule, but only if they can be  proved  to 
be exceptions;  we  must satisfy ourselves that the exception 
is  not  the  rule,  and  so  far  from  being  able  to  show 
that it was  the custom to regard a  parliament in the four- 
teenth  century  as an assembly  of  three  estates consisting 
lespectively  of  lords  spiritual,  lords  temporal,  and  com- 
nlons, we  cannot, I think, adduce a single instance of  such 
Cf.  Maitland,  Memoranda,  p.  lxxxiii.  We  are  apt to  think  that 
"whatever upon our record  makes against this belief should be explained 
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a  description  until  towards  the  close  of  the  reign  of 
Henry V. 
Certainly, the only known  description  of  parliaments  in 
the fourteenth century, the Modus Tenendi Parliamentunz,l 
knows  nothing  of  three  estates or,  indeed,  of  any estates 
at all (i). This tract has been commonly treated as a fanciful 
sketch of  no authority for  somewhat inadequate reasons, 
unless  its disagreement  with  orthodox  views  be  regarded 
as  a  sufficient  ground  for  neglect.  It is  true  that  its 
opening  statement,  professing  to  give  an account  of  the 
method of  holding parliaments in Anglo-Saxon times, does 
not  commend  it to historical  students;  but the fact  that 
it is of  no value for Anglo-Saxon history does not disprove 
its  claim  to be  considered  as  of  some  authority  on  the 
parliaments  of  the century  in  which  it  was  written,  any 
more than chroniclers who begin with the Creation  are to 
be ignored when they come down to contemporary history. 
Its composition has been  assigned  to the opening years  of 
Edward 111's reign, mainly because it mentions no viscounts, 
marquises,  or dukes, but only earls and barons among the 
magnates,  and the first  English  duke was  created  in  the 
person  of  the  Black  Prince  in  1337.  At  least  three  of 
the extant MSS.  date from the fourteenth  century;  and it 
seems to have been  regarded early in the fifteenth century 
as  an  authoritative  rather  than  a  fanciful  description. 
At any rate, a revised version of  it was sent over to Ireland 
in  1418  by the  privy council  to inform the lord deputy of 
the method in which parliaments should be held in  Dublin; 
in  1510  the clerk of  the parliaments thought it worth  while 
to transcribe the treatise and prefix  it to the Journals  he 
had  to keep;  and  another  copy  was  apparently  handed 
from clerk  to clerk of  the house of  commons. 
1 The best edition of  the Modus is that by Hardy (London, 1846), from 
whose text Stubbs printed it at the end of  his Select  Charters.  The Irish 
version  of  1418 was  first  printed  in  1911  in  R.  Steele's  Bib1io;~aphy  of 
Proclamations  (Oxford : Clarendon  Press), i.  clxxxviii-cxci.  Numerous 
MS.  copies of  the English version were made, and in  the first half  of  the 
seventeenth centr~ry  it was a favourite text for parliamentary lawyers like 
Hakewill  and Elsynge to edit.  Some attention  has been  given  to it by 
members of  my seminar,  and a preliminary survey of  forty-seven MSS. extant 
in  the  British  Museum  was published in  the English Htst.  Review,  April 
1919, PP.  209-25. 
Now,  the  Modzcs,  while  saying  nothing  about  three 
estates,  says a  good  deal  about  six "  gradus " of  parlia- 
ment;  and  these  "  grades " or  orders  are  the lting,  the 
prelates,  the  ecclesiastical  proctors,  the  lords  temporal, 
the knights, and the commons.  The Irish  version of  1418 
contains some important modifications of  the earlier English 
version;  but there are still six grades of  parliament, each 
with  its own  clerk, each  deliberating  apart, and reporting 
its  answers  separately  to  parliament.  It would  in  any 
case  be  somewhat  arbitrary  to ignore  this  evidence,  and 
such  neglect  becomes  impossible  whcn  the  general  con- 
clusion to be  derived from the Modus as regards the three 
estates is  confirmed by the "  Rolls  of  Parliament " them- 
selves.  The  Modus  gives  too  few  rather  than  too  many 
"  grades " of  parliament ; for  the  judges  are  sometimes 
described  in  the " Rolls " as  an  estate, the "  chivalers " 
as  another,  and  the  merchants  were  summoned  by  writ 
as a separate class in 1339  and 1340.  This latter practice 
was, however,  prohibited, on the petition of  the commons, 
in  1362  and  1371;  and  the judges  are  seldom  described 
as an estate.  That the "  Rolls " should  describe  thcm as 
such  at all,  and that they should speak of  prelates,  lords 
temporal,  knights,  judges,  et  tous  autres  estats,l  bcing 
charged to deliberate one by one, is sufficient evidence that 
these  estates  themselves,  or  the  clerk  of  the parliaments 
who rccorded their proceedings, knew nothing of  any sacro- 
sanct trinity of  estates.  The most formal and authoritative 
definition  of  "  a parlement somond of  all  the states of  the 
reaume " is  given  by Chief-justice Thirning on  the solemn 
occasion  of  Richard  11's  abdication;  and he  enumerates 
them as : (I) archbishops and bishops;  (2) abbots, priors, 
and "  all other men of  Holy Church, seculars and regulars" ; 
(3) dukes and earls ; (4) barons and bannerets ;  (5)  bachelors 
and  commons,  who  are  divided  into  two  sections, those 
"  by south " and  those "  by north."  He  also  refers  to 
"  the  state of  kyng,"  and, besides  the "  states,"  to "  all 
the people that was  ther gadyrd by cause of  the sommons 
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forsayd,"  by  whom  Richard's  renunciation  and  cession 
"ware pleinelich and freilich accepted and fullich agreed." 1 
Even  when  we  do  come,  in the first  year  of  the  fifteenth 
century, across an allusion in the "  Rolls " to three estates, 
they are not  the three of  constitutional orthodoxy; and it 
is as a trinity of  king,  lords,  and commons that the last- 
named describe the three estates in their address to Henry IV 
in  1401.2  If the commons had  enjoyed  the advantage  of 
reading our modern constitutional histories, they might have 
avoided this "  error,"  into which Burghley fell in 1585  and 
Charles James Fox and thousands of  others in the eighteenth 
~entury.~ 
It is  in  1421  that  we  get  the first  official  reference  to 
parliament  as consisting of  tres  status, videlicet,  pvelatos  et 
clerum,  nobiles  et  nzagnates,  necnon  com~nunitates dicti 
regni ;  and the circumstances of  this reference suggest an 
interesting  explanation  of  the  introduction  of  the  phrase 
into  English  parliamentary  usage.  The  Peace  of  Troyes 
had been  concluded between  Henry  V  and Charles  VI  of 
France,  and  every  formality  was  to  be  observed  which 
might render  it and the union of  the two crowns binding. 
The  peace  was  accordingly  to be  sworn to  by  the  three 
estates of  the two  realms.  It had been  signed in France, 
where there really was a system of  three estates, and the ad- 
vantages of  uniformity suggested the employment of  identical 
phraseology  when  the  treaty  was  sent  over  to  England 
for  confirmation.  From  this time the phrase  comes slowly 
and  doubtingly  into  English  official  and  popular  usc6 
The  process  was  eased  by  the  contact  of  the  English 
government  with  systems  of  three  estates  in  its  French 
Rot. Purl., iii. 424; Hughes, Chaucer's England, pp. 293-4. 
a  Ibid., iii. 4596;  Stubbs, ii. 172 n. 
3  D'Ewes,  Journals,  p.  350;  Bishop  Aylmer  has  the same  definition 
(An  Harborowe  for  Faithfull  Subjects, 1559,  H. iii.); and so  has  Bishop 
Gardiner (Foxe, Acts  and  Mon., vi.  51). 
4  Lecky, Hist. of  England, 1892, iii. 388 n.;  B. Whitelocke (Notes  on the 
King's  Writ, ed. ,1766, ii.  43) takes the same view. 
6  Rot.  Parl.,  iv.  135~  V.  102-3.  Even  this  adds  "clerum"  to  the 
conventional "  lords spir~tual." 
6  O~dinances  of  the Privy Council, ed. Nicolas, v. 297, vi.  71; Rot. Parl., 
iv. 420, v. 128, vi.  39, 424,444. 
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; and the privy council speaks of  the three estates 
of Guienne before it speaks of  the three estates of  England 
or 1reland.l  Englishmen, however, seemed to be  conscious 
of the false assimilation, and the phrase "  provincial estates" 
was  never apparently applied to the assemblies of  the  so- 
called  English  palatinates.  Fortescue will  not  call parlia- 
ment  three  estates; he  cautiously remarks that the three 
estates of  France "  when they bith assembled, bith like to 
the courte of  the parlement  in Ingelonde " ; and Commines 
will only say of  Edward IV's parliament that it vduli autant 
comme  les  irois  estat~.~  And  the  phrase  in its  older  and 
vaguer  sense  continued  in  vogue.  Bishop  Stillington,  in 
7 Edward IV, calls the lords spiritual, lords  temporal, and 
commons the three  estates of  the realm,  but  speaks  of  a 
royal estate over them alL3  The council talks in  1440  of 
the "  estates of  holy  church,"  just  as in  Edward  1's reign 
the "  Rolls " speak of  tous ces  estdts  de p~clacie.~  In 1491 
Henry  VII, in  a  proclamation,  speaks of  being  informed 
"  by the estates and nobles " ;  in 1497 Perkin Warbeck refers 
to  Henry's  projected  flight  "in  person  with  many  other 
estates  of  the land "; and in  1513  the  commons  desire 
"  the  great  estates. peers  and  nobles  of  this  realm " to 
grant adequate taxes.  A  chronicler  of  Henry VII's  reign 
gives the following illustrations of  the persistent indefinite- 
ness  of  the  phrase : "  there  stood  the  king,  queen,  and 
many  great  estates  of  the  realm . . . the  said  estates 
took  their  horses  and chairs,  and so  rode  to Richmond," 
and again, "  considering the great and riotable  court  that 
there was holden, as first the king, the  queen, my lady the 
king's  mother,  with  my lord of  York,  my lady Margaret, 
and divers other estates." 
Nicolas, v.  161. 
. '  Fortescue,  Governance  of  England, ed.  Plummer, pp. 113, 195. 
Fortescue, p. 127, also says that the King's estate is the highest estate 
temporal  on  earth.  So  James  I  says the  "state  of  monarchy  is  the 
supremest thing on earth."  (Prothero, Documents, ed. 1898, p. 293.) 
Proceedings of  the  Privy Council, v.  88, 148; Rot. Parl.,  i. 219. 
Steele, Proclamations, i. No.  17; my  Henry VII,  i. No. 108; Kingsford, 
Chronicles  of  London,  pp.  222,  245,  253,  263;  Lords'  Journals,  vol.  i. 
p. xxvi.; cf. L.  and P., 1539, i. No.  858, "states  doth daily assemble 
against the parliament."  See Appendix 111, note (j). THE MYTH  OF  THE THREE ESTATES  73 
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The impression  produced  by  this divergence and vague- 
ness in the use of  the word "  estates " '  is borne out by what 
we  know  of  the  medieval  organization  of  parliaments. 
Fleta  is  apparently  unaware  of  their  existence;  to  him 
parliaments are sessions of  the king's council in the presence 
of  earls, barons,  nobles,  and  other  learned  men;  in  1305 
a  parliament  can  still  be  a  "  full " parliament  when  all 
but  the  councillors have  withdrawn;  and as late  as the 
reign of  Henry VI the lords can be described as being "  in 
full  parliament "  without  any  other  asses~ors.~  Even 
when  other  elements,  nominated  and elected,  come  to be 
recognized  as  normal  if  not  essential  additions  to  the 
council for parliamentary purposes,  they  are not  regarded 
or  organized  as  three  estates.  They  meet  and  transact 
their  public  business  in  a  single  chamber,  the  camera 
magni consilii vocata le flarlement  chambre, otherwise known 
as  La  chambye  blanche  fires  de  la chambre  peynte,3  or  else 
in that Painted Chamber, sometimes called the chamber of 
Edward  the  Confessor,  where,  down  to  the  nineteenth 
c con-  century, conferences between the lords and common, 
tinued  to be  held.4  In this council chamber, which  came 
1 This  absence  of  definite  estates  is  illustrated  by  a  corresponding 
absence  of,  or  vagueness  in,  the  designations  now  used  to  indicate 
differences of status.  Originally  baro simply meant a man;  the barones 
majoves  were  the  king's  greater,  and the  barones  minores  his  lesser, 
men.  In the fourt2enth century, while a tenant by  barony might be de- 
scribed  as " baro  of  such and such a  barony, just as we yay describe 
so-and-so as lord of  the manor of  this or that place, the word  bar0 "  was 
no more used as a title of  honour than lord of  the may  is to-day.  There 
was nothing in his designation to distinguish a "peer  from a knight ; the 
knight  may  have been a lesser baron,  but his inferiority  was  expressed 
in  the extent of  his holding and his lack of  a special summons, and not 
in his mode  of  address; and the baron might or might  not  be  a knight. 
"  Dominus "  and "  Sir "  were titles they shared alike, and they shared the? 
both with griests ; it was not until after the pformation  that "  Dominus 
and "  Sir  were  replaced  by  "Reverend  as the normal  prefix  to a 
cleric's name.  "  Dominus," moreover, as applied to a priest, was inferior to 
"  Doctor " and even "Master,"  and seems to have been applied regularly 
to those who had taken no  University degree or none higher  than that 
of  Bachelor, a custom still retained  at Cambridge (k). 
2  Proceedi';"gs of  the Przvy Council, iii. lxi. : Nicolas interprets the phrase 
as meanlng  a full meeting,pf  peers."  But there are other lords than 
peers;  "  lords of  parliament  would be more correct. 
a  Rd.  Purl.,  ii.  225, vi.  232. 
May,  Parliamentary Practice, p.  496. 
to  be  called  the parliament  chamber  because  the council 
parleyed  there,  lords  and  commons  still  assemble  as one 
gathering before the throne to hear the king's  speech, the 
prorogation  or  dissolution  of  parliament,  and  the  royal 
assent  to legislation,  although the historical  origin  of  the 
chamber is effectually  concealed beneath its modern  name 
of  the house  of  lords.  Edward I  knew  no  more  of  two 
houses than he did of  three estates;  and in his  reign  and 
in those of his son and his grandson, all the formal work of 
parliament is done in common session.  It is only the work 
thus done in common, and perhaps in public, that is officially 
recorded  in  the  " Rolls  of  Parliament."  Such  are  the 
" acts " of parliament. 
This  common  session,  however,  while  convenient  and 
even  indispensable  for  the  formal  proceedings  of  parlia- 
ment, was no less inconvenient for its real work of  delibera- 
tion  and  discussion.  Only  rigid  rules  of  procedure,  the 
result  of  six  centuries  of  elaboration,  enable  a  body  so 
homogeneous as the present house of  commons to transact 
any business at all;  in the assemblies which  the first  two 
Edwards called few rules of procedure had yet been evolved, 
and the gatherings, whether they consisted of  six grades or 
of  three estates, were too heterogeneous to act in common. 
If  the king  extracted any response  at all  to his  demands 
for money  or requests  for counsel, it would be a babel  of 
tongues.  Intelligent  answers  could  only  proceed  from 
previous  consultation;  and the  exigencies of  consultation 
required  some  sort of  organization.  The accepted  theory 
is  that this  organization  took  from the  first  the  form  of 
two  houses  or  three  estates;  the Modus  Tenendi ParLia- 
menturn speaks, on the other hand, of  six grades, assigning 
to each a  clerk, whose  function was  presumably  to reduce 
the resolutions  of  his "  grade " to writing, and possibly to 
keep some record of  its proceedings.  The "  Rolls of  Parlia- 
ments " do not support either  theory in its entirety;  they 
refer vaguely  to an indefinite  number  of  "  estates " ; but 
never, I think, to more than two clerlzs.  One was the clerk 
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still sits in  the house  of  lords; l  and  the  other  was  the 
clerk  of  the  domus  communis.  There  may  have  been 
more;  thz proctors  of  the clergy doubtless had a  clerk of 
their  own,  who  might  also be a  clerk of  convocation, and 
the  different  answers  sometimes  returned  by  the knights 
and the burgesses imply separate deliberation and possibly 
separate clerks to record  their results.  But if  the picture 
drawn  in  the  Modzls  ever  represented  actual  practice, 
that  practice  was  greatly  modified  during  the  fourteenth 
century ; and by a process of  elimination and amalgamation 
the six grades were reduced to three or two. 
In the first  place,  the clerical proctors preferred  to give 
their  answers to the king's  proposals  in  convocation,  and 
absented themselves from the parliament  chamber, though 
their right to petition the king in parliament remained, and 
in Richard 11's reign, the appointment of  Thomas Percy as 
clerical  proctor,  to assent  to  the  proceedings  against  the 
Appellants, paid homage to the doubtful theory that clerical 
consent was  necessary  to their  ~alidity.~  This abstention 
eliminated one of  the six "  grades "  of  the Modus.  Another 
disappeared  with  the  amalgamation  of  the  knights  and 
burgesses,  and a  third with  the  merging  of  the  specially- 
summoned  barons and prelates under the common designa- 
tion of "  seigneurs "  or "  lords "  of  parliament.  The process 
was thus complete by which parliaments came in appearance 
to consist of  two houses and of  three estates.  It was  due, 
however, not to any preconceived ideas about the value of 
a bi-camera1 legislature or of a threefold system of  estates, 
but  to  the  operation  of  royal  writs  and  political  con- 
venience.  It was  the  custom  of  the  king's  chancery,  in 
issuing  special  writs  of  summons,  that  differentiated  the 
lesser from the greater baron, the " peer " from the knight 
1 His  present  postal  address, "  Clerk  of  the  Parliaments,  House  of 
Lords,"  is in itself  an item of  historical evidence.  The use of  the plural, 
"  parliaments," and the juxtaposition  of  the two terms, point the contrast 
betwecn  the medieval and the modern  view  of  his position. 
2  Rot.  Purl., iii.  348, 356.  There is no evidence of  the actual presence 
of  the well-known  Thomas Haxey in the parlbmsnt of  1396; he seems 
merely  to have sent up a bill  to the commons  upon  which  they acted 
(ibid., iii. 339). 
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of the shire, and one abbot from another.  As  early as the 
reign of  Edward I11 there was a list in existence of  twenty- 
eight  abbots whom  it  was  not  customary  to summon  by 
special writ,l and this custom made some of  them lords of 
parliament and left others out in the cold.  It was political 
convenience that  led  the  knights  of  the shire  to  coalesce 
with  the  burgesses,  and  induced  the  clerical  proctors  to 
 onf fine  themselves to convocation. 
Both  the  process  of  coalition  and that  of  elimination 
would  have  been  impossible had  there  been  any  marked 
division  of  estates.  The mere fact that the knights of  the 
shire  could  separate  from the  other  barons  and throw in 
their  lot  with  the burgesses proves  that  the  lines  of  de- 
marcation were not deep or fundamental.  There was, indeed, 
a  sharp distinction between  the  freeman  and  the villein; 
but that had nothing to do with parliamentary organization. 
The villein  had no "  estate " in anything, and nowhere did 
he constitute an "  estate " of the realm.  He had no status 
or  locus  standi in the king's  court,  except  in  so  far as he 
was  protected by the king's  claim to criminal  jurisdiction, 
and therefore none  in the king's  high  court of  parliament. 
The other clear distinction in English  medieval  society was 
between  layman and clerk;  but that, too, soon ceased to 
influence parliamentary organization,  because  the proctors 
ceased to attend, and in the "  upper house " or great council 
in parliament  the  common  receipt  of  a  special writ  over- 
rode  the  distinction  between  spiritual and temporal;  the 
peers did not  act as two  estates, but as counsellors of  the 
crown. 
This  had  an  all-important  effect upon  the  course  of 
English  constitutional  history,  and  saved  the  country  on 
more than one occasion from formal revolution  (I).  If  the 
necessary assent of  the lords spiritual and temporal to legis- 
lation  had involved  the independent  assent  of  a  majority 
of  each "  estate,"  many  a  change  constitutionally  carried 
out  could  only  have  been  effected by  revolution.  As  it 
was,  spiritual  votes  could  help  to carry temporal  reforms 
l Pike, p. 349; see below, p. 99. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLI.4 MENT 
in the teeth of  a majority of  temporal peers, and temporal 
votes  could  carry  religious  reforms  in  spite  of  spiritual 
peers.'  The  bishops  and  abbots  protested  against  the 
statutes of  provisors  and przmunire;  they were  none  the 
less law for that, and the prelates did not pretend that their 
protest  had  the  effect  of  a  royal  veto.  A  majority  of 
spiritual  peers  did,  indeed,  vote  for  Henry  VIII's  and 
Somerset's  ecclesiastical  changes;  but  with  Warwick's 
accession to power and the adoption by the government of 
definitely  protestant  proposals,  this  ecclesiastical  acquies- 
cence  disappeared, and the crisis came in the first year of 
Elizabeth.  Every  spiritual peer present  voted against her 
act of  supremacy and her act of  uniformity, and the latter 
was  only  carried  by  a  majority  consisting  of  twenty-one 
temporal peers over a minority consisting of  eighteen spiritual 
and temporal peers.  By no conceivable stretch of  language 
could  it  be  contended  that  the  spiritual  "  estate " had 
consented  to  Elizabeth's  settlement  of  religion, although 
the notion of  three estates had by this time made sufficient 
way to countenance the theory that the assent of  each was 
indispensable  to  the  validity  of  legislation.  If  this  was 
the true theory of  the constitution,  then, indeed, the  acts 
of  supremacy  and uniformity  were  not  merely  unconsti- 
tutional,  but  illegal;  in  fact,  they  were  no  acts  at all, 
and  the  courts  should  have  refused  to  carry  them  out. 
But it was not, and never had been, the true theory of  the 
constitution,  because  parliaments  had never  consisted  of 
estates  at all.  Nor  was  it  possible  to  escape  from  the 
dilemma by the hypothesis that a majority of  two  out  ol 
the  three  estates  could  over-ride  the  third;  for  in  that 
case  the lords spiritual and  temporal  could  always  have 
legislated in defiance  of  the commons, but in Henry VI1's 
reign the judges had laid it down that even for  an act of 
It has often been contended that Elizabeth's  ecclesiastical settlement 
was  unconstitutional  because  it was  carried  against  the  votes  01  the 
spiritual peers ; but the same theory would invalidate temporal measures 
carried  by  episcopal  votes, except on the assumption  that ecclesiastical 
affairs were  the concern of  ecclesiastics alone, but state affairs were  the 
common concern of  laymen and ecclesiastics. 
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attainder,  an  almost  purely  judicial  function,  the  co- 
operation  of  the commons  was  essentia1.l  The  theory  of 
the  three  estates  would,  in  fact, if  there  had  been  any 
substance in  it, have stereotyped and petrified the consti- 
tution  in  the  middle  ages.  But  Englishmen's  politicaI 
instinct has always been sounder than their scholarship  or 
their  logic;  and  constitutional  progress  has  not  been 
seriously impeded by the theories of  constitutional historians. 
It is, indeed, hardly too much to say that parliament, so 
far from being a system of  three estates, is the very nega- 
tion  of the whole idea.  A system of  estates is built  upon 
the principle,  not  of  national, but of  class representation; 
it suggests that a nation is not  one, but three states, each 
with  an independent will  of  its own, and each entitled to 
veto  national  progress.  It was  by  no  accident  that  the 
first step in the first French  Revolution was  the fusion of 
the three estates into one National Assembly.  The differ- 
ence  between  English  and French  development  was  that 
in France the fusion was instantaneous and therefore caused 
an  explosion,  while  in  England  it  was  a  gradual  trans- 
formation spread over centuries.  The reduction of  the six 
"  grades " of  the  Mod~s  to  two  or  three was  an  illus- 
tration of  the process,  and a proof of  the elasticity of  the 
English  political  and social system.  There  were  no  fixed 
gulfs between the different grades which the royal  authority 
could  not  bridge.  If  the knights  deliberated  apart from 
the  magnates,  it  was  not  because  there  was  any  social 
barrier between them, but because the crown directed them 
to deliberate with the commons; and conversely it directed 
the  prelates  and  magnates  to  consult  t~gether.~  The 
crown,  too,  could  issue  a  special  writ  of  summons  to a 
knight  and thus  convert  him  into a  magnate;  and by  a 
See my Henry  VII, ii. No.  14. 
Rot.  Pavl.,  ii.  135.  This  explicit  direction  of  the  crown  in  1343 
implies  that prelates  and  magnates,  knights  and burgesses  might have 
otherwise,  and probably  had previously,  deliberated apart and returned 
separate answers; and if, with Mr. Pike, we assign the  Modus to the second 
quarter of  the fourteenth century, this direction would tend to strengthen 
the credibility of  its division of  parliaments into six grades. 7Y  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
writ of distraint could make an esquire into a knight.  The 
most permanent  factor in  the English  medieval  represen- 
tative system consisted of  the knights of  the shire, and they 
represented, not an estate, but the shire courts of  the realm. 
"  Status," indeed, entitled no one to any position in medieval 
parliaments ; their composition and their organization were 
alike determined by royal writs and royal directions.  Even 
to-day  it  is  a  royal  writ,  and not  hereditary  right,  that 
entitles  a  peer  to sit in the house  of  lords; and it was  a 
royal  writ  that  entitled  a  borough  to elect  a  member  of 
the house  of  commons.  It is  true that through  judicial 
decisions in one case, and through statute law in the other, 
the crown has lost the power of  refusing a special writ of 
suillmons to the eldest son of  a peer  or a general writ to a 
borough;  but  without  the writ  the peer's  heir  could  not 
takk  his  seat  and the  borough  could  not  elect,  and  the 
modern form is the relic of  a medieval power. 
Nor  is it without significance that the English  was  the 
only  representative  system  called  a  parliament,  or  that 
other nations, when they set about imitating English insti- 
tutions,  abandoned  the  name  of  estates.  Emphasis  has, 
in  fact, been  continually  laid  by  constitutional  historians 
upon the differences between English and foreign represen- 
tative  systems;  but  it is  singular  that  they  should  have 
sought  to  fix  upon  the  English  parliament  a  designation 
appropriate only to those  estates from which  its difference 
is  so  clearly  marked.  Estates-general  could  only  vote 
taxes  and petition  for  redress;  they  could  not  impeach, 
or  pass  acts of  attainder, or  enforce  the  responsibility  of 
ministers.  For  they  were not  a  court  of  law,  and it was 
from  its armoury  as  the  sovereign  court  that parliament 
drew  the  weapons  it  used  with  most  effect  against  the 
crown.  Its procedure by bill was borrowed from chancery, 
its powers of  judicature were inherited from the curia regis, 
its acts have always been "  due process of  law "-a  character 
which American judges have denied to acts of  the American 
congress ;  for that is not a parliament  or a court. 
The ineffectiveness of  estates-general  arose from the fact 
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that  they were  nothing  but  a  body,  or bodies,  of  repre- 
sentatives.  They were  not  numbered  among  the "  cours 
souverains " of  France,  and  the  judicial  functions  per- 
formed by  the  English  parlia~nent  were  left  in  France to 
the  non-representative  pavleme?tts.  The  use  of  impeach- 
ment and acts of attainder in England from the fourteenth 
to  the  eighteenth  century may have involved  injustice to 
individuals,  but  it  was  of  inestimable  service  to  English 
constitutional  progress  that  the  judicial  review  of  state 
offences should have been preserved  for the English repre- 
sentative assembly  by  the  fact  that  it  was  a  parliament 
rather than a system of  estates.  It was hardly of  less im- 
portance that the representative elements themselves, when 
added by Simon de Montfort and  Edward  I to the king's 
council  in  parliament, should have appeared in a juridical 
guise.  Every suitor to the county court in which  members 
were  returned  to the  house  of  commons  was  an  actual 
juror;  the  elector  was  present  at the  election  primarily 
because  he  had  to attend the court  for  judicial  business. 
And  the  legal  capacity  clung  to  their  representatives;  if 
the  lords  in  parliament  were  its  judges,  the  commons, 
says  Prynne,  were  "  informers,  prosecutors,  grand  jury- 
men."  "  Through all their history, too, the Commons have 
remained '  the Grand Inquest of  the Nation.'  Judges  and 
inquest  the  two  Houses  were  before  they  were  joined; 
Council and Grand  Inquest  they remained;  and this con- 
ception  of  their  origin,  their  character,  their  duties,  and 
their privileges serves in a large measure to explain through- 
out  the history  of  Parliament not  only the claims of  one 
Houst  sgainst the other,  but also their common claims as 
the High Court of  Parliament."  l 
But  while parliament  consists, in  its judicial  aspect,  of 
judges  and inquest, it is in  its political  aspect  a  meeting 
of council and community.  Members of  the upper  house 
have properly claimed to be historically the counsellors of 
the crown, although hereditary right  was  not  the original 
basis  of  their  title  to  give  counsel  to  the  crown;  and 
1 McIlwain, The High  Court of Parliament, pp. 1867. 80  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
historically  the  house  of  lords  is  the  king's  council  in 
parliament.  No  quorum  was,  however,  required  to  give 
validity to the action of  a royal council;  because its func- 
tion  was  to  advise,  and. the  act  was  always  the king's. 
Thus the Modus  goes  so far  as to  say that  even  though 
every  specially-summoned magnate  absented himself  from 
a meeting between the crown and the community, the meet- 
ing might  still be a  valid  parliament.  The  two  essential 
factors  were  the  crown  and  the  community,  that  com- 
munitas communitaturn which came to be called the house 
of  commons.  If  this  seems  modern,  it  is  also  medieval 
doctrine;  and  the  conservative  value  of  history  is  that, 
when  properly  understood,  it helps  us  to see how reform 
succeeds  not  by  innovation,  but  by  the  renovation  and 
expansion  of  the principles  and practice  out of  which  the 
constitutional  fabric has  been  made.  If  parliaments  had 
ever  been  based  on  a  foundation  of  three  estates,  our 
constitutional  development  would  have  encountered  that 
dilemma of  stagnation or revolution which  sooner or  later 
has  confronted  every  representative  system  founded  on 
class divisions.  It was a happy fate for England  that its 
parliaments were dominated by elements, ideas, and a  pro- 
cedure emanating from the curia regis until after its estates 
had been  ~nerged  by  the growth of  national feeling into a 
single state. 
CHAPTER  V 
THE FICTION  OF THE PEERAGE 
IN  speaking of  the "  fiction " of  the peerage, no allusion 
is intended to certain  sumptuous and annual publications, 
the genealogical contents of  which might fairly entitle them 
to that description.  Nor is it meant to deny that a work of 
fiction may be good as well as bad.  Fictions, and especially 
legal fictions, have played a great and sometimes a beneficent 
part in English constitutional history.  The presence of  the 
king  in every court and every parliament  in the empire is 
a  useful fiction;  the dogmas that "  the king never  dies " 
and can do no wrong, are others of  no less value.  By means 
of  fictions judges have made law, and there is a considerable 
element of  truth in the claim that on some occasions national 
legislation  by  the  judges  over-rode  the class legislation  of 
par1iaments.l  At times the fictions of  the courts have been 
strong meat, and the identification of  Cheapside with "  the 
high seas," which was once effected in a court of  law to bring 
a  case  within  its jurisdiction,  marks  perhaps  the limit  to 
which  the  process  should be  ~arried.~  But the house  of 
lords is the highest  court of  law for civil jurisdiction  in the 
British Isles, and it is natural that there legal fictions should 
have winged their highest  flight.  Certainly no legal fiction 
runs counter to more historical fact than the rule of  the house 
of  lords that a special writ of summons to the Model  Par- 
liament  of  12gj  entitled  its recipient  and his successors to 
an hereditary peerage, and consequently to a special writ of 
summons to every succeeding parliament until his lineage 
T. E. Scrutton, The Land  in Fetters, p. 76. 
McIlwain, p. 266. 
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was  extinct;  and that if  a  commoner  can  to-day  prove 
himself to be the eldest male descendant in the eldest male 
line of any one who has since 1295  been specially summoned 
to and taken his seat in  a parliament, he becomes thereby 
entitled to a peerage of  the United Kingdom and his blood 
is ennobled  for ever. 
Before we  proceed to examine this tissue of  legal fiction 
and its bearing upon the history of  parliament, it may be 
well to  enter a plea on  behalf  of  the committee of  privi- 
leges which  advises  the  house  of  lords on peerage  cases. 
Every one of  the distinguished lawyers who constitute that 
court is perfectly aware by this time that this rule is based 
on a mass of  historical falsehood;  he will  none  the less be 
bound  in conscience to enforce it as the law.  For the law 
takes little ,cognisance of  historical fact  until  the fact has 
been  interpreted by the law; and then  the interpretation 
becomes both  fact and  law.  Once  the  interpretation  has 
been  accepted, the historical  fact or fiction  upon  which it 
was  originally  based  becomes  irrelevant;  and no  amount 
of  historical  investigation  can  affect  the law.  It is  the 
law  of  the land  that any  one  who  proves  himself  the 
heir of  a magnate of  1295 is  entitled to a  peerage.  Not 
even  the crown  can  debar  him  from  it;  and  the  court 
is bound to enforce that law.  It is also apparently bound 
to do  far greater violence to historical  truth, to interpret 
historic  facts of  the fourteenth  century in the light  of  a 
law  that  was  not  evolved  till  the  seventeenth,  and  to 
assume that when  Edward  I  or  Edward I1  summoned  a 
man by special writ to a parliament  he intended to create 
an hereditary peerage.  From the point of  view of  the court 
it is entirely irrelevant  to prove that Edward I would  not 
have known what the phrase "  hereditary peerage " meant, 
that he never  created or intended to create one in his life, 
that  scores  of  barons  summoned  by  special  writ  to  one 
parliament were not summoned again, and that no one for 
more  than  a  century  after  Edward  1's  death  dreamt  of 
claiming a right to a peerage at all. 
All  this would  be merely historical fact;  to impress the 
court  one  must  show  that this  historical  fact  had  been 
interpreted as law.  It is fortunate for the peerage that the 
house of  lords can take no cognisance of  historical fact which 
conflicts with its own judicial interpretations.  If  the house 
of  lords says a  commoner is a peer, he is a peer,  however 
inadequate  or  erroneous  its reasons  may have  been.  A 
peerage adjudged to a claimant on the strength of  a forged 
pedigree  is  not  forfeited by  the  subsequent  proof  of  the 
forgery.  A  peerage  adjudged  to the heir  general  on  the 
strength  of  the  presumption  that  it was  created by writ 
of  summons is not  forfeited by the subsequent  discovery 
of  letters  patent  limiting  its descent  to the heirs  male; 
for  no  writs  of  error  lie  against  the  house  of  lords, 
interpretation  supersedes the fact, and the law is superior 
to history.  This, indeed, is common sense;  quod  non fieri 
debuit, facturn  valet.  Much  of  the law  of  England  might 
disappear  altogether  if  its  legality  depended  upon  the 
historical  accuracy  of  the  claims  to peerage  possessed  by 
those who  voted  for it;  and the legal  foundations of  the 
English church itself would no longer be secure if  the validity 
of  Elizabeth's act of  uniformity could be shaken by attack- 
ing the pedigrees of three of  the peers who constituted the 
majority in its favour. 
We are not, however, here concerned with the legal validity 
of  the lords' decisions, except to point out that the law of 
the  peerage  is  not  historical  evidence,  and  that  judicial 
theories  are  as  irrelevant  to  historical  investigation  as 
historical fact is to legal decisions.  The lawyer is bound by 
judicial decisions which are more important than evidence ; 
the historian is free.  A  judge  can make law in a sense in 
which the historian cannot make history.  It might indeed 
be  contended  that historians have been responsible for not 
less fiction than the courts of  law;  but there is a difference. 
The fiction of  the courts becomes a binding law;  the fiction 
of  the  historian  only  entertains  the  student.  It is  only 
when history is merged in theology that pontifical utterances 
are  considered  decisive  of  historical  problems.  It is  not 
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ex  cathedra ;  his opinion  constitutes neither a sentence nor 
a dogma, and there are no penalties for contempt of  court. 
The fictions of  the courts and of  the crown are much more 
serious matters.  Solus pri?zceps, runs a legal maxim, fingit 
qz~od  in rei veritate non  est ;  l  supreme capacity for fiction 
is  an attribute  of  sovereign  power.  Sometilnes  it  seems 
more like the last resort of  weakness, and some of  the fictions 
of  the crown have proved  an ever-present help in time of 
trouble.  Such were the rules that an allegation of  the crown 
could  not  be  traversed,  and  that  only  those  things  were 
"  records"  which  the  crown  could  call  to  mind.  The 
memory  of  the crown  became  the evidence  for  the fact. 
But it had in time to share its privileges with the peers and 
to acquiesce in the distribution of  its sovereign power;  and 
peerage law is not a fiction of  the crown, but the invention 
of  the house of  lords. 
None  of  the lords'  decisions have, however, summed up 
quite so  briefly  so  much  absurdity  as the popular  phrase 
"  blue blood."  It would hardly be worth while examining 
the fantastic implications of  this expression  of  the theory 
of peerage, had it not been seriously defended by the latest 
historian  of  the house  of  lords,  who writes  with intimate 
knowledge  of  many  aspects  of  peerage  history.  " The 
doctrine,"  says Mr.  Pike,2 "  is no absurdity at all, but one 
which is perfectly intelligible, perfectly consistent with itself 
at all  points, and as scientific as anything to be found in 
medieval  or  modern  literature."  Neither  medieval  nor 
modern  literature is perhaps the place to look for science, 
and it may be that this pronouncement is not intended to 
be  so  portentous  as  it  appears.  The  obvious  criticism, 
that the blood of  the younger sons of  a peer is just  as blue 
as that of  their eldest brother, and yet does not make them 
peers, is met by the explanation that the doctrine of  blue 
blood,  properly  understood,  does  not  mean  that  blueness 
of  blood in itself  made its fortunate possessor  a  peer,  but 
makes him capable of  inheriting  a  peerage.  This may  be 
1 Maitland, Collected Papers, iii. 310. 
2  Const. History of  the House  of  Lords, pp. 141 sqq. 
comforting to a  considerable  number  of  Englishmen;  for 
there are some thousands of living descendants of  our kings ;  1 
and there must be hundreds of  thousands descended from 
the younger  sons of  peers.  They are commoners none the 
less,  and the blueness  of  their  blood  gives  them  no  legal 
or  political  distinction  whatsoever.  If  this  is  all  that  is 
meant by this perfectly scientific doctrine, it has nothing to 
do  with  peerage.  For  there  is no  mistake  about a  peer; 
the legal and political distinctions between him and a com- 
moner are clear and sharp enough, and they can be acquired 
without  any pretence  to blueness  of  blood.  Moreover,  ~II 
the middle  ages the husband of  a peeress in her own right, 
although  himself  a  commoner,  was  often  summoned  by 
special writ  to parliaments.  Mr.  Pike  himself  quotes  the 
case of Ralph de Monthermer, who was summoned as Earl 
of  Gloucester and Hereford in the right of  his wife, but lost 
to her son the right to be  summoned when  that son came 
of  age.2  He seems to have enjoyed  that strange anomaly, 
a temporary lease of  blueness of  blood !  Into such vagaries 
can people be betrayed by mixing a physiological term like 
blood  with  law  and politics.  Titles to peerage have been 
decided, not  by blueness of  blood, but by royal  writs and 
judicial  decisions.  If it pleases people to think that their 
blood  was' turned  blue  by  a  writ  of  summons  or  letters 
patent, and made red again by attainder, there is no harm 
in  the superstition ; but it need not concern the student of 
the history of  the peerage. 
There are two serious problems to be considered.  Firstly, 
what is "  peerage," and how did it develop ?  And secondly, 
how did it come to enjoy its present position in parliament ? 
The two  are distinct  questions,  for  there  is no  necessary 
connexion between peers  and parliaments, at any rate not 
in  the modern  sense of  the peerage.  But  the word  itself 
has passed  through  the whole  gamut of  meaning, from its 
See Joseph Foster, The Royal Lineage of  our  Noble and Gentle Families, 
1881. 
''~~lsynge,  Modus, PP. 39, 55 ;  Pike, Const. History of  the Housr of Lords, 
pp.  70-2.  He was subsequently summoned as Baron blot~thermer  in his 
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etymological  sense of  "  equal " to its modern  implications 
of  privilege.  In the  earliest  Anglo-Norman  legal  termin- 
ology  it  simply  denoted equality.  Co-heiresses  were  said 
to be pares  in respect  of  their father's inheritance, because 
all inherited  equal shares;  a  villein  was  described  as the 
"  peer " of  other villeins holding  of  the same lord.  There 
were, in fact, all sorts of  peers;  we  read of  " peers of  the 
county,"  and "  peers of  the borough "; Valenciennes had 
tulelve  peers,  so had  Lille, and Rouen  had a  hundred  in 
the time of  King John.1  The Modus  Tenendi Parliamentum 
implies  that  every  member  of  a  parliament  was  a  peer, 
by  dividing the whole  assembly  into  sex  gvadus  pdrium, 
clerical proctors, knights, and burgesses, as well as prelates 
and magnates. 
But even before the Norman Conquest a limitation begins 
to be attached to the meaning of  " peer " on the continent, 
a  limitation  arising  out  of  its  frequent  association  with 
the words judicium  and judicare.  Undcr Charles the Bald 
in  856  and  Conrad  the  Salic  in  1037 we  find  it stated 
that  men  are  to  be  judged  per  pares  suos  or  secundum 
judicium  parizcm  suovunz ; and in England  from Henry I 
to Magna Carta we have constant references to the principle 
quisque judicandzcs  est  per  pares  suos  et  ejusdem provinciw. 
Peer, baron, and judge come to be used as almost synonymous 
terms,  though  where  a  vassal  speaks  of  his "  peers " the 
king speaks of  his "  barons,"  because the king has no  peer 
in his kingdom.  By this time only those are peers who are 
equal to judgement, and this excludes the majority; villani 
vero, Glanvill tells us, non sz~nt  inter legum judices  nume~nndi.~ 
This is the meaning of  "  peers "  at the time of  Magna Carta. 
The idea  that judicium  pariunz  in  that famous  document 
meant  trial by jury  has been  too  often  exploded  to need 
further  ~omrnent.~  But  it  is  material  to our  purpose  to 
point out that judgement by one's equals meant that one was 
not to be judged by inferiors;  it did not in the least mean 
1  L.  Vernon  Harcourt, His  Grace  the  Steward  arzd  Trial by Peers,  pp. 
226-7. 
a  Ibid., pp. 2054. 
a  Ibid., p. 207. 
Cf.  McKechnie,  Magna Carta, 1905, pp. 158-63,  456-8. 
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that one was not to be judged by superiors.l  Our criminals 
are not the peers of  our judges;  and every lord of  a manor 
could judge his villeins. 
The "  peers " are thus already a  privileged  class;  they 
possess the right to be judged by their fellow-vassals in the 
Icing's court, and the right to judge their villeins in their own.2 
They are also becoming hereditary, for these privileges are 
always  attached to the tenure  of  land, and the tenure of 
land, though at  first a mere life interest conditioned by service, 
grows  more  and  more  into  irresponsible  property.  This 
process  was  accelerated  by  the  creation  of  strict  entails 
under Edward I.  Estates now passed from father to son by 
right of  heredity, and with the estates the privilege of  exercis- 
ing judgement, which seems to be the essential factor in peer- 
age.  By the end of  Edward's  reign England may fairly be 
said to have had an hereditary peerage. 
But this peerage has as yet little to do with parliament. 
There  are  many  hundreds,  possibly  thousands,  of  these 
It pares," but Edward I summons less than a hundred mag- 
nates  by  special  writ  to parliament.  Those  who  sit  in 
parliament  have no  hereditary claim to do so.  The word 
I( peer " does not  occur in the "  Rolls of  Parliaments " for 
his reign, and it is not mentioned in his writs.  It does not 
entitle  any  one  to  a  special  writ  of  summons,  though 
probably every "  peer " was either summoned in person  or 
included  among  those  from  whom  the  sheriff  required 
obedience  to  the  general  writs.  But  the "  peers "  still 
numbered their  thousands,  and included  the lesser  as well 
as the greater barons.  It is clear, however, that the process 
of  limitation, begun by the restriction of  "  peerage "  to those 
who could "  judge,"  was proceeding apace in the thirteenth 
century; and the problem is to bridge the gulf  between the 
numbers of "  peers " entitled by Magna Carta to judge  and 
be judged by their equals, and the smaller but still indefinite 
"  Assisiae  vero  tenentur  per  barones  et legales  homines.  Par  per 
parem judicari  debet;  barones igitur et milites,  legis statuta scientes et 
Denm  timentes possunt judicare  unus  alium  et subditum  eis  populum,; 
rnstico enim noti licet, vel aliis de populo, militem vel clericurn judicare 
(Glanvill;  cf.  Polloclc  and  Maitland,  i.  173; Vernon  Harcourt,  pp.  207, 
214; History,  April, 1920, pp. 33-5). 
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number of  "  peers " who develop into a parliamentary force 
under Edward 11.  The question is closely connected with 
the  change  in  the  magnum  concilium.  By  what  process 
were the thousands of  tenants who  are presumed to have 
gathered on Salisbury Plain in 1086, reduced to the "  mag- 
nates "  vr;ho gathered at Oxford in 1258  ?  Or, in other words, 
how was the line drawn between the greater barons entitled 
by  Magna  Carta  to a  special writ  and the lesser  barons 
summoned in general through  the sheriff?  For it is clear 
that the term  pares  tends to be  restricted  to the greater 
barons ; and the same question might be put in yet another 
form:  what is the social and legal  difference between one 
who  holds  a barony  and one who simply holds by barony, 
or between one who holds fier  baroniam and one who holds 
per  servitiunr  militare?  The answer  to any  one  of  these 
questions should supply answers to all the others;  for the 
holder  of  a  barony  receives  a  special  writ  of  summons, 
becomes a magnate and then a modern peer.  Even those 
who  hold,  not  baronias  integras, but  per  baroniam,  are 
liable  to  the  summons;  for,  whatever  "barony"  may 
have  been,  it implied a  special jurisdiction  and  a  speciitl 
obligation to the crown which conferred it. 
Now it is obvious that the thousands who took the Sarum 
oath  to William  the Conqueror  did  not  all hold  baronies, 
and it may be doubted whether any definition of  a barony 
had yet been  evo1ved.l  But  they were all the king's men, 
his barons, and they held  their lands in chief  by  military 
service.  The lands might be great or they might be small ; 
the extent would not  affect the nature of  the tenure, but 
it would  affect  the political value and  importance  of  the 
tenant.  Before long there is a distinction between barons 
and knights;  both  hold  by the same military tenure-in- 
chief, but some are the king's barons, while others are only 
1 Cf. 15lsynge, p. 51. 
3  The term  "miles " or "knight " is here used  in its feudal sense, in 
which  it implied  tenure  by  military  service.  Later  on,  in  the days  of 
cliivalry,  it became  a  nolnen  et  honor, conferring  a  military  and social 
distinction without any reference to the tenure of  land, just as, in still later 
days, "  peerages "  came to be created without any reference to tenure-in- 
chief  of  the crown.  Barons were even  knighted, so  completely  did  the 
later idea supersede the feudal principle. 
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knights.  Later  there  is  a  further  distinction  among  the 
barons themselves; some are greater and some are less, and 
the lesser barons are lost among the knights.  By the time 
that the Modw is compiled, a rule has been  elaborated by 
the king's  exchequer  to distinguish barons  from  knights; 
the baron is the holder of  a barony, and a barony is thirteen 
and one-third Itnights' fiefs.l  Now a knight's fee is calcillated 
at five hides, and if a barony was thirteen and a third times 
as  much,  it  was  two-thirds  of  a  hundred  hides.  It  is 
merely  a  guess  that  such  an extent  of  land  may  have 
entitled  a  barony  to  be  regarded  as a  private  hundred 
possessing the jurisdiction usually connected with that unit 
of  organization.  But it does not appear entirely fanciful to 
conjecture that the individual holder of  extensive lands was 
regarded  as being  entitled to special immunities, such  as 
the right to exclude the sheriff from his barony, and exemp- 
tion for himself and his tenants from attendance at the shire 
court, just  as individual boroughs in later times achieved 
the status of  counties.  These  and  greater  privileges had 
been granted to the earlier "  honours," but from 1176, when 
Henry I1 insisted that no "honour"  should exclude the royal 
judges, there is said to have been little distinction between 
an "  honour" and a barony;  and it is probable that these 
two  kinds  of  "  liberty " or  "  franchise " approximated. 
For baronies tended to be reduced in number and increased 
in  size  and  dignity.  Some  fell  into  abeyance  between 
co-heiresses;  others  were  accumulated  in single  hands  by 
marriage and inheritance.  The process which  concentrated 
five earldoms in the hands of  Thomas of  Lancaster operated 
also in the case of  baronies. 
Now,  while the grant  of  immunity  from the shire court 
would  not  prevent  the baron  from attending  if  he  chose, 
frequent complaints in the thirteenth century of  the difficulty 
of holding shire courts owing to the number of  "  liberties " 
granted  by  the king  indicate  that voluntary attendance 
Stubbs, Charters, rgoo, p.  503. 
In the "Petition  of  the Barons,"  presented  at Oxford in  1258, they 
Complain of  the difficulty of  taking grand assizes owing to the numerous 
exemptions granted to knights by the king  28), while they  (5 17) attack 
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was rare ; and a rough division of  labour and liability seems 
to have been  in  practice established.  Lesser barons, who 
had to attend the shire court, were  only summoned  by  a 
general writ  to Westminster, the practical  effect  of  which 
was  probably a licence to stay away, and afterwards they 
were  permitted to excuse themselves by  sending a  couple 
of  representatives.  But  the  greater  barons,  who  escaped 
the duties of  the shire court, were at least liable to a special 
writ of  summons to parliament;  and it is probable that the 
divergence between knights and barons which had so powerful 
an effect  upon the organization and growth of  parliament, 
had  its root  in  an earlier  separation  in  the  shires.  The 
barons held aloof from the local business of  the people, while 
the knights busied themselves with its conduct;  and habits 
of  co-operation and of  management contracted in the shires 
were perpetuated in the national business of  parliament. 
Whatever  its cause  and  method  of  operation,  this  dis- 
crimination  between  greater  and  lesser  barons  effected  a 
change in the magnum concilium.  If  that name is properly 
applied to the concourse on  Salisbury Plain, the adjective 
clearly applies to the numbers who  attended, and  not  to 
their individual greatness.  For baron at first means nothing 
but "  man "; and baron  et  femme  is the regular Norman- 
French for "  man and wife."  But in  process  of  time  the 
magnum concilium  became a small  gathering of  great men 
rather  than  a  great  gathering  of  small  men.  Greatness, 
not tenure-in-chief, constitutes the right or the liability to a 
special writ of  summons to the magnuwz concilium, which in 
the reigns of  Henry I11 and Edward I1 seems to have been 
a  council  of  magnates.  It is  significant  that  during  the 
interval of  Edward 1's strong rule, the adjective disappears 
from the council.  His council is a royal and not an oligarchic 
council;  its  personnel  depends upon  royal  writs  and  not 
upon feudal privilege, and attendance is a matter of  obliga- 
tion and not of  right.  But the idea of  right has grown up 
in resistance to the centralizing  policy of  Henry 11, the tyranny 
of  John,  and the alien misgovernment  of  Henry  111;  and 
it is only for a time that Edward I can check the aristocratic 
claims  of  the  greater  barons  to limit  the royal  authority 
and  participate  in  the  control  of  national  affairs.  The 
contest centres round the council, its composition, and its 
powers.  Is it to be a council of  magnates based on baronial 
rights,  or  a  council  of  royal advisers dependent upon  the 
crown?  This is the issue between Edward I1 and Thomas 
of  Lancaster,  and  it is  during  that struggle that  peerage 
makes its dtbut as a constitutional force in parliament. 
Naturally it sought to base itself  upon precedent, and the 
jztdicium parium of Magna Carta formed a considerable part 
of  the political stock-in-trade of  the baronial party.  They 
appealed to it as to fundamental law, which bound the high 
court  of  parliament  itself; a judgement  or act which  con- 
travened Magna Carta was regarded as ipso facto void.1  But 
every political party falsifies history in its appeal to precedent, 
and  the judicium  parium  of  Magna  Carta  was  magnified 
and transformed under the stress of  political exigencies into 
a new political principle.  Its germ may no doubt be found 
in Magna Carta, and even in 1215  there may have been more 
in the minds of  the barons who talked about judgement  by 
peers than its purely  legal application.  Without  plunging 
into the vortex of  the discussion, which has vexed courts of 
law  as  well  as  historians,  about  the  meaning  of  vel  in 
the famous phrase  of  Magna  Carts,= fier judicium  parizlm 
suorum vel  per legem  terra, we  may perhaps indicate a pre- 
ference for the disjunctive interpretation, and hold  that in 
the minds  of  the barons there was  a  clear  and important 
antithesis  between lex  terra-the  custom of  the country- 
and judicium parium-a  more or less novel royal expedient 
or baronial ~afeguard.~  Henry  I1 had invented or  applied 
1 Edward 1's  Confirmatio Cartarum declared void all future judgements 
against Magna Carta, and the declaration was repeated in Stat. 42 Ed. 111, 
c. I (1368). 
2  Cf.  McICechnie,  Mapna  Carta, pp. 442-3; Vernon Harcourt, p.  224; 
Pollock and Maitland, i.  152 n.  It may not be presumptuous to remark 
that vel  is always disjunctive, but that sometimes it differentiates  things 
and sometimes only words.  That does not, however, help us with judicium 
pacium  z'el lex terra, because the whole  dispute is whether those are two 
different  things or merely  two descriptions  of the same. 
3 While  lex  is  the custom,,of  the,fountry,  a  judicium  is  a  particular 
sentence  or  "doom,"  and  doom  is  perhaps  the  best  translation; 
doomsday is the day of  judgement.  The ordeal and trial by battle were 
parts of  the lex, but the result of  any particular ordeal or combat would 
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to England a number  of  new-fangled legal methods which 
were  certainly  no  part  of  the customary  law  of  the land; 
and one at least of  the motives of  Magna Carta was to protect 
the barons against the abuse, if  not also against the use of 
Henry  11's  expedients.  The ancient  laws  or  customs the 
barons did not impugn, but they would have none of  these 
novel  judicia  except with  their  consent.  The  crown  was 
not to be  free to devise judicial methods and enforce them 
by judges who were no better than royal servants;  if  there 
were  to be innovations,  the barons  must  consent to their 
institution or at least participate in their application. 
A  case  in  the  reign  of  Edward  I  may  illustrate  their 
point of  view.  A baron objected to the king's judges  that 
they were not proceeding against him per  legem terra ;  the 
judges  admitted the fact, but thought  it no  bar  to their 
action.  They were proceeding by royal mandate, per sfieciale 
mandatum regis, we  might say in later legal 1anguage.l  It 
was to bar such proceedings that the principle of  judicium 
parium  expanded  with  the  growth  of  royal  jurisdiction. 
The crown was ever pronouncing new decisions, and chancery 
devising  novel writs.2  These  things  were  no  part  of  the 
lex ;  they were therefore not to be done except per  judicium 
pariztm.  Even  acts  of  parliament  were  not  leges,  but 
the  judicia  of  a  court.  The  law  was  begetting  politics, 
and the privilege of  peerage overflowed from the one sphere 
into the other.  The invasion was all the more easy because 
the frontiers had not yet been fixed ; a resolution of  the king 
in  council to make war on  a vassal was a  judicium  super 
eum ire,3 and  every  legislative act  was  also  a  judicium. 
Judicium parium was a principle that might be  applied in 
every sphere of  public affairs, and the veto of  the house of 
lords has a pedigree stretching back to Magna  Carta. 
But  the more  widely  the  principle  was  extended,  the 
1 Vernon Harcourt, pp. 281,301  ; but the phrase is used in Edward 111's 
reign  (Rot. Parl., ii. 266). 
2  Maitland  (Collected  Papers,  ii.  155)  mentions  the  existence  of  471 
different kinds of  original writs in Edward 1's reign,  compared with fifty 
or sixty in  1227. 
At least so says Vernon  Harcourt, p.  248. 
narrower grew the class which benefited by its operation.  The 
pares of  Magna Carta may have been few compared with the 
total population, but they were a multitude compared with 
the peers by whom and in whose interests Edward I1 was to 
be deprived of  royal authority.  The reign of  Edward I was 
treated as an interlude, and the barons reverted to the inter- 
regnum  of  the Barons'  Wars.  But they had no Simon de 
Montfort among them, and showed no desire to share their 
counsels with knights of  the shire or burgesses.  They had, 
however, some notions of  their own which had not occurred 
to authors of  the Provisions of  Oxford;  and it is at this 
crisis that we first read about peers "  de la terre " used in 
a sense somewhat nearer to its modern signification than the 
flares  of  Magna Carta. 
The phrase is stated to have first been used in 1322  in the 
charges of  "  the prelates, earls, and barons, and the other 
peers of  the land and the commons of  the realm " against 
the two Despencers?  But  there  is  an earlier instance  of 
the use of  the phrase  in the indenture drawn up between 
Edward  I1 and Lancaster at Leake in August  1318.~  This 
agreement  provides  for  the  attendance  at council  of  two 
bishops,  one  earl, a  baron, and a  banneret of  Lancaster's 
household, on  Lancaster's behalf, and stipulates that if  the 
earl's representatives disagreed with  any resolution  of  the 
council,  soit  tenuz  #or  nient  et  adresce  en parlement  par 
agard  des pieres,  et  totes  choses  convenables  soient  redressez 
par  eux.  The later reference lays a good deal of  stress on 
the #ieres  de la terre;  the phrase  occurs five  times in the 
docum.ent.  Judgement by peers is no longer a mere protection 
against  the legal  innovations  of  the crown;  it has  been 
erected into the principle that they are to judge  the acts 
of  the crown and its ministers.  Impeachment already looms 
upon the horizon. 
1 Pike,  p. 157,  citing the Close  Roll of  14  Edward 11,  membrane  14, 
printed  in  Statutes  of  the  Realm,  i.  181-4.  The  fourteenth  year  of 
Edward 11, however, ran from July  13m,  to July  1321. 
2  Rot. Parl., i.  453-5.  The entry runs  escrit a Leek le ix jour d'Augst 
I'an  du regne du dit Roi Edward duzieme,"  and it was read and examined 
at the York parliament of  Oct. 1318.  The entry is printed in the Rot. Parl. 
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This use of the word "  peers " in the reign of  Edward I1 
is  limited to the Lancastrians;  no  royal  clerk  or  royalist 
partisan  seems  to  employ it, and  it  obviously  expresses 
a  political  theory  held  by  the  opposition.  Its adoption 
by  Lancaster  in  the  proceedings against  the  Despencers 
recalls  the  insistence  by  the  Lords  Ordainers  upon  the 
"baronage"  in their attacks upon Gavest0n.l  Peerage is a 
principle used to support the,magnates in resistance to the 
crown, and par  agard  des pieres  takes in 1318-22  the place 
of  the par  agard  del  baronage  of  1311.  It was  naturally 
selected by the opposition because the "  peers " had grown 
to be  independent of  the king; they could hardly pretend 
to independence so long as they were tenants-at-will of  the 
crown and called  themselves barons.  But hereditary  ten- 
dencies culminating in strict entails had rendered the lords 
of  the land secure;  and lords, seigneurs, barons, and peers 
of  the land come to be used as synonymous terms to express 
a landed aristocracy striving for political supremacy.  Their 
claims  reach  their  high-water  mark  in  the ordinances  of 
1311.  The king  is not  to leave the realm,  declare war, 
appoint  judges  or  ministers, keepers of  castles or wardens 
of  ports without the assent of  his baronage; and the royal 
authority is put in commission among the "  peers." 
But we  are still some distance from the modern peerage, 
and even when  clerks of  chancery are constrained to write 
of  peers in Edward 111's reign they leave a very vague im- 
pression  of the meaning of  the word.  That it was not the 
modern meaning is clear from the most cursory inspection 
of  the "  Rolls of  Parliaments "  wherein the clerk often writes 
of  "  prelates, earls, barons, and their peers,"  but never limits 
the  peers  to prelates,  earls, and   baron^.^  The  vagueness 
of  the phrase is illustrated by the fact that it was possible 
for a not unlearned clerk of  the parliaments in the seventeenth 
century  to maintain that the peers  of  the realm were  not 
the earls or barons, but the bannerets, who were  not infre- 
1 Rot. Parl., i. 28!.ff. 
2  Cf.  Rot.  Purl.,  11.  53 : "  Lesqaeux  countes,  barouns,  et peres,"  and 
"  peres, countes, et barouns." 
yently summoned by  special writs  to parliament.1  This 
introduces an unwarrantable precision into the terminology 
of  the fourteenth  century, but there is no doubt that ban- 
nerets  were  included  in  the  category  of  those  who  are 
described as peers of the prelates, earls, and barons.  Earls 
and barons were peers, but others were peers as we11,2  and 
the clearest indication of who these others were is afforded 
by the grant, in January  1339-40, of  a tenth to the king by 
the earls and barons for themselves and  for their peers of 
the  land  who  hold  by  bar~ny.~  Just  as in  Anglo-Saxon 
timcs  there were  men  who  were "  thegnworthy " without 
being thegns, so in the fourteenth century there were men 
who, without being earls or barons, were their peers.  From 
a passage in  the dlodus we  might  infer  that  this  line of 
peerage  was  determined by the possession of  thirteen and 
a  third knights'  fees;  but  the  inference would  not  be 
safe.  There  are  instances  of  men  possessing  less  than  a 
single knight's fee being summoned by special writ to parlia- 
ment, and before long Richard I1 will create peers by letters 
patent  without  any reference to the lands  they hold.  In 
any  case  this  peerage  constituted  a  liability  rather  than 
a right;  and just  as the tenure of  a ha'porth  of  land,  as 
Bracton says,6 by military tenure rendered the tenant liable 
to feudal incidents, so it rendered him liable to a special writ 
of  summons to the king's high court.  It gave him no right to 
such a summons;  but if  it were sent, he could not disobey 
unless he could prove that he held no land per  baroniam.6 
H.  Elsynge, The Manner of  Holding Parliaments, ed. 1768, pp. 43-8,  79. 
Selden  (Jyiicature  in Parliaments,  p.  159) writes  of  earls, barons, and 
llbaronets  assembled  in  the parliament  of  r386,; and the roll  of  1513 
has  <levcry  other  baron,  baronet, and  baroness  (Lords'  Journals,  1. 
p. xxvi.), where baronet seems to be the eldest son of a baron.  For other 
uses and the confusion of  banneret and baronet, see N. E. D. 
a  Earls, barons, and peers are all summarily referred  to (Rot. Parl., ii. 
53) as "  lesdits peres."  a  Zbid., ii. 107. 
4  Stubbs, Charters, p.  503 : "  item summoneri et venire debent omnes 
et singuli comites  et barones  et  eorum pares,  scilicet illi qui habent . . . 
tresdecim  feoda et tertiam partem unius feodi militis."  The poet Spenser 
thought these pares  of  the earls and barons were baronets;  see N. E. D., 
S.V. ,"  Baronet."  Pollock and Maitland, i. 257. 
6  Rot.  Parl.,  ii.  132,  139.  Nevertheless,  recipients  of  special writs of 
summons  did  occasionally  claim  exemption  on  the  ground  that  they 
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There were, therefore, many peers, but not every one who 
called  himself  a  peer  was  called  to parliament.  Nor  is 
the word  officially  used  as a  normal  description of  those 
who received a special writ of  summons.  Its correct employ- 
ment  is with  reference to judicial  proceedings, to trial by 
peers of  their equals.  It is then that the peers most insist 
on their peerage ;  as peers they are there in the king's high 
court  for  judicial  purposes only.  When  political matters 
are under discussion, it is not a's peers that they act, but as 
lords of  the council in parliament, and they are described 
as  prelates,  earls,  barons  et  azltres  grarttz  or  magnates. 
The king still holds his court in his council in his parliaments ; 
its duties are multifarious, and so are the parts of  its members. 
When they sit in judgement  they act as peers, when  they 
advise  the  crown  in  matters  of  administration  they  are 
councillors, and in time both these functions will be obscured 
by their third capacity as legislators.  This is not the view 
of  the "  peers"  themselves.  In their  own  eyes they  are 
peers above everything ; and in all their petitions, whatever 
their  purport,  they call themselves "  peers."  They  speak 
of the statutes made by the king, peers, and the commons ;  1 
they demand that the chancellor and the treasurer  should 
always be "  peers."  They won  in the end, but it  is  not 
until after the close of  the middle ages that "  peers "  became 
a  regular term  for the lords in parliament;  and  it never 
became a correct and exhaustive description of  those who 
sat in the house of  lords. 
Nor  did the use of  the term in the least imply that even 
when trial of  peers was the business of  parliament, any peer 
had a right to be present.  Some peers must participate in 
order to make the trial a trial by  peers;  and presumably 
all the "  peers "  who had received a special writ to a parlia- 
ment  were  entitled to sit  when  parliament  tried  a  peer. 
These peers  gradually,  too,  asserted  the principle  that no 
one  who  was  not  a  peer,  even  though  he had  received a 
special writ,  was  entitled to judge  a  peer.  The  prelates 
ceased  to take  part  in  judicial  proceedings, not  so  much 
1 Rot. Parl., ii. 140. 
perhaps because their "  peerage " was doubtful as because 
their holy orders forbade the shedding of  blood; and  the 
trial of  peers in parliament  was always on capital charges. 
The  exclusion of  the judges,  or  rather their  reduction  to 
the position of  assistant advisers without a vote, substanti- 
ated the old  claim  of  the barons  that  the king's  judges 
and barons of  the exchequer were not their peers and could 
not  judge  them.  But the old  claim was  vastly  extended; 
and the inferiority of  the judges,  admitted when  the lords 
sat to try their peers, was also enforced by degrees when the 
lords sat in their other capacities, as a council and as a house 
of  parliament.  The fact that the judges  could not perform 
one of  the functions of  the Iring's  court  in  his  council in 
parliaments was eventually held to debar them from perform- 
ing the others ;  and ultimately the principle that a man should 
only be tried by his peers was distorted into the notion that 
peers, and peers only, could vote in the house of  lords.  By 
a  like perversion the trial of  men by their peers sometimes 
became their trial  by  the peers.  This was not an infringe- 
ment  of  Magna  Carta, because none  of  its clauses  forbade 
trial  by  one's  superiors.  The peers'  jurisdiction, too,  was 
limited  to  crimes  against  Magna  Carta.l  But  even  with 
this limitation their claim was a usurpation.  It is true that 
in  1330  they protested that as peers  they were  not  bound 
to try Simon Burford, who was not their peer.  Yet as "  judges 
of  the parliament " they, with the assent  of  the king, sen- 
tenced him also as a trait~r.~  This, they admit, was against 
+he  law, and ultimately it was established that the participa- 
tion of  the commons as the grand inquest of  the nation was 
essential to the trial of  commoners by the peers and to their 
condemnation by act of  attainder.3 
In 1311  the Ordinances also included the Confirmation of  the Charters 
acd the Ordinances themselves among the laws, the breach of  which was 
to be tried  by the barons in parliament;  and in 1341 the peers wanted to 
include the "liberties  of  holy  church"  and the Charter  of  the Forests 
(Rot. Parl.,  i.  285,  ii. 126). 
2  Rot. Pad., ii.  53b. 
Yeav Book,  4  Henry  VII,  p.  18 : "  en  le  parlement  le  roy  voule 
I;ue  un  tie1 soit attaint et perde ses terres, et les seigneurs assentent,  et 
rlen fuit parle  des comons.  Purquoi touts les  justices  tenent  clerement 
que ceo ne fuit acte.  Purquoi il fuit restore."  etc. 98  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PAIILIAMBNT 
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We are still, however, far from a house of  lords in the reign 
of Edward 111, and the lords of  parliament are still for the 
most part lords of  the council.  But the reign of  Edward I1 
had permanent  effects upon  the constitution,  and Edward 
I11 never reduced the magnates to their insignificance under 
Edward I.  The "  Rolls "  are replete with references to the 
magnum concilium, which has entrenched itself in the heart 
of parliament, and the "  council " which the king holds in 
his parliaments is now the magnhm concilium ;  the camera 
magni concilii has become the "parliament chamber."  The 
process is very obscure, but one or two points emerge.  It 
is  clear  that  the magnates have mastered the council.  In 
1315  parliamentary pleas are held coram magno concilio, and 
answers are given  coram rege  et  magno  concilio,  instead of 
coram concilio, as in the reign of  Edward I.  In the follow- 
ing year the chancellor, judges,  and other members of  the 
collncil rcport to the king quod  no%  atdebant dictum negotium 
di@ire  net  eidem  domino  regi  super  hoc  consulere  sine 
assensu azngnatzsm de regno propter  dificultatem et  raritatem 
ezegotii  supradicti;  and they recommended its reference to 
either  a  parliament  or  a  convocatio  magnatum  de regn0.l 
"  Great  councils " continued to be summoned  for centuries 
after the organization  of  the Model  Parliament,  and they 
were a favourite expedient with the Lancastrian~.~  But here 
we  are concerned with "the king's  great council in parlia- 
ment "3 which gave its name to the "parliament chamber," 
and eventually became the house of  lords. 
That it is still primarily a king's  council is clear from the 
facts that no  principle  upon  which a "  peer " could  claim 
a  right  to be  summoned  had  been  established.  Indeed, 
there seems to be no instance in the middle ages of  any one 
claiming a right to be summoned at all;  and it cannot be 
Rot. Purl., i.  354a. 
2  See Nicolas, Proc. of  Privy Council, i. 17, 102, 144, 156, ii. 85-9,  156, iv. 
105, 185-6,  225,  V.  64, 108, vi.  214, 290, 298,  333,  339.  Their object was 
often nrobouleutic. such as to decide whether or not a parliament should 
beiilied.  But in' the fifteenth century they were not-confined  to mag- 
nates ;  about half the prelates,  earls, and barons summoned to parliament 
were  usually  summoned  to  a  great  counc:il, but  sometimes  they  were 
reinforced  by  half  a  dozen  knights or esquires  from  each county  (ibid., 
i. 156). 
8  Ibid.,  iv. 185. 
too  often  emphasized  that even  to-day  peerage  does  not 
in itself  constitute a right  to sit and vote in the house of 
lords ; it has been held to constitute a right to a summons, 
but it is the writ of summons that constitutes the title to 
sit and vote,  and in the middle ages the issue of  this writ 
was  a  matter  within  the  discretion  of  the  crown.  The 
reason  why  some  abbots sit and others  do  not  is  simply 
that it has become the custom of chancery to summon one 
and not the other.  The abbot who is not sunlmoned never 
dreams of claiming a summons ;  he has no right to  a summons, 
and a baron is in the same position.  A mere glance at the 
number  of  those  who  were  summoned  at different  times 
will show that the receipt of  a writ depended upon the dis- 
cretion  or  caprice  of  the crown  and not  upon  hereditary 
right.l  To  the parliament  of  1295  Edward  I summoned 
forty-one barons, to that of  1300 he summoned ninety-nine. 
To the parliament of  1321  Edward I1 summoned ninety, to 
that of  I322  he  summoned  fifty-two.  To the parliament 
of  1333-4  Edward  I11  summoned  sixty-three  barons, to 
that  of  1346-7  he  summoned  only  thirty, but  to  that 
of  1347-8  he  summoned  fifty-six.  No  natural  cause 
like that of  death will  explain  these  violent  fluctuations; 
and the barons who  received  a  special  writ  of  summons 
under  Edward  I  and Edward  I1 were not reduced  to half 
their  numbcr  by  extinction  of  their heirs.  Whatever  the 
house of  lords may, in defiance  of  history, have  made law 
in the nineteenth century, there was no idea in the fourteenth 
or fifteenth that a baron summoned to one parliament must 
needs be called to another, or that a writ of  summons created 
a "  peerage " transmissible by descent.  A peerage, indeed, 
is not a term which  a medieval lawyer  would have under- 
stood ;  he knew that an earldom meant an office, the tenure 
of  which always involved a special writ of  summons to parlia- 
Palgrave's  published  Parliamentary  Writs only  cover  the reigns  of 
Edward  I  and  Edward  11,  but  his  MS.  lists,  preserved  in  the Public 
Record Office,  go on into the fifteenth century; cf. Maitland, Memoranda, 
p. xxxv:  and Pike, pp. 96-100.  For later lists of  "peers"  summoned see 
47ih Report of the Deputy-Keeper of the Records, pp. 79-83. 
Murray's  N.  E. D.  gives no insfance earlier  than  1671 of  the use of 
the word to indicate a dignity; nor 1s "the peerage," meaning the body of 
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ment;  he believed that a barony meant the tenure-in-chief 
of  an amount of  land, or more probably rights of  jurisdic- 
tion, if  not an office, which involved  at least a liability to 
that summons.  But in the reign of  Charles I1  it was decided 
that the tenure of  a barony did not involve the possession 
of  a "  peerage " or a right to a special writ of  summons to 
parliament; l  and assuredly  no  such  right  existed  in  the 
middle ages.  There were many heirs in Edward 111's reign 
of  barons  summoned by  special ,writ  to parliament under 
Edward I or Edward 11, who received no writ of  summons 
themselves  and never  thought  of  claiming  it as  a  right.2 
The law of  "  peerage "  is a modern monument of  legal fiction. 
At the end of  the middle ages Fortescue talks enough about 
lords spi~itual  and temporal, but he never calls them peers, 
and the word does not occur in the " Rolls of  Parliaments " 
for the reign of  Henry VII, or in the "  Journals " for several 
succeeding reigns.  Nor does Sir Thomas Smith, who wrote 
under Elizabeth, use the term.  Peerage had been a juridical 
concept in Magna Carta ;  under Edward I1  it was turned by a 
limited class to political purposes ;  but the vogue of  hereditary 
peerage  as a  foundation  of  the  constitution  is a modern 
growth born of  antagonism to Stuart and then to democratic 
principles.  To Fortescue the barons are not an independent 
'd peerage,"  but  councillors  of  the crown, bound  to give 
advice when asked, but not entitled to enforce it. 
It is  easy,  too,  to  exaggerate  the  meaning  of  natus in 
Fortescue's  statement  that  the  lords  are  co?zsiliarii  nati 
to the king;  for he expressly includes lords spiritual as well 
as  temporal,  and  every  archbishop  of  Canterbury  and 
of  York  was legatus natus of  the pope.  It is  clear that a 
lord  spiritual was  not  a  councillor  of  the  crown,  nor  the 
archbishop legate  of  the pope,  by  hereditary  right;  and 
Fortescue's  statement  that  the  lords  are councillors "  by 
1 Cruise,  Dignities,  and  ed.,  p.  06; the  question  was  not,  however, 
finally settled until the Berkeley peerage case in 1861 ; see below, p. 307% 
2  For instance the Ughtreds (D. N. B., Iviii. 16a), Umfravilles (D. N. B., 
Iviii. 23h), Dynhams. (G. E;,C.'s  Complete Peerace, ed.  Gibbs, iv.  371-9). 
Not a few of  these  peers  of modern theory acted as sheriffs or sat in 
the house of  commons. 
reason of  their  baronies  and  estates,"  clearly implies that 
they are councillors in virtue of  their feudal relation to the 
king  and  not  of  their  blood  relation  to  their  ancestors. 
The barony, indeed, has become hereditary, but the bishopric 
has  not,  and the bishop  or  archbishop  is  just  as  much 
co~zsiliarius  natus or legatus natus as the baron.  The right 
or  the  duty to give  counsel  seems  to  be  innate  in  the 
dignity  rather  than  in  the  individual  or  in  the  blood; 
the  spiritual lord  ceased to be  consiliarius  natus when he 
resigned his  bishopric and the temporal lord when he lost 
his barony.  Ralph de Monthermer became consiliarius natus 
when  he married the Countess of  Gloucester and ceased to 
be such when her son came of  age. 
Nevertheless, the barons, who in the reign of  Henry I11 
had merely claimed to be the king's "  natural " councillors, 
as distinguished  from  unnatural  aliensI1 begin  in  time  to 
claim,  as "  hereditary"  councillors,  an  indefeasible  right 
to a seat in parliament.  The mere routine of  chancery clerks 
tended to stereotype a list of  barons to whom a special writ 
was  sent.  It was  easier for officials  to address the writs 
as  before  than  to  pick  and  choose.  They  could  hardly 
vary  the list  of  barons  or abbots, whom  it was  usual  to 
summon, on their own authority;  and even the strongest 
kings  developed  a  respect  for  chancery forms.  Chancery, 
too, was further removed by the growth  of  the privy seal 
from the caprice of  the crown ; and when a Tudor required 
the absence of  a lord from parliament,  it was secured, not 
by withholding the writ of  summons issued under the great 
seal of chancery, but by a more intimate injunction, under 
the privy  seal  or  signet, not  to obey  it.  From  the third 
Edward to the third Richard, however, kings were concerned 
to secure  the  presence  rather  than  the  absence  of  their 
councillors in parliament.  A  crowded council betokened  a 
vigorous government, and the lack of  Lancastrian governance 
was betrayed by the absence of  lords from the  council in 
and out of  parliament.  Richard I1 imposed heavjr fines on 
'  An  alien,  even  though he held  an English  earldom, was  not  a  con- 
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absentees,l and the dwindling number of  barons summoned 
to  parliament was due to the inability of  the crown to enforce, 
and to the reluctance of  the lords to meet, the obligation of 
suit  and  service  at the king's  high  court.  In  1433 the 
crown could only extort even from its chief  councillors an 
undertaking to attend the council nos  tamen continue sed 
saltem  tempove  c~riae.~  Their  ambition was not  to sit  as 
lords of  council  or  of  parliament  at Westminster,  but  to 
rule as princes in the provinces;  a special writ of  summons 
to parliament added nothing to th'e  prestige of  a Neville or 
a Percy, and threatened an irksome distraction  from more 
local and more congenial occupations. 
It was not for the writs of  summons attached thereunto 
that these lords of  misrule sought dukedoms,  marquisates, 
earldoms, viscountcies, and baronies, but for the lands, pen- 
sions, and other grants which accompanied the conferment 
of  these dignitie~.~  A  seat in parliament  only became  an 
object of  ambition when parliament itself became a seat of 
authority;  and in the fifteenth century a writ of  summons 
was merely a disagreeable incident to baronial dignity.  It 
was,  however,  becoming  hereditary  because  strict  entails 
had made baronial tenure hereditary, and writs of  summons 
had become attached by custom to greater baronies.  This 
association  seemed  to  the  crown  to  portend  a  baronial 
~e ors,  tyranny ; it tended to  restrict the king's choice of  counv 11 
because no one could be disseised of  his barony save by the 
judgement  of  his peers, and the personnel of  the king's great 
council was thus determined by them and not by the sovereign 
they were to ad~ise.~  The more rigid  the custom grew of 
sending writs to the earls and greater barons, the less scope 
there was for the crown to summon others outside the limited 
Pike, p.  237.  Rot. Purl., iv. 446. 
3  It  was  the  rule  then  for  aspirants  to  receive  and  not  to  make 
payments  for their dignities. 
4  The loss of  control over the great council was one of  the causes which 
led kings to develop a privy council immune from the limitations of  baronial 
and hereditary tenure, in somewhat the same way as the independence 
of  chancery,  due  to  the growth  of  tradition  and custom, led  them  to 
devise the more intimate and  personal machinery of  the privy seal and 
signet. 
circle  of  territorial  magnates.  Richard  I1 was  naturally 
the first to find this limitation intolerable, and it was prob- 
ably to escape it that he began the practice of  creating barons 
and other peers by patent without reference to the lands they 
held.  This practice saved the crown from a danger similar 
to that which was threatened  by the peerage bill of  1719; 
it could create peers without being limited in its choice to 
the holders of  great estates. 
But the association  of  land tenure, and consequently  of 
the  hereditary principle,  with  peerage  had  been  too  long 
established  to be eliminated;  the baron created by patent 
was usually granted lands to support his dignity, and even 
to-day,  when  he  is  less  fortunate,  he  commonly  takes  a 
territorial  title.  Nor  did the creation  of  peers bring last- 
ing advantage to the crown : the new  peer  might  be  sub- 
servient  to his  creator,  but  his  descendants had no  such 
attachment  to  his  creator's  successors.  The  patents  of 
Richard I1  and his successors asserted the principle of  heredity 
against  the implications  of  the writ  of  summons, for they 
were made out to the recipient and his heirs male, whereas 
writs of  summons ignored  the recipient's  heirs  altogether, 
and the transmission  to heirs general has been a matter of 
judicial fiction.  But the notion of  councillorship is empha- 
sized by the limitation of  patents to heirs male.  Lands might 
descend to females, but only males could counsel the crown. 
Nor  is it certain that the creation of  a barony, viscounty, 
marquisate,  or  dukedom by letters  patent  committed  the 
king, and still less his successors, to the perennial  issue of 
parliamentary writs of  summons to the newly-created  peer 
and to his heirs.  Kings were jealous of  circumscribing their 
discretion;  even a statute, it was contended as late as the 
seventeenth  century, made  by  one  king  did not  bind  his 
successors.1  Letters patent were certainly not more binding 
than a statute, and they contained nothing about writs of 
Prothero, Select  Ilycuments,  ed. 1898, p.  340.  Baron .Clarke's  argu- 
ment in Bates' case:  The statute (45 Ed. 111,  c.  4) extends only to the 
king himself, and shall not bind  his successors, for it is a principal part of 
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summons, the right to which was by later generations read 
into the patent of  creation. 
These patents  did, however, create hereditary dignities l 
to which a writ of  summons to parliament came in common 
practice to be attached ;  and the development or perversion 
of the king's council in parliament into an hereditary house 
of  lords  is  mysteriously  connected  with  the  growth  of 
heraldry, which characterized the decline of  the middle ages. 
The incorporation of  the College  of  Arms by  Richard  111, 
the passion for pedigrees, the hera)dsJ visitations, and the 
granting  of  arms  (when  they  were  losing  their  practical 
value)  were  all  manifestations  of  a  social  evolution,  the 
political and constitutional  effects of  which  have not  been 
properly explored.  There is no mention of  Garter king-ot- 
arms 2 in any version of  the Modzls  Tenendi Parliamentztm, 
not even in that which the clerk of  the parliaments prefixed 
to the Journal for 1510  ; but he figures largely in the pictures 
of parliament  which  date from  the sixteenth century, and 
his  functions  were  important.  He  preceded  the  newly- 
created peer  when he came to take his seat, and presented 
his  letters  patent;  and  Burghley  orice  moved  Garter's 
appointment to a committee of  lords to determine questions 
of  pre~edence.~  Pedigrees, too,  were  recorded  on  the first 
writs of  summons issued to peers on succession, and came to 
be regarded as an indefeasible title to the writ.  The obse- 
quiousness of  the lords in parliament after the Wars of  the 
Roses  and  the  reduction  of  the prelates  by  Henry  VIII 
blinded  the Tudors to the growth  of  a  strictly  hereditary 
peerage which ultimately turned the tables on the crown. 
The vogue of  the phrase "  hereditary peerage " involves, 
1 I have some doubts about the correctness of  this customary phrase- 
ology.  The dignity was created by the crown, and the letters patent were, 
like proclamations, merely the evidence of  the fact and not the fact itself. 
The act was,  moreover,  often done by the crown  in parliament;  and it 
seems to have been merely an accident that these acts did not permanently 
3ecome acts of  parliament. 
2  First created, it is said, by Henry V. 
8  Elsynge, pp. 6, 8, 97-8. 
4  Townshend,  Histovical  Collections,  p.  83.  The  intrusion  of  Garter 
king into the high court of  parliament is a  portent of  the subversion of 
the king's  great council in parliament  by  the modern  peerage. 
however,  some  confusion of  thought.  The essence of  the 
house  of  lords is not  that it is based upon the principle of 
heredity like the old nobility of  the continent, but upon the 
principle  of  primogeniture,  which  as the foundation  of  a 
legislative chamber was peculiar to England.  There is a great 
deal  of  physiological truth underlying the current  phrases 
about "  good  old  stock,"  "  in  the blood,"  and  so  forth; 
but hereditary virtues have a trick  of  eluding eldest sons. 
There have  been  many  illustrious  sons  of  illustrious sires 
in  English  history,  but  they have  rarely  been  the eldest. 
Queen Elizabeth was served by two great Cecils, and George 
I11 by two great Pitts;  but the first Earl of  Salisbury was 
not  the  eldest  son  of  the great  Lord  Burghley, nor  was 
William  Pitt of  the Earl  of  Chatham.  Three  of  the five 
Tudors were among the greatest of  English sovereigns, but 
not one of  the three was the eldest son or eldest daughter of 
a king.  A house selected from the sons of  peers would have 
been an abler body than the house of  eldest sons, and more 
hereditary virtue has  enriched the house of  commons than 
the  house  of  lords.  Primogeniture was  given  its  peculiar 
and exclusive privilege in order to keep fiefs intact, and not 
from any belief  in its efficacy in the transmission of  wisdom. 
The  special  writ  of  summons  became  attached  to  great 
hereditary  baronies  because  the  consent  of  their  holders 
was essential to the financial success of  the king's proposals 
in  parliament;  and  the  principle  of  primogeniture  was 
communicated  from  the  barony  to  the  special  writ  of 
summons. 
The growth of  this principle led to the depression of  the 
simple  councillors in parliament,  and as early as Edward 
111's reign the judges were denied a vote, though not a voice, 
in  the high  court  of  parliament  in which  they sat.  They 
become  assessors or advisers;  and while Sir Thomas More, 
as  chancellor,  presided  over  the lords'  deliberations, par- 
ticipated  in  their discussions,  and adjourned  their sessions 
from day to day, he had no  vote in their determinations. 
It was not, however, until comparatively modern times that 
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of  lords.  Down to the  dissolution of  the monasteries the 
non-hereditary spiritual peers constituted a majority;  and 
until  a  considerably  later  period  the  bishops  and  newly- 
created peers outnumbered those who owed their  writs  of 
summons  to heredity.  There  were  sixty  temporal  peers 
when James I ascended the English throne;  but he created 
fifty-four,  and the bishops numbered twenty-six;  and the 
eldest sons of  peers had barely attained a majority in the 
house of  lords  when  the Long Parliament abolished it as a 
dangerous and unnecessary institutiqn.  The house of  lords, 
as it is known to-day, is the outcon~e  of  thc Restoration. 
CHAPTER  VI 
THE GROWTH  OF THE  HOUSE  OF COMMONS 
ALTHOUGH  the "  commons " were the last of  the elements 
to  arrive  in  the thirteenth-century parliament,  they have 
suffered less subsequent change of  position than the crocvn, 
the  judges,  or  the lords.  The presence of  the crown has, 
except in theory, been limited to ceremonial occasions ;  most 
of  the judges of  the high court have been excluded altogether ; 
and the lords of the council in parliament have been converted 
into an hereditary peerage.  The "  commons," however, have 
rcmained in many essentials what they were in the reign of 
Edward 111, when they shared with the crown the privilege 
of  being  one of  the two  indispensable  elements  in  a  valid 
par1iament.l  Then, as now, the essence of  parliament  was 
parley  between  crown  and  commons,  the  government 
and  the  governed.  There  were  other  factors  than  the 
crown in the  government,  and other "  estates " than  the 
commons among the governed ;  but they were minor ingred- 
ients.  The distinguishing feature of  the English parliament 
is the junction  it made between government and the people. 
Not that the house of  conlmons was ever that house of  the 
common people which it is sometimes supposed to have been. 
For "  commons " means "  communes " ; and while  " com- 
munes " have  commonly  been  popular  organizations,  the 
term  might  in  the  thirteenth  and fourteenth  centuries be 
applied to any association or confederacy. 
Common  action  was,  however,  commoner  among  the 
common people,  because  they had greater need  than indi- 
vidualistic  barons  of  union  for self-protection,  and it  was 
Modus Tenendi Pavlianzentuln  in Stubbs's Select Charters, p.  512. 
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only under the pressure  of  exceptional royal  tyranny that 
barons borrowed the methods of  association from the humbler 
townsfolk who  first put the fear of  "  comnlunism " into the 
hearts of  privileged classes.  A "  commune,"  wrote a horri- 
fied  monk  of  St. Swithun's  when  John,  in the absence of 
Richard I, granted common self-government  to London, est 
tunzor  plebis,  timor  regni, tepor  sacerdotii,l  which  might be 
flippantly rendered  in the vernacular, "  a  commune  swells 
the people's head, terrifies royalty, andmakes  the clergy luke- 
warm."  It was  a  popular  conspiracy,  and the chronicler 
doubtless had in mind those formidable communes of  northern 
Italy which had humbled the pride of  an emperor at  Legnano. 
Monarchy in England was made of  stouter stuff than the Holy 
Roman Empire; but, if  Richard of  Devizes could have fore- 
seen that "  commune of  communes," as the house of  com- 
mons  was  called  two  centuries  later,  his  prophetic  soul 
might also have foreboded 1649 and 1688, when the commons 
became indeed a terror to royalty, and perhaps other occa- 
sions, both later and earlier, when they "  put the clergy in 
a stew." 
But the "  communes " or "  communitates,"  which  gave 
their name to the house of  commons, were lawful and orderly, 
comprehensive, but not democratic associations.  They were 
simply the shires or counties of  England, and the full county 
courts in which the knights of  the shires were chosen did not 
include the "  common "  people.  For villeins were not legally 
qualified  to  perfcsrrn  the  judicial  functions  for  which  the 
courts were  held.  They did not attend as "  suitors of  the 
court," and they were only represented in the sense in which 
the lord  of  the  manor  was  held  to represent  his  tenants 
without  any  choice  or  election  on  their  part.  Even  the 
freeholders  who  possessed  less  than  a  40s.  freehold  were 
excused in the reign of  Edward I ;  and excuse  from  atten- 
dance to unpaid and unpopular duties meant absence.  The 
1 Richard of  Devizes, p. 53. 
2  Rot.  Parl.,  i. 116; the statute only  applied  to  the county  courts, 
and not to the assizes held by the king's  justices  in cities, boroughs,  and 
other  market  towns.  The  exe~rlption  of  1294 became  the  exclusion 
of  1430. 
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duty was even attached to particular tenements rather than 
to their holders, and instances are known in which suit at 
the county court was imposed as a condition of  the lease or 
grant of  1and.l 
This suit at the county court was, of  course, required for 
the administration of justice, and it is important to remember 
that not only the members  of  parliament, but the electors 
as well, were primarily jurors, and only incidentally electors. 
Justice was  the  regular  monthly work of  the county court, 
the  election  of  members  of  parliament  was  an occasional 
addition  to the duties of  those  who  were  already  present 
to exercise jurisdiction.  The house of  commons, as well as 
the  house  of  lords,  grew  out  of  the  legal  system,  and 
the politics of  parliament  were the outcome of  its law.  It 
was  in  this  legal  atmosphere  that  representation  had  its 
birth, and the county court  is the  foundation of  the 'house 
of  commons.  Representation was not the offspring of  demo- 
cratic theory, but an incident of  the feudal  sy~tern.~  Suit 
and service were due from all; but, we are told in the Leges 
Henrici Primi, if  the lord or his steward will go to the county 
court, his presence will "  acquit " the tenants on his domain.= 
If  neither lord nor steward is present, there must come the 
priest and the reeve, and four best men of  the township on 
behalf  of  their fellows.  The boon  of  representation  is not 
in election to serve, but in the licence to stay away ;  it consists 
in the immunity obtained through the vicarious service of 
others,  and centuries  elapse before  the service becomes  a 
privilege  and the burden  an object  of  envy and a  source 
of  pride.  In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries the diffi- 
culty is to enforce the attendance of  representatives ;  medieval 
"  liberties " were nearly  fatal to representation  and to the 
county  courts,  for  the  most  cherished  liberty  was  that 
which  excused the lord  and his tenants from the hundred 
and  county  courts,  and  gave  them  juri::,dicljon  of  their 
own. 
But,  scanty  and reluctant  though  the  attendance  may 
Maitland, Collected Papers, i.  458.  See below, p. 153. 
a  Stubbs, Select  Charters, ed. 1900, p.  105. I 10  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
have been, the court was the legal embodiment of  the shire; 
everything  it  did  was  the  deed  of  the  shire,  and  except 
through it the shire did nothing.  Its verdicts were the final 
verdicts  of  the shire;  l therc were no  imperative  mandates 
from  below,  no  limitation  of  powers,  and no  referendum; 
its representative character was  complete.  It was the corn- 
mu~zitas,  and  not  a  mere "  estate."  Bishops,  earls,  and 
barons, as well as knights, were expected to attend in person 
or  provide  their   representative^,^ and all  were  "  peers  of 
the county."  "  Peers  of  the realm " did,  indeed,  secure 
exemption  after a while-not  as a  class, but as individual 
recipients  of  royal grants and charters-and  the ground of  ' 
their  exemption  was  perhaps  their  liability  to  a  special 
summons to more  arduous  business  at Westminster.  But 
the exemption was not a prohibition; they  could attend if 
they liked, and it is probable that the magnates who in later 
centuries intervened in the nomination of members of  parlia- 
ment  in  the  shire  courts,  were  not  exceeding  their  legal 
rights.  It was only a  resolution of  the house of  commons 
that forbade a peer to concern himself  with  parliamentary 
elections. 
Here in the shire courts was acquired that habit of  common 
action, and here was laid that foundation of  public opinion, 
upon which  the house of  commons was based.  It may be 
that undue  stress has been  laid  upon  the fact that, while 
Simon  de  Montfort  summoned  the  citizens  and burgesses 
to his parliament by writs addressed direct to the cities and 
boroughs, Edward I sent the writs through the sheriffs and 
had the returns made in  the shire courts.  It was, indeed, 
more than a  question of  mere machinery, for the common 
return  of  knights  of  the  shire and burgesses  in  the  same 
shire courts  emphasized a  community  which  was  retained 
in the house of  commons.  But the links were forged at an 
earlier period, and were  made of  stoutcr stuff  than sheriffs' 
Maitland, Lectures on Constitutional History, p. 43. 
Leges  Henrici Primi, Stubbs, Select  Charters, p. 105. 
This phrase occurs frequently in the fourteenth century, and probably 
means the " judges " of  the county court as defined  in the Leges  Henrici 
Primi, c. xxix., Stubbs, Select  Charters, p. 106. 
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writs.  The knights who failed to obtain baronial exemption 
from attendance at the shire courts recouped themselves by 
managing  the business  of  their humbler  neighbours  in  the 
shires.  It was they who prepared the agenda for the fiscal 
and judicial  visits of the justices in eyre, consulted with the 
townsfolk and small freeholders in attendance at the court, 
and negotiated  their  affairs.  They  had their  reward  in a 
leadership,  lost  by  the  peers  of  the  realm  through  their 
privileged abstention  from the county  courts,  and won  by 
the  knights  who  continued  at  Westminster  the  popular 
co-operation they had learnt in the shires. 
Nor  is there any reason to suppose that this presentation 
and conduct of  popular business by the knights was limited to 
the county courts in the thirteenth century before the formal 
election of members to parliaments or great councils.  Henry 
I1 had thrown open the doors of the curia regis to suitors of  all 
sorts-save  villeins pleading against their lords ;  and nothing 
in the records of  Edward 1's parliaments suggests that the 
regular invitation to suitors, with which a parliament always 
began,  was  a  novelty.  Suitors had been  in  the  habit  of 
coming to Westminster from  the county  courts before the 
days of  Simon de Montfort and Edward I ;  and it is almost 
certain that knights from the shire did a good deal of  repre- 
sentative legal  business  at Westminster  before  they  were 
summoned  thither  by writs.  The writ  to the sheriff, the 
election in  the shire court, and the indenture between  the 
sheriff  and  the  elected  knights  merely  made  formal  and 
regular  the spontaneous habit of  representation of  counties 
by knights at the king's high court; and the intervention of 
chancery, with its formal writs and returns, was, no doubt, 
intended to render the words  and deeds of  the representa- 
tives  more  binding  upon  their constituents.  They were to 
come,  not  merely  with  such  varylng  powers  as  different 
counties might  at different times choose to give them, but 
with full power to commit all the counties alike to approval 
of  whatever  proposals  the king  and his  council  might  lay 
before them; and in Edward 1's parliamentary writs  there 
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but also the authority of  representatives and the tyranny of 
majorities. 
Similarly there are grrounds for beiieving that cities and 
boroughs had been represented at Westminster before Simon 
de Montfort  issued his writsjl and that the petitions  from 
towns which abound in the earliest "  Rolls of  Parliaments " 
had not sprung up in a generation ; and again, all that Simon 
did was to systematize, and  perhaps turn to political  and 
party  purposes,  a  habit  of  representation  that had  long 
obtained in the redress of  grievances and the administration 
of  justice.  The itinerant justices did no;  exhaust the judicial 
business of  the counties or the judicial  powers of  the king's 
court.  There was  always the reserve at Westminster;  ti 
tap justice at its source the counties had to appear by their 
representatives in the curia regis, and the original  purpose 
of  parliament,  as declared on countless occasions through- 
out the fourteenth century, was by means of  a joint  session 
of  the courts to redress delays and determine cases in which 
the judges were in doubt. 
Out of  this attendance of  representatives of  the shires at 
the curia regis grew in time the share of  the house of  com- 
mons in the judicial work of  the high  court of  parliament. 
They were not, it is true, judges in parliament, but they were 
the grand jury of  the nation ;  the lords could try no commoner 
except on their impeachment, and their presence was essential 
at various stages in the proceedings.  The separate repre- 
sentation of  cities and boroughs  was, no doubt, due to the 
varying  degrees of  immunity  from the jurisdiction  of  the 
shire courts which they enjoyed.  But no city save London 
seems to have secured total exemption from the shire system 
before the fourteenth century, and there must therefore have 
been a local basis of  co-operation between town and county, 
which facilitated co-operation between their representatives 
in parliament.  The co-operation was not, however, complete 
at first;  as late as the reign  of  Edward  I11  knights  and 
burgesses act independently, and seemed not unlikely to form 
1 Rotuli  Chavtarum, Record Comm., pp.  57, 65; Pike, p.  337. 
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separate "  estates." l  Their ultimate amalgamation was due 
to the exigencies of  parliamentary organization. 
The house of commons was not, in fact, created either by 
Simon  de  Montfort  or  by  Edward  I.  Representatives  of 
cities, and boroughs attended the king's court at West- 
minster for  judicial and financial purposes before either Simon 
or  Edward issued  their famous writs.  They came, indeed, 
and not as a body of  men ;  but their organization 
into a  "house " of  commons  required  a  great  deal  more 
than  the  simultaneous  summons  to  shires  and  boroughs 
issued by Simon and Edward.  It grew up during the four- 
teenth century,  and its growth  is slow and obscure.  The 
"  Rolls  of  Parliaments " tell  us  little  about  the house  of 
commons,  because  they are only  concerned  with  what  is 
done in parliament, and technically the discussions and other 
domestic business of  the house of  commons are not trans- 
acted in parliament at all.  Down to this day the commons' 
debates are beyond the ken of  the clerk of  the parliaments, 
an official who sits in what has come to be called the house 
of  lords.  In the fourteenth century they were held in the 
refectory or the chapter house of the abbey of  Westminster; 
and as late as the reign  of  Henry VII the commons only 
16 appear " in  parliament  when  they  come  to  hear  the 
opening speech, to present  their S~eaker,~  or  to announce 
by his mouth the decisions they have reached on the business 
submitted for their approval.  Consequently it is on these 
occasions alone that they figure  in the "  Rolls  of  Parlia- 
ments " kept by the clerk of  the parliaments, who sits in the 
parliament chamber of  the palace.  It is true that early in 
Edward  111's  reign  an "  under  clerk  of  the parliaments 
has been told off  to attend to the domestic business  of  the 
commons, and ultimately he becomes the clerk of  the house 
of  commons.  But his duties were apparently to draft the 
As late as 1523  they took separate action (Hall, Chron., p. 657). 
The obscurity which  covers the origin of  the Speakcrship  and early 
development of  the privileges of  the commons is due to the total absence 
of any record  of  the domestic proceedings of  the house  of  commons  in 
the chapter  house  until  its Journals  begin in 1547.  The entries in the 
"Rolls "  only relate to decisions after they have been reached by  the house 
and are reported in parliament  by  the Speaker (see History, iii.  33-5). 
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common petitions of  the house, and possibly to keep some 
record  of  attendance,  upon  which  the  chancery  founded 
its  writs  de  elpensis,  entitling  members  to  recover  their 
wages  from  their  constituents.  No  other  trace  of  his 
activity has been found; it is improbable that any Joz~rnal 
of  the house  of  commons  was  kept  before  1547.l  If  it 
was,  it  has  been  lost, and  in  any  case its  contents were 
not incorporated in the "  Rolls,"  which  ignore proceedings 
taken outside the parliament chamber. 
Another cause of  obscurity in the history of  the house of 
commons  arises  from  the  indeterminate  character  of  the 
terminology  employed in the "  Rolls."  By the end of  the 
fourteenth  century  the  term  communitates  or  communes 
implies both the knights of  the shires and the representa- 
tives of  the cities and boroughs;  but this usage expresses 
the result of  a gradual amalgamation, and before 1350  the 
word is  used  in  different  senses.  Le  commun  is  used  in 
1258  of  a clique of  barons;  in 1259  communitas  bachelericz 
describes a "  cave " of  aristocratic  forwards.  In 1340  les 
communes de la terre is the phrase  employed  to distinguish 
the  knights  of  the shires  from the representatives  of  the 
cities  and  boroughs.  In  1343  we  have  les  chivalcrs des 
countez et communes, where communes seems to mean the town 
members  as distinct from the knights of  the shire;  but in 
the next line  we  have $relatz, grantz,  et  communes, where 
both  are apparently included  in the  common designation, 
and  later  on  the  same  page  we  have,  les  chivalers  des 
countees et les aufres communes.  Similarly in 133a  we have 
a distinction between les chivalers des countez and les genta 
dzc  comrn~n.~ 
Beneath  this confusion  of  terminology  it is not  possible 
to detect any real house of  commons consisting of  a com- 
bination of  knights and burgesses.  It should be remembered 
that  many  knights  of  the  shires were  not  chivalers,  and 
See Trans. Royal  Hist.  Soc.,  3rd  Ser., viii. 27. 
a  Rot. Purl., ii.  6!p,  112,  136; cf. Tout, Edward 11, p. 89.  In 1352 we 
have  reference  to  longe  trete  et  deliberation eues  par les communes 
ove  [avec]  la  communaltie,  et I'avis  d'ascuns  grantz  a  eux  envoiez " 
(Rot. Purl.,  ii.  237b). 
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that many barons summoned by special writ were.  There 
was no social designation  to distinguish the lesser from the 
greater  baron;  either  might  be  a  chivaler,  either  was  a 
baron,  and  either  was  nobizis-a  quality  attributed  to 
knights  as  late  as  the  fifteenth  and  sixteenth  centuries. 
out  of a list of  twenty-four knights present at the parliament 
of 1305, ten had received a special baronial summons.  The 
sole distinction between  knights and barons was drawn by 
royal writ of summons, and it is significant that when, at the 
parliament  of  Lincoln in 1301, we  find the earliest notable 
instance  of  the  parliamentary  activity of  a  knight  of  the 
shire,  that  action  is  taken  by  Henry of  Keighley,  as the 
mouthpiece of  the barons, and not as a leader of  the commons. 
It is probable that for a generation after 1295  the influence 
of  the "  communes " in parliament was simply that of  the 
lesser tenants in chivalry.  What general legislation there is 
affects them only, and they act as a knightly  estate rather 
than as a house of  commons. 
Nor must their parliamentary importance be exaggerated. 
There is hardly a parliament of  the first half of  the fourteenth 
' 
century the opening of  which had not to be postponed owing 
to defective attendance.  But the defect is always due to the 
absence  of  prelates  and  magnates,  and never  to  that  of 
knights  or  burgesses;  and it  is  more  probable  that  such 
absence was not regarded as a fatal defect in a parliament 
than that it never  occurred.  The summons  of  knights  of 
the  shire and burgesses  does  not  prove  their  attendance; 
and when, later on, measures are taken to compel attendance 
at parliament,  they  are applied  to magnates  long  before 
they  are enforced  upon  knights  of  the shire or  burgesses. 
The  summons  was  all  that was  needed;  according  to the 
Modus  a  total  absence  of  magnates  did  not  invalidate a 
parliament, provided  they had been  summoned;  and even 
Magna Carta had laid it down that the absence of  those who 
abstained  was  not  to frustrate the  counsel  of  those  who 
attended.  Absence, following upon due and 1,awful summons, 
gave consent as effectively as silence on the part of  those who 
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was  imposed  on  cities  and  boroughs,  although  the  only 
coilsent recorded is that of  the prelates, earls, barons, other 
magnates and knights of  the shire who granted a fifteenth ;  l 
and, although  the election of  burgesses to that parliament 
is recorded in the Oficial Return, no trace of  their presence 
is found in the "  Rolls."  That some burgesses as well  as 
some knights of  the shire did attend this and other parlia- 
ments,  their  presence  in  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the 
"  Rolls,"  is probable.  But it seems clear from the writs de 
expensis  that  election did  not  mean  attendance, and  that 
the large number of  elections recorded in the Oficial Return 
of  Members  of  Parliament  may convey an exaggerated im- 
pression  of  the importance of  the commons in ~arliament.~ 
The treatment of  the commons by the crown during the 
first years of  Edward 111's reign was not, in fact, calculated 
to  encourage  attendance.  In  March  1332, for  instance, 
the commons met on Monday the 17th ;  five days later they 
were told that their petitions had neither been received nor 
answered, and that they might go home, the king promising 
to call another parliament to deal with such business.  This 
he did in September ;  but as soon as money had been granted, 
the other estates, though not  the burgesses, were  asked to 
advise the king whether he should deal with petitions or go 
north to deal with the Scots.  He was advised to deal with 
the Scots, and the commons had to be content with a gracious 
promise to deal with their petitions at a convenient season. 
The third parliament for that year met at York on December 
4, but only five prelates attended; the requisite lords and 
lawyers failed to appear, petitions could not be answered, and 
parliament was prorogued until January, when again it met at 
Y~rk.~  A  journey  to Westminster was  then  a  matter  of 
weeks ;  a journey to York was worse for most of  the members. 
Cornwall returned ten members to the parliament of  March, 
and fourteen to that of  September; but it is not surprising 
that only two of the ten were found among the fourteen, or 
1 Rot. Parl.,  ii. 66. 
2  Cf. Tout, Edward 11,  1914,  pp. 89-90,  IO,+  See below,  Chapter xvi. 
8  Rot. Pa~l.,  ii.  64 ff. 
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that no  returns at all have been  discovered from Cornwall 
to the parliaments  of  December  and January.l  It needed 
the Hundred Years'  war, with its financial embarrassments, 
to render the crown more respectful and the commons readier 
to make better use of  the parliamentary organization which 
had been slowly developing since the days of  Edward I. 
No  precise dates can be assigned to the steps in that pro- 
gress, and it has been  further obscured by  antedating the 
definiteness of  parliamentary  institutions.  All  talk  about 
two houses of  parliament in the fourteenth century is clearly 
beside the mark, and it can hardly be too often repeated that 
the earliest reference to a "  house of  lords " occurs in  the 
reign  of  Henry  VIII.  Edward  I was  as ignorant  of  two 
houses  of  parliament  as  he  was  of  three  estates, and  his 
Model  Parliament  consisted of  a single chamber.  Nor  can 
we  obtain an accurate view of  Edward's parliaments so long 
as we  regard them as being primarily legislative assemblies. 
The king summoned them to secure supplies, and members 
attended  to  seek  redress  for  their  grievances.  But  the 
petitions they presented would practically all be now called 
private bills;  they were  not  collective petitions  and were 
not  preferred  by  corporate  action.  Of  the  five  hundred 
petitions presented at the parliament  of  1305, five only deal 
with  matters  of  public  concern,  and  of  these  five  three 
affect feudal tenants-in-chief alone.  Ninety-nine hundredths 
of: the  petitions are individual requests for legal relief,  for 
royal  favour,  or  for  redress  of  private  wrongs,  and  they 
called for no common action among the  petitioner^.^ 
An  appreciation of  the significance of  this fact is essential 
to any understanding of  the Edwardine parliament.  There 
could  be  no  house  of  commons so  long as  this  condition 
continued, for such  an institution  couldv  only  grow  out of 
common action.  Again, this fact alone would indicate that 
Oficial Return of Members of  Parliament, s. aa. 
This computation was made from the petitions for 1305 in Maitland's 
Memoranda de  Parliamento.  Palgrave in giving evidence before the Com- 
mittee on Public petitions  in 1832 reached a similar conclusion from his 
knowledge of  the whole medieval period : ', I should state that ninety-nine 
out  of  every hundred  petitions  presented by individuals related to indi- 
vldual grievances " (Parl.  Papers, 1833, xii. 20). I 18  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
the  function  of  parliaments  was  primarily  judicial;  for 
individual wrongs are always the proper  subject of  judicial 
action, and even to-day, when parliament deals with private 
bills, we commonly speak of  it as acting in a judicial or semi- 
judicial capacity; the committee to which they stand referred 
hears  counsel on both  sides, and compels parties to prove 
their locus  standi, as in a  court of  law, before they will  be 
.  heard.l  On the other hand, common petitions, or, as we now 
call them, public bills, are matters for political and legislative 
action.  So  long  as parliament  had  mainly  to  deal  with 
individual  petitions,  it remained  predominantly  a  court  of 
law :  as  soon  as  commpn  petitions  supersede  individual 
petitions, parliament becomes  a legislative body.  No  rigid 
line can be drawn-notwithstanding  the constitution of  the 
United States-between  judicial  and legislative action, and 
judges  make law to-day  in the United  States as well  as in 
Great  Britain,  the difference being  that in  England  it is 
historically  their proper  function, and legislation grew out 
of  adjudication.  It follows  that  no  definite  line  can  be 
drawn  between  individual  and common  petitions,  and no 
date assigned to the supersession of  the former by the latter 
as the main business of  parliaments. 
But  it  is  obvious  that this  transition  is  an important, 
perhaps the most important, factor in the development  and 
organization  of  parliaments.  The growth  of  the  common 
petition was the natural result  of  the collection of  knights 
and burgesses in a common gathering at Westminster and of 
the collective answer  the crown required to its requests for 
money.  Members  from divers constituencies  could  hardly 
fail to fall into a habit of  comparing notes, possibly at first 
in informal conversation and afterwards in more regular ways, 
with respect to the petitions with which they were charged; 
and sooner or later they would be impressed by the extent to 
which these individual petitions had a common foundation in 
the normal behaviour or misbehaviour of  the ministers of the 
See Erskine May, Parl. Practice, Bk. iii.  Tlie procedure of  the houses 
on private bills is totally unintelligible except on the ground that parliament 
is a court of  law. 
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king, judges, sheriffs, eschaetors and so forth.  Before long 
it must have occurred  to the shrewder  among these early 
that it would be wise to pool their petitions 
and  their  powers  of  pressure upon  the crown.  It was  an 
elementary form of  union,  for which  the crown itself  had 
paved the way by demanding common grants of  aids and 
subsidies  from  the  commons  at Westminster  instead  of 
demanding them from individual "  communitates " through- 
out the country; and almost  certainly it was one of  those 
constitutional developments of  the reign of  Edward 11, the 
importance  of  which  has  been  neglected  in  the  attention 
devoted  to the more  sensational  episodes of  the  struggle 
between the king and his bar0ns.l 
At  any  rate,  from  the  parliament  of  November  1325 
onwards the "  Rolls " begin to draw a distinction between 
petitions presented  pur  tote  la  commune and ali~  fietitiones 
in parliamento;  and, but for the  difficulty of  determining 
the  exact  meaning  of  the word  communitas, it might  be 
possible  to  date  the  beginning  of  "  common " petitions 
some  years  earlier.2  There  had,  of  course,  long  been 
common petitions of  the barons, tenants-in-chief,  and occa- 
sionally of  the clergy; but the closing years of  Edward 11's 
reign  and the  opening  years of  Edward  111's  seem to be 
marked by the earliest common petitions of  the knights and 
burgesses who  came  to  constitute the house of  commons 
In the parliament of  February 1326-7 we have such phrases 
as  fieticions  fiar  les  chivalers  et  la  commune,  firie  la 
commune, and prient  les  chivalers  et  la  commune.  One  of 
the common  petitions of  I325 is interesting from two other 
points of  view : the form of  address--et  auxint, sire, prient 
vos  liges gentz-seems  to imply a  personal  allocution  by a 
Speaker, and the content of  the petition is a complaint that 
Prof. Tout has dealt with the administrative side of  this development 
in  his  Place  of  Edward  Il's Reign in English History; its parliamentary 
aspect still needs elucidation. 
a  There are,  for instance, from  I314  onwards,  various  parliamentary 
proceedings  "ad  petitionem  communitatis  Angliae,"  e. g.  Rot.  Parl.,  I. 
3Iga, 324b,  3756;  and on February 17,  1?,16,  "  Magnates et communitas 
pn,olire concesserunt regi in auxilium . . .  (ibid., i.,;?51).  In 1320 there 
1s  a petition from  the "milites,  cives, et burgenses  (p. 371). 120  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
when  they  present  their  petitions  les  unes  sount  ajozcrnes 
devant  le  roi,  et  les  autres  devant  le chancellier,  dount  nul 
issue  n'est  fait.l  Reference  to  the  king's  bench-coram 
rege, to  chancery, and to other  courts, was,  we  have seen, 
the regular method of  dealing with petitions in parliament ; 
it has now become a grievance for which a remedy is sought 
by  the commons and promised by the crown.  The remedy 
is not prescribed in 1325, but it appears in 1327 in the demand 
of  the commons that their petitions may be made statutes 
in parliament  and held  good.2  This  demand  would  only 
apply, as a rule, to common petitions :  the individual petitions 
would continue to be referred to the various courts ; but the 
common petitions come to be taken first, to be answered l,n 
parliament before the "  estates "  go home, and to be enrolled 
as statutes. 
The common  petition  is  thus the root  of  the house  of 
commons  as a separate legislative assembly.  Institutions 
in the middle ages are not  made, they grow;  the common 
petition required common deliberation, common action, and 
perhaps even a common clerk ; the common action became a 
habit, the habit an institution, and the institution a house. 
Such  processes,  especially  in  their  initial  stages,  are  not 
recorded;  but  in  historical  as  well  as in  physical  science 
we have to deal with many developments of  which we possess 
no records, and the fact that they were not recorded does not 
prove that they never occurred.  There is ample evidence 
that no house of  commons existed in Edward 1's reign, and 
ampler evidence that it did  exist in  that of  Edward  111; 
and it is our business to infer from such knowledge as we 
possess the means by which it developed.  This requires a 
little imagination, but without  any undue stretch of  fancy, 
one  or  two guesses  may  be  hazarded  with  regard  to the 
growth of  parliamentary  procedure early in the fourteenth 
century. 
The king in council clearly met the lords and commons in 
parliament in common session, when the chancellor or some 
other member of  the council, usually a judge,  explained to 
the assembly the purport of  its summons and the requests 
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for assistance and advice that would be laid before it.  The 
advice was mainly a matter for the lords, the assistance for 
the commons.  There is reason to believe that from Edward 
1's time the king's council sat in the midst of  this assembly 
on  four woolsacks  (of  which  only  one remains) facing one 
another, and that Fleta's phrase about the king holding his 
council in his parliaments has a literal and material, as well 
as a figurative meaning :  no one would have arranged the four 
woolsacks in that way unless their occupants were normally 
engaged in confidential deliberation.  Outside this inner ring 
there sat, to the right of  the throne, the spiritual lords, and 
to the left  the temporal lords, and facing the throne there 
stood the commons.  To them the demand for aid would be 
particularly  addressed, and then  the problem  of  how  and 
what to answer would arise.  Probably there would be a divi- 
sion of  opinion, and possibly discordant murmurs ;  courageous 
commons at the back might urge  in whispers to their col- 
leagues in the front the exorbitance of  the king's  demands 
and the necessity of  refusal ;  timid members at the fore might 
tell their daring but half-concealed advisers at their back to 
speak  for  themselves;  and  then, amid  the muttering and 
murmuring, the chancellor or  other member  of  the council 
might suggest that not much progress was being made, and 
that the commons should go  and talk it over among them- 
selves, and then come back with an intelligible answer.  On 
some such occasion it must have been suggested that they 
should choose some one of  their members to be their Speaker, 
and that his answer, whether representing unanimity or but 
a small majority, should be considered equally binding upon 
all.  The commons then trooped out of  parliament to discuss 
in some more private place their domestic differences.  They 
only  reappeared  in  parliament  when  they had  reached  a 
resolution which was reported by the Speaker; and he alone 
had liberty of  speech in parliament. 
This procedure was probably not limited to the commons : 
each estate deliberated apart and outside parliament, and at 
first the knights of the shire and the burgesses occasionally, 
if not regularly, deliberated apart from one another.  There 
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in parliament, though in the end the lords remained with the 
council in parliament to form the house of  lords.  The ciergy 
went  off  to convocation, and it soon becomes impossible to 
distinguish between  assemblies of  the clergy summoned by 
the archbishop for ecclesiastical purposes and assemblies of 
the  clergy  summoned  by  the  king  for  temporal  objects. 
Logically,  of  course,  there  was  a  fundamental  distinction 
between the two :  the clergy summoned by the archbishop 
consisted  only  of  the  clergy  in  his  province;  the  clergy 
summoned  by the king consisted, or should have consisted, 
of  clergy from both provinces alike.  But in this respect the 
church proved stronger than the crown, and the provincial 
organization  of  the  one  prevailed  against  the  national 
organization  of  the  other.  Instead  of  uniting  to  form  a 
clerical estate in parliament, the clergy of  the two provinces 
preferred to transact their temporal business, such as voting 
taxes, in their two provincial convocations, and to abandon 
parliament  except in so far as they were represented there 
by  prelates who  held  baronies  of  the crown  and failed  to 
escape the liability involved therein. 
Where the commons conducted their domestic deliberations 
when  they first  departed from parliament,  is  riot  known; 
but in  Edward  11's  reign  they seem  to have  met  in  the 
refectory of  Westminster Abbey, a place outside the jurisdic- 
tion of the chamberlain and other palace and parliamentary 
officials.  Soon they took to meeting in the chapter house, 
which  enjoyed  similar  immunity;  their  presence  there 
is  recorded  in  1352, and  by  1376 the  chapter  house  is 
already  described as their ancient place of  meeting.'  This 
departure  is  the  first  step  in  the  so-called separation  of 
parliament  into two houses; but that separation  has never 
been complete, and the house of  commons was formed, not 
so much by separation  from the house of  lords,  as by the 
amalgamation  of  knights  and  burgesses.  There  are  still 
many  forms which  indicate  the unity of  parliaments,  and 
those forms were realities long after the fourteenth century. 
The  discussions  in  the  chapter  house  were  not,  strictly 
speaking, transactions in parliament at all, and the gather- 
1 Rot.  Parl., ii. 237,  322: cf. "  Histovy,"  iii.  34. 
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ings of  commons, clergy, lords,  were  more  like committees 
than houses of  parliament.  Then, as now, no act of  parlia- 
ment could be made or done outside the parliament chamber ; 
then, as now, the presence of  the Speaker and commons was 
required at the passing  of  every  bill,'  at the opening and 
prorogation  of  evely parliament.  Parliament still acts as 
one body, and not as two houses, in all its solemn functions, 
but  in  the  fourteenth  century the "  houses " had neither 
been  organized  nor  reduced  to  two.  The "  committees " 
were the various estates in parliament, who as late as 1381 
are referred to as "  prelates, temporal lords, judges, knights, 
and all the other estates."  It is the "knights  and all the 
other  estates "  who  migrate  to  the  chapter  house  and 
become  in  time  the house  of  commons. 
The judges remained, naturally, in the parliament chamber 
with the council, of  which they were an integral part.  For 
some time  and to some extent the spiritual and temporal 
peers deliberated apart from the council in parliament  and 
from  one  an~ther.~  But  baronial  tradition  and influence 
proved too strong for the king in parliament ; and while out- 
side parliament the council became "  privy " and reinaincd 
royal,  inside  parliament  it became "  magnum,"  and  fro111 
about the middle  of  the fourteenth  century, whenever  we 
read  of  the king's  council  in  parliament  the king's  great 
council is meant.4  In time the peers monopolize the position 
of "  consiliarii " in parliament, reduce the other councillors, 
such as the judges and even the chancellor, to the status of 
It was a demand of  the commons in 1348  that their petitions should 
be  answered  and  endorsed "  en  parlement  devant  la  commune " (Rot. 
purl.,  li.  165). 
Probably the clergy were not included in this vague reference, having 
already before  1381  practically severed their connexion with Parliament. 
See, for instances  of  separate deliberation of  spiritual  and temporal 
lords, Rot. Parl.,  ii.  64b,  66. 
This is one of the points  Prof.  Baldwin  has, not elucidated, and it 
remains obscure.  As  late as 1433 there was  a  king's  great council in 
Parliament "  as well as a "king's  great council out of  parliament "  (Nicolas, 
Proc. of  Privy Council, iv. 185-6)  ;  the latter contained nominated knights 
of the shire (zbid.,  i. 156,  vi. 339).  Probably a "council "  was not even yet 
Wardedas a definite body of  men, but rather as a conference without any 
Specification of  personnel.  The personnel would be specified by the writs 
of sllmmons and not by the name of  the meeting  to which  they wer: 
mmoned.  It is doubtful whether we should think of  definite "  bodies 
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voteless advisers, and eliminate  all  trace of  separate  con- 
sultation of  peers apart from councillors.  The lords, there- 
fore, instead of leaving the parliament chamber to deliberate 
by themselves  as one  or  two  estates,  remained  with  the 
council  as  advisers  of  the  crown.  It  is  thus  that  the 
petitions  of  the commons are enacted with  the advice and 
consent  of  the  lords;  for  the  lords  are the  lords  of  the 
council which  they have invaded.  They sit in the parlia- 
ment  chamber,  they  transact  all their business  there, and 
they are not called a "house " until the sixteenth century. 
The knights of  the shire and the b~lrgesses  were thus left 
to retire alone for joint or separate discussion and resolution. 
Their  co-operation  has  been  commonly  regarded  as  the 
outcome of  a deliberate determination of  the knights to throw 
in their lot with the burgesses rather than with the lords; 
but  this  view  presupposes  too  great  an  influence  of  the 
burgesses in parliament.  There is hardly a definite trace of 
parliamentary action on their part before 1340,  while there 
are many occasions on which the knights were consulted with- 
out any reference to burgesses at a1l.l  It would appear that 
the knights had already established the habit of  independent 
deliberation, and that the fusion  of  the  county  and civic 
representatives  was  rather due  to the burgesses attaching 
themselves to the knights.  No  doubt there must have been 
a reciprocal willingness on the side of  the knights, and it is a 
peculiar and remarkable feature of  the English constitution 
that the knights, in spite of  their social and political bonds 
with  the barons--such  as common military  tenure-in-chief 
and common ideas of  chivalry-should  have found it easier 
to work with burgesses than with barons; indeed, it would 
not have been possible but for the shrinking of  the baronage 
into the ~eerage.~  he fusion of  knights and burgesses was,  F 
1 E. g.  Rot. Parl., ii. 66. 
3  This, in its turn, was largely due to the success of  the crown UI  insist- 
ing on the writ  of  summons as the qualification  for  attendance at par- 
liament.  If  parliament  had  really  been  a  system  of  estates, and  the 
second  estate  had  elected  its  representatives,  the lesser  barons  would 
doubtless  have  continued  to  co-operate  with  the  greater.  But  these 
greater barons were summoned by special writ, which gave no opportunity 
for election and removed  them from  the control of  the lesser. 
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however, a slow process, the steps in which mighkbe traced 
in  some  detail  in  the " Rolls  of  Parliaments "t  possibly 
the Good  parliament  of  1376  exemplified the  fi  2  stfruits of 
In any case, separate consultation of  knights 
and burgesses grew rarer, while their  joint  deliberation in 
the "  domus communis "  grew more regular and well defined. 
This growth required  some organization, and during the 
fourteenth century  the development  of  the house of  com- 
mons gave rise to the speakership and clerkship of  the house. 
The  Modus  Teaendi  Parlianzentum  speaks  of  each  of  the 
five "  gradus " of parliament having its own clerk ;  l but the 
fusion of  estates reduced  the number  of  clerks to two,  or 
three if  the clerk of  convocation  be included.  The clerk of 
the  parliaments  was,  as  he  remains  to-day,  the  official 
responsible for the records of  the transactions of  the estates 
in  common session  in the parliament  chamber, now called 
the house of  lords; his assistant, the second clerk, was told 
off  to do the clerical work of  the knights and burgesses, and 
became the clerk of  the house of   common^.^  He  kept  no 
journal  in the modern  sense of  the word, though he  may 
have kept in the fifteenth, and certainly kept in the sixteenth 
century  a  book  in  which  he  entered  the  attendance  of 
 member^.^  But his principal work was to draft the answers 
of  the  commons  to the king's  demands, and to reduce  to 
writing common petitions or bills based upon the discussions 
in  the  house.  The  individual  petitions  which  members 
brought  up with them were, no doubt, drafted  locally, but 
to combine them in common petitions or to draft fresh ones 
after deliberation required a clerk of  the house, 
There is no direct trace of  the action of  these five clerks in the "  Rolls "  ; 
possibly the Modus refers to the period before the "  Rolls "  become anything 
like a full record of  parliamentary  proceedings. 
"he  so-called clerk of  the house of  commons is still described in his 
Patent  of  appointment "  Under-Clerk of  the Parliaments  appointed  to 
attend the House of  Commons "  (Reflort on Establishment of  H.  of C., Parl.  -.  rapers, I 833, xii. 15). 
a  In  the fourteenth century  the attendance of  knights  and  burgesses 
was so little necessary that no means of  compulsion were employed,  the 
Only penalty being loss of wages.  Richard  I1 tried to compel the attend- 
ance of  barons,  but  compulsion  was  not regularly  applied  to burgesses 
until the sixteenth century ;  see below, chap. xvi. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
The other ofiicial was  the Speaker, so called because he 
"  spoke for "  the commons in parliament and alone enjoyed 
liberty of  speech in the parliament chamber.  This, of  course, 
was an entirely different liberty from that with which it has 
been confused, the liberty of  individual speech on the part of 
members  in  the  "  domus  communis,"  which  was  not  in 
parliament  at  all.  The  medieval  claim  made  by  every 
Speaker at the beginning of  every parliament was for himself 
alone, and referred  to transactions in the common sessions 
in  the  parliament  chamber.  There  each  prelate,  baron, 
or councillor might speak, but no member of  the commons 
save the Speaker, and this is the rule to-day.  He could only 
speak as the mouthpiece of  the commons, and the principal, 
indeed, the only, liberty he claimed for a century, was that, 
if  he misreported  or misrepresented  any resolution  of  the 
commons, he might withdraw or  correct what  he had said. 
The entirely different claim to freedom of  speech on behalf 
of  individual  members  in the house of  commons was  not 
added  to the  Speaker's  repertoire  until  the reign  of  that 
great  architect  of  parliament,  Henry  VIII.2  With  regard 
to those other functions of  the Speaker which have eclipsed 
his  original  reason  for  existence,  their  growth  is  wrapped 
in  darkness.  No  records  whatever  have  survived  of  the 
domestic proceedings of  the house of  commons earlier than 
1547, and we have no information about the steps by which 
the Speaker became chairman of  the house and by which his 
authority was developed. Sir William Trussell was apparently 
Speaker  in 1343,9  but he and his  medieval  successors only 
appear on the record when they have left the domus  cow- 
munis, and come at the head of  their fellow-members before 
the lords and the council in the parliament chamber. 
1 "  Prolocutor " is his  earliest official title. 
2  In  1477, for instance, the Speaker asks for "  omnes ac singulas alias 
libertates  et  franchesias  quas  aliquis  hujusmodi  Prolocutor  perantea 
melius et liberius habuit."  The petition is for himself, and not for other 
members of  the House  (Rot.  Parl., vi. 167).  In 1482 te  Speaker, John 
Wood, omitted  the petition  for these  "alias  libertates  (ibid.,  vi.  192; 
cf. iv. 420, 482). 
3  Ibid.,  ii.  136  b: "  et puis vindrent des  chivalers des counteez et les 
communes et responderent par Monsieur William Trussell." 
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~ut  the mere  existence  of  the Speaker is  evidence oi a 
corpnrate feeling and organization, which was totally lacking 
'/ 
in  the reign  of  Edward I but grew  out  of  a  subsequent 
balf-century  of  common  deliberation  and  action.  Then 
/knights and burgesses had only been present at Westminster 
I as individual petitioners on behalf  of  their constituents ;  and 
it  is  even doubtful  whether  they voted  grants collectively 
or  by  separate bargain  with  the  crown.  In  the  reign  of 
his grandson they are a coherent body of  national legislators. 
The "  common " petition has been developed, backed by the 
hint of a  common resistance to taxation;  and in 1340  half 
a dozen citizens  and burgesses, as well  as a  dozen knights, 
are  elected  by  their  fellow-members to join  with  certain 
prelates, earls, and barons to try and examine the petitions 
presented in parliament  and put them into statutes which 
shall  be  perpetua1.l  This  is  the  method  by  which  the 
commons asserted legislative power.  They never claimed a 
right  to  initiate  legislation;  and  much  industry has been 
wasted in attempts to fix  the date at which  the commons 
asserted their right  to legislate.  They do not  possess  that 
abstract right  to-day.  The  crown  alone enacts legislation 
in parliament; the commons merely petition, and the right 
of  petition  has existed  since the days  of  Henry  11.  The 
process of  development was more  subtle than any declara- 
tion of  right.  The individual petition was gradually turned 
into the common petition of  the house, and then backed by 
the control of  the purse, and the so-called right to legislate 
consists  in  the  commons'  power  of  making  government 
impossible if  heed is not paid to the petitions they have the 
right to present.  d 
The  change from the individual to the common petition 
was fundamental.  The high  court  of  parliament  was con- 
verted into a legislature, and its judicial  function obscured 
by  its legislative activity.  Common  petitions  lead  us  out 
of the realm of  common law into that of  common politics; 
for the individual wrong  is a matter of  law,  the  common 
grievance is a question of  politics.  Common petitions could 
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not be  settled in court, and the remedy for their reference 
to  chancery,  king's  bench,  and  so  forth,  of  which  the 
commons complained in 1325,~  could only be found by their 
enactment  as  statutes  in  parliament  devant  la  commune. 
Common action is the cause, as well  as the result  of  com- 
munity of  feeling, and the communitates become the cornmuni- 
tas  commu~zitafum. By  that  process  the  locally-minded 
representatives  of  heterogeneous  communities are  welded 
into a  house  of  commons, and  in  that  house, more  than 
anywhere else, the "  estates " are made into the state. 
This growth of  common petitions, and the absorption of 
the  commons  in  their  prosecution,  diminished  the  share 
of  the commons in the judicial  work  of  parliament, made 
parliament itself  less of  a high court, and fostered the ulti- 
mate but incomplete differentiation bctween our high court of 
parliament and our high court of  justice.  Individual petitions 
were more and more neglected by the commons ;  they insisted  , 
upon  answers being  given  to  their  common  petitions  in 
parliament before they dispersed, but they would not  wait 
for answers to individual petitions.  These were  mvre  and 
more referred to the council  at the end of  the sessi~n,~  if 
they  had  not  already  been  answered,  and  this  reference 
entitled  the council to endorse its answers fier auctovitatem 
$arliamenti.s  Answers  to such referred  petitions were also 
entered on the "  Rolls of  Parliaments,"  although not  given 
until  after the dismissal  of  the  estate^,^  and  although the 
duration  of  a  parliament  was  coming  to  be  regarded  as 
limited to the  session  of  the  estates.  For,  while  as  late 
as the beginning of  Edward 111's reign a parliament might 
continue after the dismissal of  the c~rnrnons,~  the  concen- 
Rot. Parl., i. 430. 
a  Ibid., ii. 243;  Nicolas, Proc. of  Privy Council, ii. 307, v.  p. xi. 
8  Cf.  Elsynge,  Modus,  pp.  294-7,  and  below,  p.  328 n.  It was 
reference  of  petitions  to  the council  per  auctoritatern  parliarne?zti 
really gave the council in the Star Chamber  its statutory sanction, 
not the Act of  1487, which apparently has nothing to do with the 





'  Rot. Purl, ii. 304, iv. 3.34, 506. 
6  E. g.  Rot. Parl., ii. 65b  After  the knights,  citizens, burgesses  and 
clergy had  been  given  leave to go  home  (Saturday, March  21,  1331-2) 
on condition  that the prelates,  earls, barons,  and councillors  remained, 
proceedings continued "  en pleyn parlement " on the Monday. 
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tration of  attention upon common  petitions led, before the 
end  of  the  reign,  to  the  adoption  of  the  idea  that  the 
presence  of  the commons was essential to  the continuance 
of a session  of parliament.  Out of  this habitual reference 
of  individual petitions by parliament  to the council  grew, 
in  the latter half  of  the fourteenth  century, the extensive 
jurisdiction of the council and indirectly of  chancery, to which 
the council in turn referred the bulk ;  l and the specialization 
and  differentiation of  the  functions  of  parliament  began. 
In Edward 1's reign all sorts of  business had been transacted 
in parliament ;  the regular reference of  individual petitions 
to the council and to chancery tended to develop the council's 
jurisdiction and to restrict parliament to legislation. 
This  division  of  functions likewise  tended  to limit  the 
council's  power  of  legislation.  The  means  by  which  the 
commons secured  the enactment of  their common petitions 
have  already  been  indicated; it cost a  longer  and severer 
struggle  to  limit  the  council's  power  of  legislation  and 
enforce the necessity of  parliamentary consent.  Edward 1's 
great legislation had been promulgated in assemblies which, 
if  called parliaments, did not  contain the estates, and the 
presumed recognition, in 1322,  of  the need for the consent of 
the commons to 1egisla.tion has been e~aggerated.~  In 1327 
we  find  a  distinction  made  between  statutes  and  other 
forms of  legislation, and the idea is that a statute should be 
perpetual, while enactments of  a more temporary character 
were  expressed in letters  patent.4  But  the differentiation 
between those petitions, or parts of  petitions, which were to 
be made statutes and those which were to receive less solemn 
authorization was left to the council or to the judges as late 
as 1422, when the clerk of  the parliaments was ordered to read 
to the council the/ acts passed at the late parliament, and then 
submit them to the two chief  justices, who were to decide 
Cf. Baldwin,  King's Council, pp. 241 sqq. 
a  Their success was, of  course, only partial:  the crown's  power of veto 
was only limited  by political  expediency; it has never been limited  by 
law  except during the Long Parliament. 
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which of  them were statutes.  These were to be proclaimed; 
the  other "  acts " were to be handed  over to the clerk of 
the council, though all alike were to be enrolled, as was the 
custom, in chancery.l  It was not till the sixteenth century 
that the crown lost the power  of  amending and modifying 
bills  passed by both  houses of parliament.  In the fifteenth 
century the practice was extended, if  not also begun, of  draft- 
ing petitions in the form of  acts, and we  have frequent refer- 
ences  to a bill or petition "  in se formam actus continens "; 
but Henry VII himself, and even Elizabeth, occasionally took 
the liberty  of  adding  provisos to, or  otherwise modifying 
bills  before  signifying the royal  a~sent.~  There  are  three 
stages in  the history  of  legislation : d3wn to the reign of 
Edward I it is the act of  the crown; then it becomes the 
act  of  the  crown  in  parliament,  and  finally  the  act  of 
parliament.  At the end of  the middle ages it is only in the 
second of  these stages, and side by side with its power  to 
legislate  in  parliament  the crown  possessed  a  concurrent 
right to legislate by ordinance independently of  parliament, 
a power which had never been defined. 
The original function of  parliament as a gathering in which, 
according  to  Fleta, "  judicial  doubts  are  determined  and 
new  remedies are established for new  wrongs,  and justice 
is done to every one according to his deserts," tends thus, by 
the end of  the fourteenth century, to be limited to the second 
object of  enacting new remedies for new wrongs;  and this 
restriction of  function led to a restriction  of  its frequency. 
To the council and chancery parliament itself  referred most 
of  its business, and they sat throughout the four legal terms 
of  the year.  As  early as 1348 it was ordered that individual 
petitions should be addressed to the chancellor and common 
petitions  to  the  clerk  of  the  parliamenk3  Parliament 
need  no longer meet  thrice a year, as in Edward  1's reign; 
and indeed, quite apart from  this judicial  transformation, 
there were other causes tending to the infrequency of  parlia- 
mentary sessions.  The more popular and important an as- 
sembly it grew, and the greater the attendance of  commons 
and the length of  their sessions, the less practicable it became 
to hold  three general elections  and three  sessions a year. 
Accordingly the three sessions a year of  Edward 1's time are 
reduced to about three in two years in Edward II's, to one 
a year in the middle of the fourteenth century, and in the 
fifteenth century to one  in  two,  three,  four,  or  even  five 
years.  This progressive rarity of  parliaments is not due to 
the tyranny of  kings, for it proceeds independently of  the 
dynasty or particular monarch;  it is due to a fundamental 
change in the character of  parliament,  to the specialization 
of  functions previously performed by a rudimentary  organ, 
and  to the  transference  of  most  of  the original  work  of 
parliament to the council and to chancery. 
Nicolas, Proc. of  Privy Council, iii.  22.  ".  g. Rot. Parl., vi. 275,  412,  460  ;  my Henry  VII,  ii.  16-17  ;  D'Ewes, 
Journals, p. 341b.  Bills drawn up in the form of  an act were apparently 
drawn on parchment (Rot. Parl., vi. 288,  331).  See Appendix I11 (m). 
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CHAPTER  VII 
PARLIAMENT AND  NATIONALISM 
.-- 
THE  loss of  original functions through the transformation 
of parliament from a high court into a legislature diminished 
its usefulness and the reasons for its existence ;  and, pending 
the development of  fresh grounds of  action, parliament in the 
fifteenth century seemed to be treading the downward path 
of continental estates.  Its sessions grew ever less frequent; 
from  three  a  year  they  sank  to  one  in  every  four  or 
five years;  and intervals of  seven years  under  Henry VII 
and Wolsey, and of eleven under Charles I, might have been 
the prelude to a silence as prolonged and profound as that 
which fell upon national representation in France.  Parlia- 
ment itself  showed no desire to insist upon its continuance. 
After the reference of  most of  its judicial work to the council, 
the  need  for  supply  alone  made  it  indispensable to  the 
crown;  and  if  parliament  had  succeeded in  enforcing its 
persistent demand that the king should "  live of  his own," 
it  would  have  rendered  its  own  existence  superfluous. 
Nothing  but  compulsion on  the  part  of  the crown  could 
get  a parliament  together;  and  as  late  as  the sixteenth 
century ministers were wont  to apologize to parliament for 
its summons.  "  What,"  aslied Sir Thomas Smith in  1560, 
"  can  a  commonwealth  desire  more  than  peace,  liberty, 
quietness, little taking of  their money, few parliaments ? " 
The reluctance of  parliament to assume responsibility was 
as marked as its unwillingness to meet, its haste to get home, 
or  its anxiety to escape  taxation;  and the impotence that 
was  the result  of  this  slowness  to serve  might  well  have 
1  Strype, Life of  Sir T.  Smith,  p. 192.  Sir Nicolas Bacon in January 1563 
claimed in parliament credit for the queen on the ground of  her reluctance 
to burden the country with it (D'Ewes, Journals, p. 61). 
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explained its  disappearance  at the  end  of  the  fifteenth 
century.  It had failed alike to check tyrants and to support 
constitutional kings.  Good resolutions were the limit of  its 
~apacity,  and  they  were  short-lived.  No  parliament  had 
offered successful resistance to the crown, and the troubles 
of Richard 11, Henry VI, and Richard 111  came from other 
quarters.  While parliaments were ever in  opposition, rebel- 
lion and rival claims to the throne were always required to 
effect a change in government or in policy.  In spite of  the 
vaunted constitutional experiment of  the Lancastrians, con- 
stitutional methods  were,  to the end of  the middle  ages, 
powerless to effect  constitutional government.  So far from 
the constitution being in all essentials complete in the reign 
of  Edward I, it lacked the elementary means of working at all 
and was periodically being superseded by battle and murder. 
The constitutional ideal which Sir John  Fortescue depicted 
at the  close of  the middle  ages  had little more  relevance 
to the practice of  his day than More's  Utopia had to the 
government of  Cardinal Wolsey. 
The  great  service  which  parliaments  rendered  in  the 
middle ages was not, in fact, to make England a constitu- 
tional state, but to foster its growth into a national  state 
based  on  something  broader  and  deeper  than  monarch- 
ical  centralization,  to  make  national  unity  a  thing  of 
the  spirit  rather  than  a  territorial  expression  or  a 
mechanical matter of  administration, to evoke a  common 
political  consciousness  at Westminster  and  then  to  pro- 
pagate  it in  the constituencies.  The value of  parliaments 
consisted not so much in what members brought with them 
as in what they took away.  Nationalism in the middle ages 
came nearer to Napoleon 111's  la volontt de chaculz than to 
Rousseau's la  volontt  gdnkrale,  and  it was  in  and  through 
parliaments  that  local  and  social  prejudice  was  merged 
in  a  common  sense.  Every  Englishman  of  to-day  feels 
and realizes his nationality  to some extent;  the degree is 
a matter of  individual imagination, education, and interest. 
Generally  speaking, his  attachment  to  his  country  over- 
rides  every other affection except, perhaps, his devotion to I34  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
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himself  and his family and in some cases his  addiction  to 
his religious or moral faith.  But in the middle ages we  are 
dealing with  men  whose  nationalism  came  comparatively 
low  in  the  scale  of  their  affections.  Blen  of  the  highest 
mind  and  character  agreed  with  Archbishop  Winchelsey 
that the loyalty they owed the pope came before the loyalty 
they  owed  the king.  Barons were, as a rule, more devoted 
to their  class  than  to either pope  or  king;  the ordinary 
burgess  or  squire valued  his  local  affinities more  than his 
national  bonds,  and  to  the  villager  the  parish  was  his 
world.  When  he  threw  himself  upon  his  country-$osztit 
se  s~per  jbatria~n-his  country consisted of  his nejghbours, 
and every one  else was  a foreigner.  These symptoms are 
not  yet  extinct,  and  in  very  recent  years  a  protectionist 
speaker  was  told  by his  Devonshire audience that it was 
not the "  foreign "  foreigner they disliked, but the Somerset- 
shire foreigner;  a similar feeling may even be  traced with 
regard to the Mercians in the works of  the vigorous West- 
Saxon who wrote the Hislory of  the Norman Conquest.  The 
difference  between  modern  and  medieval  Englishmen's 
patriotism  is  one  of  degree;  in  the  middle  ages  locality 
preceded the nation, and it was through parliaments that the 
order was reversed. 
The nation, like the child, began its education with what 
the  Germans  call  heimatkunde.  Intimate things  were  the 
first its mind could grasp.  By  the thirteenth  century the 
normal  range  of  the  average freeman's  imagination  com- 
prehended the shire, and his public activities were organized 
on  that basis.  IIe had  to bear  arms in the fyrd,  but  the 
fyrd could not be summoned to fight outside the shire except 
at the king's expense.  He had to serve as a juror, but he 
could not be empanelled or forced to plead as a suitor beyond 
the county  boundary.  The  county  was  his  country,  and 
both the political and the verbal distinctions between  the 
terms  are  of  modern  gr0wth.l  Men  fought  as  shires and 
Cf.  K.  Brunne,  "  the cuntre  of  Dors:th  " (c.  1330)~  Caston, " the 
countre of  Leycester " (1480), Fitzherbert,  Leycestershyre, Lankesshyre, 
Yorkeshyre,  and many other countreys " (1523) (N. E. D.). 
thought as shires and judged  as shires;  they  did nothing 
as a nation,  and it is grotesque  to  speak  of  "  England " 
doing anything at all before parliaments  appeared, because 
there was no "  England " capable of  doing it.  During the 
Norman  period  "  England"  suffers,  but  does  not  act; 
Henry I1 does much, but he spends nine-tenths of  his reign 
abroad  and represents  France  rather than  England.  The 
importance of  Magna  Carta  consists, not  in  the nature of 
its  provisions, but  in  the  co-operation  by  which  it  was 
achieved.  The  movement  against  John  was,  however, 
spasmodic and feudal rather than popular, and the opposition 
to Henry  I11 was  also  mainly baronial.  It was not until 
Simon  de Montfort and Edward I popularized parliaments 
that England became really conscious of  itself and acquired 
the means of national action.  Even then the action must not 
be exaggerated; there was no will on the part of  the English 
people to determine or direct a national policy, and it was 
little more than a formal expression of  national acquiescence 
that  Edward  I  sought in parliaments.  Consent, and  not 
direction, was the object of  its summons ;  and its importance 
lay in its unity, in the absence of  rival parliaments and of 
provincial estates. 
There are many aspects of  this unity of  the English parlia- 
mentary system.  An  attempt has already  been  made  to 
indicate the significance of  the fact which distinguished every 
English  parliament  since  Edward  I  from  all  continental 
systems of  estates, namely, the fact that it was not merely 
a fiarlemefzt nor a system of  estates, but both a court of  law 
and a representative assembly, at once a judicial, a legisla- 
tive, and a taxing body.  This was perhaps the most funda- 
mental element in the unity of  parliament, but another was 
hardly less essential to its national character, and that was 
its comprehensive  scope.  Popular representation  by itself 
has never been  incompatible with  monarchical  despotism : 
provincial estates with representation  of  the tiers dtat  con- 
tinued in many parts of  France throughout the ancien rdgime 
down  to the  Revolution of  1789.  They  continued in  the 
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and  while  Philip IV denounced estates-general  as  fatal to 
the principle of  monarchy,l he and his successors permitted 
the  innocuous  continuance  of  provincial  representation. 
The  most  despotic of  German  princes  were  equally  com- 
plaisant,  and even  Von  Ranke  expressed a  preference  for 
Landtag  over Reichstag  which  helps to explain  the failure 
of  the German empire to achieve responsible government. 
This  monarchical  predilection  for  provincialism  is  merely 
an expression of  the despotic maxim divide et  impera, and 
it illustrates the fact that provincial estates were not merely 
harmless  to  autocracy  but  dangerous  to  national  self- 
government;  they  were,  in  fact,  the  principal  enemy  of 
estates-general, because by  diverting  to  local  objects the 
desire  for  self-government they  weakened  the strength  of 
national  co-operation.  Nowhere  did  provincial estates,  or 
estates-general where  provincial  estates existed, succeed in 
their resistance to the growth of  monarchy in the sixteenth 
century. 
The unity of  the English parliament has been unchallenged 
for so many centuries that it requires some effort to realize 
the medieval  danger of  provincial  estates.  Yet  the forces 
and temptations leading to such a developement were by no 
means inconsiderable.  England before the Norman Conquest 
was rarely united  under a single crown, and even when  it 
was, expedients were  occasionally adopted, like Cnut's four 
great  earldoms, which  were  hardly  less  fatal than  actual 
dismemberment to national unity.  Long after the Conquest 
the divergences between England north and England south 
of  the Humber were sufficiently strong to make their separa- 
tion  a  possible  contingency.  It was  a  recognized  line  of 
administrative  division  throughout  the  middle  ages,  and 
as late as  Elizabeth's  reign  northern  catholics dreamt  of 
an independent kingdom, or of  dependence on the Scottish 
rather than on the  English crown.  The Pilgrims of  Grace 
demanded  a  parliament  at  York,  and  Mary  thought  of 
removing her government thither for shelter and sympathy. 
1 'ILes Etats gCnCraux sont pernicieux en tout temps et dans tous les 
pays monarchiques sans exception " (Pirenne, Hist. de Belgique, iv. 401). 
~t was only by the hundred  years'  labours of  the council 
of  the north  that  the conservative  counties north  of  the 
fiumber  were  really  made  one  with  the rest  of  England. 
Further, there was the ecclesiastical model;  and if  parlia- 
ment was moulded so  closely upon the organization of  the 
church as has sometimes been supposed,l there would  have 
been  two  parliaments  in  the English state, as there  were 
two  convocations in  the  English  church.  Had  the state 
imitated  the church  and  constructed  two  parliaments  in 
England, or had the church imitated the state and gathered 
its forces into one  national assembly, the history  of  both 
church and state in England  would have been fundament- 
ally different. 
Edward I did, during one misguided moment in 1282,  set 
the perilous precedent of  a double parliament,  one for the 
north, meeting at York, the other for the south, meeting at 
Northampton.  That neither he nor any of  his successors 
followed this evil example was due to a number of  causes 
connected  with  !enera1  English  history.  The  unity  of 
England is primarily the effect  of  the unity of  its monarchy. 
Fortunately  the  Danish  wars  destroyed  all  royal  houses 
save  that  of  Ecgberht;  Alfred  the  Great  was  not,  like 
Hugh Capet, elected king by a group of  rival princes, whose 
descendants might claim to be peers of  the crown.  Harold's 
usurpation  might,  if  successful, have  divided  England  as 
France was divided;  but the most unruly feudatory of  the 
French  crown  restored  unity  to England  by  the Norman 
Conquest.  To  the  Conqueror  there  was  little  difference 
between West Saxon, Mercian, and Northumbrian;  he had 
no more local prejudices than the Indian civil servant, who 
is making India a nation by the same steady application of 
common principles of  government to diverse peoples as that 
by which the Norman baron and Angevin lawyer reduced to 
some  appearance  of  uqiformity  the  tribal  perversities  of 
their heterogeneous subjects. 
Not  only was  monarchical  unity secured, but all  traces 
of  the kingdoms  over  which  rival  houses had  ruled  were 
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obliterated.  When the West-Saxon kings acquired Mercia, 
Northumbria, and  East  Anglia, those realms were  not  re- 
tained, as Brittany, Normandy, and other French fiefs were, 
as administrative units.  They were split up into shires con- 
trolled  by the central government, and not  permitted  any 
provincial finrlevzents or estates.  Even in the most turbulent 
periods of  English anarchy, the over-mighty subject had to 
rely upon scattered domains.  A Geoffrey de  Mandeville, a 
Thomas of  Lancaster, or a Richard of  York might wreck  a 
government and overawe, or even seize, the crown ; but they 
could  not  dismember England,  because they could acquire 
no  such consolidated fiefs  as those upon  which  dukes and 
counts in France, Germany, and the Netherlands built their 
independence of  national authority.  The shires saved the 
unity  of  medieval  England  because  they  were  controlled 
by the crown and did not foment provincial independence. 
They  were  the  largest  subdivision  under  the crown,  and 
the great majority of  them were  given no  earls.  A dozen 
is  the maximum number  of  medieval  earls against  thrice 
that  number  of  shires.  Two-thirds  were  directly  under 
the  crown,  and  even  in  those  which  had  earls  the king 
maintained  a  sheriff  who  took two-thirds  of  the proceeds 
of  jurisdiction, leaving but one to the earl.  It  is the sheriff, 
and not  the earl, who  dominates the shire, and thus links 
the  shire to parliament,  instead  of  leaving it to develop 
feudal  autonomy  and  provincial  estates  under  thc  earl. 
The "  palatinates "  which approached most nearly to  the 
provincial organization of  the continent were few, and were 
restricted to the borders.  The rest of  England was "  shired," 
and this "  shiring " did for the unification of  England what 
the breaking up of  the French provinces into departments 
achieved for the unity of  revolutionary France. 
The  shire-organization, being  the  work  of  the  central 
government, was naturally made the means of  the develop 
ment  of  common  law  and  of  parliament.  It was  in  the 
The word  is rarely  used  in the middle  ages, though  Anthony  Rek 
claimed in I293  to  hold as a comes palatinus.  The title Regzstrum Palatinum 
Dunelmense, which Sir T. D. Hardy prefixed to the four volumes ha ed~ted 
for the Rolls Series, was invented by hlm. 
county courts that the royal judges  appeared and applied 
the  practice  of- the  curia  regis;  it  was  the  sheriff  who 
carried that law into execution.  It was there, too, that all 
elected  members  of  parliament  were  returned;  for  the 
citizen and the burgess, though elected in his city or borough, 
was  returned  by  indenture  made  with  the  sheriff  in  the 
shire court.  The sheriff, as the local agent  of  the central 
government, received and returned the writs that emanated 
from the same monarchical authority.  The members came 
to Westminster not  as sent  from  sovereign constituencies, 
but as summoned by a sovereign lord; they attended not as 
delegates with imperative mandates to do what  their con- 
stituents told  them, but as the unfortunate and unwilling 
persons  selected by  their  fellows to carry  out  the require- 
ments of  the crown.  Their powers  came from above and 
not  from  below,  and  their  position  was  nearer  to that of 
those  persons  selected  for  service  under  Militia  Ballot 
Acts than to  that of  plenipotentiaries.  Parliament  in  its 
origin had less to do with the theory that all power emanated 
from the people than with the fact that all people held their 
land directly or indirectly from the crown, and were bound 
by a corresponding obligation to obey its writs of  summons 
and  carry  out  its  behests.  It was  the  crown  that  put 
ad  faciendum in  their  writs  of  summons,  and  it was  the 
business of the crown they had to transact. 
The crown by means of  parliaments thus imposed a bond 
of unity upon the shires, and it was probably because there 
was  only one curia regis and one king's  council  that there 
was  only  one  parliament.  Fortunately  for  England  her 
administrative  unity  was  achieved  before  her  popular 
representation.  Even  so,  had parliament  been  merely  a 
system of  estates,  and  had  its original business been  the 
granting  of  taxes, local  patriotism  might  have  insisted on 
local parliaments, where  men could grant what they had to 
grant without a troublesome journey to Westminster.  But 
their  business  was  with  a  single  series of  national  courts 
of law, king's  bench. exchequer, and common pleas, sitting 
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this session was  held  elsewhere than  at Westminster, and 
wagons of  records and other essentials wended their way to 
Nottingham,  York,  or  Carlisle.  But  the greater  grew  the 
bulk of  these records and the more specialized the machinery 
of  government, the more  serious was  the inconvenience of 
migration, and except in 1282 the experiment of  a  divided 
parliament was never tried. 
Englishmen  from  every  shire  were  therefore  brought 
together,  generally  at  Westminster,  once  or  more  every 
year.  It was not  less  important  that they  were  gathered 
from  various  classes,  and  almost  coerced  into  common 
deliberation on common objects;  for division between class 
and  class  is  not  less  fatal  to  national  unity  and  self- 
government than division between  province and  province. 
Assuredly it was  social rather  than  local  separatism  that 
explains,  if  it  does  not  also  excuse, both  the  weight  of 
Bourbon despotism and the savagery of  the French Revolu- 
tion.  For  when  class  cannot  act  with  class,  no,  public 
opinion is possible  and therefore no  self-government;  the 
necessary result is a common despotic authority, and when 
that  despotic  authority  falls  before  revolution,  the  only 
check is removed from class hatred, which arises from lack 
of  co-operation, and, in its turn, breeds suspicion and distrust. 
Every  class in  France  during the first  French  Revolution 
was  ready to believe  that it was  betrayed  and that other 
classes were  bought with Pitt's gold, because all classes in 
France were strangers to one another.  Similar accusations, 
even if  made, have seldom been believed in England, because 
all  classes know  something about  one  another;  and  that 
knowledge has come from centuries of  co-operation between 
diverse  classes in  local  and national  government.  It was 
not for nothing that the shire court was called a community, 
and the house of  commons the community of  communities 
The  house  of  commons is  not, indeed,  and  never  was,  a 
haven  of  peace;  feeling runs  high  and  language  is  tem- 
pestuous;  but when  one leader accuses another of  having 
no  principles,  it  is  not  because  they  belong  to  different 
classes or have different codes of  honour, but because they 
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belong to different parties and have to observe the conven- 
tions of  party conflict.  The  gulf  is easily closed  at times 
of crisis and easily passed by individuals whenever they feel 
disposed. 
The absence, or rather the confusion of  class distinctions, 
which  dates  from before the Norman  Conquest, was  con- 
firmed  by  parliament.  The "  estates " of  which  we  read 
in  its "  Rolls"  had  little  of  caste  rigidity;  the  judges, 
for instance, are called  an estate, but  in  England judicial 
office  never  became  hereditary,  as  in  France,  and  such 
great offices of  state as did  become  hereditary  soon  lost 
their importance.  Prelacy also is  called  an "  estate,"  but 
prelacy,  like  the judiciary,  was  always  a  career  that was 
open to talent.  Nor  was  there any demarcation of  birth 
between the knights and bannerets, who sat in the house of 
commons, and  the barons, who  sat in  the house of  lords. 
Elected  knights  and  bannerets  were  often  "  chivalers " 
and were  commonly  called  nobles;  there were "  barons " 
of  the Cinque  Ports and of  the exchequer who  were  not 
"  peers  of  the  realm,"  and  the  distinction  between  the 
"nobility"  and the gentry  of  England  in  the fourteenth 
century was  as vague as is  to-day  the meaning of  gentle- 
man.  Even the serio-comic distinction, made by the College 
of  Arms between those who  have inherited  or  bought the 
right to bear arms and those who  have not, had not  been 
invented.  Co-operation and community of  sentiment were 
thus comparatively easy ; and  the separatist tendencies of 
deliberation by  "  estates " were  checked  by  the  common 
action  which  followed it  in  the parliament  chamber.  In 
1332 we  read, for instance, that the estates first answered 
separately et pztis  tous  eft  commune ;  l and although acts of 
parliament  are now  made  law  by  the royal consent given 
in  what  has  come  to  be  called  the  house  of  lords,  the 
presence  of  the Speaker and some of  the commons, which 
is  always  required,  still  bears  evidence  to  this  common 
action of  all the estates.  It was in parliament that differ- 
ences of  local and class sentiment had to be accommodated 
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and fashioned into a national determination ; and the result 
was effected more and more by mutual interchange of  views, 
less  and  less  by  the arbitrament  of  a  superior authority. 
Far more of  the work of  parliament was done by conference 
in  the  Painted  Chamber  or  elsewhere  than was  the  case 
after  the  amalgamation  of  the  various  estates  and  the 
severance of  parliament into two houses. 
The fluidity of  medieval ideas about "  estates "  facilitated 
the unifying work of  the crown in parliament.  Their number 
and  the  vagueness  of  their  delimitation,  which  depended 
more  upon  royal  writ  than  upon  any  question  of  status, 
hindered the adoption of  the continental  theory, that the 
assent of each estate was essential to legislation.  It is true 
that phrases  expressing the  assent  of  the  lords  spiritual 
and temporal  and  the  commons in parliament  assembled 
came  to be  customarily used  in  acts of  parliament;  but 
it is certain that their employment had not become essential 
by  the end  of  the fifteenth  century,  and  a  great  deal of 
legislation  was  passed  as late  as the reign  of  Henry  VII 
without any further testimony to its legality than the fact 
that it had been enacted by the king in parliament.1  More- 
over,  the "  assent  of  the  lords  spiritual  and  temporal " 
did not  mean their several assent, and the validity  of  the 
statutes of  provisors and pramunire, as well as of  Elizabeth's 
acts of  supremacy and uniformity, depends upon a repudia- 
tion  of  the  theory  that  the assent  of  the lords spiritual 
was requisite for such legislation.  For no  other "  estate " 
has  the  claim  ever  been  made.  The  assent  of  the 
lords  was  sought,  not  because  they  were  one  or  two 
"  estates,"  but  because  they  were  consiliavii  na!i  of  the 
crown.  The assent of  the commons was claimed as neces- 
sary not on the ground that they were an estate, but because 
they were the commulaitas commz~lzitatum. 
Cf. my Reign  of  Henry  VII,  vol. i. p.  xxxii,  iii.  199-200.  A  more 
scientific study of  the development of  legislative forms is  badly needed. 
Even  the  editors  of  the  Statutes  of  the  Realm  have  sometimes  pre- 
ferred one MS. of  a statute to another, on the ground  that it embodied 
modem  legislative  phraseology,  although  that  fact  is  evidence  of  its 
later date.  The stereotyping  of this phraseology  has been considerably  . 
ante-dated,  and  the constitutional  importance of  the middle  ages  has 
been magnified by attributing to them not a little modern achievement. 
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Taxation  was,  of  course,  a  different  matter.  For  the 
ordinary revenues of the crown, such as feudal aids, regular 
customs. and so forth, no consent was necessary; they were 
"  the king's  own,"  and  he was  not  only entitled to have 
them,  but  expected  to  live  on  them.  Other  taxes  were 
matters of  voluntary  g~ant,  and their history  is bound up 
with  the gradual  growth  of  the right  of  the majority  to 
bind the individual.  Peter des Roches, in Henry Ill's reign, 
successfully claimed immunity  from a  tax on  the ground 
that  he  as  an individual  had  not  consented  to  its levy. 
We  have no knowledge of  the important process by which 
this extreme view of  the rights of  "  liberty and property " 
was  surrendered, and the right of  an "estate " to bind its 
individual  members  by  a  majority  vote  was  established. 
The  principle  had  been  recognized  in  Magna  Carta, and 
taxation by "  estates "  was the regular practice in medieval 
parliaments.  It was but slowly that taxation was national- 
ized : each estate made its own  grant, and no estate could 
bind  any  other.  But  the "  estates " which  voted  taxes 
were limited in number;  the judges did not tax themselves 
separately, nor did the prelates, who taxed their temporalties 
with  the temporal  peers and their spiritualties in convoca- 
tion.  On  the other hand, the merchants, who were not  an 
estate  in  parliament,  often  arranged  their  own  taxation. 
Nor  did  the  class-taxes  that were  voted  correspond  with 
this or any other division of  estates : the taxes granted by 
the knights  of  the shires were,  like those  granted by  the 
lords temporal and the lords spiritual in parliament, mainly 
taxes  on  land;  citizens and burgesses  for  the  most  part 
granted  taxes  on  chattels or moveables,  while  merchants 
paid  on  their  merchandize.  But  the  original  distinction 
in  kind  between  danegeld,  carucage, tallage  and  so  forth 
was passing away with the change of  land from a source of 
men  into  a  source  of  wealth,  the acquisition by  tenants- 
in-chief  of  vast  flocks of  sheep, and the purchase  of  land 
by citizens and burgesses.  The effect of  this confusion was 
to break  down  the system  of  class  taxation:  each  estate 
would  have to grant  and pay various kinds of  taxes,  and 
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the  development  of  common  action  in  the  commons' 
house  led  to  common  taxation.  The  knights  join  with 
the town  representatives,  and  together  they  succeed  in 
depriving  the  merchants  of  the right  of  separate  taxa- 
tion.  The  church  consolidated  its  claim  to  grant  all 
its taxes,  temporal  as well  as  spiritual,  in  convocation 
and  to  collect  them  itself; l  while  the  peers,  in  return 
for  their legislative share in  general finance, acquiesced in 
the taxation  of  their  possessions by  grants  originating in 
the commons.  Taxation was thus, by the end of  the middle 
ages,  a  national  act, except  in  so  far  as the church  was 
concerned:  its taxes  were  granted in  two  provincial  con- 
vocations;  the  laity  were  all  taxed  together  by  act  of 
'  parliament.  The grant  for  all  is  made  by  the  commons 
with the  consent of  the lords;  but it takes the form of  a 
statute, and the sanction  behind it partakes  less and less 
of  the nature of  a gift by the representatives of  those who 
have  to  pay,  and  more  and  more  of  the  authority  of  a 
sovereign legislature.  In taxation, as in other matters, the 
"  estates "  become one, which is called the state, and national 
unity takes the place of  class diversity. 
A similar process affected the growth of  legislation.  Before 
parliaments  existed, the granting of  charters by the crown 
had exhibited the same tendency to expand from individual- 
ism and particularism to collectivism.  The earliest charters 
are to individual persons or boroughs;  then come  charters 
to  classes,  such  as  tenants-in-chief  and  merchants,  and 
finally the  great  charter, which  at any rate  mentions all 
classes of  the community.  The confirmation of  the charters 
by Edward I marks the culmination of  the charter and the 
point at which the charter merges into parliamentary legisla- 
1 See my Reign  of  Henry  VII,  ii. 39-43.  The law does not, however, 
appear to have been clear on the matter.  In 1480 counsel argued that 
grant by the commons was valid  without the consent of  the lords  (Year 
Book,  21  Ed.  IV. p.  48;  Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ed.  1878,  iii.  108  n.). 
Possibly  anti-clericalism assisted  their  decision,  for  the validity of  the 
grant was contested by the church in the interest of  some property that 
had been left it.  So long as lords and commons made separate grants, 
the assent  of  the lords would  not be necessary;  it was different when 
lords and commons were taxed by the same grants and when taxation took 
a definite legislative form.  See Appendiv I11  (n). 
tion.  Here,  too,  the  individual  petition  comes  first,  and 
gradually merges into petitions which  are common,  except 
that the church is reserved.  It is not, of  course, that all 
!egislation is general or public, but all legislation is backed 
by  the commons.  The distinction is clearly marked in the 
last  volume  of  the "  Rolls  of  Parliaments."  About half 
the petitions are common;  the  rest  are  presented  by the 
commons ex parte,  on  behalf  of  sorile individual person  or 
corporation.l  The former become public, the latter private 
acts;  and  this  familiar differentiation is first  adopted  in 
the  sixteenth-century  statutes,  although  the  principle  of 
discrimination  is  not  that  adopted  to-day : and  grants 
of taxes to the crown are often, in Henry VII's reign, classed 
as private  acts.  Still they are all acts done in a national 
parliament, and that  is the recognized method of  making 
secular law at the end of  the middle ages. 
This nationalization of  politics was fatal to the medieval 
conception of  jurisdiction  as something inherent in lordship 
of  the land;  and by a process which has never been traced 
in  detail  parliaments  developed  a  practice  of  making 
their  legislation  applicable  tam infra quam extra  libertates 
within as well  as outside liberties.  Gradually the distinc- 
tions between  one franchise and another, and  between  all 
franchises and  the remainder  of  the realm, were  whittled 
away;  and ideas of  legal uniformity and of  equality before 
the law begin to find expression in phrases that meant more 
than  the  old  and  empty  platitude  omnes  homines  natura 
~quales  sunt.  The King of  England, the Emperor Charles V 
was told in 1551, had but one law by which to rule all his 
 subject^,^ and that was  law  made in parliament.  Nothing 
could be less medieval : a contour map of  medieval England 
indicating the various heights of  jurisdictional privilege would 
have  revealed  an  infinite  diversity  of  inequality;  and  a 
vast  and  patient work  of  levelling was  required before the 
king's writ ran throughout the land and reduced its people 
to  equality in his  courts of  law.  But the equalization of 
1 E. g. Rot. Purl., vi. 290-z,  294, 298, 331. 
Calendar State  Papers, For., Edward VI,  p. 137. 
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liberty by means of  parliament must be reserved for separate 
treatment, and so must the nationalization of  the church, the 
greatest  of  medieval  liberties and the latest of  the spheres 
into which parliament ventured to intrude. 
Parliament was,  of  conrse, no more than the instrument 
of  comprehensive social, economic, and political  forces.  It 
had little to do directly with the nationalization of  language 
and literature,  without  which  there  could  have  been  no 
national  state, though  it can  hardly  be  doubted that the 
association of  men from all parts of  the country in common 
discussion  at  Westminster  assisted  the  adoption  of  a 
common standard of  speech and common habits of  thought. 
Parliament, too, had something to do with the nationalization 
of  defence, whereby  that obligation  was  converted  from a 
burden  imposed  upon  locality  and  class  into  a  common 
duty.1  Resistance  to this development  was  long in  dying 
down.  Cornwall, in Henry VII's reign, rebelled rather than 
acknowledge its liability to taxation for the defence of  the 
Scottish  borders;  and Hampden's  case  against  Charles I 
was  largely  based  on  evil  precedents  which  distinguished 
between  the  obiigations  of  inland  and those  of  maritime 
counties for naval defence.  Similarly, the northern counties 
were  under special liability for the defence of  the borders, 
and were entitled to corresponding privileges.  Particularism 
was  of  the  essence  of  the middle  ages,  and  it was  only 
broken down by the common spirit developed in parliaments 
and by  the  common  taxation  they provided  for  national 
objects. 
Every national state has necessarily undergone processes 
1 Particularism, however,  often  found expression  even  in parliament. 
in 1339,  for  instance,  the  commons  disclaimed  all  obligation  for  the 
protection  of  the Scottish Marches and the keeping of  the Narrow  Seas 
(Rot. Pavl., ii. 103).  If  the Wardens required  assistance,  it should  be 
provided, the c:mmons  contended, by the great council, without charging 
"  la  commune  ;  and as for naval defence,  it was the busiyess  of  thz 
barons of  the Cinque Ports, who for that purpose possessed  honours 
above all  commoners  of  the land, did  not contribute  to  the aids and 
charges touching the land, and took endless profits arising from the sea. 
Therefore they should guard  the sea  as  la commune " did  the land, 
without  pay,  as other towns and havens which  had navies were bound 
to do  (ibid., ii. 105). 
of nationalization.  In some the process has been sudden and 
revolutionary,  and  the  fusion  has  taken  the  form  of  an 
explosion.  In others the nationalization has proceeded on 
purely monarchical lines and has thus produced a despotism. 
In England the process was slow and parliamentary.  Had 
~n~land  developed  a  system  of  estates  independent  of 
its  judicial  parliament,  had its representative  systems and 
its parliaments been  provincial and manifold, as in France, 
the bond of  national unity could only have been forged here, 
as abroad, by the growth  of  royal  authority.  The  unioll 
would have been personal, not parliamentary :  it would have 
resembled  the  unions  between  France  and  Brittany,  or 
England and Scotland in 1603, and not that between England 
and Scotland in 1707; and where the bond of  union is the 
person  of  the  sovereign,  liberty  cannot  be  safe;  because 
for the sake of  unity men will strengthen the bond of union 
and thus enhance the authority of  the crorvn. 
Charles  I  might  have  succeeded  could  he  have  played 
off  a  parliament  of  the  north  against  another  of  the 
south; and a diversity of parliaments would have rendered 
each  one  of  them  weaker  against  the  crown,  as well  as 
less  national  in  its outlcok.  When  the estates-general of 
France  had  sunk  into  abeyance,  the  fiarlement  of  Paris 
aspired to p!ay  the part of  its English namesake.  It failed 
because, save  for  the  name, the  two  bodies  had  little  in 
common.  The  fiarlement  of  Paris  was  but  one  of  many 
French Qarlrnzcnts, and it had long excluded all representa- 
tive elements from its closing doors of  privilege.  In England 
all the estates had entrenched themselves in the high court 
of  parliament,  and  had  used  its  judicial  machinery  of 
impeachment  and attainder with  deadly effect against the 
royalist  champions.  The  English  estates wele  the  grand 
jury of  the nation, because they sat in a parliament which 
was a court of  law.  There was no national  presentment of 
offenders in  France, because  the  parlements  excluded  the 
estates,  just  as  lower  French  courts  extruded  the  jury. 
The time-honoured  maxim  that union  is  strength has no- 
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in the history of  the English parliament.  It has embodied 
a  national  union  of  law  and  politics,  of  class  and  class, 
of  province  and province-a  union  slowly  and  painfully 
achieved  in the  course of  ages, and not under the sudden 
stress  of  emergency.  In  part  the  creation  and  in  part 
the  creator of  English nationality, the English  parliament 
is the essence of  modern England.  CHAPTER  VIII 
THE  GROWTH  OF REPRESENTATION 
THE fundamental  difference  between  the  English  and 
other  parliaments  lies,  we  have  seen,  in  the  fact  that it 
combines a  system  of  popular  representation  with a high 
court  of  justice.  Unlike  all  other  courts  of  justice,  it is 
therefore representative, and unlike all other representative 
assemblies, it is a  court of  justice.  Further, the court was 
also the council, and a  parliament  was  a  joint  session  of 
executive,  judicature,  and  legislature.  This  connexion 
between the governing and representative bodies was indis- 
pensable  to  national  democracy.  City-states  can  govern 
themselves by direct action without representation.  National 
states  can  be  maintained  without  representation,  but 
without  it  they  cannot  govern  themselves  or  determine 
national policy.  Aristotle's  maxims about the limited size 
of  a state  are sufficiently familiar;  but they are all based 
on  the  assumption  that  a  state cannot  be  self-governing 
unless the citizens govern directly, and themselves fulfil the 
functions of  legislators, judges, generals, and admirals.  Ac- 
cording to the Athenians, the state required the whole life of 
its citizens ;  they were to be ready to undertake any political 
duty, and every other claim on their time was subordinate. 
A man who had to earn his living should be precluded from 
citizenship, because he  lacked  time and energy  for public 
activity;  and the occasional exercise of  a vote at the polling 
booths would have seemed to them a poor qualification for 
citizenship.  This conception in itself  was fatal to modern 
ideas of  democracy, because  the  mass  of  producers  were 
excluded from political  rights and duties;  in Athens they 
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were largely slaves, and Athenian democracy was really an 
;iristocracy based upon the most odious of  class distinctions. 
No doubt it rendered a high ideal practicable for the favoured 
few, who  were  expected  to realize  themselves  and  attain 
their  highest  individual  development  in  the  service  of 
the state.  But even the capacity of  virtue was  denied to 
the  slave  and the mechanic;  an impassable gulf  was fixed 
between  them and the citizen;  most  men  were  slaves by 
nature, and such they must remain.  The non-Greek peoples 
were qalled barbarians and excluded from the scope of  Greek 
morality. 
The Romans were  more  cosmopolitan;  they  disbelieved 
in this natural inequality of  men, and Cicero thought that 
all men were  capable  of  progress  and of  virtue.  But  the 
absence  of  any idea  of  representation  prevented  the real- 
ization of these comparatively liberal views in the expanded 
Roman  state.  Rome  as a  city  could  be  democratic,  but 
not  as an empire;  and the wider  grew  Rome's  dominion 
the  more  autocratic  grew  its  government.  The  more  its 
sway expanded, the more did its governing  class contract. 
Direct  popular  participation  in politics  can never  be  more 
than municipal in scope, and the city-democracy  that tries 
to govern an empire fails in its task and incidentally ceases 
to  be  a  democracy.  Athens,  Rome,  Venice  all  point  to 
the  incompatibility of  imperium et  libertas when  either  is 
divorced from the principle of  representation. 
The evolution  of  this  principle  has,  therefore,  provided 
an escape from the dilemma upon either horn of  which every 
ancient  state  was  sooner  or  later  impaled,  has  rendered 
possible  the  national  democratic state, and has reconciled 
liberty  and empire;  and the credit for this discovery has 
bee11  claimed for  political  or  ecclesiastical theorists  of  the 
middle  ages.  Representation has been regarded as a great 
democratic  principle  first  elaborated  and  applied  in  the 
organization of  the friars and particularly of  the Dominican 
Order in the thirteenth century, and its adoption for parlia- 
mentary purposes has been ascribed to the influence which 
Dominican  confessors  exerted  over  the  minds  of  English 
kings and statesmen.l  The part played by theorists in the 
practical  development  of human affairs is a question upon 
which  theorists  are apt to differ from  other  people;  but 
probably  the theorist,  especially if  he has been  fortunate 
to possess  a  great  gift of  literary  expression, has 
more than his share of  responsibility  for the good 
and evil  in history.  Machiavelli is  believed to have cor- 
rupted the politics of the sixteenth century, Locke to have 
prepared  men's  minds  for  the  Revolution  of  1688, and 
Rousseau  to have  stimulated that of  1789.  It is  well  to 
remember  that Machiavelli's Prince was  not  written  until 
real  princes had given  the most  striking manifestations of 
his  principles,  that  Locke's  Two Treatises were  published 
two years after the Revolution of  1688, and that Rousseau's 
resonant  phrases  were  borrowed from ancient  Roman law. 
It was the aptness of these doctrines to the conditions of  the 
time that gave them their vogue, but they did not  create 
the  conditions,  and  in  other  circumstances  would  have 
fallen on stony ground.  The soil is not less important for 
the  harvest  than  the  seed,  and  in  the  case  of  political 
ideas  the  seed  is  in  the  air, blown  by the wind, and  not 
sown by the hands of  individual men. 
Representation  is,  moreover,  an  ambiguous  word  which 
needs to be defined before we can deal with its development. 
It does  not  necessarily  imply  election.  When  Emerson 
wrote  his  Representative  Mert  he  said  nothing  about  a 
popular vote ;  nor was Hobbes thinking about the franchise 
when  he  described  the sovereign  as the representative  of 
all the citizens.  Charles I on the scaffold claimed to be the 
true representative of  his people;  and the  house  of  lords 
has not infrequently made the same claim against the house 
of  commons.  In Germany after  1815,  when  the constitu- 
tion of  various German states was under discussion, it was 
colltended that the peasantry needed no special representa- 
tion  because  they  were  adequately  represented  by  their 
landlords ; but there was no suggestion that landlords should 
be  elected by  their tenants.  Nor  does election necessarily 
Cf. E.  Barker, The Dominican Order and  Convocation, 1913. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE GROWTH  OF  REPRESENTATION  I  53 
mean popular election : the Calvinist commonly talks about 
the elect, but they are not chosen by ballot.  Election does 
not, in the middle ages, reveal the person of  the elector, and 
means no more than selection by the persons authorized to 
select.  It is a matter of  common knowledge that knights 
of  the shire were selected in the county court, but by whom 
they were really chosen is merely a matter of  surmise. 
It is idle to seek the origin of  representation in its vaguer 
sense;  for the  representation  of  states by  their  govern- 
ments  hnd  ambassadors  is  almost  co-eval  with  the  state 
itself, and when Hobbes writes of  the sovereign representa- 
tive he is expanding the Roman juristic maxim quod  principi 
placuit legis habet vigorem . . . utpote . . . populus ei et  in eum 
omne suum imperium et  Potestatem confirat.  Casar was omni- 
competent because Casar was the repository of  every citizen's 
powers ;  he was the universal agent, the representative of  all. 
It  was  in  this sense that the feudal  lord  represented his 
tenants and that the priest and fonr "best"  men represented 
the village community in the hundred and shire-moots ; and 
it is only in this sense that parliaments were representative 
during the earlier periods of  their existence.  Modern ideas 
of  representation  assume that the representative  is  bound 
by the will of  the represented, but the will of  the people is 
a  modern  fact  which  largely  partakes  of  fiction.  There 
seems  in  the  middle  ages  to have  been  a  total  absence 
of  specific  instructions  from  constituencies  to  their 
members.  Election promises were unknown, and they appear 
in their earliest form in sixteenth-century undertakings on 
the part of  candidates to serve without exacting the wages 
their  constituents were legally bound  to pay.  They  were 
elected to bind their constituents, and not to be bound by 
them;  they were to come  empowered to execute the pro- 
posals of  the crown, and not to impose upon the crown the 
proposals of  their constituents.  The growth of  the popular 
will is the most important, obscure, and neglected content 
of  English  domestic  history.  It  takes  place  behind  and 
under the forms of  representative government ; but the form 
of  governmellt no more reveals  its controlling  power  than 
the structure of  a ship tells us whether it is run by the cap- 
tain or the crew, and our representative parliament has been 
the instrument  in turn of king, lords, and commons.  It is 
easy, therefore, to exaggerate the importance of  representa- 
tive forms in the middle ages.  On the other hand, it should 
not  be  ignored; the development  of  the machinery  of  the 
constitution was important before the people had learnt to 
drive it, and no democracy has ever constructed a workable 
constitution  until  it  has  been  taught  the  elements  of 
politics. 
The earliest  forms of  English representation  appealed to 
the interests  of  the government and the selfishness of  the 
majority  rather  than  to  popular  ambition.  The "  best " 
men, who were  required by royal  ordinance to attend the 
local courts, were certainly not elected; they may have been 
a sort of  local hereditary aristocracy, like the twelve lawmen 
of  Chester  and  Lincoln, of  whom  we  read  in  Domesday. 
Under the Norman  and Angevin kings they were probably 
the holders of  the "  best " tenements, and the obligation to 
do suit at the county court was attached as a condition to 
certain holdings.  Representation was, in fact, an unpleasant 
incident  of  feudal  service.l  This  is  the ,popular attitude 
in the middle ages towards parliament, as towards the shire 
court;  it is not a question of  who is anxious to serve, but 
of who is obliged to attend. 
The business to be done is also that of  the crown;  it is 
the king's writs by which the suitors are summoned, and it 
is mainly the "  pleas of  the crown " that are heard in the 
county  court.  No  doubt  humble  folk  are  interested  in 
having  justice  done,  but  it is  the  crown  which  discovers 
that justitia  magnum emolumentum.  Justice is done for the 
sake of its proceeds, and representation is used by the crown 
for  purposes  of  justice  and  finance.  The  county  court 
consists of  jurors, who represent the county ; ponere  se  super 
Patyiarn  is to go throw oneself  on a jury, and the verdict of 
the jury is the county's act.  It is also upon the county that 
taxation is  later  imposed, and  its  re-partition  among  the 
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smaller  communities  is left to the county  court  or  to the 
sheriff.  But  attendance  is  all  a  matter  of  service  deter- 
mined by tenure.  By a statute of  I294 it is enacted that 
no one with less than forty shillings a year in land can be 
empanelled on a jury  in the county c0urt.l  The boon con- 
sists in the exemption of  the poor;  but the burden becomes 
in time a franchise.  These jurors  elect the knights of  the 
shire  in  the court  to which they are summoned  for jury- 
service, and in Edward 1's statute we have the origin of  the 
forty-shilling freehold vote.  In 1430 the vote has become 
a privilege, and a famous statute prohibits  its exercise by 
those  whom  Edward  I  had freed  from  jury-service.  The 
important  point  is that every  voter  is first  a juror:  he is 
only a voter  because he is a juror;  he can only enjoy the 
franchise  because  he  discharges  an obligation.  The  vote 
is  not  a  matter  of  individual  right,  but  of  duty to  the 
community. 
The  idea  that  any  one  had  a  right  to a  vote  would 
have been  unintelligible in' the fourteenth  century, and its 
discussion would have seemed as irrational as the question 
whether a man has a right to serve on a jury  to-day.  He 
may  have, but  the  point  does  not  arise, because  no  one 
thinks of  claiming the right.  Men are more concerned with 
their liability to be summoned;  and it was his liability to 
attendance at the shire court and to election as member of 
parliament that troubled  our medieval ancestor.  Whether 
he was a baron liable to individual summons or a knight or 
a burgess  liable to election, he  was  anxious to escape the 
liability;  and the constituencies were of  like  mind.  Some- 
times  a  recorder  was  bound  by the terms of  his appoint- 
ment  to serve the borough  in parliament and thus relieve 
the burgesses.  The two  knights  for  Oxfordshire who  fled 
the country on  their  election  to parliament  exemplified a 
common frame of mind among the elected, and Torrington, 
which secured a charter giving it perpetual exemption from 
1 Rot.  Parl.,  i. 116.  Forty  shillings  had  previously  been  made  the 
limit of  suits over which the county court had jurisdiction  (Pollock and 
Maitland, ii. 540-1). 
in parliament,l typified  the attitude of  the 
electors.  The  shires  could  not  expect  such  favours,  and 
their representation remained constant throughout ; but the 
166 cities  and boroughs  frorn which  Edward  I  had sum- 
moned  representatives  to  parliament  had  sunk  to  less 
than a hundred  in the reign of  Henry VI.  The nulnber of 
members was smaller than these figures would  indicate, for 
sometimes, to save  expense, Cornish  and  Devonshire  con- 
stituencies  returned  identical   member^.^  Local  parsimony 
prevailed over national interest.  Not only did the borough 
which  evaded  representation  escape  the liability for mem- 
bers' wages, but it got off with lighter taxation.  Boroughs 
which  were  represented  only  by  the knights  of  the shire 
were  taxed  with  the  shires,  and  paid  a  fifteenth,  while 
boroughs  with  representation  of  their  own had their  own 
taxation and paid a tenth (0).  Parliamentary ambition was 
a feeble incentive when representation meant extra taxation, 
and  when  attendance  at Westminster  involved  responsi- 
bility without  power or profit.  Parliament was not then a 
career, and it opened no paths to promotion.  Members were 
men  of  business  reluctantly  diverted  from  their  private 
affairs for occasional public service ; and the few who aspired 
to political eminence had to choose the church or the service 
of  the king or of  a baronial magnate. 
Representation, in fact, was nowise regarded as a means of 
expressing individual right or forwarding individual interests. 
It was communities, not individuals, who were represented, 
just  as it was  communities  and not  individuals who were 
taxed in parliaments.  The  poll-tax,  when  it  appeared  in 
1380,  was resented because it was a departure from the old 
tenths  and  fifteenths which were  levied  on  boroughs  and 
Rot.  Pavl., ii.  459b;  Maitland,  Const. Hist.,  p.  174;  the exemption 
was secured  in  1366 and confirmed in  1368  (Cal. Patent  Rolls, 1364-7. 
P. 246,  1367-70,  p.  115).  Edward  IIA,  in  granting  the  petition  of 
the  men  of  Torrington,  remarked  that  vos  ea  occasione  laboribus  et 
expensis multipliciter  gravati fuisti, ad vestrum  damnum non modicum 
et depressionem manifestam." 
See J. J. Alexander  in Tyans. Deuon. Assoc.,  1910, xlii. 260.  In 1362 
one John Hill was returned for six  Devonshire constituencies, and John 
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sons  to school attended the  county  court  themselves, and 
contributed  to the  tumultuary elections which  led to  the 
restricting statute  of  1430.  Similar irruptions into the oligar- 
chical  circles of  municipal government led to corresponding 
restrictions  of  the municipal  franchise.l  These restrictions 
were less important and less permanent than the movement 
by which they were provoked, and their significance lies in the 
indirect evidence they provide for the growth of  a political 
consciousness among the mass of  the population.  It may 
have  been a sign of  grace when  the commons complained 
in 1436 that sheriffs often returned  members who  had not 
been ele~ted.~ 
Probably here we have also the explanation of  the curjous 
fact that about then the ebbing tide of  parliamentary repre- 
sentation begins to turn, and the number of  boroughs return- 
ing members to increase.  The lowest limit was reached in 
1435,  when  only  ninety-four  made  returns;  Henry  VI 
added  eight  and Edward  IV five.  Henry  VII apparently 
made no ~hange,~  but under  the later Tudors the increase 
was rapid and steady.  Later on we shall see that the attribu- 
tion  of  this increase to Tudor designs upon parliamentary 
independence is not a tenable theory;  and even if  it were, 
their  attempt  would  illustrate  their  appreciation  of  the 
importance of  parliamentary support.  It is more probable 
that the creation of  new boroughs, and restoration of  parlia- 
mentary representation to others which had lost it, was due 
to a deeper national impulse.  We have at least one protest 
from a Tudor  secretary of  state that there were too many 
merrlbers already,  a  refusal  to listen to Newark's  petition 
for representation, and a hint that the government in 1579 
1  See my Reign of  Henry  VII,  ii. 181-5,  for restrictions on the borough 
franchise at Leicester and Northampton. 
Qot.  Purl., iv. 507. 
3  The  difficulty  of  tracing  accurately  the growth  of  parliamentary 
representation  is increased  by the defectiveness  of  the lists of  members 
printed in the Oficial Return.  Apart from one for  I491 in Harleian MS. 
;252,  f.  28, there are no lists between  1477 and  1529, although  research 
arrlong  borough  archives  and  elsewhere  may help  to supply the  defici- 
ency (p).  Something may also emerge from the neglected records of  the 
Crown Office recently transferred from Westminster to the Record Office. 
the abolition of  rotten b0roughs.l  The demand 
for representation now  came from below, from prospective 
themselves or from neighbouring  magnates seeking 
an  easy  seat  in  the  house  of  commons.  Boroughs  were 
bought up in the sixteenth century;  the eldest sons of  peers 
became  candidates  for  election;  the  proceedings  of  the 
house were  considered worth recording in Journals ;  candi- 
dates offered to serve without their wages ; and even bribed 
the electors, not to escape, but to secure, election.  Men no 
longer  fled  the country when  elected,  or  transferred  their 
liabilities to their  tenants.  A  member  of  parliament  had 
become an important person, a  seat in the house an object 
of  ambition, and the house itself a place of  political power. 
The seats of  the mighty were filling with popular candidates. 
Elections  were  contested,  and  electors  were  canvassed; 
boroughs refused to accept neighbouring magnates' nominees, 
and riots were not  infrequent.  The burden  of  representa- 
tion had become a privilege, because people had grasped the 
fact that through it they could impose their will on the crown, 
instead of  the crown through it imposing its"wil1  upon them. 
The forms of  the partnership remained, but the predomin- 
ance was changing hands. 
National spirit had fused local prejudices.  Members are 
regarded as serving their country and not merely their shires 
or  boroughs;  and residence  ceases  to be  an indispensable 
qualification.  The legal requirement stood, and the matter 
was  often  debated  in  the house;  but  the  national  view 
prevailed  over  the  letter  of  the  law,  and parliament  was 
saved from the dead hand of  medieval parochialism.  Other 
influences, no  doubt, contributed to this  result;  insistence 
upon residence would have defeated aristocratic designs on 
the commons,  and  have excluded  many privy  councillors 
'  T.  Wilson  to  the Earl of  Rutland,  June  17,  1579  (Rutland MSS., 
Hist. MSS.  Comm. i. 117) : "  I have moved  the Queen for the town  of 
Newark, and have obtained her consent that the book shall be engrossed 
by Mr.  Attorney,  and all  the articles  allowed,  save  the nomination  of 
two  burgesses.  It is  thought  that there  are over  many  already,  and 
there will be a device hereafter  to lessen the number for divers decayed 
towns."  Newark did not obtain parliamentary representation until 1673 
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of  the crown.  But  the substitution of  landed gentry  for 
timorous townsmen stiffened the back of  the commons, and 
is definitely assigned by a Venetian ambassador as the cause 
of the recalcitrance of one of  Mary's parliaments ;  and even 
the  election  of  privy  councillors testified to the growth of 
popular  influence.  In Edward  1's  reign  a  councillor  was 
summoned ex  ogicio  to parliaments,  and a parliament  was 
a  meeting  between  council  and  estates.  Now,  instead  of 
sitting ex oficio, the privy councillor sought popular election, 
and  in  Thomas  Cromwell  and William Cecil  we  have  the 
first  striking examples of  the (( old parliamentary  hand " ; 
both sat continuously in the commons until they were raised 
to the peerage, and both were there in the interests of  the 
nation and not in those of  their constituencies.  The com- 
nzunitates  have  become  the  communitas, England  is  one 
whole instead of  many parts, and in politics and history the 
whole  is  greater  than  the  sum  of  all  the  parts.  Out  of 
the  fusion  arises  the national  patriotism  of  Elizabethan 
England. 
The sixteenth  century  is indeed  the great period  of  the 
consolidation  of  the house  of  commons, and without  that 
consolidation the house would have been  incapable of  the 
work it achieved in the seventeenth.  Under the Tudors it 
becomes  a  compact  and  corporate unit,  and  acquires a 
weight which makes it the centre of  parliamentary gravity. 
Its transference,  in  Edward  VI's  reign, from  the chapter 
house to St. Stephen's chapel  brings it under the same roof 
as the parliament chamber, and provides ocular demonstra- 
tion of  its position as an integral part of  parliament.  The 
commons no longer comparent in  fiarliamento by traversing 
the  street  between  the  abbey  and  parliament  with  the 
Speaker at their head;  they are already "  in parliament " 
when  they meet  by themselves, and their  domestic discus- 
sions become  parliamentary instead  of  extra-parliamentary 
proceedings.  Each representative is now a limb, a " mem- 
ber " of  parliament, a phrase which appears in the fifteenth 
1  Venetian Calendar, vi. 251. 
See below, p. 333. 
century,l was  used  by  Henry  VIII when  vindicating  the 
of  the commons, and gradually secured a popular 
vogue ; and a prominent member is described in Elizabeth's 
reign  as  "  the  great  parliament  man."  The  house  is  a 
national representative : every Englishman is "  intended," 
in Sir Thomas Smith's phrase, to be present either in person 
or  by proxy ; and the house derives its authority from the 
fact that it embodies the will  of  the English people.  The 
laxity  which  in  the middle ages  put  up with the absence 
of a majority of elected members, and assumed that absence, 
like  silence, gave  consent,  was  no  longer  tolerated.  The 
clerk kept  a book  of  attendance : no member was  allowed 
to go home without leave, and those who did so were prose- 
cuted  before  the king's  bench.  Down  to 1558  the leave 
had to be obtained  from the crown;  in Elizabeth's  reign 
it begins to be granted by the house it~elf.~ 
Slowly, too, the house developed  a  corporate conscious- 
ness  bred  of  prolonged  and  intimate  association.  The 
medieval parliament was an affair of weeks ; it seldom had 
more than one session, and members rarely sought re-eIec- 
tion.  Every  house  was,  therefore,  a  body  of  strangers, 
speaking  perhaps  incomprehensible  dialects,  distrustful  of 
one  another,  here  to-day  and  gone  to-morrow,  never,  in 
most cases, to meet again, and utterly unable, on account of 
$heir  transitory  existence, to  acquire  confidence  in  one 
another  or  to develop  leadership and  parliamentary  skill. 
On  rare occasions before 1509 a parliament was called back 
for a second session ;  but it is during the reign of  Henry VIII 
that  the  modern  practice  begins,  and  it begins  with  the 
parliament  that wrought  the Reformation.  Summoned to 
meet on November 3, 1529, its existence was continued until 
April 4, 1536, and during that period it held eight sessions 
extending over more months than the days of  the average 
Rot.  Purl.,  v. 240,  vi. 191;  cf.  Smith.  De Republics  Anglorum,  ed. 
Alston, p.  63. 
A  bill  to  control  the  unlicensed  absence  of  members  passed  the 
Commons,  but  not  the  lords,  in  January  1554-5,  and  three  similar 
attempts  were  unsuccessfully  made  in  the  following  session  (Political 
Histovy  of  England, vi. 147-8).  and yet another on November  g. 1558. I 62  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
medieval  parliament.  By the end of  that period members 
of  the house  of  commons must have acquired a familiarity 
among themselves, a knowledge of  parliamentary procedure, 
and an acquaintance with national politics such as no house 
of  commons  had  ever  possessed  before.  The  experiment 
was unique in the sixteenth century, but a later parliament 
of Henry VIII had four sessions, and the first of  Edward VI 
had three.  Mary  saw fit  to change her  parliaments  with 
greater frequency, and five were elected during the five years 
of  her  reign,  only  one  of  which  met  for  a  second session. 
Elizabeth had not her father's faith in parliament ; but most 
of her parliaments sat for more than one session, one session 
lasted  over  three  months,  and one parliament  was  undis- 
solved for nearly nine years.  The leading members, more- 
over,  both of  the  government  and  of  the opposition,  are 
constantly re-elected;  the ordinary personnel of  the  house 
grew more stable ;  and if  Cecils and Bacons placed parliamen- 
tary experience  at the service of  the crown,  Nortons and 
Wentworths  used  it  on  behalf  of  the  liberties  of  the 
coinmons. 
Internal  consolidation  was  accompanied  by  expansion, 
and  the  number  of  members  increased  during the  Tudor 
period by more than fifty per cent.  There were fewer than 
three hundred when Henry VII ascended the throne;  there 
were more than four hundred and fifty when Elizabeth died. 
Henry VIII added eight members to the representation  of 
Lancashire,  two each to London  and Middlesex,  Cornwall, 
Norfolk, Suffolk, and Buckinghamshire,  and one to Shrop- 
shire;  he "  shired " Wales and Monmouth  and introduced 
twenty-four Welsh members  to parliament ; he also incor- 
porated  Cheshire,  and  even  extended  the  parliamentary 
system  to Calais, leaving  the  county palatine of  Durham 
alone outside the national 0rganization.l  Edward VI added 
fourteen members  to Cornwall,  four  to Northamptonshire, 
and  two  each  to  Hampshire,  Yorkshire,  Lincolnshire, 
1 A  bill "  to have  two  knights from  Durham  into the parliament " 
was  introduced  in  the house  of  commons  on  January  18, 1562-3, but 
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Cheshire,  Staffordshire, and  Wales.  Mary  increased  the 
representation of Yorkshire by tcn members, that of  Oxford- 
shire by three, of Kent, Northumberland, Norfolk, Hertford- 
shire,  Buckinghamshire,  and  Worcestershire  by two  each, 
and  of  Northamptonshire  and  Berkshire  by  one  apiece. 
Elizabeth's  additions amounted to fifty-nine  against  forty- 
five made by Henry VIII, thirty by Edward VI, and twknty- 
seven by Mary;  sixteen new members went to Hampshire, 
twelve to Cornwall, six to Suffolk, four each to Kent, York- 
shire and Lancashire, two each to Devon, Notts, Gloucester- 
shire,  Shropshire,  Staffordshire,  and  Surrey,  and  one  to 
Wales.  It was reserved for James  I to grant special repre- 
sentation to the universities of  Oxford and Cambridge, which 
gratefully elected  his nominees;  but by 1603  the house of 
commons was  more  completely representative  than  it  had 
ever  been  before,  and in spite of  the acts restricting  the 
franchise it is probable that the electorate was also growing 
wider.  The amount of  free  socage was  increasing  in  the 
counties, and the bar of  serfdom was steadily being removed ; 
at the  disputed  Norfolk  election  of  1586  three  thousand 
voters  are  stated  to have  been  present,l  though  in  the 
boroughs the widening of  the  franchise  had to await  the 
period  of  the  Long  parliament  and the  Comrnonwealth.2 
The  facile explanation  of  all this expansion  on the theory 
that it was  due to the efforts  of  the crown  to pack  par- 
liaments will  not bear examination.  The Cornish boroughs, 
which are  usually  chosen  to  substantiate this hypothesis, 
were  in  reality  notorious  for  the  independent  and  even 
fractious  spirit  exhibited  by  their  representatives  and 
for  the  paucity  of  privy  councillors  among  their  ranks.3 
D'Ewes, Journals, p. 396.  2  See below, p. 324. 
At least  four pronounced  protestants  sat for Cornish constituencies 
in the first parliament of  Mary's  reign;  Peter and Paul Wentworth and 
James Dalton were elected by Cornish constituencies in Elizabeth's reign ; 
and under James I and Charles I nearly all the leaders of  the parliamentary 
opposition  found  seats at one time or other in  Cornwall, including  Sir 
Jobri  Eliot,  Hampden,  Coke,  Sir  E.  Sandys,  Holles,  Hakewill,  Sir  R. 
Phelips,  Sir  Henry  Marten,  and  John  Rolle.  Hallam's  theory  (Const. 
Hist., i. 45) that these Cornish constituencies were created  to foster the 
influence  of  the court over  the commons  is not  corroborated  by  the 
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It is more reasonable to suppose that the house of  commons 
was reflecting the general growth of  national sentiment and 
of  the popular  desire for a voice in its own affairs.  People 
who repudiated  absolute authority in the church would not 
remain submissive to political autocracy. 
Tliere  were, of  course, defects  enough  in the  sixteenth- 
century  representative  system  from  the  modern  point  of 
view.  The  lower  classes  had  small  means  of  asserting 
what little political will they possessed; and the greater the 
influence which the house of  commons acquired, the greater 
the eagerness of  landlords and aspiring lawyers to manipulate 
its elections.  The social status of  burgesses rose  with  the 
prestige  of  the house, aristocrats canvassed for seats which 
medieval  craftsmen  had  sought  to  avoid,  and  in  the 
eighteenth  century both houses of  parliament  were  appan- 
ages of  the highest class of  society.  But the electorate was 
never  reduced  to the same  uniformity : the representative 
system  consisted  of  sections or  samples;  but the sections 
were  vertical,  not  horizontal, and the samples  came  from 
various  social strata.  The  county  voters had  to be  free- 
holders,  and  the  restriction  was  arbitrary  enough,  but it 
included in the franchise many who were poor and excluded 
many who were rich.  The forty shillings, which had been a 
serious property disqualification in the reign of  Edward I, 
was a trifling sum in that of  George  111, and many of  the 
forty-shilling freeholders  must  have  been  very poor  men. 
Again, the franchise in many boroughs was democratic, more 
democratic  before  than  after  1832;  and  while  the  great 
reform  bill  mitigated  many abuses  and swept  away some 
anomalies,  it disfranchised  numbers  of  poor  electors,  and 
created a grievance which fostered the Chartist movement. 
Feudal  traditions, however, long  clung  to our  franchise 
law, and with  them the  theory that it was  the land, and 
not  men which should  be  represented  in  parliament.  The 
"  stake in the country,"  which was  used in the eighteenth 
century to defend the monopoly of  political  power by the 
landed aristocracy against the claims of  mere wealth derived 
from banking or commerce, was employed in the nineteenth 
against the claims of intelligent poverty; and some contended 
that the number  of  a  man's votes should be  proportionate 
to his posse~sions.~  Even now mere wealth does not entitle 
a man to a vote at all unless that wealth is converted into 
terms of  the tenure or  occupancy of  land and what stands 
thereon.  Mere  intelligence  does  not  count  at all  in  our 
franchise laws except in so far as it accounts for university 
representation.  Vast inroads have, however, been  made on 
feudal theory by ideas of  universal  suflrage, and  the  real 
issue  with  regard  to  representation  is  whether  the  indi- 
vidual or the family is the unit to be represented.  Modern 
socialism tends to make the  state the sole form of  society 
and to weaken every other bond of association; and parlia- 
ment,  instead  of  representing  communities  or  families,  is 
coming to represent nothing but individuals. 
1 These  views  were almost entirely abandoned  in  the debates on  the 
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CHAPTER  IX 
PARLIAMENT  AND  LIBERTY 
IT  has been remarked by a skilled Arnerican  observer of 
English  politics  that " private property in England  is,  on 
the whole, less secure from attack on the part of  the Govern- 
ment  to-day  than it was  at the time of  the Stuarts."  l  A 
similar substratum of  truth would  underlie  the  statement 
that there was greater liberty before the beginning of  parlia- 
ments than there has been since or is likely to be again ; and 
the days when  a  wealthy  magnate like  Peter  des  Roches 
could evade a tax by voting against it must seem to many 
a golden age of  liberty and property, from which England 
has  been  steadily falling away ever since parliaments  were 
invented to rob the individual of  his liberty by means  of 
other  men's  votes.  There  is,  however,  no  end  to  the 
paradoxes  for  which  liberty  has  been  the  excuse  or  the 
justification.  The crimes perpetrated in its name have been 
as multifarious as the sins committed on behalf of  religion or 
the battles fought for the sake of  peace. 
It is the penalty of  general and inspiring conceptions that 
lire  different  they  mean  so  many  different  things and   in.;^ 
minds  in  so  many  different  ways.  "  When  I  mention 
religion,"  said the frank but reverend Mr.  Thwackum, "  I 
mean  the  Christian  religion;  and not  only the  Christian 
religion,  but  the  Protestant  religion;  and  not  only  the 
Protestant religion, but the Church of  England."  Ortho- 
doxy  is  my  'doxy;  heterodoxy  is  other  people's.  True 
liberty is  my  liberty;  other people's  is their presumption. 
Servants take liberties, but are not often, in the minds of 
1 A. Laurence Lowell, Essays on Government, pp. 81, 82. 
2  Fielding, "Tom Jor~es"  in Works, ed. 1859, p.  26. 
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their masters or their mistresses, entitled to what they take. 
l6  Like every other struggle for liberty," writes Bishop Stubbs 
of  the Great  Civil  War,  "it  ended in being  a  struggle  for 
supremacy.J'  Charles I fought for liberty no less than did 
the parliament  or the  army, the English, the  Irish, or  the 
Scots.  Both  north  and  south  fought  for  liberty  in  the 
American civil war, the north for the liberty of  the negroes 
In the south, the south for liberty to manage its own affairs. 
Masters and men are fighting all over the world for liberty, 
masters for liberty to en~ploy  their capital as they think fit, 
men  for liberty  to choose their  own  conditions  of  labour. 
Like charity, liberty covers a multitude of  sins. 
Nothing  has  proved  more  elusive  than  liberty,  and its 
endless pursuit has filled the pages of  English history.  Merl 
thought, and still think, it was  achieved  by Magna  Casta; 
but it had to be fought for again in the fourteenth century, 
in the Great Civil War, and at the Revolution of  1688. Gloriol~s 
as it seemed to the Whigs, even that vindication  of  liberty 
failed to satisfy men for long;  reform bills in the nineteerith 
century were one after another hailed as heralds of  a newel- 
freedcm;  and even after the parliament act of  1911  liberty 
seems  to  some  of  us  farther  off  than  ever.  Nor  are we 
singular in our discontents.  The thirteen American colonies 
fought  a  war  of  independence  to  achieve  their  liberty; 
they won, but three-quarters  of  a century later they were 
still fighting a sterner civil war for liberty;  and the latest 
generation  of  freeborn  Americans  carried  into  office  and 
power  in  1912  a president whose  banner  bore the strange 
device "the new freedom."  Man, said Rousseau, is born free, 
and everywhere he is in chains ; man, it would rather seem, 
is born a slave and ever he is seeking to burst his bonds. 
The fallacy lies in "  man " ;  it also lies in "  liberty."  To say 
that man has achieved liberty is an inaccurate way of  stating 
that some men have achieved some liberty.  The problem of 
liberty, 11ke  that of  property, is one of  distribution, and cannot 
be  dlvorced  from  that of  equality.  There  was  sense  and 
logic in the union of  the trinity of  the French Revolution : 
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there can be no liberty without some equality.  But the third 
of  the trio,  fraternity, supplies-at  least  to an American 
student-the  best  illustration  of  the difficulty we  have  to 
face  in  tracing  the  growth  of  liberty.  Every  American 
undergraduate  knows what  a fraternity is;  to an  English 
undergraduate  it  looks  like  an  embryo  college.  It  is  a 
voluntary association of  students for social--some  think for 
anti-social-purposes.  Like  every  association,  its  value 
consists quitc as much  in the many undesirable  persons it 
excludes as in the select few it comprehends.  Fraternities are, 
indeed, too select for ultra-democratic feeling in the United 
States, and in more than one legislature bills have been intro- 
duced  to  abolish  them  as  contraventions  of  democratic 
principle.  Now,  if  a  measure  were  passed  by  congress 
guaranteeing to all fraternities in perpetuity their privileges 
and their property, it is easily conceivable that such a measure 
might  come  to be called the  great  charter  of  fraternities. 
But  it  is  not  less  easy  to understand  that  the  excluded 
majority might  fail to discern any connexion between such 
a measure and the democratic ideal of  fraternity. 
That  is  the  position  of  Magna  Carta.  It is  the  great 
charter of  liberties,  but not of  liberty, and few habits are 
more fatal to historical understanding than that of  assuming 
that  the  same  word  has  the  same  meaning  at different 
periods.  We have no constants in history.  It is far safer to 
assume discrepancy than identity, and it is an elementary pre- 
caution to warn beginners in history that medieval Germany 
might  include  Austria  but  not  Prussia,  Cambrai  but  not 
Breslau.  These changes in the territorial meaning of  familiar 
terms are comparatively simple and obvious ; the vicissitudes 
in the terminology of  ideas are more subtle, and even eminent 
archivists have provided striking illustrations of  the dangers 
of  ignoring  them.  Sir  T.  Duffus  Hardy  assumed  that 
religio  in  the  thirteenth  century  meant  religion,  and was 
astonished at John's  modernism when he discovered a royal 
licence condere novam  religionem, although John  was guilty 
of  nothing  worse  than granting a  baron leave to found  a 
religious house  by  alienating certain lands into mortmain. 
Yet the difference between rdigio and religion was not greater 
than that between  libertas and liberty;  and John  was  as 
medievally-minded  when he granted Magna  Carta as when 
he licensed a baron to found an abbey. 
The medieval libertas and religio have this in common to 
distinguish them from their modern synonyms.  Both were 
concrete  and material;  both  are now  abstract and ideal. 
The  transformation  from the  one  to the other  has  been 
the common characteristic of  linguistic  development.  The 
expansion of  a nation's  mind is seen, like that of  a child's, 
in  the expansion  of  the meaning  attached to the terms it 
uses.  One child has been known to think that Eleanor of 
Aquitaine  was  corpulent  because  she  was  described  in  a 
textbook as "  one of  Henry 11's stoutest adherents " ; and 
another imbibed  the same idea  of  God  from  being  told  of 
His omnipresence.  Liberty and religion are very  local  to 
primitive minds : local gods become tribal deities, and then 
the national gods of  chosen peoples.  But even Israel revolted 
against  a  God  which  had to be worshipped  in Judah,  as 
England murmured against a pope in Avignon, and nations 
had  to  advance  far  on  the  path  of  civilization  before 
they relinquished  their  conviction  that  their  God  spoke 
in  their  vernacular  and gave  them  special  protection  in 
battle. 
Their liberties were as their deities, peculiar to themselves, 
circumscribed in their operation, bound to the soil, tangible, 
visible, and concrete.  The ge?zius loci was at the bottom of 
both;  and famous shrines  had their  counterpart in great 
liberties.  The general idea was lost in the local manifesta- 
tion ; and our Lady of  Walsingham belongs to the same class 
of  phenomena  as the  "liberties  of  the  Fleet."  Liberties 
were always attached to particular persons or places; there 
was nothing  general  or  national  about  them.  They  were 
definite  concrete  privileges,  which  some  people  enjoyed, 
but most  did not.  The first  clause of  Magna  Carta--quod 
ecclesia  anglicana  libera  sit-seems  to be  general  enough; 
but  the explanation  that follows  shows  that all  it  meant 
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bishops, and presumably that the king should not be  free 
to  refuse  them  their  tempora1ities.l  Possibly  the  explan- 
ation was a royalist gloss, and the demand for ecclesiastical 
freedom meant, in the minds of  those who made it, that the 
restrictions  imposed  on  the liberties  of  the church  by  the 
Constitutions of  Clarendon should be ignored : as a matter 
of  practice  they were ignored in the later middle ages, and 
this was assuredly a  more  general  liberty  than  any  con- 
ceded  in the  charter.  For  the  rest,  the  liberties  of  the 
ecclesia were simply the sum  of  the  particular  liberties  of 
each ecclesiastic.  They were rights of  patronage and juris- 
diction;  and  contention  over  these  "  liberties "  of  the 
church  is  quite as rife  in the middle  ages among church- 
men  themselves  as between  church  and  state.  In both 
spheres  alike  liberty  was  an adjunct,  almost  a  form,  of 
property;  and it was prized for its material  and financial 
attributes. 
It was almost always a local monopoly.  The liberty of  a 
town consisted largely in its right to rate its inhabitants and 
to levy tolls on all who frequented its markets.  The liberty 
of a baron consisted in his authority over others, in the court 
he  owned, and in  the perquisites  of  his  jurisdiction.  To 
deprive  him  of  this jurisdiction  over  his  villeins  was  an 
infringement  of  his  liberty  expressly  prohibited  by  the 
thirty-fourth  clause of  the charter.  Another  infringement 
of  liberty forbidden  by the charter was the reduction of  the 
number  of  villeins on the estates of  a ward  of  the crown. 
That was a "  waste  of  men " which  impaired  the value  of 
the lands, and the emancipation of  his villeins infringed the 
liberty of  the lord.  Just as one man's food is another man's 
poison,  one  man's  liberty  was  another's  servitude.  The 
liberties which  the barons hoped  to secure  at Runnymede 
were largely composed  of  the services of  their villeins.  A 
liberty was in no sense a common right or a popular concep- 
tion.  It  has been defined as a portion of  sovereign authority 
1 There is nothing  in Magna  Carta  to compel  the king  to  invest an 
elected  bishop  with  his  temporalities,  and  the impossibility  of  binding 
the king in this way  rendered  the concession almost nugatory from  the 
first. 
in  the hands  of  a  subject;  and the popularity  of  liberty 
entirely depends upon the extent of  the portions and of  their 
distribution.  Medieval  liberties  were  large,  but  their 
were few.  They were the exceptions to the rule; 
it was because  they were rare privileges and not  common 
that the framers of  Magna  Carta set so much  store 
upon liberties.  When the house of  commons began to deal 
with the subject in Edward 111's  reign,  it had a  different 
tale to tell; it begged the king,  in 1348,  to grant no more 
liberties in the future.  Every franchise or  liberty was  so 
much land and so  many people  cut  off  from the  common 
law, excluded from the beneficent operation of  king's writs 
and royal justice, and subjected to the arbitrary will  of  the 
owner of  the liberty. 
To redistribute  and equalize liberty has been  one of  the 
principal functions of  parliament;  and the petition of  1348, 
is the earliest indication of  its grasp of  the problem.  But one 
of the greatest obstacles to reform is commonly the reformers' 
frame of  mind;  and the keenest  opponents of  other men's 
privileges  are  often  the  stoutest  defenders  of  their  own. 
Parliamentary concentration on the task of  reducing liberties 
was impeded by the addiction of  members to their own ;  and 
so long as constituencies were  evading parliamentary repre- 
sentation in order to lessen their share in taxation and save 
the expense of  members' wages, the house of  commons could 
not be a very efficient instrument of  reform.  The local interest 
ever outweighed the common advantage during the middle 
ages ; and parliaments, while they gave vent to complaints, 
failed to enforce a remedy.  The Good parliament  of  '1376 
was followed by a worthless successor, and the commons by 
themselves were  hardly  able to compel the  adoption  of  a 
single reform throughout the middle ages.  It was not they 
who  checked Edward I, removed Edward I1 or Richard 11, 
or disposed of  Henry VI or Richard 111.  Changes of  govern- 
ment were sometimes legalized in parliament, but they were 
made outside, by unparliamentary methods and forces ; and 
these  same  forces  which  made  and  unmade  kings  were 
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commons complained.  Indeed, the more they made free with 
the royal  prerogative  and  took  liberties  with  the  crown, 
the greater grew their own.  "  Get you lordship," wrote one 
of  the Paston correspondents in 1450, "  quia ibi fiendet  tota 
lex  et  prophets." l  Lordship  and  liberty  were  much  the 
same thing, and the over-mighty subject grasped an ever- 
increasing share of  sovereign power.  As late as Elizabeth's 
reign  it was  said that the men  of  Northumberland  would 
have  no  other prince than a  Percy, and in  Yorkshire  the 
sheriff  had  little  power  against  the  bailiffs  and  stewards 
of  the northern earls.  The so-called constitutional  experi- 
ment of  the Lancastrians consisted in  little more than giving 
rein to the local liberties of  the magnates, who in the Wars 
of  the Roses took the bit between their teeth. 
The  extent  of  the liberties  claimed by  these  magnates 
is  difficult  to realize, but without  some  appreciatior~  of  it 
we  cannot explain the Tudor autocracy or understand how 
that despotism coincided with a vast movement of  national 
liberation.  It was not merely that the over-mighty subject 
excluded royal writs from his franchise and defied the crown 
from his  feudal castle.  We  now  regard  the armcd forces 
of  the nation as the armed forces of  the crown, but then the 
crown controiled  but a fraction of  the military strength of 
England.  Each magnate had his council of  state, his council 
learned in the law, and his bands  of  armed retainers, with 
which he could do more or less as he liked.  In a state trial 
of  1554 it was urged in defence of  the Duke of  Suffolk that 
there was  nothing treasonable in a peer levying his forces 
and  making proclamation that foreigners should  quit  the 
realm.2  Technically  the  contention  was  sound,  but  the 
picture  of  peers  raising  forces  and  malting  proclamations 
on  their  own  account  in  the middle  of  the Tudor  period 
indicates the  largeness  of  their  liberties.  In  Elizabeth's 
reign even members of  her council considered it not incom- 
patible with their loyalty to carry on diplomatic correspond- 
ence of  their own with foreign powers and to invoke foreign 
assistance in their struggles with their colleagues.  The law 
1 Paston Letters, i. 156.  Chron. Queen Jane, Camden Soc., p. 60. 
of  treason, too,  protected  them  as well  as the  crown;  if 
an offence  against the latter might be high treason, an offence 
against the former might  be  petty treason;  and an act of 
Henry VII speaks of  a man's  master as being his sovereign.  l 
The idea  of  a  single  all-embracing national  sovereign was 
still in  the making, and lords still regarded  themselves as 
princes 2  enjoying sovereign liberties. 
The destruction  of  these  liberties was  the great  service 
rendered  by  the  Tudors  to  the  cause  of  English  liberty. 
Parliament  in  the  middle  ages  had  failed  to nationalize 
liberty;  with  the  help  of  the crown  that nationalization 
was  achieved in the sixteenth  century.  Liberty  was made 
more  common by redistribution;  the great liberties of  the 
.few were  diminished, the meagre liberties of  the mass  in- 
creased;  and dukes and serfs make a simultaneous disap- 
pearance from the England of  William Shake~peare.~  The 
liberation  was  achieved,  like  most  acts  of  emancipation, 
by  despotic  means.  Even  the  act  emancipating  British 
slaves,  was  passed  in  1834 by  a  parliament  in  which  the 
slaveholders were not represented and over which they had 
no  control;  emancipation was imposed by the north on the 
south  of  the  United  States at the point  of  the bayonet; 
and it was an autocrat of  all the Russias who  emancipated 
the Russian serf.  So it was the Tudor despots who emanci- 
pated  England from its medieval "  liberties."  Henry  VII 
restrained the liberty of  maintenance and deprived the nobles 
of  their  hosts  of  armed retainers;  and by  means  of  the 
Star chamber he checked their liberty of  packing, bribing, 
and intimidating  juries.  Henry VIII, by an act  of  parlia- 
See below, p. 228. 
The modern  restriction  of  princeps  or  prince  to members  of  royal 
families is an illustration of  the centralization of  sovereignty.  Cf. Shake- 
speare's  King John, "  Now these her princes are come home again." 
a  With the execution of  Northumberland  in 1553 and Suffolk in 1554, 
Norfolk became the only duke in England, and he was attainted in 1572 ; 
for more than half  a century England was destitute of  dukes.  Similarly 
the marquisates were reduced to one-Winchester.  With regard to serfs. 
Sir  Thomas  Smith declares that they  were  practically  non-existent  in 
his tlme, though some instances of  manumission  are found earlier in the 
century. 
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ment,l took many medieval "  liberties " into his hands; he 
improved  upon  the petition  presented  by the commons in 
1348, and not only refrained  from granting liberties, to the 
hindrance of  the common law and oppression of  the common 
people, but revoked  the grants that had been  made.  The 
Tudor  prerogative  courts,  the  councils  of  the  North,  of 
Wales, and so forth, gathered into their hands the liberties 
of  the marcher lords, and reduced the realm to a common 
order. 
Nor was it only lords whose liberties were restricted in the 
interests of  national  freedom.  The franchises  of  corpora- 
tions  might  be as fatal to  general liberty as the privileges 
of  peers.  Bacon described gilds as "  fraternities in  evil," 
Sir John  Mason  thought  corporations more hurtful  to the 
realm  than  anything else;  and  in  1682  the  citizens  of 
London  were declared liable to fine and imprisonment  for 
"presuming  to act as  a  corporation."  They,  too,  were 
possessed of  portions of  sovereign authority which they used 
to the common detriment.  London tried to impoverish other 
English cities by forbidding its merchants to frequent their 
markets, and England presented a welter of  conflicting and 
restricting municipal  jurisdictions.  The "  freedom " which 
cities now  confer on eminent politicians is a  survival from 
times  and  conditions  in  which  every  Englishman  was  a 
foreigner outside his native town, with  no liberties  in any 
city but his  own.  Nor  did he  possess  much  liberty even 
there.  Municipal  independence was  no  guarantee of  indi- 
vidual freedom; and in many a medieval city renowned for 
its fight against despots the individual's liberty was confined 
by a minute and meticulous regulation  unknown to oriental 
tyranny.  His  every  act  was  regulated  for him  from  the 
1 27 Henry VIII, c.  24; cf.  32  Henry VIII, c. 20.  There  are  still 
survivals.  The city of  London  is  exempt from  iustices of  assize.  The 
Marquis of  Exeter, as lord paramount, appoints all magistrates in the soke 
of  Peterborough (Vict.  Hist. of  Northamptolzshire, ii,. 423-4,  42.7).  Halifax 
had its own "  gibbet-law."  and there are st111  qualnt "  llbertles " in Kent 
(McIlwain, p. y60). 
2  Leadam, Star Chamber, Selden Soc., vol. i. p, cli; Tytler, Edwavd  VI, 
i. 362; Foreign  Calendar,  1547-53,  p.  go;  Maitland,  Collected  Papers, 
~ii.  31  I. 
cradle  to  the  grave.  He  could  not  leave  the  parish  in 
which  he  was  born  or  the  trade  to which  he  was  bred, 
or  carry on  business  except  in accordance  with  cast-iron 
rules.  The  necessities  of  self-defence in  a  limited  space 
compelled the closest formation, and individual liberty was 
a  luxury  which  municipal  independence  could not  afford. 
National  strength  and  protection  relieved  the  need  for 
congestion.  City walls and castle-keeps could disappear with 
civil war and feudal anarchy, and civic liberty could spread 
to  the  bounds of  the sea  behind the  shield  of  a  nation's 
navy.  It was  not  mere  chance  that  the  dynasty which 
created  England's  fleet  destroyed  its  civic  independence 
and  subjected  municipal  legislation  to  national  contro1.l 
.By centralizing power the Tudors expanded English liberties 
and converted local privileges into a common national right. 
They did it by means of  parliament, and could not have 
done it without.  For one thing, only the common feeling 
produced  by  the  co-operation  of  local  representatives  at 
Westmjnster could have prepared the way for the requisite 
surrender  of  local  prejudice  and the merging  of  local  in 
national  liberty.  For  another,  nothing  less  than  an act 
of  the  crown  in parliament  could  have  constrained  these 
local and personal liberties.  It  was sufficiently revolutionary 
that  even an act of  parliament should  override a medieval 
liberty;  for  the  notion  of  fundamental  law  was  deeply 
ingrained  in  the  medieval  mind,  and  the  possessors  of 
liberties  based  their possession on a  divine or natural law 
that was beyond and above the power of  kings or parliaments. 
Magna  Carta was  long regarded  as fundamental law,  and 
repeated protests were made that all things done in contra- 
vention  thereof,  judicial  or  legislative,  within  or  without 
parliament, should be regarded as null and void.  The growth 
of  positive law at the expense of  divine and natural law, and 
of  the idea  that human will  and mundane counsels could 
amend the foundations  of  society, is the beginning of  the 
sovereignty  of  parliament.  But  without  that  overriding 
1 rg Henry VlI, c. 7; cf.  Leadam, Star Chamber, vol. i.  p. cli; and my 
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sovereignty  to  limit  and abolish  them,  English  medieval 
liberties would  have petrified  society  on  a  mould  of  local 
and  class  particularism,  and have  produced  that kind  of 
ossification which stereotyped oriental communities and even 
reduced  France to the necessity of  bursting its social shell 
for the sake of  expansi0n.l 
As  it was, the crown in parliament  secured a  free hand 
through the tacit or actual surrender of  the claim to inde- 
feasible liberty on the part of  individuals and associations. 
The attachment of  the medieval mind to this autonomy was 
pronounced, and it has been said that the indestructibility 
of  the individual will was the strongest characteristic of  the 
middle  ages.=  Even  in  the  administration  of  justice  the 
accused could refuse to submit to the verdict of  his country ; 
he could "  stand mute," i. e. decline to plead.  It  is true that 
the one form of  torture countenanced  by  English law, the 
peine forte  el  dure, could be applied to overcome this resist- 
ance;  but if  he died under its pressure, the court had to go 
without  its  verdict.  He  died  an innocent  man  and  his 
property  could  not  be  touched.  When  Henry  VIII  was 
attacking the monasteries infinite pains were taken to secure 
(( surrenders " in preference, or at least as a preliminary, to 
parliamentary confiscation.  In  every sphere the particularist 
manifestation was strong compared with  the national,  and 
parliaments  only  succeeded  in  overriding  the  individual 
because  every  Englishman was "  intended " to be  present 
in parliament, and an act of  parliament was understood  to 
be  by  representation  the  act  of  every  individual.  Its 
sovereignty was the sum total of  the will  of  every member 
of  the  community.  It  monopolized  power  and  prepared 
the way for the Austinian dogma that law is the command 
of  the state.  Liberty therefore  came to depend, not upon 
an immutable  divine or natural law, but upon  the will  of 
the  community  as  expressed  in  acts of  parliament  which 
1 Cf. the French declaration of  18  August, 1792  : "A state that is truly 
free nupht not to suffer within its bosom anv corporation. not even such  .. . - 
as, beiG dedicated to public instruction, havemeriied well of  the  country " 
(Maitland, Coll. Papers, iii. 311). 
Gierke, Polztical  Theorzes of  the Middle Age, ed. Maitland, pp. 81-2. 
could extend, restrict,  or  redistribute  the  various  liberties 
possessed by different classes. 
The effect of  this development of  parliamentary power was 
to make it possible to moderate the inequalities of  medieval 
liberty;  and, while the overmighty subject suffered crushing 
blows in Tudor times, the age was for the mass of  English 
people one of liberation.  Liberty became a national matter 
rather than the privilege of  a  class or a locality.  Curious 
relics  of  local liberties  still remain;  but for the most  part 
these anomalies were, during the sixteenth century, merged 
in common and equal rights guaranteed by  acts of  parlia- 
ment and enforced by royal or national law courts.  It was 
the destruction  of  these  barriers and the fusion of  classes 
that produced the intense national  and patriotic  feeling  of 
Elizabeth's reign.  The trinity of  estates fades into the unity 
of  the state. 
The state, however, and its organized expression in parlia- 
ment were of  composite character;  and each of  its elements 
struggled for supremacy.  England had been unified under 
the aegis of  the high court of  parliament;  there were to be 
no local sovereignties, no provincial parliaments, no autono- 
mous church, and that "  parliament cannot err " became a 
doctrine recognized  even  by  royalist  judges.l  But  within 
the precincts of  this court, crown, lords, judges, and commons 
contended  for  the  mastery, and asserted  their  "  liberties " 
in  a  medieval  spirit.  James  I  and  Charles I were  just 
as  intent  upon  "liberty"  as  the  house  of  commons  or 
chief  justice Coke;  and to each element in the constitution 
liberty meant its liberty, that is to say, its indepcndence and 
irresponsibility.  James  had engraven  in his heart a "  law 
of  free monarchy "  and he tried also to impress it on his 
people.  By  this freedom he  meant  independence  alike  of 
pope  and parliament, and dependence only on  God.  Nor 
was James peculiar in this view;  his most illustrious victim 
agreed.  The  prince,  quotes  Raleigh  with  approval,  non 
Letters  and Papers of  Henry  VIII,  vol. xxi. pt. ii. p. 345;  Gardiner, 
Select  Documents, ed. 1889,  p. 54. 
See Political  Works of  James I, Harvard Univ.  Press, pp.  52 sqq. 
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szcbjicitztr lzisi sua voluntate libera, mero ntotzc, et scientin certa ; 
and any constraint absolved him from his b0nd.l  Charles 
also  contended that in defending the liberties  of  kings he 
was  making  common cause with his people.  Government 
was  nothing  pertaining  to  them;  it  was  his "  liberty " : 
theirs  consisted  in  living  under  such  laws  as  protected 
their lives and property, and not in controlling the govern- 
ment.  He claimed that the free  choice of  advisers  was  a 
liberty  possessed  by  every  man,  and that parliament,  in 
attempting to  make  his  ministers  respmsible  to it,  was 
robbing him of  a liberty enjoyed by all his subjects2  Like 
true medievalists, the Stuarts based their claim upon a divine, 
immutable right ; but they added a  Reformation  doctrine 
that this right was immune from papal arbitrament, and a 
further  contention  that  it  was  based  on  primogeniture. 
That was the one kind of  predestination which commended 
itself to James  I ; and his divine hereditary right of  kings 
was  a  cross  between  scholastic  politics  and  Calvinistic 
theology.  With it parliaments had nothing to do : no posi- 
tive law made by human hands could amend an ordinance 
of  God. 
Parliament's  conception  of  liberty  was  hardly  less  self- 
centred.  Liberty was its liberties.  Whence they had been 
derived was of  little concern to members, and their historical 
scholarship  was  worse  than  that  of  the  Stuarts.  But 
convictions that have no historical basis are often political 
assets.  Parliament  was  convinced  that  its  liberties  were 
immemorial, that they were irrevocable rights independent 
of  the grace  or  favour  of  the crown.  Parliament  was,  it 
told James  I in 1604, above the law;  it regarded itself as 
responsible neither to the crown nor to the people, and its 
privileges  as being  the  expression  of  its  own  autocracy. 
Coke, on the other hand, was concerned with  the liberties 
of  the judges;  according to him they were independent and 
irresponsible.  They  were  the supreme interpreters  of  the 
1 Prothero, Select Documents, p. 409. 
Gardiner, Select  Documents, pp. 157,  285-6. 
8  Prothero, Select Documents, p. 290. 
common law, and the common law was to him what divine 
right was to the Stuarts and parliamentary privilege to the 
house  of  commons, something above the reach  of  amend- 
ment either by crown or by par1iaments.l  He looked upon it 
as perfect  and fundamental, and upon  the  judges  as the 
arbiters  of  the  constitution,  in  much  the  same  way  as 
federalists regard  their  supreme  courts.  His  view  was  a 
reversion to the thirteenth century, when Magna Carta was 
the constitution and judicia  were the only form of  legislative 
amendment.  "  Magna  Carta,"  he  said, "  is such  a  fellow 
that he will have no sovereign " ;  and he, as chief  justice 
of  common pleas, was its high priest.  To him the autocracy 
of  the  bench  was  the highest  kind  of  liberty.  Nor  did 
Cromwell differ radically from these conceptions, though he 
gave them a  different turn.  The army's  title to rule was 
a  divine  right,  proved  by  victories  vouchsafed  by  the 
God  of  battles;  and the  supreme magistrate  must  have 
liberty to establish that form of  religion in which he believes ; 
otherwise he is denied his freedom of  con~cience.~ 
The  constitutional  struggle  of  the  seventeenth  century 
was an effort to deprive kings of  their liberties, and it was 
consummated in the Revolution  of  1688,  which robbed  the 
crown of  liberty of  conscience and imposed upon it a whole 
decalogue  of  prohibitions.  Liberty  was  transferred  from 
king to parliament, and parliament could authorize the king 
to  commit  every  one  of the  acts which it declared  illegal 
without its consent.  While bounds were  set on  every side 
to the freedom of  the crown, none were imposed on that of 
parliament;  and for  three-quarters of  a  century after  the 
Revolution the house of  commons asserted an independence 
and irresponsibility as great as that which  the Stuarts had 
claimed for themselves.  It interpreted  its liberties as  in- 
cluding powers to deny the right of  petition to the crown, to 
1 The lawyers in parliament held similar views, and in 1604 the Speaker 
described the common  law  as a  compound  of  the law of  God, the law 
of  reason,  and  the law  of  nature,  and  therefore  as  being  immutable 
(Comntons' Jouvnals, i. 254~;  McIlwain, p. 63 n.). 
"bid..  D. 81. 
8  ~arlyle,  ~~-ofnwell,  ed. Lomas, ii. 382. 180  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  PARLIAMENT  AND  LIBERTY  181 
refuse as a matter of  privilege the right of  electors to vote, 
to exclude members whom they had elected, and to admit 
candidates they had rejected.  To report speeches delivered 
and to publish  division  lists taken  in  parliament  was  de- 
nounced as countenancing the mischievous idea that members 
were responsible to an authority outside the walls of  the two 
houses ;  and their parliamentary liberties were even invoked 
to give an extra-legal protection to members' fishponds and 
rabbits.l  Parliamentary  privilege  was,  in  fact,  the  last 
of medieval liberties to be reduced by common law.  Nor is 
the medieval conception of  liberty yet extinct;  it survives 
in the independence sometimes rashly claimed for the house 
of  lords.  For  independence is  like  liberty,  a  vague  but 
stimulating word,  and its value  depends upon the sort of 
immunity it implies.  Independence of  the  house of  com- 
mons is at least a plausible claim to make for the house  of 
lords.  But one of  its boldest members has contended that 
even  though a measure were  approved at a  dozen general 
elections, the house of  lords would be entitled to reject it. 
This is frankly  independence of  public  opinion;  it is the 
liberty  of  Magna  Carta  and the Stuarts, a  liberty  to the 
hindrance of  the common law and oppression of  the common 
people. 
What then did the Whigs mean by that "  civil and religious 
liberty "  which they were never tired of  toasting and thought 
they had won by the glorious  revolution?  Clearly it  did 
not imply to them a universal franchise, a share of  every man 
in  the  control  of  government.  Not  one  Englishman  in 
fifty possessed  a vote in the eighteenth century;  even the 
agitators of  Cromwell's time scouted the notion that serving- 
men  should vote, and for a hundred years and more  after 
the revolution the Whigs as a whole opposed any extension 
of the franchise.  Electors must be "  free and independent," 
independent, that is to say, of  masters and employers.  The 
Whig conception of  liberty was not very different from that 
of  Charles I; government was not  a matter pertaining to 
the people;  for the vast majority  liberty should consist in 
1 McIlwain, P.  376;  this was  only an extension of  the privilege  which 
protected membt:rs' servants from arrest. 
freedom from molestation, the kind  of  liberty which every 
benevolent despot of the eighteenth century tried to bestow 
on his subjects.  Liberty of  conscience they conceded, and 
some  liberty  of  speech  and  worship;  but  the  Test  acts 
still remained upon  the statute-book, freedom of  the press 
was  still restricted,  and that kind of  liberty which implies 
a right to vote was ignored.  It was not until 1917  admitted 
as  an  indispensable  element  of  freedom;  for  the  whole 
population was  supposed  to  be  free,  while  only  one  sex 
wielded the vote.  Parliament in 1688 thought that liberty 
was achieved when the houses controlled the crown.  Their 
liberties were  no  doubt secured;  but the Whigs  failed to ' 
realize that unless the nation secured control of  parliament, 
parliamentary  liberties might  become  as dangerous to the 
community as  the baronial  liberties of  1215  or  the royal 
liberties of  the Stuarts. 
This failure was largely responsible for the American war 
of independence ; but the authors of  that revolution no more 
succeeded in solving the problem  of  liberty  than  did  the 
Whigs  in  1688.  Indeed,  they  provided  perhaps  the most 
striking example in history  of  the facility with which men 
can be blind to any liberties but their own;  and there are 
few more  ironic spectacles than  that of  a community con- 
sisting largely of  slave-owners proclaiming in  fervid tones 
their devotion to the rights of  man.  When they spoke of 
man they meant white, and not yellow, red, or black men; 
and their gospel of  universal liberty was  only intended for 
application to themselves.  But, even apart from the races 
more  highly  coloured  than  the  colonists  themselves,  the 
assertions  of  liberty  in  which  American  constitutions 
abound have left a good deal to be desired by the descendants 
of  those who  framed them;  and latter-day  citizens of  the 
United  States have discovered that the mere  assertion of 
the principle of liberty is a poor substitute for its definition. 
No  one, runs the most famous of  the commonplaces of  Ameri- 
can constitutions, shall be deprived of  his liberty without 
due process of law;  and the interpretation thereof has been 
left  to  the supreme  courts  of  the various states.  A few 
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passed a measure prohibiting employers from paying wages 
in kind instead of  coin;  its supreme court declared the law 
invalid because  it infringed  the employer's  liberty without 
due process of  law.  Similar measures to compel the provision 
of  washhouses for miners and to prevent the use of the stars 
and stripes  for  commercial advertisement  have been  pro- 
nounced invalid in the sacred cause of  liberty.  That a man 
may do what he likes with his own was for long one of  the 
cardinal principles  of  American sociology; even when "  his 
own "  included his human chattels.  Liberty was linked with 
property and became the liberty of  property, the servitude 
of  men. 
From these judicial estravagances England has been saved 
by the historical fact that parliament is the highest court in 
the land.  Every act of  parliament  is due process  of  law, 
and no  inferior  court  can  declare  it invalid,  while in the 
United States no legislature is a court, no legislative act is due 
process of  law, and a supreme court  can often frustrate the 
legislature of  the state.  But the problem of  liberty remains 
unsolved.  At the revolution of  1688  men imagined that all 
was gained with the achievement of  civil and relig.ous liberty ; 
in the nineteenth  century they pinned their faith to political 
liberty and looked for the advent  of  the millennium  with 
the vote.  In the twentieth we  are still seeking for a new 
freedom, for a  fresh liberty, which  some would  call  moral 
and  some  economic.  What  is  liberty  wLthout a  living? 
" We know,"  declared  the Levellers more than two and a 
half  centuries ago, "  that England cannot be a free common- 
wealth  unless  all  the poor  commons have  a  free  use  and 
benefit of  the land."  l  "  So you stand upon natural right," 
Ireton  had  retorted  to Rainsborough  in  one  of  the great 
army debates of  1647, "  then show me the difference between 
the right to a vote and the right to subsistence."  Ireton's 
purpose had been to explode the right to a vote;  but the 
justice of  political liberty once conceded, it is hard to defend 
the justice of  economic dependence 
G.  M.  Trevelyan. England  undev the  Stuarts, p. 283 n. 
2  Morley, Cromwell, p. 231. 
The ceaseless struggle for liberty has therefore  taken at 
last  an  economic  turn.  The  liberties  of  Magna  Carta 
implied  the  servitude  of  villeins;  the  enfranchisement  of 
villeins  portends  the "  servile state."  For the liberties  of 
masters we have the liberties of  men, and for the subordin;i- 
tion  of  the  many  the restriction  of  the few.  The rise  of 
democracy,  like  every other struggle for  liberty, ended  by 
becoming  a  struggle for  supremacy.  But  it did not  solve 
the  problem  of  liberty.  Even  the  democrats  feel  that 
freedom is not identical with the rule of  the majority;  and 
syndica!ism  is a reversion to medieval liberty, in that it is 
an  attempt  to  substitute  group-control  for  state-control, 
a sort of  democratic feudalism, a compromise with anarchy, 
and a counterpart of  the capitalistic feudalism of  the trusts. 
But the restoration  of  particularism would  mean  anarchy, 
and anarchy is more fatal to common liberty than any form 
of  polity, because it leaves the common man at the mercy 
of  his unscrupulous or over-mighty neighbour.  Sovereignty 
is  the  only bulwark  against  civil war,  the only  arbiter  of 
rival  claims,  and  the  only  guarantee of  peaccful  liberty; 
and sovereignty  can only be the national  will  expressed in 
parliament.  Parliament  alone can expand and redistribute 
economic liberty,  as it has  expanded  and  converted  the 
private liberties of  the middle ages into the common rights 
of  modern  times.  Its  arbitrament  is  indispensable,  for 
otherwise  struggles  for  liberty  will  be  chronic,  barbarous, 
and  inconclusive.  The  individual  cannot  be  isolated  in 
the  state; his liberty is always a matter of  relationship to 
others ;  and the greater the liberty of  any particular man, the 
less is the liberty of  his fellows.  Struggles for liberty always 
end in struggles for supremacy, because liberty depends upon 
control.  My  liberty consists in the restraint  imposed upon 
the actions  of  other men; it  is worth nothing  if  they are 
free to do what  they like, and theirs is a phantom if  mine 
is  absolute.  Liberty uncontrolled is the licence of  tyranny, 
and the alpha and omega of common liberty is the common 
restraint of  the individual. 
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it lies in equality.  Without some equality there can be no 
common liberty;  and the equalization of  liberty has been 
one  of  the  greatest  achievements  of  parliament.  There 
are,  indeed,  endless kinds  of  equality,  some  of  them  idle 
dreams, some pernicious, others desirable, and some accom- 
plished.  Abstract  or  mathematical  equality  has no  value 
amid the infinite and inevitable inequalities of  human con- 
ditions;  and the most fervent apostles of  human equalities 
do  not hope to go  further in the promotion of  equality in 
physique than giving every child an equal chance of  healthy 
development.  But  more  has  been  done  than  that  with 
regard to the results or implications of  physical inequality. 
Men  vary in  physical  strength;  but so  far as their  social 
relations go that inequality has been abolished.  The weak 
are as safe as the strong in civilized communities, and the 
strong are effectually prevented from using  their  strength 
to  the  detriment  of  their  weaker  neighbours.  Yet  there 
must have been a period in social evolution when this refusal 
to permit the strong man to do what he liked with his own 
physical strength seemed, at  least to the strong, an outrageous 
interference with  personal  liberty.  Of  what  use  was  his 
strength unless he  could  use  it as his  taste  or  conscience 
suggested?  There is, in fact, no  more  reason why a man 
should be  allowed to use his  wealth or  his  brain  than his 
physical  strength  as  he  likes;  and  the  principle  which 
controls the  one  should  also  control  the  other.  No  one 
hopes to equalize physical strength ; no sane person expects 
to  equalize  wealth  or  mental  equipment.  But  liberty  in 
the employment of  each should be  restrained by  the same 
social considerations.  The liberty of  the weak depends upon 
the restraint of  the strong, that of  the poor upon the restraint 
of  the rich,  and that of  the simpler-minded upon  the re- 
straint of  the sharper.  Every man should have this liberty 
and  no  more,  to  do  unto  others  as he  would  that  they 
should do  unto him;  upon  that  common  foundation  rest 
liberty,  equality, and morality. 
That is the golden rule for the liberties of  the subject. 
Others, it is true, must  possess more extended powers.  A 
police  constable  and  a  prime  minister  must  have  wider 
liberties than the private citizen;  but these are matters, not 
of  right,  but  of  obligation,  service,  and  responsibility. 
Their liberties are their duties, imposed  upon them by the 
community;  and the greater the liberty, the more exacting 
the obligation.  Freedom is grounded in service : as of old 
in England a man was a voter because he served on a jury, 
so  to-day  a  man  wields  power  because  he  is  a  minister. 
We  have princes and governors galore, but their ministers 
are  their  masters,  because  they  are  responsible.  It has 
been the supreme good  fortune of  England that her consti- 
tutional history  and her  liberties started from  service and 
duty,  and  not  from  the rights  of  man.  These  were  the 
natural  product  of  an  impious  generation  which  ignored 
man's  obligations,  and  looked  upon him  as  an  anarchist 
to  be  judged  by  the liberties he  seized  and  not  by  the 
services, he  rendered.  "  They  made  and  recorded,"  said 
Burke, "  a sort of  institute and digest of  anarchy called the 
'  Rights of  Man.' "  1 
Absolute rights are, indeed, fatal to society, and it would 
be easy to strangle a community with liberty and property. 
One of  the causes, said Hobbes, which tend to the dissolution 
of  a commonwealth, is the idea that the subject possesses 
such  a  right  of  property  as  excludes  the  sovereign.  No 
taxation  could  be  raised if  the individual had an absolute 
right  to  all  his  property,  and  no  railway  could  have 
been  constructed without acts of  parliament overriding the 
liberty of  landlords to do what they liked with their own. 
But  if  property  has  its  liabilities and  its limitations  for 
the sake of  the common good, so  too has labour.  If, for 
instance, the interest of  the consumer is a valid objection to 
a protective tariff, it can also be pleaded against a minimum 
wage.  If  the  interest  of  the  community  is  the  supreme 
consideration,it must be superior to the libertyof any section ; 
and any differentiation must be  based, not on the absolute 
Speech on Amy  Estimates, 1790, in Works, ed.  1834, i. 378:  Boston 
ed. 1865-7,  iii.  221.  Burke  referred  to  the French,  and  not  to  the 
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right of  any class, but on the value which  concessions to a 
particular class may have for the community as a whole. 
The only criterion of  such issues is the common sense and 
conscience of  the community expressed by means of  parlia- 
ment.  On that all liberty must depend.  It is thought by 
many that such decisions, which are fundamentally questions 
of  morals, should rest with the church, and not with the state. 
But  churches  are  many,  and  they  do  not  always  agree. 
Judgement  by  churches  would  be  judgement  by  groups, 
with no final arbiter in case of  divergence;  and divergence 
without  a supreme tribunal involves an ultimate appeal to 
the barbarous arbitrament  of  social, political,  or  economic 
warfare.  To some institution representing  the whole  com- 
munity we must therefore have recourse;  and in its service 
we must seek our liberty.  Medieval liberty was a monopoly, 
an irresponsible  trust;  modern  liberty  should  be  a  trust 
for the community;  and given that equal condition, there 
need  be  no  equality  in  the  powers  entrusted.  Much  is 
required from him to whom much is confided.  There need 
be  no  servitude  in  that  service  and no  servility  in  that 
state.  Obedience to a  tyrant is  slavery,  but  the  service 
of  mankind  is  liberty.  The  proudest  of  the  titles  of  the 
pope is servus servorum Dei, and the highest ambition of  an 
Englishman  is to be  prime  minister,  the  chief  servant  of 
the  people.  The  nearer  we  get  to  a  perfect  master,  the 
nearer  does our service approach to perfect freedom. 
CHAPTER  X 
PARLIAMENT  AND  THE  CHURCH 
THE  progressive interference of  parliament with medieval 
liberties inevitably  involved a conflict  with  the church, for 
the Church in England  was  the greatest  and most  august 
embodiment  of  medieval  liberties,  and  the  first  clause 
of  Magna  Carta  guaranteed  that  the  ecclesia  anglicana 
should be free.  To that clause the great charter owes not 
a little of  the admiration it excites in modern times.  It is 
a clause which appeals with equal force to the catholic and 
to the free churchman; and no  principle  commands  more 
general  acceptation  than  that which  is  read  by  different 
schools of  thought into the opening words of John's surrender. 
It is, however, a singular fact that the liberty thus guaranteed 
to the  church, and explained in the following clause to be 
freedom of  election,  is  a  liberty  of  which  the church wad 
effectually deprived four centuries ago.  It is true that under 
the Reformation settlement the crown issues a conge'  d'e'lire 
whenever an episcopal vacancy has to be filled, and that the 
chapter concerned meets and elects its head.  But the con& 
d'klire  is  speedily  followed by  letters  missive in  which  the 
crown designates the person to be elected; failure to comply 
involves  liability  to the  penalties  of  pramunire,  th?t  is, 
total forfeiture of  goods and imprisonment for life;  and the 
fact that no  chapter  has  ever  braved  these  penalties  by 
neglecting  to  elect  the crown's  nominee must be  accepted 
as proof  that the church has been, and is, content to forgo 
the  liberty  granted  by  Magna  Carta.  These  matters 
were  settled  by statute in  the  sixteenth century, and  the 
instrumentality  of  parliament  in  the  suppression  of 
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ecclesiastical  freedom harmonizes with its general  attitude 
towards  medieval  liberties.  But  before  discussing  the 
relations between parliament and the church, it is well  to 
attempt some definition of  our terms. 
The church has many meanings ; indeed, it might almost 
be said that the long story of  theological controversy turns 
mainly  on  its interpretation.  Apart  from  the church  in- 
visible, the church  visible may  mean  the whole  church of 
God  or  any particular branch thereof to which the speaker 
belongs;  every  churchman,  free  or  other,  will  limit  the 
church by his definition of  the faith ;  and the more numerous 
the articles of  his faith the smaller will be the number of  the 
faithful.  The medieval catholic was less perplexed about his 
frontiers; there was but one church and one great schism. 
The  Greek  and the Roman  communities belonged  to  one 
catholic church, though each regarded the other as schismatic. 
But, while more comprehensive in this respect, the medieval 
church  was  more  circumscribed  in  another.  No  layman 
could be a churchman ; the ecclesia was composed of  ecclesi- 
astics.  The distinction  survives in popular  parlance, and 
"  to  enter  the church " is  the vernacular for taking  holy 
orders and becoming an ecclesiastic.  Modern confusions, no 
doubt, have crept in; "  churchman " is used with a some- 
what offensive implication to distinguish Anglican laity and 
clergy alike from nonconformists and from Roman catholics, 
and on theological grounds it is held that one "  enters the 
church "  at  baptism.  But  this  is  not  the  language  of 
medieval  times.  When  parliament  or  the council  speak, 
as they often do, of  tow esfats de sainte kglise, they do not 
include  a  single  layman; and  even  as late  as the seven- 
teenth  century, when  Bacon  describes Henry  VII's  coun- 
tenance  as  being  "reverend  and  a  little  like  that  of  a 
churchman,"  he  is  not  contrasting  it  with  that  of  a 
nonconformist or that of  an unbaptized infant.1 
The point is of  some importance, because no understanding 
is possible of the relations between church and state without 
clear conceptions upon it, and the confusion between modern 
Bacon,  Henry  VII, ed. 1870, p. 402. 
and  medieval  ideas  is  widespread  and persistent.  It has, 
for instance, been  recently  remarked,  in  an  attack  upon 
Maitland's views of canon law, that the statutes of  provisors 
and  praemunire  were  passed  "  by  representative  bodies of 
Anglican  churchmen." l  But  "  churchmen "  could  only 
be  translated  into  medieval  Latin  as  viri  ecclesiastici; 
and  the only  ecclesiastics present  in  parliament  protested 
unanimously  and  vigorously  against  the  passing  of  these 
acts.  There was the clearest and sharpest antithesis between 
lay and clerical authority, between courts that were  royal 
and  those that were  christian, between regnum and  sacer- 
dolium.  Regnum  terrenum,  declared  a  medieval  publicist, 
est malum et  diabolicum  et  opponitur  regno  cale~ti.~  There 
was nothing 'in common, wrote Queen Mary to Cardinal Pole, 
between the body politic and the body eccle~iastical.~  The 
famous altar-piece at Mansfield, which produced so profound 
an impression on the youthful Luther, represented the church 
as a  ship in which  alone lay salvation from the waters  of 
destruction; no layman was  in  the ship, no  churchman in 
the water.  The state appeared, at least at times, to Hilde- 
brand  and his pontifical  successors as the work if  not  the 
sphere of  the devil. 
This, no  doubt, was the extreme papalist view, in which 
few  English prelates concurred.  For after all the state, in 
England  at least,  was  largely  the  work  of  their  hands 
and the sphere of  their activities.  They sat in  parliament, 
almost monopolized  chancery, and were often predominant 
in the king's council.  The wordy warfare, in which papalists 
and  imperialists developed a  whole  literature  of  analogies 
and  abuse,  appealed  to  metaphysical  Germans  and  per- 
fervid Italians rather than  to stolid  Englishmen, who  had 
not the same personal  or patriotic  concern in the  struggle 
Ogle,  Canon Law, 1912,  p.  106, although Mr.  Ogle himself  has jusf 
(p. 103) Cstinguished between  the medieval  meaning  of  "  churchmen 
and the  fuller modem  sense which  includes the laity."  On  p.  60  he 
also  identifies  the "  prelatz  et autres gentz  de seinte eglise " with  the 
royal and baronial patrons (Rot.  Parl., ii. 233).  Churchmen are defined  in 
the Rot. Parl. for 1376 (ii. 336) as prelates  and "hommes de Sainte Eglise, 
c'est assavoir, chanons, prebenders, et persons." 
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between a German regnunz  and an Italian sacerdotium.  The 
investiture  controversy  was  feebly  reflected  in  England, 
where,  except  for  occasional  outbursts  from  Beckets  and 
Winchelseys, churchmen  and laymen worked well  together 
under a common and temporal sovereign ; and the compara- 
tive  feebleness  of  the  roots  which  the  papacy  struck  in 
English soil helps to explain the ease and completeness with 
which they were torn up by the Tudors.  It  was seldom that 
an  English  prelate  went  so far  as archbishop Winchelsey 
when  he asserted  that English ecclesiastics owed a twofold 
allegiance to the pope and the king, and that their allegiance 
to the pope took precedence of  their allegiance to the king. 
The medieval contest in England was not so much a foreign 
war between English monarchy and the papacy as a domestic 
struggle between lay and ecclesiastical jurisdictions.  Some- 
times a powerful pope took over the lead of  the clerical forces, 
but more often it was an insular combat of  barons and bishops, 
royal  prohibitions  and  episcopal  injunctions,  and  papal 
intervention  was  not  always  welcome  to those  on  whose 
side the papacy intervened. 
The papal yoke lay light upon the conscience of  the average 
English  prelate,  perhaps because it bore  so heavily  on his 
pocket;  and  the oaths  of  fealty  exacted  by  the  Roman 
pontiff  were  probably taken with mental  reservations  over 
and  above  the  express  reservation  contained  in  the  oath 
he  swore  to the king.  He was  ever a baron as well  as a 
bishop,  and his  barony  was  a  bond  with  the  crown  not 
easily ignored.  Moreover, a bishop had frequently from his 
youth up been nurtured in the service of  the crown.  Rome 
was a distant place to the medieval Englishman ; only one 
attained the papal  chair,l and he had been  a  stranger to 
England  from his youth.  English  cardinals were  few  and 
far  between.  The  papacy  was  in  every  sense  a  foreign 
government, for which  there was little, if  any, enthusiasm 
among the ranks even  of  English  churchmen.  Maitland's 
jest  about  Anglo-Catholics, who  believe  that the  English 
church was protestant before the Reformation and has been 
1 Nicholas Breakspear, who was Pope as Adrian IV from  1154 to 1159. 
ever  since, was perhaps deserved;  but it is quite 
probable that there have been more sincere adherents of  the 
papacy in England since the breach with Rome than there 
were before it.  The dogma of papal supremacy was academic 
and disputable in orthodox circles till the close of  the middle 
ages.  (Ecumenical councils deposed popes one after another ; 
and  the  Pilgrims of Grace had little to say for the pontiff. 
He was not an integral part of the catholic faith, and there 
were other supports than the papacy for the catholicis111 of 
medieval  England.  But  after the  breach,  and  still  more 
after the  Edwardine  Reformation, the papacy seemed the 
only bulwark of  the catholic  church;  catholicism  became 
bound  up with  Rome, and most  catholics dedicated to the 
pope their  loyalty to the faith.  There  was  a  new  and  a 
stronger  bond  between  Rome  and  English  catholics  than 
had existed in the middle ages. 
But this old  English  indifference to the papacy did  not 
imply the independence of the English church.  During the 
later  middle  ages  English  churchmen  were  devoted  to 
a catholicism which they did  not identify with the papacy, 
but they feared and detested the approaches of  nationalism. 
The arguments for English ecclesiastical independence gcner- 
ally fall very wide of  the mark.  Nothing, for instance, could 
be  more  misleading  than the  contention  that Henry VIII 
did no more than William I had done when he claimed to 
determine which pope should be recognized in his dominions. 
Henry eradicated the jurisdiction altogether : William merely 
asserted a voice in the determination  who should wield  it. 
He no more thought of  abolishing papal jurisdiction than the 
Whigs  thought  of  establishing  a  republic  when  they  sub- 
stituted William I11 for James 11.  Nor would the argument,. 
if  sound, estabIish the independence of  the English church ; 
it  would  merely  establish  her  dependence  on  the  English 
monarchy. 
A more serious source of  error is confilsion of  chronology. 
It will  not  do  to  build  fourteenth-century independence 
on  arguments from  the Anglo-Saxon period.  The middle 
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true of  one century is false of  another.  Provincial independ- 
ence was  obviously greater  before the catholic church  had 
been organized by Hildebrand and his successors.  Cranmer 
selected the pontificate of  Nicholas I1 (1058-61)  as the epoch 
at which  the church  became  corrupt, or, in other  words, 
the epoch at which  archbishop Stigand was condemned by 
papal  legates  and provincial  independence  was  submerged 
in catholic organization.  It  might be safer to put the matter 
in Stubbs's fashion, and say that in England the time had 
come for Lanfranc and Anselm  as well  as for  William  of 
Normandy and Henry of  Anjou.  The point is that Lanfranc 
and Anselm were not English;  they represented the eccle- 
siastical aspect of  the Norman  Conquest and the submerg- 
ence of  English insularity beneath the waves of  continental 
culture.  From that time for two centuries there was even 
less English independence  in the church than in the state. 
The law and the language,  the ritual and the organization 
of  the church, all  came from abroad;  the episcopate was 
almost closed to natives; and there was nothing national in 
the inspiration of  the monks and friars.  To the end of  the 
thirteenth  century England was  catholic to the core.  Our 
concern here is with the two and a half  succeeding centuries, 
during which England emerged from these catholic conditions 
and parliaments assisted in developing the nationalism which 
involved  a  gradual differentiation  and  then  independence 
of  type.  The history of  the constitutional relations between 
parliament  and the  church  turns  mainly  on  the  friction 
between  a secular body, growing more and more national, 
and an ecclesiastical body  clinging more  and more  closely 
to the international system on which it was based and from 
which it derived its support. 
The  antagonism  was  fundamental,  although  it  only 
developed with  the growth of  the English  national  state; 
for in England the church was Latin, but the state Teutonic. 
In Latin communities the conflict was less pronounced and 
the Reformation made  little way, for there both state and 
church were based upon identical Roman principles ; empire , 
and papacy,  said  Zwingli,  both  came from  Rome.  Both 
claimed a divine and not a popular sancti0n.l  In Teutonic 
states, on the other hand, the ruler's commission came from 
below, not  from above;  and the form at least  of  popular 
election survived the attempts of  the church to base secular 
monarchy also on a divine right conveyed and interpreted 
by  herself.  For a  time,  indeed,  during the halcyon  days 
of  the papacy,  the  Latin  ecclesiastical view  obscured  the 
secular and Teutonic,  and in France it achieved  a  lasting 
victory.  But in England the growth of  representation, which 
enveloped the central government, withdrew it further and 
further from the domain of  Latin ideas.  A divergence set 
in  which  led  to conflicts of  jurisdiction  and finally ended 
with the submission of  the clergy to Henry VIII. 
This divergence permeated both organisms.  The papacy, 
that ghost of  the empire sitting enthroned in the midst of 
the  ruins  thereof,  inherited  the spirit  and carried on  the 
traditions  of  Casar.  Its law  was  the law  of  Rome;  its 
principle was unlimited monarchy;  its divisions were Roman 
provinces, carefully drawn to divide and undermine national 
sentiment.  It trusted to revelation and not to representa- 
tion.  Its legislation consisted of  papal bulls and not of  the 
acts of  an assembly;  its courts  required  no  juries,  for a 
system  claiming  infallibility  could  hardly  invoke  the  aid 
of  common  intelligence.  Its  taxes  were  not  voted,  but 
imposed.  The clergy in  England  granted their aids, their 
tenths, and their subsidies to the king ; they granted none to 
the pope, because he took them without their leave.  First- 
fruits and tenths were not voted in convocations ;  they were 
levied by papal command;  and the "  taxatio "  under which 
the clergy groaned was named after the pope or the papal 
 collector^.^  The  pope  was  God's  vicegerent;  he  had  no 
need of  consent.  Harmony, no doubt, was always desired 
between the Vicar of  Christ and his flock, but harmony must 
Both  emperor and  pope  were,  indeed,  elected,  but  one  by  seven 
princes and the other by cardinals. 
E. g. the "  taxatio Norvicensis " of  T?jalter Suffield, Bishop of  Nonvich 
and  papal  collector  in  1253,  and  the  taxatio " of  Pope  Nicholas  IV 
In  1291.  Cf. Wilkins, Conczlia, iii. 646, "  Alexander VI papa . . . imposuit 
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be secured through the obedience of  the sheep and not through 
the shepherd's  concessions.  A  theocracy could not  parley 
with popular pretensions. 
The Teutonic  state was  more  a  matter of  compromise. 
Royal  elections  involved  electoral  promises,  and  Norman 
kings  themselves began  their  reigns with  charters to their 
people.  Even before parliaments were created, royal aci  r;  of 
legislation were constitutions rather than institutes, measures 
set up by agreement and consultation, and not imposeti by 
sole  authority.  Kings levied, indeed, their  rents or  feudal 
services, but other aids and scutages had to be given them 
by their subjects ;  and Edward 1's maxim, q~od  omnes langit 
ab omnibus  approbetur, was the  antithesis of  the  principle 
of  papal  sovereignty.  With the growth of  parliament  the 
necessity for consent grew ever more insistent, and with it 
widened the breach between the foundations of  church and 
state.  Edward I attempted a union by summoning church- 
men  and laymen alike to the high court of  parliament ;  but 
the reigns of  his son and his grandson witnessed the failure 
of  the  experiment,  and in  course  of  time  the side  which 
rejected the union for the sake of  independence  fell into a 
state of  subjection. 
The  conflict  of  ideals  developed  a  practical  conflict  of 
jurisdictions.  It  was not a simple matter of  warfare between 
two organisms, each with its own code of  laws ;  for both were 
subject to both  jurisdictions.  Churchmen were  under the 
law of  the land as well as under that of  the church ; laymen 
were subject to canon as well as to civil law.  It was strife 
between  two  kinds of  allegiance, in which  every  man was 
divided  against  himself;  he had two  sovereign lords,  the 
pope and the king, and while the clergy inclined to the pope, 
the laymerl preferred  the king.  Each, however,  made his 
choice at no  little  risk  to  himself;  and the dilemma,  in 
which  the soldier may find himself  placed to-day, between 
the risk of  court martial if  he refuses when ordered to fire 
upon a mob, and the risk of  trial for murder if  he obeys, is 
a  rare inconvenience compared  with  the distraction of  the 
medieval  Englishman between the courts christian and the 
courts of  his king.  He  might  be  outlawed  if  he  obeyed 
the church and e:rcon~municated  if  he obeyed the king.  He 
might be treated as a bastard by royal judges and as legiti- 
mate by the authorities of the church ;  for the famous refusal 
of  the barons in  1236  to assimilate  the laws of  England to 
those of  the church and to recognize legitimation by the sub- 
sequent marriage of parents, had no effect upon ecclesiastical 
jurisciiction, and down to the Reformation the ecclesiastical 
courts administered one law of legitimacy  and the secular 
courts an0ther.l  He might be granted probate by one court 
and be refused possession by another;  for in the fourteenth 
century the church was  encouraging villeins and women to 
make  wills, which  the commons complained in parliament 
was contrary to rea~on.~ 
Friction  between  the  two  jurisdictions  was  incessant, 
because  their  frontiers  were  disputed,  and  there  was  no 
supreme court to settle the issue ;  the two supreme authorities 
were the parties to the suit.  Henry I1 attempted a settle- 
ment  by  the  Constitutions of  Clarendon, and  Edward  I 
another by his writ of  circumspecte agatis.  There were few 
acres in the whole field of  secular jurisdiction  which might 
not be  invaded by clerical courts.  Everything to do with 
marriage,  the making and administration of  wills, and the 
faith was left as a matter of  course to the clergy, though an 
attempt to include  debt  among matters of  faith provoked 
a clause in the Constitutions of  Clarendon.  If  a debt  was 
confirmed  by  an oath, it  brought  the  debtor  within  the 
sphere of  ecclesiastical jurisdiction ; for the oath was inter- 
posita  fides, it  established  a  direct  relation between  God 
and the debtor, and of  those relations the church was  the 
only arbiter.3  These were questions which  drew the laity 
into the clerical courts;  still greater efforts were made to 
keep the clergy out of  the clutches of the secular law, and 
Maitland,  Canon Law, pp.  53-4;  Makower,  Const. Hist  pp. 422-3; 
Rot. Parl., ii.  153, 171; Letters and  Papers of  Henry  VIII, vii. 1385. 
Rot. Pad., ii. 148-51. 
The attempts to  draw  debts  and  other secular  contracts into  the 
courts christian were  the subject of  perpetual complaint  in parliament; 
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the most resounding blows in the conflict between the two 
lurisdictions were struck over the corpus vile of  the criminous 
clerk.  Maitland has illumined the legal intention of  Henry 
11's proposals without attempting an estimate of  their results. 
But  it seems  clear  that  victory  rested  with  the  church : 
judgement, indeed, appears to have gone to the secular court, 
but execution remained in the tender hands of  ecclesiastical 
authority  which  was  precluded  from  shedding blood.  In 
1351,  in answer  to a  petition  of  the  clergy,  Edward  I11 
maintained  his  jurisdiction  over churchmen so far as high 
treason  was  concerned,  but admitted benefit  of  clergy for 
murder  and  other  crimes  on  condition  that  the  church 
inflicted perpetual penance and prison-a  condition that was 
kept with exceeding 1axity.l  Benefit of  clergy continued to 
shield the clerical criminal to the end  of  the middle  ages, 
and the chief  liberty of  the church, exclaimed a puritan in 
Elizabeth's parliament, had been a liberty to sin.2 
-  -  This conflict of  jurisdictions was fatal to a parliamentary 
union  between  church  and  state;  for  parliament  was  a 
court of  law, but only a court of  secular law, and a supreme 
court  from  which  spiritual  jurisdiction  was  withheld  had 
little attraction for churchmen.  Laymen had been  drawn 
to Westminster because parliament was held three times a 
year to redress  grievances and settle disputes about which 
the judges were in doubt.  The clergy, indeed, participated 
in so far as they were subject  to secular law, and clerical 
proctors  presented clerical  petitions in parliaments  as late 
as the reign of  Edward III.3  But parliaments provided no 
remedy for abuses in the clerical courts;  no writs of  error 
could right a spiritual wrong in parliament, and for redress 
1 Rot.  Parl., ii.  244.  The  control  of  the  courts  christian  over  the 
criminous clerk ceased of  course when the clerk ceased to be a churchman; 
but only the church could degrade him into a layman. 
2 D'Ewes, Journals, p. 167. 
a  Triers of  clerical  petitions  in parliament were  appointed  in  1347-8 
(Rot.  Parl., ii. 164).  In 1366 there were petitions from the four mendicant 
orders  and the universities  of  Oxford  and Cambridge,  which were not 
represented in parliament  (ibid., ii. 290); and  in  the Good  parliament 
of  1376  petitions  were  presented  from  the clergy  of  the  province  of 
Canterbury, though it does not appear that those clergy were represented 
(ibid., ii. 357). 
against their official  superiors the clergy must look elsewhere ; 
appeal from them lay not  to the king at Westminster, but 
to the  pope  at R0me.l  The laity also suffered  from this 
disability,  but  it went  more  to  the  heart  of  the  church. 
Parliament  was  not  the  final  resort  for  matters in  which 
the  affections  of  churchmen  were  mainly  involved.  The 
original motive which led to lay demands for regular parlia- 
ments did not exist for the church;  and its absence rein- 
forced the other inducements which counselled the clergy to 
abstain from participation in parliamentary business.  The 
judicial system which linked the representatives of  the laity 
to parliament  did not bind the church to a temporal court ; 
trial  by  their  peers  in  parliament  was  repudiated  by the 
prelates, and churchmen contended "  that no clerk would be 
arraigned before  the king's  judges  on any criminal charge, 
since  for  such  cause  no  soul  could  judge  them  save  the 
pope." 
Nor would they submit to the taxation of  their spiritualties 
in  parliament.  The  essence  of  frankalmoign,  or  spiritual 
tenure,  was  its immunity  from  temporal  jurisdiction,  and 
freedom  from  parliamentary  taxation  seemed  a  natural 
corollary of  freedom from parliamentary  jurisdiction.  The 
claim appears in time to have been extended to all the pro- 
perty  of  the church, and clerical taxes were voted in con- 
vocations and collected by clerics appainted by the  prelate^.^ 
The clergy, indeed, were a body of  men set apart from the 
community, and the indelible character of  priesthood sancti- 
fied their liberty.  There is some justification for the protest 
against  regarding  church  and  state  as  two  independent 
and  rival  communities,  and  for  the  contention  that  the 
"  respublica  christiana " was a  single  community governed 
by two sets of  officers, the spiritual and the temporal magis- 
Cf. Memoranda de Purl., pp. 34, 82, I I I  12. 
Rot. Purl., ii. 151-3. 
See  my  Reign of  Henry VII,  ii. 39-43.  The voting of  clerical taxes 
in  convocation  instead  of  in  parliament  dates  back  at least  to  1339, 
when  the Archbishop  of  York  was  adjured  in parliament  to  urge  his 
clergy to make liberal grants in their forthcoming convocation at York 
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trates.l  But  we  cannot  explain  the  issue  of  their  strife 
by leaving out of account the army they strove to command. 
Constitutionally the ecclesia  was  a  body  of  ecclesiastics, a 
corps of  officers without any private sojdiers.  The privates 
at least were entitled to no benefit of  clergy;  they took no 
part in electing clerical proctors,  and were not represented 
in the councils of the church.  Clerical representatives repre- 
sented no  one  but the  clergy, and the house  of  commons 
would  have  resembled  convocation  if  it had been  elected 
by temporal magistrates.  The circumstance that the bulk 
of  the English people was represented  in parliament, but not 
in convocation, has been the decisive factor in the constitu- 
tional  conflict  between  the regfzum and sacerdotium.  The 
contest had not been unequal so long as parliaments consisted 
solely  of  councillors;  but Edward  I  began  to  enlist  the 
services of  the English people in parliament, and thus decided 
beforehand the issue which was brought to a head by Henry 
VIII. 
There were  causes enough for the aloofness and aversion 
from parliaments shown by the church in the middle ages. 
Some were common to it and to other orders, and we  have 
seen how  the numbers of  attendant barons  and burgesses 
dwindled  during  the  foulteenth  and  fifteenth  centuries. 
The service was  irksome,  and the  clergy disclaimed  their 
liability.  With  them it was  not  a  question  of  dwindling 
by  special  grace,  but  of  total  exemption  by  right.  The 
bishops, of  course, and the abbots, who held baronies of  the 
crown, were summoned, or  were  liable to be summoned, as 
barons;  and their only escape was to disown their baronial 
tenure.  But the crown had a feeble  claim to the suit and 
service of  clerical proctors in the high  court of  parliament : 
they  were  not  individually  tenants-in-chief,  and they  did 
1 Figgis, "  Respublica Christians "  in  Tram. Royal Hist. Soc.. 3rd Ser., 
v. 63-88.  Curiously enough Dr. Figgis' view is that of  Marsiglio of  Padua, 
who insists on the sovereignty of  the univevsilas fidelitcm,  as represented by 
the Prince.  But Marsiglio was a prophet of  the Reformation rather than an 
exponent of  the medieval church.  There are  worse theories of  the origin of 
the Reformation  than that which  ascribes it to the growth of  Dr. Figgis' 
idea of  the medieval church 
not,  like the knights  of  the shire and burgesses, represent 
collective tenants-in-chief.  The clergy of  a diocese were not 
a co~nmunitas  which farmed its own shire, or belonged, like 
a borough, to the royal demesne.  Edward I,  as a matter of 
fact, had never summoned the clergy by writ to parliament ; 
he summoned the bishops qu8 barons, but merely admonished 
them to bring their  clergy with them.  The writs that the 
priors, archdeacons, and proctors obeyed were not royal, but 
episcopal, and the clergy were really  attending upon  their 
bishops and not upon the king.  1, 
For a brief  period down to 1332,  and possibly later, t$& 
attendance  was  twofold,  upon  the  bishops  in  parliaaw 
and upon the bishops in convocation.  But insistence uph 
this  double  duty was  quietly  resisted  by  the  clergy  and 
tacitly  abandoned  by  the  crown;  nothing  less  than  a 
royal writ could secure lasting attendance in parliament, and 
even that failed  to constrain most  of  the abbots to come. 
When,  after  the opening  of  each  parliament,  the  various 
estates  were  told  to  withdraw  and  consider  apart  the 
business of  the session, the clergy had not, like the knights 
and  the  burgesses,  to  devise  a  new  domus  communis; 
they already possessed in convocation  a  domestic organiza- 
tion,  to which  they naturally had recourse, and there they 
debated  their  grants and other responses  to the demands 
of  the crown.  So far they were acting like  other estates : 
the  precise  difference  in  procedure  was  that,  instead  of 
returning  and  announcing  their  decisions  in  parliament 
through the mouth of  the Speaker, they communicated them 
through  the  prolocutor  of  convocation  or  through  the 
prelates.  As late as 1332  clerical proctors put in an appear- 
ance in parliament ;  but they deliberated apart, and in time 
their appearance  in  parliament  ceased  altogether.  It  was 
considered  sufficicrit  that convocation  should  meet  simul- 
taneously,  and  transact  apart  the  business  which  would 
otherwise have  reqnircd  attendance in parliament.  Occa- 
sionally  the  view  was  expressed  that the assent  of  the 
clergy  in parliament  was  essential  to  the validity  of  its 
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royal  household, was  appointed a  clerical  proctor for this 
purpose.  l  But this was a unique occasion, which prefigured 
Thomas Cromwell's vice-gerency ;  and the unanimous protest 
of  the prelates in parliament  was considered no bar to the 
statutes of  provisors and przmunire. 
This clerical retreat to their convocations, however costly 
it  may in the end have  proved  to  the national  influence 
of  the church, evaded some difficulties and coincided with 
ecclesiastical  traditions.  There  were  two  convocations, 
not one, and when  the clerical proctors ceased attendance 
in parliament, those for the northern  province escaped the 
toilsome  journey  to  London.  Their convocation  met  at 
York, and its gathering there gratified the provincial feeling 
which tended to separate England north from England south 
of  the Humber.  It also avoided the scandalous  scenes, oi 
which  there was always a  risk, when  the two archbishops 
met in the same assembly.  Each prelate was jealous of  his 
primacy, and neither would suffer the other to bear his cross 
before him.  The archbishop  of  Canterbury  had no  juris- 
diction over the clergy of  York, and York had none over those 
of  Canterbury.  They  were  entirely  independent  one  of 
the other;  the only links between them were their common 
subordination to the papacy and to the crown.  The latter 
kept  them  in  order  in  the king's  council and parliament, 
but the only presence that could secure unity in an ecclesi- 
astical  assembly in medieval England was that of  a  papal 
legate a  late~e.~  Peace could be kept in a parliament where 
the archbishops  sat  as tenants-in-chief  of  the  crown;  it 
1 Rot.  Purl., iii.  348,  356;  Cotton,  Records,  p.  368.  Percy's  was  a 
singular appearance,  as he was  said  to have full power  and  authority 
committed  to him  by  the prelates and clergy of  the realm, not of  one 
province  alone, and was a layman to boot.  In this capacity he joined 
in  the condemnation  of  Archbishop  Arundel,  and took  the oath "  pur 
et en  nom  del  dit clergie " to observe all the resolutions  adopted by 
Richard 11's  Shreysbury parljament. 
2 The so-called  national  councils of  the English  church  only  met 
when the presence of  a special papal legate gave them "  national " unity 
by  imposing  a  superior  papal  authority  on  the  two  provincial  arch- 
bishops.  The  links  betmeen  Canterbury  and  York  were  never  both 
national and ecclesiastical : when  they were national they were secular, 
and when they were ecclesiastical they were papal. 
could  not be  guaranteed where  clerical proctors  sat under 
rival  archbishops.  Either,  however,  could  reign  supreme 
in his own provincial synod. 
Of  greater consequence was the fact that this provincial 
organization  fell  into  line  with  the  whole  governmental 
tradition  of  the  church.  The  papacy  inherited  from  the 
empire its provincial  system, and Constantine perpetuated 
the work of  Diocletian.  Nationalism  was the antithesis of 
the Roman church and of  the Roman empire, and no nation 
was  made  a  province  in  either  sphere;  each  was  divided 
into two or more provinces, and the papacy never borrowed 
from the empire with greater success than when it adopted 
the imperial maxim divide et  impera.  Had not the English 
state, through' the instrumentality of  the  crown in parlia- 
ment,  developed  a  stronger  sense of  nationality than the 
church,  there  could  have  been  no  national  reformation 
and therefore  no  national  church.  The "  establishment " 
of  the Engiish  church consists in the secular framework of 
unity which the national state imposed upon two provinces of 
the Roman church ; it could only be achieved by a complete 
repudiation of  the Roman imperial and papal tradition. 
Every  manifestation  of  nationalism  opened,  in  fact,  a 
fresh  breach  with  the  catholic  church.  The  growth  of 
English language and literature led to demands for the use 
of  the vernacular in the services of  the church, while church- 
men  clung  to  their  catholic  Latin  as  an  expression  of 
unchanging unity in the church and a symbol of  their segre- 
gation from the people.  The cry for the bible  in  English, 
satisfied at first by translations from the Vulgate, produced 
at length  translations from  the originals, and undermined 
the  authority  of  the catholic  standard.  The  growth  of 
national  legislation  in  parliament,  accompanied  by  the 
inroads of positive man-made law upon the old cosmopolitan 
laws of  reason and of  nature, produced  English law out of 
the  international  legal  systems  of  medieval  Europe;  and 
the more  English  our secular law became in the hands of 
English  parliaments, the more  certain and incessant would 
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if  it changed at all, grew ever stranger to England.  Church 
and state in England could agree fairly well so long as neither 
was national ; they could not agree when one became more 
and more  English  and the  other  more  and more  Roman, 
nor even while one was becoming national at a much greater 
pace  than the other.  An  insular commons and a catholic 
clergy could not be combined in an English parliament. 
We must not, however, imagine that the barons, or even 
kings, were much  more  national  than the  clergy;  and to 
regard  their  interested  protests  against  papal  interference 
as evidence of  national resentment, is hardly more rational 
than to regard the same protests  as proof  of  the independ- 
ence of  the church of  England.  There was too much parti- 
cularism in England in the fourteenth century to permit of 
a  really  national  movement  against  the papacy,  and  the 
petition of  the barons in 1307  and the statutes of  provisors 
and  praemunire  were  instinct  with  medieval  notions  of 
liberty.  They were  designed to protect the peculiar rights 
and  property  of  the  king  and his  barons  against  ecclesi- 
astical encroachment, and the animus is as much against the 
clerical  courts  in  England  as against  the curia at Rome. 
The barons in 1307 contend that seinte dglise . . . soit f~ndd 
fiar  le roi el par  ses ancestres et  par  les ditz co~ztes,  barons, et 
leurs ancestres, and that, inasmuch as they had founded the 
church,  they were entitled  to its advowsons untrammelled 
by  the claims of  the ecclesiastical courts to all the goods 
of  intestates and to all lands not specifically mentioned  in 
testators' wills.  They complain of  the efforts of  the pope and 
his clerks to secure cognizance of  all debts, and to draw into 
the church  courts all  suits relating to the temporalties  as 
well as to the spiritualties of  churchmen ;  and they conclude 
with  a  rhetorical  anticipation  of  ruin "  unless  God  arises 
and  His  enemies  are  scattered " by  the  temporal  prince 
and his council, with the assent of  the nobles and magnates1 
1 Rot.  Pavl., i. 219;  cf.  ibid., ii. 144-5.  The  description  of  the act 
of  1351 as "  the first statute of  provisors " (Stubbs, ii. 430) is somewhat 
misleading.  The statute of  Carlisle in  1307 had  sought  to protect  the 
advowsons of  lay patrons, and in 1343 parliament endeavoured  to secure 
its  better execution, but no answer to its  petition is recorded on the "  Iioll." 
The statute of  1351, while  reciting  the statute of  Carlisle, goes  on  to 
protect the English  ecclesiastical patrons. 
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rhis sounds like a first blast from the trumpet of  Henry 
VIII, but the note is very baronial ;  the church is "  founded " 
on property, and the liberty proclaimed is the right of secular 
property  to determine  spiritual preferment.  The  same  is 
the purport of the statutes of  provisors.  No one is thinking 
of the national liberties of the English church ; the freedom 
of election promised in Magna Carta has already disappeared, 
and the issue is between papal and royal or baronial nomina- 
tion.  It is royal and baronial rights of  presentation that are 
to be protected against the Vicar of  Christ and his appoint- 
ments;  and so far as national  sentiment was  involved,  it 
was only concerned with the probability that English barons 
would  prefer more English  clerks than would  a  French  or 
Italian pope.  Already Englishmen's catholicism was breaking 
down before their prejudice against alien  bishops;  but  the 
baronial objection to papal  provision was the same, whether 
it was  exercised on behalf of  an English or a foreign clerk. 
The animus of the statute of pramunire was somewhat less 
sectional, but  more  comprehensively  anti-ecclesiastical;  it 
was  aimed  against  all  infringements  of  royal  jurisdiction, 
whether by  the papal  curia or by  any subordinate ecclesi- 
astical court in England.  No  distinction was made between 
them, and English prelates supported the papacy with their 
protests in parliament. 
Nothing, indeed, could be a greater travesty of  the truth 
than  the  representation  of  these  statutes  as  protests  of 
English churchmen against the pretensions of  Rome.  After 
the days of  Grosseteste there were few clerical protests against 
the papacy.  Ecclesiastical chroniclers continued to grumble 
for  a  time  at papal  taxation;  but  they  were  soon  more 
concerned with  the encroachments  of  parliament  on their 
immunities, and began to feel that the liberty of  the church 
depended  on  papal  protection.  The pope was the supreme 
governor  of  the  church,l  and  English  churchmen  made 
common cause with him against all forms of  temporal juris- 
diction.  The  endless  petitions  in parliament  against  the 
papacy are all petitions of  the commons, against which the 
prelates  protest,  sometimes  with  and sometimes  without 
1 Rot. Parl., ii. 172. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
success.  The only point upon which the prelates concurred 
with the commons in disputing papal claims was in resistance 
to the payment of  Peter's pence.l  It was the laity, not the 
church, which  attacked papal provisions, reservations, and 
even  firstfruits.2  There  were  many  clerical  petitions  pre- 
sented by the prelates in parliament, but not one was anti- 
papal.  Their  purport  is  very  different :  they  complain 
bitterly that the king's  courts imprison  clerks against  the 
law and liberties of  the church, that lay ministers enter upon 
ecclesiastical fiefs in retaliation for the fines and dues levied 
by the clergy, that aids are exacted from churchmen who 
are exempt  from  parliamentary  service and had  not  con- 
sented  to their  imposition, that  people  are  forbidden  to 
pay their  tithes to God  and holy  church until the king  is 
satisfied of his taxes.  They contend that the king's judges 
have no  jurisdiction  over clerks, nor even over the laity in 
such matters as bigamy, matrimony, bastardy, and licences 
for mortmain;  and they  demand that prohibitions issuing 
out of the royal courts of  justice, royal commissions of  inquiry 
into  the working  of  ecclesiastical courts,  and  summonses 
to the clergy to answer in chancery suits about tithes should 
cease, and that churchmen should be exempt from all tolls, 
purveyance, and so forth.3  These were the coveted liberties 
of  the English church; they  constituted freedom from the 
English state, not independence of  the papacy. 
That freedom from Rome is fictitious.  The crown might, 
and did, indeed, by means of  its temporal jurisdiction protect 
to some  extent  English  churchmen  from  the  pope;  the 
ecclesiastical courts provided no protection whatever.  The 
1 Rot. Parl., ii. 290; ~f.  ii. 336-9.  The assent to these anti-papal statutes 
is  always limited  to  les contes,  barons,  et autres sages  lais gentz  du 
conseil"  (ibid., ii. I~I),  and often  the dissent of  the prelates is  recorded 
(ibid., ii.'~8~-5,  iii. 264, 340-1). 
2  The Commons'  pet~tion  in  1373 and  1377  against  the payment  of 
firstfruits  (Rot. Parl.  ii.  320,  iii.  18) is  an interesting  anticipation of 
sixteenth-century legislation, and still more so are the proposals made in 
parliament in 1387 and 1413 that they should be paid to the king and not 
to the pope (ibid.. iii. ZI~),  and that, owing  to the papal schism, bishops 
elect should  be confirmed by  the metropolitan  acting upon  king's writs 
without further excuse or delay  (ibid., iv.  71). 
8  Rot. Parl., i. 392, ii.  129,  151-3,  357-9,  iii. 25-7. 
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famous statutes of  przmunire set  no  limit  to the pope's 
control  over  English  ecclesiastical courts; their object was 
to defend the king's temporal jurisdiction from papal aggres- 
sion  working through  the courts of  the church.  In  1348 
a claimant to a living pursued his appeal to Rome;  on his 
return to England he was sued and imprisoned, not because 
he was appealing from an English ecclesiastical court to the 
papal  curia, but because he was bringing before the pope a 
suit belonging to royal cognizance ;  and his defence was that 
the living was held in spiritua1ty.l  To appeals from English 
spiritual  jurisdiction  to  the pope  the  English  crown  had 
not the least objection in the middle ages ; such appeals were 
often facilitated by the crown, which discountenanced their 
reception in ~arliament.~  It was its own temporal jurisdic- 
tion that the crown was concerned to protect ;  and it insisted 
upon that protection against both the lower courts christian 
in England and the highest court christian at Rome. 
The strife was  ever between  English  secular courts and 
catholic spiritual courts, and the evidence all points to the 
natural conclusion that English churchmen took their stand 
by  the catholic church.  Any other attitude has only been 
made to appear plausible by reading back into the middle 
ages the conditions of  later times, when the hold of  national- 
ism over Englishmen's minds had immensely strengthened, 
and the hold of  catholicism had correspondingly weakened ; 
and the unhistorical creation of  a national  church in the 
middle ages is the offspring of  a desire to give the authority 
oi antiquity to a conception which seeks to make the best of 
both ages, and to combine in the Anglican church of  to-day 
the medieval advantage of  freedom from the state with the 
modern advantage of  freedom from Rome.  That twofold 
liberty  is  by  no  means  an  impossible  or  an  unworthy 
ideal, and  the historian's  only objection is to the claim of 
such an  achievement  to  be  a  conservative or  reactionary 
reproduction  of  medieval  conditions.  Similar  arguments 
Rot. Parl., ii. 178b. 
E.g, Ibid , i. 3, 40b, 41-2,  375b, ii. 151-3,  161  ; Maitland, dic~~iota~zda, 
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from  an imaginary past have been used to advance the causes 
of  liberty,  socialism, and nationalism,  and most  reformers 
have decked out their principles of  progress with prehistoric 
plumage. 
To the medieval  churchman his  duty in  the conflict  of 
laws was clear.  By all that he held most sacred he was bound 
to cleave  to the pope;  every churchman took the oath of 
canonical obedience, while an oath of  allegiance to the king 
was only taken by tenants-in-chief and officials.  Those who 
took both, such as bishops, took first their oath to the pope, 
and were required to give it precedence.  If  they committed 
treason, it was for the pope, and not for the king or for the 
peers in parliament  to condemn them.  The king,  indeed, 
maintained the contrary ; but when Henry IV enforced this 
view  at the  expense  of  archbishop  Scrope, his  deed  was 
regarded with horror and held to be the cause of  the king's 
subsequent troubles.  Churchmen stood by the laws and the 
liberties of  their church; and the louder grew the claims of 
nationalism, the closer they clung to their privileges and to 
the protection of  the pope.  Some prelates, at least, preferred 
papal provision to the chances of  election ;  and the statute 
of  provisors, it was  contended  in 1415,  stopped the prefer- 
ment  of university students, starved the church of  learned 
clergy, and thus promoted the growth of  heresy and schism. 
The commons also on one occasion petitioned the crown for 
a remedy against the evil effects of  that royal and baronial 
legislation ;  2  but it was to papal protection that churchmen 
looked more  and more for the safeguard of  their faith and 
for the security of  their liberties against the encroachments 
of  parliament  and of  the royal  courts. 
In the face of  these disruptive forces the wonder is not 
that parliament  and the church  should  have fallen  apart, 
but that churchner, should have retained so long the position 
they  did.  Charch  and  state, however,  had  this  much  in 
common:  both, in the higher ranks at least, had been per- 
meated with feudal influence ; and while the clerical proctors 
1 Rot. Parl., ii. 154. 
Ibid., iv. 81;  cf.  Nicolas,  proceeding.^  of  the  Privy  Council,  i.  282, 
ii. 113. 
disappeared  from the  houses  of  parliament,  bishops  and 
abbots remained.  The  crown might excuse the attendance 
of  others, or allow them to be represented;  but it success- 
fully insisted upon the liability of  its greater tenants-in-chief 
to a summons,  and imposed fines ranging from  forty to a 
hundred pounds on those who failed to obey.  The force of 
passive resistance prevailed to some extent even among the 
greater tenants-in-chief;  by  Edward  111's  reign l  twenty- 
eight abbots had already secured definite exemption from the 
customary summons, and while the number of  barons sank 
from a  hundred to less than fifty, the  number  of  abbots 
declined  from  seventy-two  under  Edward  I  to a  regular 
twenty-seven under Edward 111's successors.  Of  the twenty- 
seven who were summoned few attended, and in 1513  it was 
declared by the judges  that the presence of  abbots was not 
essential to ~arliament.~  When the philosophical historian 
comes to describe the decline and fall of  the house of  lords 
in modern  times, he will  probably attach no  little import- 
ance to the habitual absence of most of the peers from their 
parliamentary duties ; and similarly it may be pointed  out 
that, had not some forty-five abbots evaded their summons 
to parliament, it would  not  have  been  possible for Henry 
VIII to obtain a majority for the dissolution of  the monas- 
teries.  The church had done its best to abandon parliament 
before parliament surrendered it to the king. 
In both cases the abandonment was merely the outward 
sign of  a growing distaste and lack of  sympathy.  Churchmen 
would have continued to throng the high court of  parliament 
had they continued to feel at home in its portals.  But their 
heart was elsewhere ; and while an encroaching nationalism 
increased the alienation,  it weakened  the feudalism which 
bound bishops and abbots and barons to the crown and to 
one  another.  Hildebrand  and  Henry  VIII  dreaded  the 
corruption of  the church by feudalism;  but feudalism had 
at least saved the church from an isolation in which it could 
only  stand  secure  so long  as it retained  its incorruption. 
The bond between the church and parliament was weakened, 
Pike, Const. Hist. of  the House of  Lords, p.  349; cf Rot. Parl.,  ii. 119. 
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not  because  abbots  and  proctors  feared  corruption,  but 
because they evaded their duties and feared the loss of  their 
liberties.  Taxation of  themselves by themselves, self-made 
legislation, and independence  of  everything save of  Rome, 
were their cherished desires;  they chose isolation, and they 
fell from lack of  support. 
There was nothing strange in this isolation.  The association 
of  individuals in classes and the dissociation of  class from 
class were characteristic of  the middle ages ;  and in preferring 
to  concentrate  in  convocation, instead  of  dividing  their 
attention  between  it  and  parliament,  the  clergy  were 
adopting  the  same  policy  as  the  commons  themselves. 
Indeed the consolidation of  estates in the house of  commons 
imposed upon  churchmen  the alternative of  absorption  or 
separation.  The definite parting of  the ways is commonly 
placed  in  the  reign  of  Edward  11;  but  clerical  proctors 
attended at least at the opening of  the parliament of  March 
1332, when the prelates, remarking that some of  the business 
propounded  by Geoffrey le  Scope on  behalf  of  the crown 
was not within the competence of  the clergy, suggested that 
they  and  the  clerical  proctors  should  separate  from  the 
laity for the discussion of  their own affairs;  the clergy, too, 
were dismissed with the knights, citizens, and burgesses after 
the six days' session, while the prelates, earls, barons, and 
councillors were ordered to remain?  Similar  arrangements 
were  made in the following December;  but it had already 
become  the  practice  to hold  convocations  simultaneously 
with  a  parliament, and  thither  the clergy resorted when 
they retired from the parliament  chamber to discuss their 
pariiamentary business.  The clerical  committee  or  estate 
cf  parliament was absorbed in the lower house of  convoca- 
tion, and it became  impossible to distinguish  between  the 
flersonnel  or the action of  the clerical proctors summoned to 
parliament  and of  those summoned to a provincial synod.2 
1  Rot. Parl., ii. 64b, 65b, 67. 
Makower,  Const. Hist.  of  the  Chuvch, p.  355.  Nor is there a  clear 
distinction in medieval  terminology,  though  now  it is  usual  to  reserve 
the  word  " convocation " for  the  provincial  assembles  of  Canterbury 
&d  York summoned by royal writs;  with the firanzunientes  clause, as a 
In 1339  it is clearly in convocation that the clerical proctors 
voted  their  grants  to the  cr0wn.l  The  dissociation  from 
parliament  involved  also a  dissociation  of  the proctors  of 
York from those of Canterbury; for if the two convocations 
ever sat together  (except when a papal legate a Zatere  held 
a "  national " council) the practice was soon discontinued, 
and at the close of the middle ages the convocation of  York 
did not commonly meet at the same date as that of  Canter- 
bury  or  as parliament.  Indeed,  it was  clearly  impossible 
for the archbishop of  Yo~k  and his suffragans to be simul- 
taneously in their  places in parliament  at Westminster and 
in convocation at York. 
Abstention  from  attendance in parliaments  on  the  part 
of  the lower clergy did not, however,  mean  an absence of 
clerical  petitions;  and  at first  the  clergy  seemed  to lose 
nothing by  their retirement.  In I340  their petitions were 
read  after  those of  the commons by the king's  order, and 
statutes were  made to give them effect with  the assent  of 
all  the  estates2  A  hardly  less  pleasing  harmony  was 
exhibited  as late  as  1376,  when  the  commons  of  York 
presented a petition against the excessive fees extorted by the 
archbishop from his ~lergy.~  But by that time harmony was 
exceptional, and a rift had developed between the commons 
and clergy.  The petitions of  the clergy continued, throughout 
the fourteenth century, to be presented and read in parlia- 
ments, and the practice was  for the judges to be required 
to assemble in the presence of  some of the prelates and pro- 
vide  a  remedy.4  To  this  habit  the  commons  offered  an 
increasing resistance, and in 1377  they asked that no ordin- 
ance  should be  made  in parliament  without  their  leave 
on  a  clerical  petition,  and that  the  commons  should  not 
be bound  by constitutions adopted in convocation;  "  for," 
they declared, "  they do not wish to be bound by any statute 
part of  the parliamentary system, and to describe  the other provincial 
an?'dlocesan assembhes, summoned merely by the archbishops and bishops, 
as  synods."  Synods m~ght  be  summoned  at any time, convocations 
Only with parliament. 
Rot. Parl., ii. 106.  Ibad., ii. 113, 244. 
Ibui.,  ii. 352.  Ibzd., ii. 358. 
H 2  10  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
or ordinance without their assent."  In 1382 they secured 
the repeal of  a statute against heretic preachers, on the ground 
that it had been  enacted  without  their  consent, and they 
declared their determination not to bind themselves or their 
successors more to the prelates than their ancestors had been 
in times past.2 
This rising temper  proved  fatal to clerical legislation  in 
parliament.  Petitions from  individual prelates, clerl~s,  and 
clerical corporations continued to be occasionally presented 
in  the  Lancastrian  period;  but  the  collective  petitions 
of  the clergy disappear from the proceedings in parliament, 
and the church had to content itself with its limited  powers 
of  legislation  in  diocesan  and  provincial  synods.  This 
retreat  was  not  without  its  compensations.  The  sphere 
of  legislation was, indeed, limited to the affairs of  the church, 
but those affairs extended far beyond  the persons and the 
property  of  the clergy  to the  marriages,  wills,  faith  and 
ecclesiastical  dues  and duties  of  the laity;  and no  royal 
or  other  lay  assent  was  needed.  This  autonomy was, of 
course, restricted by papal jurisdiction,  but whatever feeling 
had existed in the days of  Langton and of  Grosseteste against 
the Roman  curia had weakened  before  the nearer  enmity 
of  the commons assembled in parliament.  In 1359 the pre- 
lates, alike of  Canterbury and of  York, solemnly protested 
in parliament  on behalf  of  themselves and all their  clergy 
that they repudiated then, as they had  always repudiated 
in the past, every statute tending to restrict  the power  of 
the pope  or  the liberty of  the church, and required  their 
protest to be enrolled as a permanent witness to their deed." 
For them the liberty of  the church had come to depend upon 
the jurisdiction  of  Rome.  Such was  the inevitable  result 
of  growing alooiness from a parliament which was becoming 
more  and more  the focus of  national unity and the organ 
of  national  independence. 
This  general  alienation  made  the  exception  to  it,  the 
retention of  the bishops in parliament, a matter of  enormous 
1 Rot. Parl., ii. 368.  a  Zbid., iii.  141  ; Stubbs, ii.  628. 
Zbid.,  iii. 264. 
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consequence.  They  formed  the link  between  church and 
state, being  themselves both barons and bishops;  and they 
were the pivot upon which the whole government of  medieval 
England  turned.  In the twelfth and thirteenth  centuries 
we  have,  indeed,  prelates  of  the  uncompromising  stamp 
of  Becket  and Winchelsey, who were  churchmen  first  and 
last, and viewed  the state with the eyes of  an Innocent 111 
or a  Boniface VIII.  But from the fourteenth century we 
get, as a rule, prelates of the type of  Wykeham and Morton, 
less single-minded as churchmen, but more patriotic as states- 
men.  Rightly  they held  it their function, not to press  to 
extremes the claim of  their order, but to mediate between 
the opposing forces.  They tempered clerical zeal in convo- 
cation and secular anger in parliament.  Theirs was not a 
popular  attitude;  but perhaps  it was well for both church 
and state  that bishops owed their appointment, not to election, 
but to bargaining between the king and the pope, and that to 
the holiness of  their orders they usually added the qualifica- 
tion of  long years in the service of the king.  Assuredly it was 
this connexion, their regular obedience to writs of  summons 
to parliaments, which  helped  to delay the final conflict of 
church and state, and moderated its fury when it broke out. 
Had  there been  less  compromise  before  the  reformation, 
there would also have been less after it, and bishops would 
have gone the way they went in really protestant countries. 
They  could  not,  however,  indefinitely  stop the  secular 
inroad  by  parleying  at the gate,  charmed  they  never  so 
wisely ; and the last of  the ecclesiastical statesmen hastened 
the  final  assault  by  overdoing  the  part.  Ecclesiastical 
liberties and jurisdiction  might be tolerable so long as they 
were  scattered  in  various  hands;  but when  concentrated 
in  Wolsey's  to  an unprecedented  extent,  they  evoked an 
unprecedented  resentment.  His  extraordinary  legatine 
powers  made  him  supreme  over  both  the  provinces, and 
constituted  a  national  papacy; l  and  the  union  of  this 
' The authority of  a legatus a laters overrode that of  a legatus natus just 
as a  special  envoy  supersedes  ad  hoc  a  resident  ambassador.  The  two 
archbishops  were  always  legati  nati, but Wolsey  secured  a  permanent 
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authority  with  his  control  of  the  state was  a  precedent 
for the combination under Henry VIII.  If  there was to be 
national  autonomy  in  church  as  well  as in  state,  and  if 
the two  corps  of  ecclesiastical and secular  officers were  to 
be united under  a single command, the crown was a more 
natural head than a cardinal;  for nationalism was inherent 
in the state, but exotic  in the church, and a legate of  the 
pope could only play at independence of  the papacy. 
Wolsey himself clearly foresaw and foretold that with him 
would fall the liberties of  the church.  Like other medieval 
liberties,  they passed  by  the  grace  of  parliament  into  the 
hands of the crown.  It  was a comprehensive but incomplete 
process  of  nationalization,  in which  the  act of  supremacy 
and the act for the submission  of  the clergy were  merely 
details.  These were but trifles compared with the revolution 
which made it possible to call the laity churchmen, and then 
to  term  them  "  religious "  l-a  revolution brought  to  its 
consummation  when  men  began  to  expect  the  appeals 
which move their souls to fall, not from the lips of  official 
clergy, but from those of  the poet, the playwright, the philo- 
sopher, and even the politician.  Fundamentally the move- 
ment was one to equalize churchmen and laymen by reducing 
the  liberties  of  the  church;  and  extremists  wouId  have 
whittled  away to nothing  the difference between  the two, 
pronouncing every man a priest and abolishing the "  Aaronic " 
vestments, benefit  of  clergy, and ecclesiastical jurisdiction. 
The clerical estate was to be merged in the national  state, 
and its affiliations with the international papacy to disappear. 
In its political  and constitutional  aspects the reformation 
was  no  more  than a  stage in the progress of  nationalism, 
and medieval  petitions  in parliament  provided  precedents 
for most of  Henry's acts.  The payment of  annates and the 
to  the convocations  of  the two provinces  the appearance of  a national 
council of  the Church.  Overriding Archbishop Warham's summons of  the 
Canterbury convocation to St. Paul's, he summoned  both it  and the York 
convocation to meet before him at  Westminster in June 1523 (Letters and 
Papers, iff.  Nos. 3024, 3239). 
1 The  religious " in the middle ages were the members of  the religiou; 
orders ; no parish priest could be religious, and the change of  "  religion 
in Henry VZII's rejgn was primarily the dissolution of  the monasteries. 
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pursuit of  appeals to Rome had been attacked in  the four- 
teenth century, as well as the papal appointment of  prelates ; 
and even an archbishop had asserted the right of  the crown 
to prevent the translations and defy the escommunications 
of  the  p0pe.l  Nationalism  was,  in  short,  invading  the 
church  on  its march  to its modern  omnipotence;  and in 
the Iatest of days we  have seen international bonds, whether 
in the form of socialism or finance, pacifism or catholicism, 
shrivel like wisps of straw in the consuming fire of  national 
c ass ion and prejudice. 
The Ioss  of  the church's  liberties  increased  those  of  the 
crown and threatened those of  the people.  It  is not, indeed, 
that the r61e, ascribed by Lord Acton to the catholic church, 
of protecting theliberties of  the individual against the tyranny 
of  the state has been  filled with much  success.  Countries 
in which the catholic church retained  its  liberties  between 
the Reformation  and the  Revolution  were not conspicuous 
for the freedom enjoyed by the individual or by the nation ; 
and liberty  was  not  more  at home  in  France,  Italy, and 
Spain  during  the  seventeenth  and  eighteenth  centuries 
than  it  was  in  England,  Holland,  and  America.  For  it 
was  not  with  other  people's  liberties,  or  with  liberty  in  ' 
general  that the  church was concerned, but with  its own; 
it interfered, not  to save  victims  from  the  state, but  to 
claim them for itself, not to enforce freedom, but to establish 
jurisdiction.  Its ideal was  medieval independence, and not 
modern liberty.  Nevertheless, the concentration of  medieval 
liberties in  the  crown,  which  created  modern  sovereignty, 
was a menace to liberty from which England, Holland, and 
America were saved, not by the  reformation, but by revolt 
against their monarchs.  The great rebellion of  1642 sprang 
in a sense from the Tudor acts of supremacy. 
For thobe acts of  1534  and 1559 united two incompatible 
forms of  sovereignty-the  absolute jurisdiction  of  the pope, 
instinct with  Roman tradition, and the limited jurisdiction 
of the king, with its Teutonic and feudal restrictions.  Care 
had,  indeed,  been  taken  in  drafting the acts  to meet  the 
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consequent  danger;  and the  crown,  as  supreme  head  or 
governor  of  the  church,  was  only  authorized  to exercise 
such  jurisdiction  as properly  belonged  to the ecclesiastical 
courts;  otherwise, said  the  lord  chancellor,  Audley,  in a 
significant conversation with Bishop Gardiner, "  you prelates 
would enter in and order the laity as you  listed."  Coke 
fought a long battle in  defence of  Audley's  interpretation; 
but only the great  rebellion brought  success to his  cause. 
For the acts of  supremacy had made the crown the keeper 
of  its own  conscience, the judge  of  its own  liberties,  the 
controller of  its own powers.  In the middle ages the courts 
christian had  been  restrained  by those  of  the crown, and 
those of  the crown by  those  of  the church.  But was the 
crown  to restrain  itself?  were  prohibitions  of  the  Icing's 
bench  to impede  the  high  commission  ?  was  praemunire 
to  limit  the  royal  supremacy?  The  crown  could  be 
trusted in the middle ages to see that the  courts christian 
did not overstep the mark;  but would it be equally jealous 
of  their  liberties  when  they  exerted  a  royal  jurisdiction 
and  proclaimed  the  divine  right  of  kings?  The  court of 
high  commission answered  the question, and Charles I and 
Archbishop Laud paid with their heads the penalty. 
The civil war  of  the seventeenth  century was  thus pre- 
pared by the least  constitutional measures of  Henry VIII, 
for  the  act  of  supremacy  was  really  a  revolution.  That 
there  was  something  fundamentally  unconstitutional  in 
Henry's  government  has  been  widely  felt,  but  wrongly 
expressed in the constitutional terms of  a later age.  Parlia- 
ment became so closely identified with the constitution that 
nothing done by parliament was regarded as unconstitutional, 
and  every  unconstitutional  course  was  interpreted  as  an 
infringement of  parliamentary  liberties.  So  men  were  led 
to express their conviction of  Henry's tyranny by attempt- 
1 Gardiner to Somerset, October  14, 1547, Foxe. Acts  and  Monuments, 
"'.,  4? 
How,"  asked  James  I, "  can  a  king  grant  a  prramunire  against 
himself ? " (Political Works, ed. McIlwain, 1918,  p. 334).  Bishop Gardiner, 
in the letter quoted above, expressed a similar disbelief in the possibility 
of  restraining by pvmmunive  a minister of  the king. 
ing to prove his designs upon  parliamentary independence. 
~ut  the least constitutional  acts of  Henry's reign were acts 
of parliament, and he strained the constitution by expanding, 
and  not  by restricting, the sphere of  its activity.  He did 
not  minimize,  but  magnified  parliament.  Under  his  rule 
its privileges were consolidated, its personnel was improved, 
its  constituency  enlarged,  its  political  weight  enhanced 
in  foreign  eyes,  its authority  increased,  its sessions made 
more  frequent  and prolonged.  He did  not  invade  parlia- 
mentary liberties;  he  led  a parliamentary  invasion of  the 
liberties of  the church and of  feudal franchise. 
Under  his  impulse  parliament  was  called  upon  to deal 
with  clerical  privileges,  papal  jurisdiction,  and even  with 
matters  of  faith;  and  the  chief  constitutional  demands 
of the Pilgrimage of Grace were that the church of  England 
might enjoy the liberties granted by Magna Carta and "  used 
until  six  or  seven  years  past,"  and that spiritual matters 
should be dealt with by convocation.  These were liberties 
denied  by  parliament,  and  not  to parliament;  and  this 
parliamentary  invasion  was  unconstitutional  in  the  sense 
that it was  based  on a  novel theory of  an omnicompetent 
I  I  crown  in  parliament,"  and on  a  repudiation  of  a  juris- 
diction, the independence  of  which had been acknowledged 
and enjoyed for centuries.  The English clergy, indeed, made 
their submission in both their provincial convocations; but 
the abandonment of  the catholic position by two provinces 
was  not,  and  could  hardly  be,  regarded  as constitutional 
by the rest of  the catholic church.  The revolution only be- 
came constitutional through the process by which triumphant 
treason  ceases to be  treason, that is,  by  success, and  by 
the recognition  of  the supremacy  of  the crown  in  parlia- 
ment over all competing jurisdictions.  The constitutional 
aspect of  the Ang1:can  Reformation  can  only be  summed 
up  in  the  dubious  maxim  quod  fieri non  debuit,  factuna 
valet;  and nations have ever since paid  toll for a national 
sovereignty which  is based  on the sixteenth-century claim 
of parts of mankind to independence of the rest. GROWTH  OF  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  PARLIAMENT  217 
CHAPTER  XI 
THE  GROWTH  OF  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  PARLIAMENT 
IT has been  said  that the  supreme achievement  of  the 
Reformation  is the modern  state.l  The truth  that  lies in 
an epigram often bears restatement in a reversal of  its parts, 
and it might be as true to say that the Reformation was the 
supreme  achievement  of  the  modern  state.  Certainly  in 
England  it was  largely  the work  of  the Tudor  monarchy, 
which was rather a cause than a result  of  the Reformation. 
There  is, however,  a  fundamental truth in this  connexion 
between  the  Reformation  and  the  modern  state,  and  it 
concerns the nature of  sovereignty.  Without the Reforma- 
tion  there  could  have  been  no  such  thing  as  modern 
sovereignty ; for the sovereignty of  every medieval monarch 
in western  Christendom was limited by the recognized claim 
of  the pope to hold kings responsible for certain of  their acts 
and to inflict pains and penalties for the infraction of  certain 
rules  of  conduct.  They were not  exempt  from citation to 
Rome, and they could not afford to assert that divine right 
of irresponsibility with  which  protestantism  endowed their 
successors. 
It would, however, be a mistake to regard this acllievement 
of  sovereignty as an act of  creation.  The crown in  parlia- 
ment is legally omnicompetent, because it was never created, 
because there never was made that social contract to which 
philosophers in the pre-scientific ages of  history were wont 
to ascribe the origin of  the state.  The act of  creation involves 
the  relation between creature and creator, and the purpose 
of  the  theories  of  contract  was  to impose  the limitations 
1 Figgis in Cambridge Modern History, iii. 736. 
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involved in that relation, and to bind sovereignty down to 
the terms and conditions that pleased its imaginary creator. 
Wherever  a  constitution  has  been  made,  and  power  has 
been  conferred  by  a  definite  act,  limitations  have  been 
imposed  by  its  makers.  But  no  one  made  the  English 
crown or the English  parliament, and no powers have  been 
conferred upon  them; for  that reason  they are unlimited. 
No  one has had the right to confer, and therefore no one has 
had  the  right  to  limit  their  sovereignty.  It grew,  and 
things that grow have a power divine beyond that of  things 
that are made with hands. 
The  slow  evolution  of  sovereignty  in  England  precludes 
any theory of  its special creation at any particular  period; 
and the  process  reaches back beyond the middle ages and 
spans the whole course of  English history.  If  it is an error 
to regard  sovereignty  as the creation  of  the age of  Luther 
and Machiavelli, it is a greater error to regard  the  English 
constitution as complete in the reign of  Edward I.  In spite of 
the growth of  parliament during the fourteenth century and 
of  the Lancastrian experiment, it is the imperfection rather 
than the perfection of  government that strikes the observer 
at the close of  the middle ages.  The burden of  Fortescue's 
complaint  is  the  lack  of  governance  in  England,  and 
Machiavelli attributed the political ills of  his time to lack of 
will.  He  was  thinking,  not  of  the  individual  will  which 
superabounded in the over-mighty subject, but of  will in the 
state.  The "  Rolls of  Parliaments " are full of  lamentations 
over the king's failure to execute justice;  and a profounder 
study than these plaintiffs gave to the subject suggests that 
it was  the king's  power rather than his  will  which  was  at 
fault.  Nor was the lack of  governance a novel grievance : 
under  the "  greatest  of  the  Plantagenets " complaints  are 
made in parliament  of  livery and maintenance, champerty 
and riots ;  and petitioners allege that no truth can be obtained 
of juries,  so corrupted are they by rich men's bribes.l  The 
captains and ringleaders of  anarchy were, no doubt, greater 
men in the reign of  Henry VI than in that of  Edward I, but 
Rot. Purl., i.  96, 183,  201;  Maitland,  Memoranda, pp. 109,  286-7, 305.  * THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
the concentration of  the forces of  disorder  in  fewer  hands 
did not necessarily increase the extent of  the evil, and weak- 
ness  of  government  was  endemic  throughout  the  middle 
ages. 
Nothing,  indeed, could  be  wider of  the  mark  than  the 
popular identification  of feudal times with royal  despotism 
or of  the progress of  constitutional liberty with the whittling 
away of  sovereignty.  Freedom  without  sovereignty  is  the 
idle dream of  anarchists; and sovereignty without  freedom 
is the aim of  bureaucratic despots.  Neither is safe without 
the other, and it was the absence of  national sovereignty that 
left  medieval  England  a  prey  to  feudal  disorder.  The 
government, as Maitland  has remarked,  was  occupied  less 
in governing than in struggling for existence ;  and the impedi- 
ments  that hampered  its action were  not  merely  material 
forces,  but  the  ideas  of  liberty  and  law  which  were 
ingrained in medieval man.  Some were due  to intellectual 
immaturity.  When  the law confessed  its  inability to dis- 
criminate  between  murder  and homicide,  proclaimed  that 
"  the thought of  man shall not be tried, for the devil himself 
knoweth not the thought of  man,"  1 and only distinguished 
crimes of  violence according to the accidents of  the time and 
place of  their committal, there was little hope of  justice, and 
inadequate security for execution so long as the  individual 
was entitled  to defeat  the law by "  standing mute."  To 
this  deep-seated  distrust  of  human  capacity  or  rectitude 
was  due the resort  to judicial methods like  trial by fire or 
water, by which the hope of  justice was frankly abandoned 
to  the miraculous  interposition  of  supcrhuman  powers,  an 
attitude  of  mind  which  still  survives  in  the  belief  that 
victory in battle is a judgement of  God. 
This  disbelief  in human  achievement, natural enough in 
the early stages of  political evolution, explains the medieval 
conception of  law.  Nowar.lays law is regarded as something 
which man has made; then man could not make law at all. 
1 Maitland, Collected  Papers, i. 304, 315, 453. 
a  Not abolished until 1772.  Cf. L. Vernon Harcourt, His  Grace the Steward 
and Trial by Peers, p. 228. 
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~t had been made for him, directly by God in the form of 
divine law, or indirectly by God in the forms of  the law of 
nature or the law of universal reason.  Really this law was 
custom sanctified  by  the church; but whether regarded  as 
custom in heathen communities or as the direct or indirect 
expression of  the divine will in Christian states, no  king or 
parliament  could make,  repeal,  or amend  it.  They might 
proclaim  or  apply it, but they  could not  create it; it was 
immutable and eternal, and all alike, prince and people, were 
subject to its dictates.  These laws, however,  required  an 
interpreter,  especially  since  they  often  conflicted.  Few 
schools of  political  thought have failed to find justification 
in  the laws of  nature, or  of  reason,  or  of  God-from  the 
absolutist  to  the  tyrannicide,  from  the  individualist  to 
the communist ; and the conflict of  laws demanded a supreme 
arbiter  in  the  interests  of  peace.  Sovereignty,  therefore, 
appears in a judicial guise and sits in a court of  law ;  and the 
king in his council  in parliaments interprets the law before 
he  pretends  to  make  it.  Our  earliest  laws-apart  from 
customs  which  are  not  conscious  creations-are  judicial 
decisions.  Indeed,  most  formal  acts  in  the  early  middle 
ages were  regarded  as the judgements  of  a  court : even a 
declaration of  war was a judicium  super eum ire,l and from 
it descends the right  of  the  high  court  of  parliament  to 
consultation on such issues.  Treaties of  peace are recorded 
on the rolls of  that court as late as 1420. 
A  decision in court, however, makes law, and legislation 
begins under judicial forms.  But the ordinances of  Edward 
I, f3r instance, should be regarded rather as general instruc- 
tions to judges  and others in their administration of  existing 
law than as deliberate and conscious efforts to alter the law. 
Magna Carta was a treaty rather than an act of  legislation, 
and  with  its corollaries, the Conjirmatio Cartarurn, and the 
Articuli  super  Carias, continued  to be regarded  as funda- 
mental law, infractions of  which, even  by parliament  itself, 
were  ifso facto  in~alid.~  But  constitutional  and  social 
1  I.e. on a vassal;  see above, p.  92  fl. 
Rot. Purl., i.  285. 220  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
development was outgrowing rigid conceptions, and the law 
which  satisfied  past  generations  had to be  supplemented : 
even  the  constitution  of  the  United  States  has  required 
amendment.  The medieval supplements to the constitution 
of  the world took  the form of  piisitive law, that is, of  law 
imposed by human authority.  But this law, made by man, 
was inferior  to the  older  laws  of  God  and  nature :  those 
were,  so  to speak,  the  constitution,  these  the  provisional 
regulations  made  under  its  authority.  The  prince  was 
above  the  laws  he  made,  but  subject  to  those  of  God 
and nature ; l an offence against the latter was malum in se, 
an offence against the former was only a malurn prohibit~m.~ 
It was from these immutable laws that medieval liberties 
were derived : they wcre absolute rights, not the concessions 
of  human authority.  Kings and parliaments had not given 
them,  kings  and  parliaments  could  not  take  them  away. 
Louis XIV declared that even he, with his plenitude of  royal 
power, could not deprive his grandson of  his hereditary right 
to the Spanish  thr~ne.~  Hereditary right was  divine, and 
the monarchical character was indelible : not  all the water 
in the rough, rude sea  could wash the balm off  an anointed 
king.  So thought Richard 11, Mary Stuart, and Charles I.  As 
with the regnum, so with the sace~/dotium  ;  and not until 1870 
did the English parliament admit that a  clerk in Anglican 
orders  could  divest  himself  of  the  indelible  character  of 
prie~thood.~  The peerage was not to be outdone by  priests 
or kings; in the course of  time it  established  for  itself  an 
indefeasible  privilege  which  kings  and  priests  have  lost, 
and in 1894  three  eldest sons of  peers attempted in  vain to 
evade the impending doom of  a nobility inseparably blended 
with  blue  bl~od.~  Thus is  man's  liberty  impeded  by  the 
barriers he has sought to raise in its defence. 
1 "  Positiva  lex est infra principantem  sicut  lex naturalis est  supra " 
(Maitland's Gievke, p. 176;  cf. Sir T. Elyot's Governour, ed. Croft, p. lxiv.). 
Prothero, Select  Documents, 1898, p. 402;  Coke placed  the common 
law almost on a level with the older fundamental laws. 
8  Torcy, MLmoires, ed. 1850, pp. 710-11. 
4  33 and 34 Vict.  c.  91 ; Anson,  Lav~  and  Custom of  the  Constitution. 
1908, 11.  ii.  326-7. 
See below, pp. 27+ 306. 
GROWTH  OF  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  PARLIAMENT  221 
These were the liberties of  the great, but those of  the humble 
were based on the same foundation of  imprescriptible right. 
Private  property  was  by  some  medieval  thinkers  placed 
outsidc the sphere of  public power,l not indeed on the ground 
that it is inherited, but because it originates in the labour of 
the  individual,  and  was  thus  a  right  independent  of  the 
community.  Citizens  were  regarded  as  shareholders  who 
could not be deprived of  their shares by a vote of  the majority 
or by any other means than their own voluntary concession.2 
Medieval history, says Stubbs, is the history of  rights  and 
wrongs, to be followed by a modern history of  powers, forces, 
dyna~ties.~  In theory every one's right was indestructible; 
society was, in  fact,  static and not  dynamic.  There  was 
no  power to reform a  right, and  the  only way  to  dispose 
of  it  was  to  prove  that  it  was  "  usurped "--like  the 
supremacy of  Rome.  In practice,  of  course,  the  absence 
of  means of  legal redress led to violent measures on the part 
of  those who felt themselves wronged or incommoded by the 
rights  of  others.  The  legal  employment  of  torture  was 
probably  due  to the  same  process  of  thought;  even  the 
criminal must consent to plead or confess, and without his 
individual  surrender  there could  be  no  legal  verdict.  The 
weakness of  the state was the parent of  its cruelty.  It was 
hemmed in by iron laws and indestructible rights; it could 
not  create  or  modify  the  conditions  of  its existence,  and 
the " Rolls " of  medieval  English  parliaments  are records 
of  their conscious infirmity. 
The greatest of  all these limitations imposed on the state 
were  those  imposed  by  the  church.  Indeed,  from  Hilde- 
brand onwards papalists had contended that the state had no 
rights or powers at all except in so far as they were derived 
from, and controlled and guided by, the church : papa  ipse 
verus imperator, declared the canonists of  the twelfth century, 
and the prince only wielded the sword as the officer of  the 
pope.  The pope was the judge, the king  the  executioner. 
John of  Paris, quoted in Maitland's Gierke, p.  180.  "  rhid., p. 167; cf. Collected  Papers, ii.  318-19. 
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Spiritualis judicat  omnia et  ipse a  newtine judicatzw.l  The 
pope should elect the emperor, and the English  clergy their 
king2  The king was  the minister of  the church, and was 
subject to its law, not merely the divine law, but the canon 
law, the lex positiva imposed by the pope.  This was universal 
law, and municipal legislation like acts of  parliament, which 
conflicted with it, was ifso  facto null and void.  The original 
sin of the Reformation was its rejection of  this catholic law; 
thence sprang all its schism, its heresy, and sacrilege.  Nor 
did even the champions of  the regnum against the sacerdotium 
claim any plenitude  of  legislative power  for  the  emperor. 
He and d fortiori  lesser princes were  limited by  divine and 
natural law, by papal jurisdiction,  and even by the will  of 
the  people,  from  whom  imperial  sovereignty  was  derived. 
An obdurate monarch might not only be condernned by the 
pope, but killed  by his people,  provided  that they selected 
some  method  of  tyrannicide  countenanced  by  biblical 
precedents, and not such new-fangled means as poi~on.~ 
The  political  theory  of  the middle  ages, indeed,  knows 
little of  absolute authority except that vested in the papacy ; 
and in  practice  the forces of  feudalism left  little room  for 
the exercise of  sovereignty.  The depths, to which the empire 
sank, submerged the cause for which it had stood, but the rise 
of  national monarchy rescued the world from the impotence 
of  authority.  In the reign  of  Philip  IV of  France,  Pierre 
Dubois proclaimed the decadence of  the empire, and, arguing 
that sight without  might was vanity, claimed for kings the 
emperor's  inheritan~e.~  Later  in  the  fourteenth  century 
Marsiglio  of  Padua, the  most  modern  and original  of  all 
medieval  political  thinkers,  outlined  in  his  Defensor  Pacis 
a comprehensive theory of  the sovereignty of  the state. 
Thechurch, hemaintains, isa state [civic] institution, and the sacerdotium 
is "  pars  et ofhcium civitatis."  Sovereign in  things ecclesiastical is the 
1 Maitland's Gierke, pp. 107-12. 
"bid.,  pp. I 17~18  ; William of  Malmesbury apud Stubbs, Select Charters, 
ed. 1900, p. "7:  Coram majori parte cleri Angliae, ad cujus jus potissimum 
spectat principem eligere simulque ordinare." 
8  John  of  Salisbury,  quoted  in  Maitland's  Gierke,  p.  143;  Dunning, 
Political  Theories, p. 187. 
"unning,  ibid., p. 228. 
GROWTH  OF  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  PARLIAMENT  223 
universita~  fidelium,"  which, however,  coincides with the "  iiniversitas 
civium,"  and in  this  respect,  as in all other matters, is  represented  by 
the principans  whom it has instituted, so that the line between spiritual 
and temporal is always a line between two classes of  affairs and never a 
line between two classes of persons.'  The state [civic] power imposes con- 
&tionsfor admission to the sacerdotium, regulates the functionsof the priest- 
hood,  fixes  the number  of churches  and spiritual offices.  It authorizes 
ecclesiastical foundations and  corporations.  It appoints the individual 
clergyman, pays him, obliges him to a performance of  duties, removes him, 
nay, its consent is necessary  to every ordination.  It watches over  the 
exercise of  every  spiritual office,  to  see  that it is  strictly  confined  to 
spiritual affairs.  All jurisdictio  and potestas  coactiva are exercised imme- 
diately and exclusively by the wielder of  temporal power, even if  clerical 
are concerned, or matrimonial causes, dispensations, legitimations, 
or  matters  of  heresy.  Interdicts,  excommunications,  canonizations. 
a~~ointlnents  of fasts-and feasts require at the very least authorization 
bythe state  [community].  Only on the pound of  exjress commission from 
the stateisit conceivable that the churches should have anv worldlv Dowers 
the decretals any worldly force.  Education is exclu~vely  thk 'state's 
affair.  Appeals and complaints to the state  [civic] power arealways permis- 
sible.  All councils, general and particular, must be summoned and directed 
by the state.  Church property is in part the state's property, and in part 
it is  res  nullius.  In any case it is at the disposal  of  the state, which 
thereout should  provide what is necessary for the support of  the clergy 
and  for  the maintenance  of  worship,  and should  collect and apply the 
residue for the relief  of  the poor and other public purposes.  The state 
therefore may freely tax it, may divert the tithes to itself, may give and 
take  benefices at pleasure,  and  for good  cause  may secularize and  sell 
tliem "  quoniam  sua  sunt et in ipsius semper potestate de jure."  Only 
what  has  come  from  private  foundations  should,  under  state control, 
"conservari,  custodiri,  et  distribui  secundum  donantis  vel  legantis 
intentionem." 
It was not without reason that Thomas Cromwell financed 
the publication of  an English edition of  Marsiglio's Defensor 
Pacis in 1534,  or that his friends recommended its perusal to 
Cardinal  Pole  and  the  monks  of  the  Charterhouse;  for 
Marsiglio had provided Cromwell and some of  his successors 
with the best part of  their programme. 
'  This  is  perhaps  the crucial  distinction  between  the medieval  and 
modem points of  view.  Medieval papalists, indeed, agreed with Marsiglio 
to some extent, and claimed predominance of the spiritual authority over 
every person in every sphere, on the ground that man's soul was superior 
to his body.  But  in  practice the contest between  state and church led 
to  a  separation  between  the  persons  in  whom  the spiritual  character 
predominated-;.  e. the clergy-and  the laity, the former being primarily 
subject to the church and the latter to the state. 
This is Maitland's translation of  Gierke's summary of  Marsiglio's views ; 
he g~ves  references  for each  sentence,  pp.  191-2  ; but "  civic " would 
perhaps  be  a  better  translation  than "  state " as an adjective,  and 
"  community " as a substantive. 
a  Letters  and  Papers of Henry  VIII,  vii. 423, viii.  1156,  ix. 523.  Nor 
is it surprising that one of  the monks should have burnt the volu~ne  lent 
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He was a dreamer of  dreams.  The lawyers and statesmen 
of  his time were hard pressed to secure a foothold or two in 
Marsiglio's  promised land; and the boldest  of  legal fictions 
and  the  hardiest  of  assumptions had  to be  made  by  the 
principans  to extend  that field of  positive law of  which he 
was  master, at the expense of  that field  of  natural  law  to 
which  he was  subject.  The secular  prince  borrowed  most 
of his maxims from the law of  the church, a sphere in which 
the pope's  claims to divine  authority had  enabled  him  to 
exalt his  lex positiva  above the lex naturalis ;  for the pope 
was, so to speak, the legatus a latere of  God, while nature and 
reason  were  merely  legati  nati whose  authority was  over- 
ridden  by  special  commission.  From  the  canon  law  was 
taken  the  phrase  ex  certa  scientia, whereby  the  statute or 
ordinance disposed of  the defect arising in natural law from 
the  absence  of  "  just  cause " for  the  invasion  of  private 
rights;  from  it,  too,  came  the  lege  no%  obstante  clauses, 
which calmly assumed the plenitude of the sovereign's power 
over all other 1aws.l  Richard 11, however, borrowed whole- 
sale ;  he not only claimed to be "  entire emperor "  in England, 
but appropriated the contention of  Boniface VIII that he had 
omnia  jura  in scrinio  pectoris  sui;  and  in  many  other 
respects  he  attempted  to anticipate  the  new  monarchy. 
But  the time  was  not  ripe,  and  Richard  himself  was  not 
the man to wield  tlle sceptre of  a saviour of  society.  The 
Lancastrian  experiment  and the  Wars  of  the  Roses  were 
still required to convince the English people that sovereignty 
was a necessary supplement to liberty, and the Reception, 
the  Renaissance,  and  the  Reformation  were  needed  to 
complete the rout of  feudalism and fortify the monarchy. 
The  reception  of  the  Roman  law  by  almost  all  the 
kingdoms of  western Europe was one of the great movements 
which marked the close of  the middle  ages.  It completed 
1 Maitland's  Gierke, p. 185. For an  early use of  non  obsiante in England 
see Rot. Parl., ii. 167. 
2  Maitland's  Gierke,  p. 176;  cf.  Letters  and  Papers  of  Henry  VIII, 
iv. p. 1839  ; Rot. Parl., iii. 343.  Richard was accused of  having said "  quod 
leges  suz erant in  ore  suo  et aliquotiens  in pectore  suo; et quod  ipse 
solus posset  mutare et condere leges regni  sui"  (abid., iii. 419). 
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the  translatio  irrtperii  from  the  moribund  Holy  Roman 
emperor to the lusty national  king,  who  appropriated  the 
legal  effects  of  the  deceased world-sovereign.  Technically 
the  Roman  law  was  never  "  received " in  England,  and 
the  resistance  of  homespun  English  law  is  a  momentous 
chapter of English legal hist0ry.l  But English law was only 
successful in its resistance  because in the earlier  stages of 
its existence it had been  inoculated by  Henry  I1 and the 
cabria  regis, as well as through  the canon law, with  some of 
the  principles  of  the rival  system,  and was  therefore  the 
better  prepared  to  withstand  the  legal  epidemic  of  the 
sixteenth  century.  Even  so  the  struggle  was  long  and 
arduous, and did not end till the revolution of  1688  expelled 
the Stuarts and gave the victory  over the civilians to the 
common lawycrs.  In the interval between  the premature 
efforts of  Richard I1 and the fall of  his followers, the Stuarts, 
maxims of  Roman civil law played  a great part in English 
history, a part which, though dangerous to self-government, 
was essential to the establishment of  the sovereignty of  the 
state.  "  If  we  should do nothing but as  the common law 
will," wrote the president of  the Council of  Wales with respect 
to Welsh  disorders, "  these things  so far out of  order  will 
never be redressed " ; and the prerogative courts and councils 
of  the  Tudors found in the Roman  law indispensable aids 
to the  suppression  of  local  anarchy.  Tudor  officials  were 
nearly  all trained in the civil laws, and while the study of 
canon  law  was  forbidden  by  Henry  VIII,  attempts  were 
made  to  found  a  college  of  civil  law  at Cambridge,  and 
chairs of  civil law were endowed at both universities.  Civil 
law was an apt weapon against both the canon and common 
law, and "  imperial " became one of the favourite adjectives 
of  the crown. 
While  the  invasion  of  Roman  law  released  sovereignty 
from the trammels of  common law, the Renaissance tended 
to  relax  the  restraints  of  morality;  and  Machiavelli,  the 
See Maitland, English Law and the Renaissance, 1901. 
Roxland  J.ee  to Cromwell,  July 18, 1538;  the letter is abbreviated 
in Letters und Papers. XIII. i.  1411  ; cf. Skeel, Council of  Wales, p.  68. 7.26  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PAIZLIAMENT 
political philosopher of  the Renaissance, has been acclaimed 
as one of  the fathers of  the modern state.  His offence was 
not so much that he invented political immorality, as that he 
laid bare the secrets of  princes, and treated politics as a science 
and an art with its own principles and technique which were 
like those of  surgery or navigation, independent  of  morals. 
The state was the only available instrument for the work of 
political reformation,  and it could  only achieve that work 
by being liberated from the conventions of  medieval thought 
which had left society bankrupt at the close of  the fifteenth 
century.  Machiavelli's  contribution to political sovereignty 
was his assertion of  freedom of  will for the state. 
Luther's was his assertion of  its freedom from the papacy,l 
and the Reformation broke one of  the bonds which fettered 
the sovereignty  of  kings;  it  rendered  them  irresponsible 
except to God.  While Machiavelli, like Hobbes, contemplated 
the possibility of  a sovereign republic, Luther tied his cause 
to the chariot wheels of  German territorial princes, and his 
political theory evoked many echoes in the England of  the 
Tudors.  The  jurisdiction  of  the  pope  was  abolished  as 
"  usurped,"  and  canon  law  was  subjected  to  royal  veto. 
The king was thus Zege  solufus so far as the greater portion 
of  medieval law was concerned ;  and of  the law that remained 
he was the final arbiter.  From Roman civilians he learnt 
that quod  Principi placuit  legis habet vigorem; and even the 
common law of  England  could  now  be  made and unmade 
by  the  crown in  parliament,  and interpreted by the king's 
own  courts.  The  crown  in  parliament  was  emancipated 
from  the  control  of  fundamental  law  and  from  the 
medieval  liberties  which  were  derived  therefrom.  The 
conflict  of  independent  legal  systems was at an end; they 
were  all fused in national  law and subjected to a  common 
sovereignty.  There was only one divine right, and that was 
the right of  kings; all the rest were "  usurped."  The king 
was the supreme head of  one body. 
The medieval distinctions between churchmen and laymen 
were  swept away or reduced  to insig~iificance,  and laymen 
He  may also havehelped by his denial of  free will to the individual. 
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in  time  were  even  called  churchmen.  Ecclesiastics  were 
required  or  encouraged  to  assimilate  the  habits  and 
customs of  their  flocks, to discard  their  clerical  vestments 
and  assume  the  bonds  of  matrimony.  The  concentration 
camps  of  monasticism  were  broken  up,  and their  inmates 
dispersed among the civil population.  Every form of  loyalty 
except allegiance to the national king was discouraged; and 
the  characteristic  hostility  of  the  Roman  law  to  every 
association  that  weakened  the  direct  connexion  between 
the  state  and  the  individual  was  reflected  in  the 
attitude of  Tudor statesmen to  corporation^.^  Ecclesiastical 
colleges and chantries felt the brunt of  this animosity, but 
secular  guilds  and  municipal  corporations  found  their 
liberties restrained by acts of  parliament, and their freedom 
of internecine legislation controlled by chancery.  Medieval 
rights gave way to modern law, and all municipal authority 
was  regarded  as a  concession  from  a sovereign parliament 
and not  as a  derivation  from  imprescriptible  right.'  The 
passion  for  national  independence  left  little  room  for  the 
independence  of  church,  class,  or  corporation;  the  many 
estates  were  fused  in  the  single  state,  and  their  liberties 
were  confiscated  in  the  interests  of  national  sovereignty. 
The revolts of  the Tudor period are nearly all local, sectional, 
or ecclesiastical protests against this national consolidation. 
The Cornishmen in 1497  resent taxes levied for the defence 
of  the  Scottish  borders : the  Pilgrims  of  Grace  complair~ 
of  the neglect  of  the  house  of  lords  to begin  each  day's 
proceedings  with  the  time-honoured  recital  of  the  first 
clause of  Magna Carta, and of  the transgression by statute 
of  the liberties  of  the  church;  and the northern earls in 
1569 were fighting a last fight for feudal freedom from the 
state. 
This  monopoly  of  sovereignty  was  something  new  in 
English and in other history.  There was little of  it in  the 
middle ages, but only suzerainty of  many sorts.  Every lord 
See above, pp. I 74-6. 
Letters and Papers of  Henry VIII,  xi. 1182  (2). xii. pt. i. 401 ; Dodds, 
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was  sovereign "  to his man, and every master to his servant. 
Even an archbishop was "  sovereign" to his suffragans, and a 
husband to his wife.l  To kill one's lord was treason, petty 
it  is  true, but none  the less a worse  offence than murder. 
What real sovereignty there was had been discovered by the 
pope when he stepped into the shoes of  the Roman Imperator, 
and he alone was sovereign in the modern  Austinian  sense. 
For the barbarians had not only shattered Roman empire, 
but dissipated sovereignty, and it easily slid down the slippery 
sloI~esofthe  feudal pyramid.  Much of  it passed, for instance, 
from the king of  the French to the Norman duke, from the 
duke to the kngevin count, and from him to the count of 
Maine, before it sank into the minds of  the people of  Le Mans ; 
and a sovereignty which had to satisfy so many mouths was 
a diluted form of  political authority.  The medieval preroga- 
tiva regis  was  a  purely  feudal  conception;  the  king  was 
regarded  as simply paramount landlord, and his prerogative 
only affected his subjects qua* tenants. 
But the royal  prerogative  of  the  Tudors  affected  their 
relations with every subject irrespective  of  his  tenure; the 
"sovereignty"  of  masters over men, and with it petty treason, 
almost  disappeared in one conception of  sovereignty and a 
single notion of  high treason.  Even the sovereignty of  the 
pope had had its rivals ; that of  the Tudors had none.  The 
subject's relation to the crown became his political all in all. 
All  the  liberties  and  jurisdictions  which  had  intervened 
between the subject and the national sovereign were abolished, 
and  Englishmen  were  brought  into  direct  and  constant 
contact with the state.  The relationship, therefore, assumed 
an  overwhelming  importance,  and  created  a  problem  of 
absorbing magnitude.  Sovereignty might be tolerable while 
12  Henry VII,  C.  7';  "  their master or their immediate sovereign "; 
Rot. Parl., ii. 244-5  :  et le dit evesque . . . eit receu  mandement de 
. . . son soveregn erchevesque "  ; Paston Letters, i. 78 : " to my soveregn, 
John Pasto)'";  Rot. Parl., 4 Henry VIII,  prefixed to Lords'  Journals, vol. 
i. p. xxix :  that every lord  espiritual and temporal and every sovereign 
of  monastery . . . t$t  every  such  lord, sovereign,  master,  mistress,  or 
other  householder:  Tanzing of  the  Shrew,  Act  v. Sc.  ii.  147 : "  Thy 
husband is . . . thy sovereign." 
a  On  the so-called  statute Pra?rogativa  Regis, see  Maitland,  Collected 
Papers, ii.  182--9. 
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it was  distributed in many hands; it took  on  a  forbidding 
when  gathered  into  one.  Contact  often  means 
conflict,  and  popular  hostility  is  only  aroused  by  the 
jurisdiction  with  which  people  are  brought  into  touch. 
Hence the popular risings and resentments of  the middle ages 
were directed against  ecclesiastical and feudal jurisdictions, 
because those were  the authorities under which  most  men 
suffered.  There were no really popular rebellions against the 
crown;  the movements against  the crown were baronial or 
ecclesiastical, because it was the crown which threatened the 
liberties of  the magnates and the church. 
But now the crown has absorbed  and wields these  juris- 
dictions; the buffers are removed, and a king who demands 
the  undivided  loyalty  of  his  subjects  runs  the  risk  of 
their  undivided  disaffection.  The  crown  has  enveloped 
church and state alike in the ample shield of  its supremacy, 
and  that shield  must  bear  the brunt  of  every  attack on 
the powers the crown has absorbed.  Every movement for 
liberty becomes  an attack on the crown : the strife is no 
longer between barons or bishops and the king, but between 
the king and his parliament or his people.  The crown had 
become  the  universal  agent  and  everybody's  proxy;  and 
its monopoly of  powers involved a monopoly of  responsibility. 
Medieval  sovereignty,  dispersed  in  local  franchises  and in 
the  privileges of  orders  and estates,  and bound  down  by 
fundamental  laws,  might  be  irresponsible;  but  modern 
sovereignty, triumphant over canon and over common law, 
and over all excIuding liberties,  must be  made  responsible 
or must be dismembered.  It was well that Leviathan should 
have  a  giant's  strength;  it was  ill  that  he  should  use  it 
in  a  giant's  spirit.  The  problem  of  the seventeenth  and 
eighteenth centuries was  whether  to dismember or harness 
Leviathan, and how to effect  the process.  The Americans 
preferred dismemberment of sovereignty and the separation 
of  powers.  England decided for unity of  powers combined 
with responsibility for their exercise ;  it hitched a democratic 
wagon to Ze  roi soleil. 
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the English parliament.  It inherited, but did not divide the 
sovereignty  of  the crown;  or  rather,  there  was  no  demise 
of  powers at all, but a  rearrangement  of  predominance  in 
the  partnerslrip.  The  crown  had never  been  sovereign by 
itself, for  before the days of  parliament  there  was  no  real 
sovereignty  at  all :  sovereignty  was  only  achieved  by 
the energy of  the crown  in parliament,  and the  fruits of 
conquest were enjoyed in  common.  It was a happy thing 
that  no  English  king  ever  delegated  powers  to  an 
IZnglish  parliament,  but preserved  them  entire,  so  that in 
due  time  the  people  should  enjoy  them.  For  delegation 
would have meant division, and division would have meant 
subtraction.  But  since there  was  no  delegation  from  the 
crown, there was no circumscription of  the powers of  parlia- 
ment.  It was summoned to do whatever might be proposed. 
No  doubt, in  reality,  and  also  in  men's  ideas  of  what 
was  right,  the  competence  of  the  crown  in  parliament 
was severely restricted ;  and possibly the obvious narrowness 
of  those  limitations dispensed with  the need  of  definition. 
For we only limit powers which may conceivably be used or 
abused; it is  but  lately  that  men  have  begun  to  talk  of 
sovereignty or property in the air, and we are not yet reduced 
to dealing by statute with  property in sunshine or in rain. 
If Edward  I had had James  1's notions of  sovereignty, he 
would  have  been  more  chary  of  summoning  parliaments 
to  share  it with  him; and if  barons  and  churchmen  had 
dreamt  of  the lengths to which  the  crown  in  parliament 
would  go  under the Tudors in  dealing with  their  liberties, 
they would  early have insisted on a written and rigid con- 
stitution.  They did, in fact, try to stereotype Magna Carta, 
fortunately without success.  But, on the whole, the poverty 
of parliamentary  force enabled it to avoid definitions of  its 
authority  until  the  Tudors  had  discovered  in  parliament 
the aptest  instrument  for  their  designs.  It was  then  too 
late for  the threatened  liberties to protest,  for the crown 
in parliament was the interpreter of  the extent of  the powers 
it exercised; it was judge,  jury,  and criminal all combined, 
so far as its offences against fundamental law and medieval 
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liberties  were  concerned,  and  the  political  efficiency  of 
combining a  supreme  court  with  a  legislature  has  seldom 
been illustrated with more striking effect. 
Nor was there ever a more signal proof  of  political genius 
or  more fortunate coincidence of  interests  than that which 
led  to  the  co-operation  of  crown  and  parliament  under 
Henry VIII.  The two were knit  together  in  terms of  the 
closest alliance in their conflict with rival jurisdictions,  and 
each found its advantage in exalting, instead of  in fighting, 
the other.  The way in which parliament  magnified Henry 
VIII is written in the statutes of  the latter half  of  his reign ; 
and the king repaid  the  compliment.  "  We,"  he declared 
to  the  commons,  "  be  informed  by  our  judges  that  we 
at no  time  stand so  highly  in  our  estate  royal  as in  the 
time of parliament, wherein we  as head and you as members 
are  conjoined  and  knit  together  in  one  body  politic,  so 
as whatsoever offence or  injury during that time is  offered 
to the meanest member of  the house is to be judged as done 
against  our  person  and the whole  court  of  parliament."  l 
It was  in his  reign  that the  Speaker's  claim  for  personal 
freedom of  speech was expanded into a claim on behalf  of 
every  member,2 and  there is  no  instance  in  which  Henry 
himself violated those privileges, respect for which he enforced 
upon  others.  Parliamentary  sanction  was  sought  to  an 
unprecedented extent for the acts of  the crown. 
It was not the debasement, but the exaltation of  parlia- 
ment  that  impressed  the  witnesses  of  the  process;  and 
malcontents  sneered  at  that  "  thirteenth  article  of  our 
creed,  added  of  late,"  that  parliament  cannot  err,3  a 
doctrine  which  even  royalist  judges  admitted  under 
Charles  I.*  Parliament, says Sir  Thomas  Smith, "  repre- 
senteth and hath the power of  the whole realm . . . and the 
Letters  and  Papers of  Henry VIII,  vol.  xvii. pp.  iv, 107;  Holinshed, 
Chronicles. iii. os6. 
a  Lords;  ~ou'Y"nals,  i. 167;  Hakewill,  Modus  Tenendi  Parl.,  p.  213; 
Manning,  Speakers, p. 192. 
Lettevs  and Papers of  Henry  VIII,  vol. xx. part ii. p. 345.  '  Justice Berkeley on ship-money, Gardiner, Select  Documer.ts, ed. 1889. 
P. 54. 232  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMEhlT 
consent of  parliament is taken to be every man's consent." 1 
 ta tat, c'est  moi was the boast which  Voltaire put  into the 
mouth  of  Louis  XIV :  in  England  the state was  not  the 
crown, but a fusion of  all the estates, and every free English- 
man could share in the glory reserved in France for the king. 
Sovereignty was vested, not in a single person, but in a ccm- 
posite and representative body, which expressed the national 
will and mind, and not merely that of  a monarch.  It was 
this national  will  that gave the Tudors  their  strength; it 
was a new will to be free from the old restraints, and it sprang 
from  a  disappearance  of  the  medieval  distrust  in  human 
rectitude  and  capacity,  and  from  a  growth  in  conscious 
control  over  national  destinies.  He  knew  not,  Burghley 
was  wont  to  say,  what  an  act of  parliament  could  not 
do in England ;  2  and the long list which Sir Thomas Smith 
gives  of  the  things  which  parliament  could  do  and  did, 
trespasses  far  and wide  on  the  old  forbidden  domains  of 
immutable law, and sets no bounds to the sphere of  national 
legislation. 
Not  that  the  old  landmarks  of  thought  were  suddenly 
swept away or submerged in one or two generations.  They 
still survive in conservative affections, and iconoclasts them- 
selves  use  the arms of  the  past  to break  with  the  past. 
Richard of  York  claimed  in  1460  that  hereditary  right 
was part  of  the law  of  nat~re.~  Hc11r.y VIII alleged the 
will  of  God  and the law of  nature as the two foundations 
of  royal  authority; and  chief  justice  Coke  tried  to  place 
man-made  common  law  on  a  pedestal  above  the  reach 
of  king  or  parliament.  That there was  a  law  of  nature, 
a law of  nations, and a law of  reason outside the scope of 
statute was a conception which lingered long in the judicial 
mind.  Lord Mansfield laid it down that "  the act of  parlia- 
ment 7 Anne c. 12  did not intend to alter, nor can alter, the 
law of  nations."  In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
the courts often  declared statutes null  if  against reason  or 
1 De Republics Anglorum, ed. Alston, p. 49. 
McIlwain, Political  Wovks of James I,  p. 329. 
a  Fortescue, p.  207. 
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fundamental  law; l  and  to-day,  after  all  the  labours  of 
Austin,  the church  declines to recognize  the  ecclesiastica1 
jurisdiction  of  the judicial  committee of  the privy  council, 
which is based on parliamentary statute.  It holds that the 
law of  the church, which is thereby overridden, rests on a 
higher  authority than any positive law of  the state.  This 
gound was  common  to  all  parties  to  the  constitutional 
struggles of the seventeenth century-to  crown and commons, 
peers and judges.  All  claimed to hold what they held by 
right.  But they also held this in common, that they could 
override  the  rights  of  others  by  statute.  The  commons 
disposed of  endless rights by  statute and ordinance during 
the  Long  parliament;  and crown,  church,  and  lords  em- 
ployed  statutes for similar  ends at the Restoration.  Par- 
liament,  wliich  is  not  regarded  by  high  churchmen  as a 
sufficient authority for the jurisdiction of  the privy council, 
was  good  enough  for a  Test  act  and  a  Clarendon  code 
Indefeasible  right  is,  in  fact,  the  right  of  oneself;  and 
fundamental law is the law one invokes to restrain legislation 
by other people.  As  a minority dwindles, its attachment to 
fundamentals develops ;  but the more completely parliament 
represents the nation, and government grows responsible, the 
less does the nation demand restrictions on sovereign power. 
Fundamental  laws  and  written  constitutions  are,  in  the 
main, expressions of  the distrust which a  people feels of  its 
government or a government feels of  its people. 
So  sovereignty  has  grown  with  popular  representation 
and popular  ed~cation.~  The revolution of  1688 weakened 
the king,  but  strengthened  the  crown.  The  reform  acts 
of  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  enfranchised 
masses  who  used  their  votes  to demand  more  and more 
governmental  activity; and a  cabinet  has at its disposal 
to-day a wealth of resource and a profusion of  powers beyond 
McIlwain, The High Court of  Pagfjament, pp. 271, 281-3,  329. 
So modem is our " sovereignty  that it is not even mentioned  in 
Cowell's Law Dictionary, and so different is its modern from  its medieval 
meanlng that we had early in the nineteenth century to adopt a variation 
of  the woe and  use  " suzerainty " to  express  what medieval  writers 
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the wildest dreams of  a Tudor or Stuart despot.  The royal 
prerogative, so long feared and disliked, grows by leaps and 
bounds, for the advice of  ministers  has become  the act of 
the crown, and ministers themselves the agents of the people. 
"  The  progress  of  constitutional  liberty  in this  country," 
it was  remarked long ago, "  is  shown not  so  much  by the 
actual restraints that have been  imposed upon the powers 
of  the crown, as by the efforts which  have  been  made  to 
render  the king's advisers responsible to parliament." l 
Thus  did  England  deal  with  the  problem  created  by 
the  monopoly  of  sovereignty  and  the  decay  of  medieval 
restraints.  Three  alternatives were  conceivable  as means 
for preventing  a  monstrous  tyranny.  Sovereignty  might 
be limited,  it might be divided,  or it might be kept intact 
but  entrusted  to  ministers  responsible  to  the  nation  for 
every detail of  its exercise.  Each of  these expedients was 
tried in turn by  England  during the seventeenth  century : 
experience taught it to prefer the third.  Influenced perhaps 
by  the short-lived  experiments of  the  Commonwealth and 
Protectorate,  but  more  by  the  exigencies  of  their  own 
situation, and misled  by  the superficial appearance  of  the 
British constitution and by deductions therefrom by French 
philosophers, the Americans chose the second, and constructed 
a constitution on the basis of  a divided sovereignty and on 
the dogma of  the separation of  powers.  They believed that 
undivided sovereignty meant unbridled  tyranny; and thcir 
descendants still maintain that the sovereignty of  parlia~~ient 
is a doctrine inapplicable to the United States, and therefore 
to any free imperial community.  The fiction that  there is, 
or ever was a separation of  powers in the English constitution, 
and  the  assumption that in that  separation  lies  the  sole 
guarantee for effective liberty, are based upon historical and 
other arguments which require further investigation. 
Nicolas, Proc. of  Privy Council, vol.  vi. Introd. p. cxl. 
CHAPTER  XI1 
THE  SEPARATION  OF  POWERS 
HOWEVER  closely  and  completely  an  institution  or  a 
constitution  may  be  studied  by  those  familiar  in  practice 
with  its working,  there  is always something further  to be 
learnt  by  regarding  it  from  a  distant  and  external  point 
of  view, by  examining  the  efforts  made at imitation, and 
even by investigating intelligent misconceptions of  its spirit 
and its working.  No  commentary on the British parliament 
is  more  illl~niinating  than  the  constitution  of  the  United 
States  of  America,  and  nothing  helps  to  understand  the 
sovereignty of  parliament  so clearly as the doctrine of  the 
separation  of  powers.  That  doctrine  was  dcduced  by 
Montesquieu  from  his  study  of  the  English  constitution 
in the first half  of  the eighteenth century;  it was accepted 
as  valid  by  Blackstone  a  generation  later;  and  it  was 
preached  with  unquestioning  fervour  and  conviction  by 
the  authors  of  the  American  federal  constitution  and of 
the State constitutions in which that Union abounds.  The 
division  of  the  functions  of  government  into  legislative, 
executive,  and  judicial  is  indeed  as  old  as  Athens  and 
Aristotle.  But Montesquieu "  was  the first to demonstrate 
that the separation of  governmental powers is indispensable 
to civil  liberty " ;  1  and the  American  constitution-"  the 
greatest government  God ever made,"  as it has been rashly 
called  by  an ex-president  of  the  United  States-was  the 
first to be constructed on that principle.  A few quotations 
will explain the meaning of  the doctrine and the fundamental 
importance that has been  attached to it. 
W.  Bondy, The Separatzon of  Governme~ztal  Poweus (Columbia Univer- 
sity), 1896, p. 13. 
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" When  the legislative and executive powers  are united 
in the same person or body,"  says Montesquieu, "  there can 
be  no  liberty "; and  again,  "  there  is  no  liberty  if  the 
judicial  power  be  not  separated from  the  legislative  and 
executive."  "  Wherever," declares Blackstone, "  the right 
of  making and enforcing the law is vested in the same man, 
or in one and the same body of  men, there can be no public 
liberty."  " I agree,"  echoed Alexander  Hamilton, "  that 
there is no liberty if  the power of  judging be not separated 
from  the legislative and  executive  powers."  Washington, 
in his farewell address, carried the argument a step further :  3 
"  the spirit of  encroachment,"  he  declared, "  tends to con- 
solidate the powers  of  all departments in one, and thus to 
create,  whatever  the  form  of  government,  a  real  despot- 
ism " ;  and the first constitution  of  Massachusetts, adopted 
in  1780,  attempted  to  guard  in  perpetuity  against  the 
danger.  "In the  government  of  this  commonwealth,"  it 
provides,  "  the legislative  department  shall  never  exercise 
the executive  and judicial  powers, or  either  of  them; the 
executive  shall  never  exercise the  legislative  and  judicial 
powers, or either of  them; the judiciary shall never exercise 
the legislative and executive powers,  or either of  them;  to 
the end that it may be  a  government  of  laws and not  of 
men." 
This is a far cry from Fleta's rex enim hnbet curiam suam 
ilz  co~zcilic  suo  in #arliamentis  suis ;  and an Englishman 
who is not overwhelmed by this weight  of  testimony, who 
is not convinced that this drastic separation of  powers has 
ever  existed, or exists in  England  to-day, and yet  is  per- 
suaded  that  his  country  is  not  quite  a  stranger  to  civil, 
religious, and political liberty, is tempted to put one or two 
preliminary  questions.  Firstly, if  this separation of  powers 
existed,  as  Montesquieu  and  Blackstone  believed  that  it 
did exist, in England and her colonies in the first half  of the 
eighteenth  century,  and if  this separation  of  powers  is  so 
unique  a  guarantee of  liberty  and so  sovereign  a  remedy 
1 Esprit des Lois, xi. c. 6.  P  Commentaries, 5th ed., i. 146. 
8  Bondy, p.  17.  Ibid.,  p.  19. 
against  despotism,  why was it necessary  for the American 
people to issue a declaration of  independence and resort to 
war  in  defence  of  their  liberties  and the  rights  of  man? 
Secondly, why, after that demonstration of  the inadequacy 
of the separation of powers to secure liberty, did the fathers 
of  the  Amerlcan  constitution  adopt  it  as their  palladium 
and enshrine it in the heart of  their constitutional affections  ? 
Thirdly, why, after the unanimous  acceptance and careful 
elaboration of  the principle,  was  it necessary  seventy-five 
years later to wage another and a still more terrible war to 
define  and  ensure  that  liberty  so  amply  guarded  by  the 
constitution?  And  fourthly,  what,  after  a  century  and 
more of  "  a government of  laws and not of  men,"  and after 
a double and triple assurance of  liberty, is the exact point 
of  a  presidential  campaign  with  "The  New  Freedom " 
as its war-cry ? l 
It is no part of my purpose to attempt an answer to any 
one  of  these  questions.  They  are  suggested  merely  in 
criticism  of  the  confident  assertion  that  liberty  cannot 
exist without  a  separation of  governmental powers, and of 
the optimistic assumption that with that separation liberty 
is secure;  and they may perhaps help to reassure some  of 
us in our belief  in English liberty, of  which we should other- 
wise  be  bereft.  For  assuredly  there  is  no  separation  of 
powers  in  the  British  constitution,  and  Montesquieu  was 
at fault alike in his  observation  and in the deductions  he 
made therefrom.  It was easy, indeed, to be misled on the 
point,  and as a  matter  of  fact  he  was  only  assuming  as 
accomplished  an  ideal  at which  the  house  of  commons 
deliberately  aimed  in  the  early  part  of  tlie  eighteenth 
century.  It was the age of  place bills ; distrust of  the crown 
was rampant since the days of  the later Stuarts; and all con- 
nexion between the court and the commons was considered 
corrupting.  Many attempts were therefore made to preserve 
the independence and purity of  the legislature by excluding 
from it all servants of  the crown,2 and thus establishing  a 
This was President Wilson's battle-cry in the election of  1912. 
a  The demand was put forward as early as 1536  in the Pilgrimage  of 
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complete  separation  between  the legislative  and  executive 
powers.  Montesquieu's mistake lay in his failure to realize 
that  the growth  of  the cabinet,  the pivot  of  the modern 
British  constitution, was  already  destroying  that  separa- 
tion.  It is more singular that Blackstone and the American 
lawyers  should  have  adopted  the  misconception,  though 
there was  some excuse for  failure  to discern  the responsi- 
bility  of  the  executive to the legislature  in  George  111's 
cabinets between  1763 and 1782. 
The fundamental unity of  governmental powers in England 
is apparent from the briefest survey of the constitution.  It 
is not a mere form that all powers, executive, legislative, and 
judicial, are vested in the crown.  Every item of legislation 
throughout  the  British  empire  is  enacted  by the  king,  in 
person  or by deputy; "  every single act of  administration, 
from the arrest of  a suspected criminal to the declaration of 
a war,  is in express terms his act.  The formula is carried 
out  logically and  minutely ; his  image  and  superscription 
appear on every coin, his monogram on every mailcart  . .  . 
he is every day plaintiff  in a thousand  suits and president 
of  a  hundred  courts." l  The  capacities  of  the  lord  chan- 
cellor are almost as varied  as those of the crown : he is the 
head of  the judicature,  he presides over one branch  of  the 
legislature, and he is an important member of  the supreme 
executive.  We have two supreme courts of appeal, the house 
of  lords and the judicial committee ;  one of  them is a branch 
of  the legislature, the other a  committee of  the executive 
council.  So far from there being a rigid separation between 
the legislature and the executive, there is the closest possible 
connexion.  Textbooks say that the legislature  controls the 
executive;  publicists  complain that the executive controls 
the legislaturr:.  The cabinet is part and parcel of  the legis- 
lature; and but for the presence of  ministers in the houses 
of  lords  and  commons,  parliament  would  be  unable  to 
discharge  it:;  constitutional functions. 
The judicature stands more apart, but there is no separa- 
tion  of  powers  or  even  of  persons.  Judges  are  lords  of 
The British Enzpivc, ed. A. F. Pollard,  1909,  pp. 169-70. 
parliament, they are appointed by the executive, and they 
can be removed on an address from  both houses of  parlia- 
ment.  Parliament itself is a court, and discharges judicial 
functions.  In private bill legislation, a committee of  either 
house  can  hear  counsel  on  both  sides  and  summon  and 
cross-examine witnesses.  Each house has its bar, to which 
petitioners and offenders  may be called.  Parliament can pass 
acts supplementary  to,  or overriding the verdicts  of  lower 
courts.  It has  passed  hundreds  of  acts granting  divorce 
which  could not be obtained  from the courts;  and by acts 
of  attainder and impeachments  has brought  many a  head 
to  the  scaffold.  Such  methods  may  not  recommend  the 
fusion of  powers to transatlantic critics;  but at the worst 
they  bear  comparison  with  the  presidential  assassinations 
and  lynching  of  negroes which  have  darkened  the abodes 
of  purer  democracy.  More  important  are the facts that 
parliament  defines and determines the law and the justice 
which the courts administer, and that no judge  can dispute 
the legality  of  an act of parliament.  Nor had parliament 
to wait on the  bench before it could  levy  an income-tax, 
legalize  trade unions,  or abolish trusts. 
This absence of delimitation is the natural characteristic of 
a constitution that has grown, and not been manufactured. 
l'tle separation of powers in politics corresponds to the fixity 
of  species  in  natural  science;  and both  ignore  evolution. 
But  the history of  parliament is mainly concerned with the 
evolution  of  institutions  from a  common  protoplasm  and 
with  their mutual  struggles  for recognition  and predomin- 
ance.  The  influence  of  common  origin  pervades  every 
branch  of  English  government,  and behind  all its specific 
functions there lies a fundamental unity symbolized by the 
crown.  But there has been specialization and differentiation, 
for  every  organism  which  fails  to  specialize becomes  in- 
efficient;  and we  have  firstly to trace  the differentiation 
which  gave  colour  to  Montesquieu's  fancied  separation; 
secondly, to indicate the limits which  made his interpreta- 
tion  fiction  and  not  fact;  and  thirdly,  to  inquire  how 
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which  seemed  so patent to the founders of  the  American 
constitution. 
We  revert  to  Fleta's  description  of  parliaments,  and 
find that his conception  of  a  composite body  consisting of 
court, council, and parliament  is  amply borne  out by  the 
records.  Doubtless  the executive was the earliest  and the 
most  prominent of  the composite functions of  government ; 
war begat the king, and his first duty was execution.  There 
was little scope for "  judgement " in primitive law, and less 
for legislation  under the rule  of  primitive  custom.  What 
judgement and legislation there was, was passed by the king, 
and it was only by a slow process of  differentiation that he 
partially  divested himself  of  the personal  exercise of  these 
functions.  The  Norman  and  Angevin  rulers  judged  and 
legislated as well as administered, and even under Edward I 
there  was  no  clear  discrimination.  When  the king  holds 
his  court  in his council in parliaments,  he  can  clearly  do 
anything; but it is also clear that the king in council can 
legislate  without  the  assistance  of  parliament.  Most  of 
Edward's  legislation  was  promulgated  before the  days  of 
his  Model  Parliament.  Even such separation of  powers as 
may  be  implied  in the requirement of  the assent of  lords 
and  commons  to  legislation  has  never  been  completely 
effected, and in 1872  the crown, in abolishing by an order 
in  council  the  purchase  of  army  commissions,  carried  a 
measure which had failed to pass the legislature. 
The  consent  of  a council to legislation  was,  no  doubt, 
secured in practice at  an early date, and probably Edward 1's 
council  assented  to all  his  enactments.  But, in  the  first 
place, the power of  the council to veto legislation has never 
been  formally  admitted;  its  constitutional  function  was 
merely to advise, and it is no  part of  the law of  the con- 
stitution that the crown must take the advice of  its council. 
The secrecy which has always enveloped  the  deliberations 
of  the executive in England  precludes any accurate know- 
ledge of the extent to which  English kings have overruled, 
or been overruled by, their councils ; and down to the reign 
of  George 111  it is  often impossible to determine how  far 
the  policy  of  the executive  was  that  of  the king  or  his 
ministers.  Secondly,  a  council  is  primarily  part  of  the 
executive,  and proof  of  its fullest  control  over legislation 
would  not establish any separation of  powers. 
The presence of  the king's council in parliament, and the 
extent of  its identity with  the lords of  parliament,  render 
it  well-nigh  impossible  to  distinguish  in  the middle  ages 
between the assent of  the council to legislation and the assent 
of  a  second  chamber;  and  for  indications  of  any  clear 
distinction between  executive  and legislative  functions  we 
have rather to look to the relations between the crown and 
the commons, who were no part of  the council.  The matter 
is  complicated by taxation.  Apart from the regular feudal 
aids and tallages, which  were regarded as rent rather than 
taxes, and therefore required no consent for their exaction, 
there was never  any idea that the crown could tax its sub- 
jects  without  their  consent ; and taxes were  considered as 
voluntary grants made to the king by the estates in parlia- 
ment.  Not  until towards the close of  the middle ages did 
taxation take even the form of  legislation; l and the grant 
of  taxation  is  only  germane  to  the  separation  of  powers 
in  so far as the control of  supplies enabled the commons to 
assert an influence over legislation. 
The  claim  of  the commons  to a  voice  in  legislation  is 
supposed to have been finally established by the statute of 
York in 1322.~ It is probably nearer the truth to say that 
the claim was then first advanced ;  and before we can accept 
even this modified version, various qualifications have to be 
made.  Firstly,  if  the  claim  extended  to  all  legislation, 
centuries  elapsed  before it was  completely, admitted,  and 
there  is  at least  plausibility  in the contention that it was 
only understood  to apply to what  would  be  called  to-day 
constitutional  changes  or  alterations  of  fundamental law, 
leaving the king in council still free to legislate in ordinary 
The earlier grants were made in the form of  an indenture;  and even 
when we come to "  acts for a tenth,"  etc., they often contain indentures. 
'  Statutes of  the Realm, i. 189;  Report on the Dignity of  a Peer, i. 282-3; 
Hallam,  Middle  Ages,  ed. 1878, iii.  233;  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist.,  ed. 1887, 
u. 369, 628. 
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matters  by  means  of  ordinances1  Magna  Carta,  the 
Confirmatio Cartaram, and the Articuli super Cartas, were 
undoubtedly  regarded  as  fundamental law;  and the com- 
mons,  in  asserting  a  voice  in  legislation,  would  naturally 
begin  with  the more  obvious,  moderate,  and conservative 
claim, instead of  with a sweeping radical pretension.  But, 
further, it must  be  remembered  that "the commonalty  of 
the realm,"  on whose behalf the claim is made, is a phrase 
of  very vague  meaning.  It may or  may  not  include  the 
city and borough representatives ;  it may or may not exclude 
the clerical proctors, but it cannot safely be identified with 
the  still  undeveloped  house  of   common^.^  It  is  quite 
possible,  moreover,  that  the real  emphasis of  the  statute 
is not upon "  commonalty " at all, but upon the phrase "  in 
parliaments " ; and on  this interpretation the statute was 
better observed than on any other.  Its meaning would then 
be  that matters of  state were to be  determined  in  parlia- 
ments, and not in great councils, albeit great councils some- 
times  contained  representatives  of  cities  and boroughs  as 
well  as prelates, earls, barons, and knights,  and continued 
to be  summoned  throughout the middle  ages.  There was 
certainly a well-recognized distinction between the functions 
of  parliaments  and great councils, though the subject has 
received comparatively little attenti~n.~  Finally the mere 
silence of  a public meeting, such as the assembly of  estates 
was  before  the  organization  of  the  house  of  commons, 
would  be  taken as giving  consent.  No  real  consent,  and 
therefore  no  approach  to  a  distinct  share  in  legislation, 
can  be  claimed  for  the  commons  until  it is  expressed in 
documentary  forms. 
Ten years later, however, we  have in the records  of  the 
parliament  of  March  1332,  the  definite  statement  that 
certain  measures  "  ordained"  by  the  earls,  barons,  and 
1 G.  T.  Lapsley  in  Engl.  Hist.  Rev.  xxviii.  118-24; Tout, Reign  of 
Edwfrd II,  pp. 150-1 ; Conway Davies, Baronial Opposition to Ed. II,  1918. 
a  Whenever you meet that word ' commonalty ' in ancient proceedings, 
you must translate it a community not the commons " (Palgrave in Ksp. 
on Public Petitions, 1833. xii. 21). 
3ee  below, Chap. xiv. 
other magnates were read before them, the king, the knights 
of  the  shires,  and  the  gentz  du  comman,  were  found 
pleasing to them  all,  and were  fully  agreed  t0.l  Further 
progress is marked in 1340, when twelve knights of  the shire 
and  six  borough  members  were  added  to a  committee of 
prelates,  earls,  and  barons  to  try  and  examine  certain 
petitions  et  de  les  mettre  en  e~tatut.~  In  1343  there  is 
fuller evidence of  the activity of  the commons : not  only 
is  their  advice  asked,  and  articles  drafted  by  the  lords 
submitted for their consent, but they add provisions of  their 
own,  and  the  ensuing  statutes  are  said  to  have  been 
"  ordained " by  la  commune  as well  as by  the king  and 
the  peers3  These  proceedings imply the existence of  that 
machinery  for  deliberation  and  the  expression  of  opinion 
wlthout  wh.ch  consent  was  the  merest  form;  but  they 
do not imply any recognition of  the claim that the assent of 
the commons was  indispensable to legislation, and in spite 
of the repeal of  the 1382 statute against heretic preachers! 
there remained a sphere of ecclesiastical legislation which the 
commons did not dispute. 
The distinction between statute and ordinance contintzed 
obscure till the sixteenth century ;  and the province of  pro- 
clamations was contested into the seventeenth.  Sir Thomas 
Smith, no despiser of  parliaments, tells us that "  the prince 
useth  to dispense with laws made ";  and even the Whigs, 
at the revolution of  1688,  while  abolishing the suspeuding 
power,  only  abolished  the  power  of  dispensation "  as  it 
hath  been  exercised of  late."  There  were  famous  orders 
in  council during the Napoleonic wars;  and if  it had not 
been  possible in  1906-7  to legislate by  similar  means,  the 
Transvaal  and  Orange  River  colonies  might  not  have  re- 
ceived responsible government yet.  Over vast areas within 
the  British  empire  the  crown  can  legislate  without  the 
sanction  of  parliament ; nowhere  can  parliament  legislate 
without  the sanction of  the crown;  no important measure 
Rot. Purl.,  ii. 65.  Ibid., ii. 113. 
Ibid., ii. 135-9.  See above, p.  210. 
Cf.  Rot. Parl., ii.  12;  Nicolas, Pvoc.  of  Privy Council, vol. iii. pp.  vi, 
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can  pass  without  the goodwill  of  the  executive  cabinet; 
and legislation by means  of  departmental regulation tends 
to increase.  From the top to the bottom of  our  constitu- 
tion,  from  the  privy  council  down  to  county  councils, 
borough councils, district councils, and parish councils, every 
administrative  body  possesses,  within  limits  laid  down by 
the  law,  legislative  powers  as  well.  The  notion  that 
the  executive  "  should  never  exercise  the  legislative  and 
judicial  powers or either of  them " is one which could only 
commend itself  to an unsophisticated community with the 
simple  conceptions  of  the  first  constitution  of  Massa- 
chusetts.  So  far  from  the  separation  of  powers  being  a 
constitutional  dogma in the British  empire,  it is regarded 
as almost unconstitutional-and  in the Australian Common- 
wealth  it is positively illegal-for  an executive minister to 
be long without a seat in one or other branch of  the legis- 
lature.  The crown  has  dissociated  itself  from  no  powers 
and  no  functions  of  government  whatsoever :  it  has 
associated  with  itself  in  the  exercise of  those  powers  an 
ever-widening  circle  of  popular  representation,  and  every 
extension  of  that  circle  has  added  to  the  strength  and 
unitv of the will expressed by the crown. 
Imperfect  and  superficial  as  has  been  the  separation 
between  the executive and legislative  powers,  the  divorce 
between  the executive and the judicature  has hardly been 
more  complete.  Between  council  and  curia a  distinction 
is  barely  discoverable  in  the  reign  of  Edward  I.  The 
judges  are all members of  the council ; the supreme arbiter 
of  differences  between  the  lower  courts  is  a  common 
session in  council in  parliament;  and it is  to the council 
that  petitions  in  parliament  against  judicial  abuses  are 
referred.  It is true that from the days of  Henry 11 certain 
members  of  the  council  are  assigned  for  specific  judicial 
purposes,  and  that  their  specialized  functions  crystallize 
into the  three  courts  of  common  law, king's  bench,  ex- 
chequer, and common pleas;  but it was long before the idea 
of "  once  a  judge,  always  a  judge " obtained.  Judges  of 
the  common  law  courts were  often  employed in executive 
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functions, and the temporary "  assignment " of  commissions 
of knights and others for judicial purposes was of  constant 
occurrence;  even  to-day  there  is  no  fixed  line  between 
judicial and other functions, and laymen are often employed 
in judicial inquiries.  We are told, indeed, that about 1345 
the  judges  of  the  three  courts  cease  to  be  sworn  of  the 
counci1.l  But in Richard  11's reign they are still assessors 
or advisers of  the council for legal purposes, and parliament 
insists on their presence in the council  on these  occasions. 
Late in the reign of  Henry V1 they are still in attendance, 
though they protest that they are of  the council for matters 
of  law and not of  p~litics.~  In Tudor  times the two chief 
justices  were  commonly  members  of  the  privy  council, 
and down to the present day all law lords and lords justices 
of  appeal  are sworn privy  councillors, while  a  committee 
of  the council exercises the functions of  a supreme court of 
appeal  for vast  areas  of  jurisdiction.  If  one  of  our  two 
supreme  courts  of  appeal  is  a  branch  of  the  legislature, 
the other is a committee of  the executive council. 
Moreover, the abandonment of the council by the common 
law judges did not in the least involve a separation between 
the  judicial  and  executive  functions  of  the  council.  It 
simply emphasized the abandonment to the council of  all 
jurisdiction which could not be brought within the narrowing 
and hardening frontiers  of  the common  law, a  process to 
which  the need  for Tudor  despotism  has ingeniously been 
attrib~ted.~  For  it left  enormous  and  growing  fields  of 
jurisdiction  unprovided with  any judge  except  the council 
and its offshoots.  Equity was thus left to the executive; 
chancery  was  the  king's  council  in  ~hancery,~  the  star 
chamber  was  its  sessions  for  dealing  with  over-mighty 
subjects, the court of  requests its sessions for hearing poor 
men's  complaints,  and  the  councils  of  the  North  and  of 
Wales were  its  provincial  delegacies.  Nor  was  it ~nly  in 
'  Baldwin, King's Council in the Middle Ages, p. 76. 
Ibid., pp. 205; cf. Nicolas,  Proc. of  Privy  Council, i.  76,  ii.  304,  iii. 
"2,  132, 151, 313 ; the council  still remained a  curia. 
Cf. Nicolas, i. 297-8. 
Baldwin. pp. 241--2  ;  Nicolas, iii. 36. THE SEPARATION  OF POWERS  247 
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the sphere of  central  government that administrative and 
judicial  functions were combined.  The union is still more 
marked in the activities of  the justices of  the peace.  They 
administered  the  statutes  of  labourers  and  apprentices, 
the vagrancy acts and the  poor  law;  and they acted  also 
in  petty  and  quarter  sessions  in  a  judicial  capacity.  In 
spite of  a  multiplicity of  local government acts, this  com- 
bination continues to this day, and to enforce a separation 
of powers we should have to send to the scrap-heap our whole 
system of  magistracy.  We  should  also have  to break  up 
our courts-martial, our consular courts, and our ecclesiastical 
courts, in all of  which  executive officers act judicial  parts. 
The  affairs  of  the  British  empire  cannot  be  managed  on 
the lines of  the original constitution of  Massachusetts ; and 
the doctrine of  the separation of  powers was an ingenuous 
attempt to reduce the infinite con~plexity  of  human govern- 
ment  to the sublime  simplicity  of  a  constitutional  rule  of 
three. 
So  far we  have been  dealing with  the retention  by the 
executive  of  legislative  and  judicial  functions.  A  similar 
refusal to obey the rules of  abstract political science is seen 
in  the  retention  by  the  leg~slature of  its hold  over  the 
executive and judicial  powers, and in the retention  by the 
judicature of  no slight power of  making law.  In the days 
of  Edward  I  and his  immediate  successors, when  parlia- 
ments met three times a year, a good deal of  administrative 
work was discussed and done in parliaments, and the " Rolls " 
contain  pages  of  details which  read  exactly  like the later 
"  Acts of  the Privy Council."  But the expansion and popu- 
larization  of  parliament,  and its development  into estates 
and houses, made it less and less suitable for the transaction 
of  administrative business.  This was withdrawn more and 
more from the cognizance of  the  king's  council  in  parlia- 
ment to that of  the king's council out of  parliament, and the 
council  itself  became  less  a  magnum  co~zsilizrm  and  more 
a  consilium  privatum,  secretzr?~~,  or  continuum.  But  the 
council  remained  an integral  part  of  the  legislature;  the 
lord  chancellor  presided  in  the  parliament  chamber, 
he was a peer or not, and secretaries of  state were 
given  by  statute in  Ij39 official  seats  on  the  woolsacks. 
The  presence of  privy councillors in parliament  was not  a 
Tudor  novelty  introduced  to  influence  its  decisions,  but 
a practice handed down  from the reign of  Edward  I; the 
novelty consisted in their presence in the house of  commons 
rather than in the parliament chamber, and illustrates the 
growing  importance  of  the  commons  rather  than  the 
servility of  the electors.  They were then, as they are now, 
the means through which the wishes of  the legislature were 
impressed, if  not imposed, upon the crown. 
This  link  between  the  executive  and  legislature  was 
never,  in  spite of  place  bills,  broken;  and the more  the 
actual  details  of  administration  were  withdrawn  from 
parliament,  the  more  it began  to insist  upon  the  general 
responsibility  of  ministers.  Impeachments  and  acts  of 
attainder  kept  the  principle  alive  from  the  reign  of 
Edward  I11  to  the  Revolution,  when  more  refined  and 
effective methods for achieving that end were devised in the 
practices of  voting supplies and legalizing the maintenance 
of  the  army and navy for one year only at a time, and of 
refusing the means of  carrying on government to ministers 
of  whom  the  commons  did not  approve.  The control  of 
the  executive  by  the  legislature  is  not  laid  down  as  a 
principle in any law of  the constitution;  it is none the less 
the essence of  the constitution, and it is a contradiction in 
terms  to  attribute  a  separation  of  governmental  powers 
to  a  constitution  the  essence  of  which  consists  in  the 
control  of  one  by  the  other. 
The  connexion  between  legislature  and  judicature  has 
throughout  English  history  remained  no  less  intimate. 
Parliaments began in a court of  law :  their original functions, 
indeed, seem to be hardly distinguishable from those of  the 
later chancery;  their  forms  of  proceeding  by  writs,  bills, 
and  petitions  were  identical, and in  many  minute details 
they  still  preserve  evidence  of  their  common  origin.  To 
devise new remedies for new wrongs, to hear and determine 
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differed, were  the oft-enunciated  purposes  of  parliaments. 
The  core  of  every  parliament  was  a  session  of  judges  in 
council, and the earliest pictorial representation of  the parlia- 
ment chamber shows that its inmost circle consisted of  four 
woolsacks arranged vis-a-vis to facilitate intimate confabula- 
tion (q).  On the upper woolsack sits the chancellor, on the 
sacks to his right and left: the justices of  the Iring's bench and 
of  common pleas, and the master of the rolls, and opposite 
him the masters in chancery.  Behind the judges there sit, 
in outer rings, the bishops and abbots to the right and the 
temporal peers to the left; and below the bar, opposite the 
chancellor, stand  the  Speaker  and  the  commons;  and  all 
these  elements  represent  the  legislative  accretion  on  the 
judicial  core.  No  assembly organized  from  the beginning 
as a legislative body would have assumed the configuration 
of  the parliament chamber. 
The  distinction  between  judicature  and legislation  goes 
back,  however,  a  long  way;  and  its  earliest  traces  may 
perhaps  be  found  in  the  distinction  made  in  chancery 
between judicial and original writs.  The former might issue 
as matters "  of  course,"  de  cursu, but "  the granting of 
specially-worded writs was regarded as an important matter, 
which required grave counsel and consideration  . . . it was 
no  judicial  act."  l  In time  it  was  thought  that  only  a 
parliament  could  devise  new  remedies  and  ordain  new 
forms of  procedure, that is  to say,  that only  parliament 
could legislate.  This, however, was a limitation of  chancery 
and  not  of  parliament,  and  there  was  no  suggestion 
that  delays  and abuses  arising  out  of  common  litigation 
could not be redressed by bills and petitions in parliament. 
The gradual loss of  judicial business by parliament was due 
to its  political  de~elopment,~  to the growing  rarity  of  its 
sessions compared with the permanence of  the council and 
chancery, and to the development  of  "  common"  petitions 
as  a  means  of  dealing  with  grievances  which  were  most 
1 Maitland,  Collected  Papers, ii. 122-3:  Pike, Cogzst.  Hist.  of  House  of 
Lo~ds,  p. 296.  See above, p. 39 and Appendix 111, note If). 
2  See above, pp.  128-31. 
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widely  felt  and  enlisted  the  greatest  support.  But  even 
when individual petitions come to be habitually referred to 
the council and chancery, the answers are given  per  auctori- 
tatem parZiame?zti, and continue for a while to be entered on 
the "  Rolls."  l  It is an instance of  delegation of  functions, 
not  of separation  of powers.  The legislature long retained 
in its hands the power of  punishing state offenders by means 
of  impeachment and  acts of  attainder, or, in  other words, 
of  dealing  judicially  with  persons  whose  influence  might 
render  them  immune  from  lower  courts  or whose  offences 
could not easily be brought  within the four corners of  the 
common  law.  It also  retains  judicial  authority  over  its 
own precincts,  members, and servants.  Evcn the claim of 
the commons to hear the evidence against Thomas Seymour 
in 1549  and their condemnation of  Floyd in 1621  were based 
upon  precedent,%ad  represent attempts to retain  a  share 
in the common inheritance of  parliament, and not  a spirit 
of  radical  innovation.  In the same way, the  reference of 
individual petitions  to courts  of  law  did  not  preclude  the 
passing  of  private  acts  of  parliament  to  grant  relief  or 
impose  disabilities  where  other  means  might  fail : down 
to  1857  an  act  of  parliament  was  the  only  means  of 
annulling  a  valid  marriage.  It  is  to  the house  of  lords 
that  appeal  lies from  the  civil courts  in the British  Isles, 
and  the  distinction  between  the  house  of  lords  as  a 
legislative  chamber  and  the  house  as  a  court  of  appeal 
is  merely  one  of  practice,  and  is  no  part  of  the  law 
of  the constitution.  Finally,  while parliament will  rarely, 
if  ever,  intervene  nowadays  to reverse  a  judicial  decision, 
it  will  and does  intervene  to  reverse  the principles 'upon 
which  that decision  has been  based;  and by  passing  acts 
of  indemnity it can bar judicial action in multitudes of  cases 
in which  the logic of  common law would inflict intolerable 
injustice. 
The withdrawal of  the judicature from executive functions 
1 Nicolas, Proc.  of  Privy Council,  i. 73, ii. 307,  309, v. p. xi: Leadam. 
Star Chamber, i. pp. xxiii-xxiv;  see above, p. 128. 
See below, p. 309, n.  2. 
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has been  a  more  comprehensive,  but  still  a  gradual  and 
an  incomplete  process.  The  prerogative  courts  of  the 
Tudor period were councils as well ; and the justices of  the 
peace did most of  the work of  local government till late in 
the  nineteenth  century.  A  lord  chief  justice  sat  in  the 
cabinet as late as the same century, and the lord chancellor 
continues to do so to-day.  Lords  justices were frequently 
appointed to  govern England during the reigns of  William 111, 
and even the first two Georges, when the king was abroadY1 
and lords  justices  have  governed Ireland  for  considerable 
periods  of  its  history.  Judges  have  acted  as  colonial 
governors in all  parts  of  the British  empire,  and  some of 
the greatest  founders  of  New  England, like  Bradford  and 
Winthrop,  combined in their persons  the supreme judicial 
and executive functions, without presumably entailing upon 
those  colonies  the  deplorable  consequences  deduced  from 
the  combination  by  the  framers  of  the  constitution  of 
Massachusetts.  It was,  however,  to  the  government  of 
men  that  those  logicians seem  to have  had  the  greatest 
objection. 
Their boldest  effort was to deprive the judicature  of  all 
control over legislation.  In England, as we  have seen, the 
judges  practically made the laws in the middle ages, and a 
chief  justice alleged the fact in court to support his under- 
standing of  a  statute.  Baronial  jealousy,  however, which 
insisted that judges were  mere  ministers of  the crown and 
could  not  be  peers,  succeeded  by  Richard  11's  reign  in 
reducing  their  status in  the high  court  of  parliament  to 
that  of  mcre  advisers without a  vote;  and in 1586, when 
they  fell  foul  of  the  privilege  claimed  by the commons 
over  the  Norfolk  election  case,  that house,  too,  resolved 
that "  though the lord chancellor and judges were competent 
judges  in their proper courts, yet  they were  not in parlia- 
ment."  It  is  not  unlikely  that  this limitation applied 
originally only to that function of  the judicature about which 
the barons were most sensitive, namely, the trial of  peers. 
1 See Prof. E. R. Turner in Engl. Hist. Rev.,  xxix. 5453-76. 
2  Prothero, Select  Documents, p. 130. 
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But the statute of  I539  clearly states that no one under the 
degree of  a  baron,  although  he were lord  chancellor, lord 
treasurer, lord privy seal, lord president of  the king's council 
or ch~ef  secretary, and sat in the parliament chamber in virtue 
of his office, "  could have any interest to give any assent or 
dissent  in  the  said  house."  The  anomaly  of  having  a 
lord  chancellor to preside over a  house in which  he "  had 
no  interest  to give  any assent  or  dissent " was  gradually 
removed  by the practice  of  creating the  lord  chancellor a 
peer, though the rule did not become invariable until after 
the reign  of  Queen  Anne.  The  cause  of  the anomaly  by 
which judges sat in a house in which they had no votes was 
the removal  of  the business  for which  their  presence was 
primarily  required, to another sphere.  "  In proportion  as 
this  channel  enlarged, i. e.  direct  access  of  petitioners  to 
the council, chancery, etc.,  instead  of  via  parliament,  the 
number  of  parliamentary  petitions  decreased.  Equity 
continued to gain rapidly  upon  parliament,  and about the 
time of  Edward  IV, when equity was fully established, the 
remedial  jurisdiction  of  parliament  wholly  ceased, and  it 
does not appear to have been revived  to any extent until 
the time of  James  I."  The lords recovered their  jurisdic- 
tion  after the  fall  of  the  prerogative  system  under  the 
Stuarts;  and  the  anonlaly  of  judges  sitting  in  a  house 
which  dealt  with  no  jodicial  business  was  subsequently 
eclipsed by the anomaly of  an assembly of  hereditary peers 
exercising a  suprcme appellate  jurisdiction  independently, 
or even in defiance of, their judicial  adviser^.^ 
But the denial of  votes to the judges  in the house of  lords 
did not  dispose of  their  influence over  legislation.  It has 
been claimed by a lawyer that in the fifteenth century "  the 
class legislation of  parliament was defeated by the national 
31  Henry VIII,  c. 10. 
'  Palgrave,  Report  on  Public  Petitions  (Parl. Papers),  1833, xii.  19; 
McIlwain, p.  133 ; Maitland, Memoranda, p. xxxiii.  Palgrave's statement 
probably requires a good deal of  qualification;  it may be due to the fact 
that parliameotary petitions for the period  are not in the Record  Office, 
but at  Westminster. 
" The decision  of  the house  of  lords on  the right  of  the  crown  to 
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legislation of the judges " ;  and Coke points out that the 
judicial decision in Taltarum or Talcarne's  case  effected a 
reform which had been  often  rejected  in  parliament.  The 
year books of  Henry VII contain ample evidence that before 
legislation  was  introduced into either  house  its  principIes 
were discussed and settled by the judges in common session. 
'Thus they laid down the principle of  Poynings' law nine years 
before  it was  enacted;  they  defined the law  of  attainder 
before  bills  were  introduced  to  give  it  effect;  and  they 
decided that an act was not valid unless passed by the house 
of  ~ornrnons.~  Statutes,  indeed,  were  still  regarded  as 
measures  to give  effect  to the  law  as  interpreted  by  the 
judges.  Bacon's  encomium  on  the  practice  of  frequent 
consultation  between  the  crown  and the  judges  was  sug- 
gested by his historical reading ; and James  1's predilection 
for  it  was  no  constitutional  innovation.  It can  only  be 
regarded  as unconstitutional  in  the  light  of  ex  Post  facto 
generalizations  from  later  constitutional  practice.  The 
practice  admired  by  Bacon  was  no  doubt  objectionable 
from  the democratic  point  of  view,  because  it  made  the 
judges  the final  arbiters  of  the liberties  and  laws  of  the 
English people so long as parliament  could be  muzzled  or 
suppressed.  But the remedy  did not  lie in increasing the 
separation  of  powers.  Judges  make  a  great  deal  of  law 
to-day : they do  so even  in  the  United  States, in spite of 
the paper guarantees of  "  a government of  laws and not of 
men." 
The  truth is, that human  affairs cannot  be  cut  up into 
mathematical  portions  and  confined  in  logical  categories. 
The  separation  of  powers  is  a  will  o'  the wisp,  and the 
rigid restriction  on  paper  of  the  United  States judicature 
to strictly judicial functions  has, in point  of  fact, enabled 
it to determine all sorts of  political, executive, and legislative 
questions.  A  legislative  veto  is  a  legislative  power,  and 
the  veto of  the  supreme court on American legislation has 
1 Mr. (now Justice)  Scrutton, The Land in Fetters, p. 76. 
2  My  Reign  of  Henry  VII, ii.  10-11,  iii.  292-4 ; Vinogradoff, 
"  Constitutional History and the year-Booksl'in  Law  Quarterly  Review. 
xxix. 1-12;  McIlwain, p. 325. 
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been  as effective as ever  was  the royal  veto  in  England. 
Without  the  leave  of  the  judicature  no  trade  could  be 
defined  by  the  legislature  as  a  dangerous  occupation, 
no  limit  could  be  set  to  hours  of  labour,  no  restraint 
imposed  on  the  conditions  of  employment,  no  measure 
taken to further social reform, because such measures always 
involve some restraint  on  somebody's  liberty or property, 
and according to the constitution no such restraint could be 
imposed "  without  due process of  law,"  by which is meant, 
not  due legislation, but judicial  procedure.  In the United 
States the solution of  the problems of  social reform depends 
more upon  the judicature  than  upon  the legislature.  By 
declaring an income-tax unconstitutional  the supreme court 
compelled the legislature  to devise  other forms of  taxation 
until the constitution was amended;  and it thus controlled 
taxation as well  as legislation;  for  a  particular  course of 
action can always  be  dictated  by the authority which can 
veto all alternatives. 
Nor does the separation of  powers prevent that arbitrary 
exercise of them, which the framers of  the American constitu- 
tion dreaded  so intensely.  It is  rather thereby facilitated, 
for  within  its  sphere  each  authority  is  irresponsible  and 
unchecked ;  and each department is, under the constitution, 
the final and exclusive judge of  its own competence.  Each 
of  the  powers  of  government  in  the  United  States  has 
greater opportunities for arbitrary action than in England. 
Every  legislative  body  is,  for  instance, the arbiter of  the 
validity of  its own elections, a system that produced many 
scandals  in  England  until  it  was  abolished  by  reference 
to the judges.  Within the executive  sphere the president 
can do what he likes for his prescribed four years ;  no popular 
agitation, no  vote of  censure by  the legislature  can  drive 
him from office, and the only practical means of  removal is 
assassination.  He can, indeed, be impeached, but only for 
crime and not for his policy.  Nothing, too, can dissolve the 
legislature before its term is finished, and neither legislature 
nor executive can correct an interpretation of  the law by the 
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conscience  it  may  be.  There  is  a  total  absence  of  that 
mutual responsibility and control  which  has proved  a  far 
better safeguard of  liberty in England than has the separa- 
tion of  powers in the United States. 
Here, the legislature  can  turn  out the executive or  the 
executive dissolve the legislature at almost any moment  in 
response to a national  outcry.  Either can force an appeal 
to the people, on this condition, that it is willing itself  to 
submit to the same arbitrament.  There is nothing sacrosanct 
or fixed about the cabinet's tenure of  office or the duration 
of  parliament;  a  parliament  may  be  dissolved  at  a 
premier's  nod,  and  3  cabinet  will  not  last  a  month 
unless  it  possesses  the  confidence  of  the  legislature.  Its 
conduct of  affairs is reviewed in the legislature day by  day 
by  means of  questions  and answers, and, if  necessary,  by 
motions  for adjournment or  of  want  of  confidence.  Even 
the  judicature  is  not  exempt  from  responsibility;  it  is 
true that judges are seldom removed  by the formal means 
of  an address of  both houses of  parliament, but  informal 
hints that such might be necessary are not so rare, and are 
as  a  rule  effective.  A  more  salutary check  on  judicial 
extravagance  is the knowledge that decisions like some of 
those  pronounced  by  supreme  courts  in  America  would 
precipitate  acts of  parliament  preventing  their  repetition. 
This system of  mutual responsibility is at once the effect 
and the cause of  confidence, which is the basis of  the con- 
stitution of the British empire.  The keynote of  the Ameri- 
can constitution was, on the other hand, distrust-distrust 
of  the  government  and  also  distrust  of  the  people.  The 
fundamental assumption was  that every  man is by nature 
not free, but a tyrant.  "  It is,"  declared John  Adams, " by 
balancing  each of  these three powers against the other two 
that the efforts in human nature toward tyranny can alone 
be checked and restrained, and any degree of  freedom pre- 
served."  1  They were not to co-operate for the production 
of  good, but to counterwork one another for the prevention 
of  evil.  It was assumed that each would do wrong unless 
Quoted in Bondy, p. 17. 
it  was  checked;  and the  people  could  not  be  trusted to 
check them.  Congress cannot force an appeal to the people 
against  an obstinate president,  nor  the  president  against 
an obstructive  congress.  The president's  telm was  fixed, 
and  re-election  discouraged, lest  he should by long tenure 
of  office so corrupt the electorate, or create by means of  the 
system of  spoils so powerful a party machine that he would 
become  dictator  and the electors helpless.  He was  to be 
prevented  from governing  badly,  and not  encouraged  by 
governing well  to look forward to a renewal of  the nation's 
confidence.  Indeed, the people were not to elect him at all, 
but a college of prudent men better fitted to choose a ruler 
for the people  than the people themselves.  The idea of  a 
people finding its ablest men and trusting them so long as 
they are able and willing to serve it, still seems foreign to 
the United States, and the framers of  the constitution did 
their  best  to hamper the process and harness the popular 
will.  Theirs  was  the  age  of  paternal  despots,  but  rarely 
has  paternal  despotism  laid  its dead  hand  on  the future 
with greater effect than in the rigid conditions of  government 
which  the  United  States  constitution  imposed  on  four 
generations of  freemen. 
This fundamental distrust,l expressed  in the separation 
of  powers, explains the reason why American efficiency, so 
marked in private concerns, has been so fettered in govern- 
ment.  The constitution  was framed under  the dominance 
of  the old  popular  prejudice  that there must  always  be  a 
fundamental antagonism between the interests and instincts 
of  the government and those of the governed.  No one could 
really be trusted with the exercise of  sovereign power.  It 
was  therefore  put  under  the lock  and key  of  a  rigid  and 
written  constitution, and such  powers  as were  permitted 
exercise  were  divided.  Thus  the  American  legislator 
attempts to legislate without  the co-operation  and advice 
of  the expert in  administration, and the administration is 
isolated  from  the wholesome  influence derived  from  daily 
contact  with  a  popularly  elected  congress.  The  expert, 
"  Freegovernment is founded in jealousy, not in confidence "  (Jefferson 
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indeed, is reserved  for private adventures and not  for the 
public  service;  and conditions  which  no  American  would 
tolerate in his private business are regarded with equanimity 
in the affairs of  the nation.  The civil servants of  the state 
are treated  as no  individual  would  treat  those  on  whose 
service  he  relies.  Ambassadors  are  relegated  to  private 
life at every change of  government;  they are paid on such 
a  beggarly scale that wealth, and not  capacity is the first 
requisite  for a.  diplomatist;  and  even a  secretary of  state 
has been driven to eke out subsistence by lecturing tours. 
The public conscience is indifferent to these details, because 
the  public  believes  in  private  enterprise,  but  does  not 
realize  the  claims  of  efficient  national  government.  The 
separation  of  powers  is an expression of  this distrust  and 
indifference, and helps  to  explain  why  American  politics 
are unattractive to so many American minds. 
There were good reasons for the adoption of  that principle 
in  the eighteenth  century,  but  those  reasons  are  passing 
away.  Distrust  of  sovereignty  was  the  natural  product 
of  centuries  during  which  it  had  been  exercised  in  the 
interests of  the sovereign and not in  those  of  the  people; 
and  confidence  grows  slowly  in  a  people  with  few  com- 
mnnications.  The  previous  independence  of  one  another 
enjoyed  by  the  thirteen  colonies,  and  the  vast  extent 
over  which  their  scattered  and heterogeneous  population 
was  spread, engendered  distrust  of  a common sovereignty. 
Subsequent  extensions  of  territory  and the mighty  influx 
of  alien immigrants with no ideas in common delayed the 
consolidation  to be  expected  from  the  development  of 
communications, the filling up of  vacant territory, and the 
pressure  of  external  forces.  The  alien  immigrant  still 
provides the "  boss " with the raw material for his machine- 
made politics, and feeds the public distrust of  a government 
subject  to such  manipulation.  When  the "  hyphenated " 
American disappears, the "  hyphenated " system of  govern- 
ment  by  separation  of  powers  will  go  with  it;  and  an 
American nation will  trust a national government  with the 
full  powers of  sovereignty. 
The separation of powers will then be reduced to its true 
proportions as a specialization of  functions.  That has been 
the limit of  differentiation in English government.  Execu- 
tive, legislature, and judicature  have been  evolved from a 
common  origin,  and  have  adapted  themselves  to specific 
purposes, because without  that  specialization  of  functions 
English  government  would  have  remained  rudimentary 
and inefficient.  But there has been no division of  sovereignty 
and  no  separation  of  powers.  The  head  cannot  do  the 
work of  the heart, nor the hand that of  the foot;  but that 
is  no  reason  for  disconnecting  them  one  from  the  other, 
and endowing each with  a  will  of  its own.  Above  all we 
need  a brain  and a  conscience to move  every limb  at will 
and  without  the  abnormal  exertion  of  recourse  to  the 
cumbrous  machinery  of  reconstitution.  We  need  not 
dissolve our unity of  will  in a trinity of  powers;  and that 
unity of  will is expressed by the crown in parliament. THE CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT  259 
CHAPTER  XI11 
THE  CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT 
THE  establishment  of  sovereignty  in  parliament  secured 
unity of  power, but did not determine its distribution among 
the various elements which made  up that composite body; 
and Ilie forms of  the constitution were  equally compatible 
with  monarchy,  aristocracy,  or  democracy.  Whichever 
element  prevailed  would  have national  sovereignty  at its 
disposal,  but  there  was  no  clear  indication  which  that 
element  would  be.  Each  of  the  factors  in  parliament, 
crown,  lords,  and commons, has  claimed at different times 
a predominant share in the partnership ; and  from  the end 
of  the  Tudor  harmony  to  the  passing  of  the  parliament 
act in  1911  the struggles  between  them have  filled many 
pages  of  constitutional  history.  The  crown  was  clearly 
the  effective  factor  in  parliament  under  Edward  I,  and 
with  considerable fluctuations it retained  its predominance 
until the Stuart period.  That predominance was, however, 
disputed  by  the  lords, whose  constitutional  influence was 
exerted  in the  middle  ages  by  means  of  the  council  in 
parliament, and in  modern  times  by  means  of  the  peers 
in parliament.  The reform bill  of  1832 initiated  the  pre- 
dominance of  the commons in parliament  which was  com- 
pleted  by  the  parliament  act  of  1911.  Nevertheless,  the 
fundamental difference between the evolutionary growth of 
the British  constitution  and the revolutionary  creation  of 
other  systems consists largely  in the fact that the  crown 
was never expelled from parliament, and remains an essential 
factor in its organization.  Parliament may hold the crown 
in solution, but the crown is not dissolved. 
The conception of  crown and parliament as two  distinct 
entities  confuses  the interpretation  of  much  of  our  con- 
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stitutional  history.  It arose in  the  Civil  War,  and  was 
perpetuated by the eighteenth-century dogma of  the separa- 
tion of  powers which was stereotyped in American constitu- 
tions.  Rut it was always a fundamental misconception of 
the English  constitution; it tends to falsify history and to 
render unintelligible the actual working of  the constitution 
of  the empire.  The problem for the constitutional historian 
is not to discriminate between the powers of  the crown and 
those of  parliament, but between the things the crown could 
do in council and the things which it could only do in parlia- 
ment.  The  powers  of  the "  crown  in  parliament"  have 
never been defined, and they have no constitutional limits. 
The "  crown  in  parliament " wields  a  sovereignty which 
legally and constitutionally is absolute; and the separation 
of  crown and parliament  is a dichotomy which divides the 
indivisible, and promotes the cause of  anarchy. 
There had, indeed, been a real separation of  powers in the 
middle ages between regnum and sacerdotium, and none save 
a few extremists denied that each had an independent juris- 
diction.  Edward I often in parliament refused to trench upon 
the sphere of  the ecclesiastical courts,l and he gave that sphere 
an elastic interpretation in his writ circztnzspec~e  agatis.  On 
the eve of  the Reformation the king's judges  denied that an 
act  of  parliament  could  make  the king  an ecclesiastical 
person,2 and parliament itself, in the reign of  Henry VII, was 
chary in restricting the enormous liberties of  clerical criminals. 
It was  this  well-nigh  universal  recognition  of  a  supreme 
ecclesiastical jurisdiction  that was repudiated by the act of 
supremacy against the will of  the catholic church and with- 
out the consent of  nine-tenths of  its provinces.  The revolu- 
tion was, however, successful, and its effect was to establish 
the  absolutism of  the "  crown in parliament,"  which  is  a 
very different thing from the supremacy of  the crown over 
parliament. 
The problem, therefore, is not to define the unlimited and 
Cf. Rot. Purl., i. 3, 42, 46. 
?  McIlwain, pp. 277-9.  If  he was a semi-ecclesiastical person, he was 
made so by the ecclesiastical unction he received at coronation and not 
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undivided  authority of  the "  crown in  parliament,"  but to 
trace, firstly, the limitations of  the "  crown in council," and, 
secondly, the shifting weight of  the various elements in that 
composite  entity the  "  crown  in  council  in  parliament." 
The  restriction  of  the powers  of  the "  crown  in  council " 
was effected by parliamentary legislation ;  and it was possible 
to limit the "  crown in  council " by that method, because 
fr~m  the time of  Edward I onwards the "  crown in council 
in parliament " had admittedly enjoyed  fuller powers than 
the "  crown in council."  It  had long been possible to appeal 
from the king in person to the king in sober council, by writ 
of error from cornm rege to the king in parliament ; and in 
repeated great councils it had been held that only in parlia- 
ment  could  questions  of  peace  or  war  be decided.l  The 
delimitation  of  the powers  of  the various elements in the 
"  crown in council in parliament " could not, on  the other 
hand, be easily achieved by parliamentary legislation, because 
crown, lords, and commons each possessed, since the fifteenth 
century, an absolute veto over the resolutions of  the others. 
Hence the great changes in this sphere were accomplished 
by open force in the Civil War and at the revolution of  1688, 
and by veiled coercion in 1832  and 1911.  Similarly it was 
not  by  legislation,  but through  decay  of  power  that  the 
crown lost its veto, and the  lords their hold  on  finance and 
administration. 
The problem of  the crown in council  does not fall within 
the scope of  this essay except in so far as concerns its relations 
with parliament.  Its domestic history has been  treated in 
a number  of  admirable monographs,  whose  main  defect  is 
that they leave on one side  the position  of  the council in 
parliament  and its relations with  the council out of  parlia- 
ment.2  It is with the former that we shall have to deal; but 
Nicolas,  Proc.  of  Pvivy  Council,  vol. i.  pp.  xxxviii, 144.  It was  a 
stipulation of  the treaty of  Etaples in 1492, following the precedent of 
Troyes in  1420. that it should  be  confirmed by the three estates of  the 
two realms  (2 Henry VII, c. 65).  Cf.  Cottoni Posthunza, pp. 13-39,  and 
Vernon-Harcourt, His Grace the Steward, p. 248.  For detailed proceedings 
on writs of  error in parliament cf. Rot. Purl., iv. I 8, 41 1-1 3. 
See Baldwin,  The Kinq's Council, 1914.  Cf. Nicolas, iv. 185-6,  and 
Rot.  Parl.  iv.  424b,  fof, references to "  the king's great council in parlia- 
ment "  and the king's  council out of  parliament." 
inasmuch  as the council--.whether  in parliament  or not- 
was  subordinate  to  the  crown,  it  will  be  convenient  to 
discuss first the position of  the crown in parliament. 
The throne, which the lords have sought to exclude from 
their  house,  is  more  than  a  bare  symbol;  for  the  crown 
in parliament  is a real presence, which  did not cease to be 
real when it ceased to be corporal.  Down to  the middle of  the 
seventeenth century no one visualized, and no artist depicted 
parliament without the king enthroned in the midst thereof. 
In the reflex light of  later history Henry VIII's presence in 
parliament  has  been  regarded  as exceptional  intervention 
with  a  view  to interference  with  its  liberties.  But  time 
had been when the royal presence was the rule and not the 
exception;  in the sixteenth century the throne in the parlia- 
ment chamber was not intended to be empty ;  and its vacancy 
to-day does  not  indicate  that the king has no right to be 
present,  but that the lords have  reduced  that right to an 
empty f0rm.l  The crown is, indeed, the core out of  which 
the rest  of  parliament has grown; for the  crown expanded 
into the "  crown  in council," and then into the "  crown in 
council  in parliament. "  Constitutional theory  thus repre- 
sents historical fact.  Historians a generation ago were wont 
to trace in Anglo-Saxon localism the original liberties of  the 
English constitution,  and liked to dwell upon  its analogies 
with  the  equally  local  and  primitive  liberties  of  Uri  and 
Schwyz.  It is significant that the same historians admired 
federal  government,  and  saw  in  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States  a  true  reflection  of  English  constitutional 
principles.  That there were germs in common is obvious; 
but the differences are fundamental.  The English constitu- 
tion has always been unitary; those of  Switzerland and the 
The minority of  Edward  VI,  followed  by  the reign  of  two queens, 
contributed  as much towards the sovereign's absence from parliament as 
the reign of  Queen Anne,  followed  by  those  of  two Germans, did  to  a 
similar absence from the privy council.  The parliament chamber, of course, 
must not be confused with the house of  commons.  The commons protested 
in  1523  against Wolsey's presence as infringing their liberties;  and, while 
the commons often visited  Henry VIII-and,  indeed, insisted upon their 
right of  access--Henry  VIII only once visited the house of  commons, and 
then  to recommend  a bill  which  apparently did  not pass  (Bentley, Ex- 
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United States are federal, and in neither is there anything 
corresponding to the crown in parliament.  Their constitu- 
tions  start from  the lowest  forms  of  political  association, 
which only delegate to the higher, remaining themselves the 
residuary legatees of  sovereignty.  The English constitution 
starts with  the crown and works downwards; in  England 
local legislatures only receive the powers the nation grants; 
in truly federal states the nation only receives those which 
the local assemblies bestow.  The forms of  federal govern- 
ment are more flattering than our own to popular  suscepti- 
bility, but place greater impediments in the way of  effective 
national action. 
Parliament is thus an emanation from the crown;  it was 
summoned by royal writs to meet in a royal palace, and the 
royal  business  always  stood  first  on  its medieval  agenda. 
The crown accorded or rejected its petitions at  will, and le roy 
le vezdt  is still the phrase which, pronounced in  parliament, 
makes an act.  Throughout  the middle  ages the commons 
remain  but  suitors,  and the lords the counsellors, of  the 
crown  in  parliament.  It  is  the  crown  which  legislates, 
on the petition of  the commons and the advice of  the lords, 
Legislation  in parliament  has the highest  sanction; but it 
is  not  the only  method  of  legislating,  and the  crown has 
never  been  completely  debarred  from  legislating  without 
parliament  by  means of  ordinance, proclamation, and order 
in  counci1.l  The  financial  needs  of  the  crown  and the 
commons' control  of  the purse  made  every  parliament  an 
exchange  and  mart, in  which  the commons bargained  for 
legislation, and  the crown for grants of  money.  But this 
was  the custom  and not  the  law  of  the  constitution.  If 
the crown needed no grants, the commons could  extort no 
legislation;  they  could  always  petition,  but  the  right  of 
petition in itself confers no power to initiate legislation. 
There was  no  doubt  about the  power  of  the crown  to 
prevent  legislation by lords and commons ; there was more 
ambiguity  about the  power  of  the lords and commons  to 
1 As  recently as December  1919  the attorney-general argued in courr 
that by proclamation the crown could prohibit every kind of  import. 
prevent legislation by the crown, and this legislation might be 
effected either in parliament or outside.  Within the parlia- 
ment  chamber it might  seem that legislation by the crowri 
would be controlled  by  lords and commons.  But effective 
machinery  for this purpose was conspicuous by its absence 
at the close of  the middle  ages.  The indispensable forms 
were few;  a bill must be  read in the parliament  chamber, 
and the king must give his assent.  But Henry VII thought 
he  could  pass  an act  of  attainder in parliament  without 
consulting the commons.l  The judges decided against him, 
and he accepted their opinion.  But the assent of  the com- 
mons was often little more than a form.  "  Howbeit," writes 
a parliamentary correspondent  of  the said act of  attainder, 
"  ther was many gentlemen agaynst it, but it wold not be, 
for yt was  the king's  pleasure."  The lack  of  commons' 
Journals  before  1547 makes  it  impossible  to speak  with 
confidence, but Bishop Stubbs's assumption that the account 
given by Sir Thomas Smith of  Elizabeth's parliaments holds 
good for the fifteenth century is somewhat  rash.s  Of  any 
three readings  in either the lords or the  commons there  is 
no evidence before 1495,  and any legal requirement of  assent 
by the commons was fulb  met by the word, or even perhaps 
by the silence, of  the Speaker at the bar of  the parliament 
chamber.  Bills,  first  read  in the  lords,  were  sometimes 
"  transportata " across  to the  commons  in  the  chapter 
house  for  their  consideration;  and  their  petitions  were 
6 6  baillees aux seigneurs."  But many an act in the fifteenth 
century begins with none  of  the modern formula, but with 
such phraseology as "  the king calling to remembrance,"  or 
"  the  king  remembring " such  and  such  circumstances, 
ordains,  enacts,  or  establishes  such  and  such  a  remedy, 
generally with,  but often without  mention  of  the assent of 
the lords spiritual and temporal and of  the commons.  There 
See my  Reign of  Henry VII,  ii. 19;  Year Book, 4 Henry VII,  p.  18. 
Ibid.,  i. 32. 
Stubbs,  Const.  Hirt.,  iii.  483.  For reasons  which  I have given  in 
Trans. Royal  Hist.  Soc.,  3rd  Ser.,  viii.  26-7,  the absence of  commons' 
Journals before 1547 seems to me clearly due, not to loss of  the MS.,  but 
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is  sometimes  a  c~lrious  blend  of  the autocratic formulz of 
Roman  and papal  law with parliamentary language which 
illustrates  the  menace  of  the "  reception " to the English 
constitution.  Edward IV, for instance, "  of  his most blessed 
disposition, mere motion, and certain science, by the advice 
and assent  of  the lords spiritual and temporal, and of  the 
commons of  this realm in this his present parliament assem- 
bled, and by authority of  the same, ordaineth, enacteth, and 
establisheth  that  all  and  every acts and act made in  any 
of the parliaments holden since the first day of  his reign, or 
in this present  parliament  made or to be  made, be  not  in 
any wise prejudicial " to the dean and canons of  St. Mary's, 
Leicester.l 
There was abundance of  royal IegisIation in parliament in 
the reign of  Henry VII.  On the thirty-first day of  parliament, 
in the twelfth year of  his reign, the king "  with his own hand 
delivered in a bill of  trade then read " ; and legislation thus 
royally introduced was not necessarily, and perhaps not  at 
all, cast in the form of  parliamentary petitions; it may have 
been Henry VIII or Thomas Cromwell who first selected this 
humble garb for the royal proposals.  Nor was there yet any 
rule  that  all  acts  of  parliament  required  the  commons' 
consent.  No doubt the "  communes petitiones "  represented 
the wish of  the commons ; but that house had as yet estab- 
lished no right to debar the individual petitioner from access 
to the crown in parliament; and the petition of  the city of 
Gloucester to Edward IV in the parliament of  1473  is granted 
by  the king by  the advice of  the  lords, and is enrolled as 
an  act  of  parliament,  without  any  intervention  by  the 
c~mrnons.~  The legislative power of  the house of  commons 
rests upon the denial of  the right of  the crown to legislate 
upon ille petition of  the individual.  Individuals and groups 
of individuals can petition the crown, but no such petition 
can now become law unless it is adopted as a common peti- 
tion  of  the  house  of  commons.  The right  of  the subject 
t-, secure legislation by individual petition  to the crown in 
1 Rot. Purl.,  vi. 48b.  Cottoni Posthuma, 1672, p. 54. 
Rot. Parl.,  vi. 49; cf. ibid., v. 68. 
prliament was one of the medieval liberties destroyed by the 
growth of  the house of commons.  The commons could only 
limit  the legislative  discretion  of  the crown by  controlling 
the  approach  of  the  individual  petitioner,  and the house 
adopted the practice of presenting petitions ex parte in order 
to block petitions not backed by  themselves.  Most  of  the 
individual  petitions,  which  are becoming "  private  acts " 
in  the fifteenth century, are  presented  in this way to the 
crown and lords in parliament ;  but the access of  individuals 
to the crown in parliament was not yet  completely barred, 
and the king could  make acts in parliament on the petition 
of  other bodies than the house of  commons. 
The commons themselves  connived  at a wide legislative 
discretion  on  the  part  of  the  crown  outside  parliament. 
In  1504 parliament,  acquiescing  in  Henry  VII's  declared 
intention of  not calling another together for a "  long time," 
and  recognizing the hardship  thus  inflicted  on  applicants 
for  the repeal  of  their  attainders,  empowered the king to 
repeal several acts by letters patent.'  By legalizing a bene- 
volence  in  1495, it  countenanced  royal  taxation  without 
parliamentary grant,2 feeling  perhaps that the individual's 
liberty was not more seriously violated by the gift he made 
to the  king than by a tax imposed by parliament.  Legis- 
lation concerning foreigners, if  not regarded as being outside 
the scope of  parliament,  was held  to be at least  equally  a 
matter  for council; and in 1515  the lords determined  that 
a  certain  bill  possit  tam #er  concilium  quam  per  actum 
$arZiamenti  +rovideri,  cum  non  concernat  subditos  domini 
regis, sed  e~traneos.~  Foreign trade came within this discre- 
tion,  and in  1533 Henry  VIII was  authorized  by act  of 
parliament to repeal or revive all statutes since 1529  touch- 
19 Henry VII, c. 28; Rot.  Parl.,  vi.  526; Statutes  of  the Realm, ii. 
669.  Edward  IV exercised  this power  (Baldwin, p. 427) merely  on the 
advice of  his council.  Parliament in 1523 gave it to Henry VIII for life 
(Lords' Journals, vol. i. p. cxxi.). 
a  11 Henry VII, c. 10; Statutes of  the Realtn, ii.  576. 
a  Lords'  Journals, i. 56.  Cf. ibid., i. 17: "  Et  dictum et decretum est 
Per dominum cancellarium  et episcopum Wynton., quoad provisiones  pro 
mercatoribus de Hanse, quod  provisio pro ipsis per regem signata sufficiet 
els absque assensu dominorum ant domus communis ";  also ibid.,  i. 41. 266  THE EVOLUTION 01;  PARLIAIZZENT 
ing exports or imp0rts.l  It seemed a  greater extension  of 
the royal  prerogative when he was authorized to leave the 
crown  by will, though he was never empowered to leave it 
away  from  his  one  child  whose  legitimacy  was  beyond 
dispute.*  But the highwater mark of  royal legislation was 
reached by the statute of  proclamations,  which gave them 
the force of  law.s 
This  lex  regia has excited so  much  attention, and gives 
rise to such apparent contradictions, that it deserves careful 
consideration.  The  point  that  most  forcibly  strikes  the 
student of  history, as distinct  from  the student of  law, is 
the extent to which  this  act remained  a  dead  letter.  It 
may  be  that it was  Cromwell's  rather than  Henry VIlI's 
proposal ; Bishop  Gardiner relates a  conversation  hetween 
Henry VlII, Cromwell, and himself, in which Cromwell advo- 
cated  the  policy  of  making  the king's  will  the  law,  and 
Gardiner replied by advising the king to make the law his will.4 
Cromwell fell in 1540, the year after the statute of  proclama- 
tions was passed;  Gardiner became the most influential of 
Henry's  advisers,  and  the  act  was  almost  ignored.  A 
hundred and twenty proclamations are known to have been 
issued  between  the  passing  of  that  statute and  Henry's 
deat11,~  and not one of  these seems to depend for its validity 
on  the  statute.  The  great  majority  of  them  relate  to 
matters arising  out  of  the state of  war  between  England 
and France in 1543,  matters which  down  to this day are 
regulated by royal proclamation;  and the rest were mostly 
the  mere  proclamation  or  publication  of  statutes passed 
by  parliament.  Either  Henry VIII  did not  interpret  the 
statute  as  conferring  new  powers  of  legislation  on  the 
crown,  or  else  he refrained  from  using  them.  It  is  no 
less  certain that he did not regard the statute as enabling 
him  to  dispense  with  the  assistance  of  parliament  in 
legislation.  Sessions were  as  frequent  after  the  statute 
26 Henry VIII, c. 10. 
"8  Henry VIII, c. 7; 35  Henry VIII, c.  1. 
31 Henry VIII, c. 8. 
Foxe, Acts and Monuments, vi. 45-6. 
Steele, Tudor and Stuart Proclamations, i. 20-31 
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as  before it, and the numerous  bills that were  introduced 
and  passed  give  little  support  to  the  supposition  that 
Henry could have achieved the same objects by  proclama- 
tion.  It never seems to have occurred to any one that the 
king  might,  for  instance,  have  confiscated  chantries  by 
proclamation,  although  the bill for that purpose was hotly 
debated  and  narrowly  escaped  defeat.'  Some  bills  were 
actually  rejected,  but  no  steps were  taken  to repair  their 
loss by means of  the powers which the statute of  proclama- 
tions is supposed to have placed in Henry's hands. 
The  act  would  appear,  then,  to  have  been  a  piece  of 
gratuitous dogma, more in kecping with Stuart pretensions 
than with Tudor practice,  unless some other interpretation 
of  it is possible.  It may be, however, that Tudor lawyers 
were  more  literal  than  modern  historians,  and that when 
parliament  passed "  an  act  that  proclamations  made  by 
the king  shall  be  obeyed,"  it never  dreamt  of  extending 
the  sphere  of  proclanlations  or  restricting  that of  parlia- 
mentary statutes.  It simply meant that within their proper 
and  recognized  sphere  proclamations  were  to  have  the 
binding force of  law-and  unless they have, they are useless 
even to-day.  That sphere was, indeed, defined by the act 
itself, which  provided  that none of  the king's  lieges should 
"  have any of  his  or their inheritances, lawful possessions, 
offices, liberties,  privileges,  franchises,  goods  or  chattels 
taken from them or any of  them, nor by virtue of  the said 
act suffer any pains of  death other than shall be hereafter 
in this act declared."  It was not to be used to repeal any 
existing laws, "nor yet any lawful or laudable customs," and 
the people  really  affected  by the act were "  such  persons 
which  shall  offend  any  proclamation  to  be  made  by  the 
king's highness, his heirs or successors, for  and  concerning 
any kind  of  heresies against  Christian  religion."  The  act 
of proclamations was in  effect an act to put  into prcctice 
the  theory of  the act  of  supremacy.  That act  had  been 
merely  declaratory,  and  had  contained  no  pains  and 
penalties;  the  treason  act  of  1535  had, indeed,  penalized 
See below,  p. 336. THE  CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT  269  268  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
the denial  of  the royal  supremacy,  but it was  the act of 
proclamations  in  1539 which  first  gave  the new  supreme 
head  something  of  the  power  of  independent  legislation 
which  had belonged  to the p0pe.l  The supreme head  of 
the  church  was  not  to be  subject to parliamentary  con- 
ditions in the exercise of  his  supremacy;  and the ecclesi- 
astical  sovereign was to be the crown  in  council and not 
the crown  in parliament.  If  there had ever been a crown 
in convocation  other than the pope's,  Henry  VIII would 
assuredly  have  been  tempted  to retain  and  enhance  the 
position,  and to make  the crown,  rather  than the crown 
in  parliament,  the  link  between  church  and  state.  As 
it  was,  the  dichotomy  of  the  provinces  discouraged  the 
presence of  the crown, and the vicegerent  was not at home 
in an ecclesiastical assembly.  Cromwell  had no  successor 
in that capacity, and convocations were left to the prelates 
and  proctors.  The  act  of  proclamations  itself  did  not 
prevent  the  six  articles  from  being  an act  of  parliament 
and not  a royal proclamation;  and in 1547  the legislative 
independence  of  the  supreme  head  was  destroyed  by 
Somerset's repeal of  the act of   proclamation^.^  The crown 
in parliament would not tolerate an English pope in council.. 
Cromwell, however, represented the crown elsewhere than 
in   convocation^  and  the  real  importance  of  his  position 
1 Offenders were to be tried by the council (34 & 35  Henry VIII, c.  8). 
which was thus to exercise a jurisdiction  similar to that exercised by the 
later high comlnission;  although during the debate on the biI1,  promises 
were given  that nothing  should  be  done under it contrary to  an act of 
parliament  or  common  law  (Gardiner  to  Somerset  in  Foxe,  Acts  and 
Monuments,  vi.  43).  This, however, was the ecclesiastical aspect of  the 
statute of  proclamations.  Its general purpose was to revive the waning 
respect  for  royal  proclamations.  Such importance had  in recent  years 
come  to  be  attached to parliamentary statute that the impression  had 
been  produced  that  other  forms  of  legislation  were  very  inferior  in 
authority,  if  they were  law  at all.  This was a  far cry  from  the time 
when  Edward  I  could  enact all his legislation in council.  Henry VIII 
did  not  attempt  to  recover  Edward's  comprehensive  sphere,  but  the 
statute  of  proclamations  gave him,  within  the shrunken  limits  of  his 
legislative power, the same authority as parliament possessed in its more 
e&nded  sphere. 
2 The repeal was effected by a single sentence in I Ed. VI, c. 12. 
It is  notable  that as vicegerent  of  the supreme head  Cromwell was 
by 31  Henry VIII, c. 10,  given a place in the house of  lords on the right, or 
ecclesiastical side of  the throne, and above the archbishop of  Canterbury. 
in  parliament  was  due  to  the fact  that, while  the crown 
had  a recognized place  in  the parliament  chamber, it had 
none in the house of  commons.  Its absence  accounts  for 
some of  the irresponsibility  and factiousness  of  the com- 
mons  during  the  fourteenth  and fifteenth  centuries;  and 
when Henry VIII began  to look for a lever in parliament 
against the prelates,  both in their convocations and in the 
parliament  chamber, he felt the need of  some agency in the 
house  of  commons.  This was  the part designed for Crom- 
well  from  his  first  entry  into  Henry's  service  in  1529. 
Wolsey's  intervention  in  I523 had  merely  brought  the 
Speaker, but not  the commons to their knees, and subtler 
methods  than  intimidation  were  required  to  maintain 
harmony between  ambitious monarchy  and a rising  house 
of  commons.  The  separation  had  never  been  complete, 
for,  while  the  commons  withdrew  from  the  parliament 
chamber  to  the  chapter  house,  they  were  often  accom- 
panied  by lords of  the council and of  parliament, deputed 
to give them the benefit of  their wisdom and advice;  often, 
too,  the  commons  were  directed  to  deliberate  in  some 
chamber  in  the  palace, in  order  that  they might  be  near 
the  lords  for  consultation.  But  stronger  bonds  were 
needed than deputations ;  and harmony between crown and 
country  could  best  be  secured  by  identifying  the  agents 
of  the crown with the representatives of  the constituencies. 
The process, however, by which  councillors became largely 
identified with elected members of  parliament belongs rather 
to the  position  of  the  council  than  to that  of  the crown 
in parliament .l 
The  distinction  was  clearer  in  the  sixteenth  century 
than it is  to-day,  because the  crown was  then little more 
than the king, while the council was only a body of  advisers 
whose  advice  need  not  be taken.  The crown  did  not, so 
to  speak, consist of  the cabinet, and the crown in  parlia- 
ment was manifest in the very personal action of  the Tudors. 
The practice of  royal  commission was in its infancy;  and, 
although  the  expedient  was  adopted to save  Henry  VIII 
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from the pain of  giving a personal attendance at the attaint- 
ing  of  his  queens,  the  parliamentary  action  of  Tudor 
sovereigns was, as a  rule, immediate and direct.  Not that 
u 
the sovereign  ever pronounced with  his  or her  own mouth 
the  decisive  phrase  le roy  le zleult,  le  roy  s'avisera, or  soit 
fait  comme  il  est  desM ; and the  notion  that he  signed 
or  signs  acts  of  parliament  is  a  popular  superstition.2 
The giving  or withholding the royal  assent  was  not  quite 
so blunt a process;  and the  king would have had reason to 
complain  had he been  expected  to make  up his  mind  on 
the  merits  of  a  long  list  of  bills  awaiting  his. enactment 
during the brief  interval which elapsed between the reading 
out of  their  titles by the clerk of  the crown  and the pro- 
nouncement of  the royal decision by the mouth of  the clerk 
of  the  parliaments.  The  king,  like  the  commons  and 
other "  estates " of  parliament, needed  time  and  privacy 
for deliberation, which was  impossible ilz pleno  parliamento, 
where decisions were announced, but were not taken;  and 
just  as  the  commons had withdrawn  from the parliament 
chamber  to the commons' house, so  the king decided upon 
his action, not in the parliament chamber, but in an adjoin- 
ing  council-room.3  No  doubt  he  had  had  earlier  oppor- 
tunities  of  acquainting himself  with  the  contents  of  sucli 
bills as he had not personally inspired; but his final  deter- 
mination  on  the  bills,  as  they  emerged  from  the  two 
houses,  was  reached  in  secret  conclave  on the  last  day 
of  the session;  and was  announced by the clerk after the 
king,  commons,  and  other "  estates " had  assembled  in 
pleno parliantelzto for the crowning work of  the sessi0n.l 
1 The third of  these phrases was used when the bill was what we should 
now call a private bill (Hakewill, Passing of  Bzlls, 1641,  p. 75) ;  other phrases 
were used  for the royal acceptance of  money, grants. 
Palgrave went  so far as to assert that  signatures are never  found 
in ancient documents"  (Rep. on Petitions,  1533,~  p.  21).  When  the king 
signed  bills,  he signed  them  before  introductlon; but  these were  only 
bills affecting  the property of  the crown, which cannot, even to-day, be 
introduced  without  the royal  consent.  A  bill  for the restitution of  an 
attainted  felon  or traitor had to be  signed  in this way before introduc- 
tion,  because  its passing  would  mean  the crown's loss  of  the forfeited 
goods.  Cf.  Hunne's  case in E~gl.  Hist. Rev.,  July  1915.  p. 482. 
a  Now called "  the robing roo?  " (May, Purl. Pvacticc, ed. I 883, p. 593). 
"  In the open  parliament  is  Hall's  version  in  1529  (Chro~zzcles, 
It was  not  merely  on  this  last  day of  the session  or 
by  the  exercise  of  the  veto  that  the  crown  partook  of 
the  business  of  parliamentary  legislation.  We  have  seen 
Henry VII introducing a bill with his own hand, seeking to 
pass another without  consulting the commons, and drafting 
most of  the acts of  his parliaments in the language of  royal 
edicts.  The commons  were  a  far  less  negligible quantity 
under  Henry  VIII, at any rate after  1529, and the auto- 
cratic form, at least, disappears from the phraseology of  the 
statute  book.  The  co-operation  of  lords  and  commons 
is  always expressed in the language  of  an act, and parlia- 
ment  is  always  alleged  as  its  authority.  The  king's 
''  remembrances " and "  considerations " are veiled  behind 
the less personal terminology of  parliament.  It was Henry 
VIII's  policy  to  envelop  himself  in  parliament,  and he 
did it with such success that the crown was never  thence- 
forth  able to divest  itself  of  its parliamentary robes.  He 
wove  parliament  like  a  garment  round  his  royal  carcase 
for  protection;  and  the  king-spun  constitution  of  the 
realm  was  all  the  closer  in  texture  because  parliament 
had  ever  been  an  outcome  of  the  crown.  Henry  VIII 
was not a mere  member of  parliament, but its very head; 
and when the head condescended to debate the six  articles 
it confounded all the members by its 1earning.l  Parliament 
met  in  the king's  palace;  its rooms  were  allotted by  the 
king's  chamberlain,  and  its  members  were  sworn  before 
the king's  steward  or  his deputies;  it betrayed in all its 
trappings  its origin as a feudal court.  It was summoned, 
prorogued, adjourned, dissolved by the king or his ministers 
at  his  pleasure.  Its  clerks  were  the  king's  clerks,  and 
even  the  serjeant-at-arms,  who  attended  the  Speaker  of 
the house  of  commons,  was  a  king's  serjeant,  appointed 
by him and removable at his pleasure.  The king's attorney 
and  solicitor-general,  and  his  serjeants-at-law  attended 
the house  of  lords, not  as  the  servants of  an autonomous 
house, but as the servants of  the king, doing his service in 
Letters  and  Papers,  xiv.  i.  1040;  Pocock  (Burnet,  vi.  233)  prints 
"  God's  learning " for "  his learning."  '  D'Eww  Tolwnals. pp. 39-40. 272  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT 
his  great  council  chamber.'  The  Speaker was  nominated 
and paid  by the crowns2  though the nomination was veiled 
more  decently  than  that of  bishops  after  the second  act 
of  appeals;  and the subsequent  election by the commons 
only grew more  real  than the election  of  a  bishop  by  his 
chapter  with  the  contest  over  Onslow's  election  in  1566 
and the success of  the commons in  Lenthall's  case at the 
opening  of  the  Long  parliament.  The  lords,  as  befitted 
a royal council, never secured even the pretence of  a power 
to  elect  a  presiding  officer,  who  could  only  preside  in 
the  absence  of  the  king;  and  to  this  day  the  lord 
chancellor  is appointed by  the crown,  and need  not  be  a 
peer,  except  as  a  matter  of  deference  to  the  historical 
fictions  on  which  the  lords  have  sought  to  build  their 
house.  The whole  machinery  of  parliament  was  part  of 
the permanent machinery of  the crown temporarily applied 
to the purpose of  holding the king's high court. 
Gradually  the  two  houses  secured  control  of  this 
machinery, but this control has been less perfectly won  by 
the lords  than by  the commons, who could never be over- 
ridden  by  a  threat  to  double  their  numbers  by  rcyal 
creation.  Neither  lords  nor  commons  could,  it  is  true, 
come  to parliament  without  a royal summons;  but while 
the crown summoned a peer  by name, its summons to the 
commons was addressed to communities, who could choose 
what  members  they  pleased.  No  doubt  a  good  deal  of 
pressure  was  brought to bear  at different  times upon  con- 
stituencies to elect representatives acceptable to the crown; 
but this pressure was of little avail in the shires, and even 
in the  boroughs  it was  not  so  formidable  an obstacle  to 
freedom of  election as the influence of  the county magnates. 
The crown could also create new boroughs by charter;  but 
1 When Onslow was elected Speaker in 1566, it was contended, though 
unsuccessfully,  that his  duty as a  serjeant-at-law in  the  upper  house 
nverrode  the  commons'  claim  on  him  as their  Speaker  (D'Ewes,  pp.  - 
98, 121 ;  cf. Elsynge,  82). 
Tytler, Edward 8,  ii. 163 : Campbell's  Materials, ii. 217.  His fee in 
1485 was Lroo; but in  1563 Speaker Williams writes that the allowance 
the queen was pleased to make was never certain, but more or less according 
to the length of  the parliament  (Cal. S.  P.  Dom.,  Addenda,  1547-65, 
as early as the reign of Elizabeth the motive for new creations 
was  rather the political  ambition  of  the constituency than 
the desire of  the crown  for "  king's friends " in the house 
of  commons;  and secretary Wilson, replying to a petition 
for  parliamentary  representation  from  Newark  in  1579, 
remarked  that the government  thought  too  many  parlia- 
mentary seats  had  been  created  already,  and  was  con- 
sidering  the  question  of  reducing  the  number  of  rotten 
boroughs.l  James  I created university constituencies,2 but 
Charles 11's letters patent to Newark seem to have been the 
last  occasion  upon  which  the crown  increased  the house 
of commons by charter instead of by act of  parliament. 
With  the lords  it was different.  -4n attempt was made 
in  1719 by the peerage  bill  to limit the power  of  creation 
by the crown.3  It failed, and was not repeated; and while 
the power of  the crown to modify the size of  the house of 
commons has been  abolished, its power  to create peerages 
is unlimited.  The bishops, too, have ever been in practice, 
though  not  in  theory,  royal  nominees;  and  from  the 
Reformation  to the  Revolution  the  royal  supremacy  over 
the  church  gave  it great  control  of  the  house  of  lords. 
But  its  control  over  temporal  peers  diminished.  During 
the Tudor period  the crown could  compel a peer's  attend- 
ance;  if  for  good reasons  he were  allowed to stay away, 
he  had  to  seek  royal  licence to appoint  his  proxies,  and 
over his choice the crown could exercise a veto.4  The crown 
could  also  prevent  an unwelcome attendance.  There was 
no  law  requiring  the  crown  to  summon  any  one;  alien 
peers were not summoned by  Henry VII,S nor, apparently, 
See p. 159 n. 
a  Both  universities  received  writs  for  James'  first  parliament,  but 
apparently  Cambridge  made  no  return.  James  conferred  a  similar 
privilege upon Trinity College, Dublin, in  1613. 
Lecky, i. 230-1. 
'  Lodge,  Illustrations,  i.  252-3;  cf. Cottoni  Posthuma,  pp.  264,  267; 
Elsynge, pp. 32, I I 9-20. 
For instance,  Philibert de Chand6, the leader of Henry VII's  Breton 
contingent  in  1485, who was  created  earl of  Bath, was never summoned 
to  parliament;  nor  were  Louis  de  Bruges  and  John  de  Bruges,  who 
were  successively  earls  of  Winchester  (see  my  Henry  VZI, iii.  320). 
The  latter " resigned " his  earldom  in  1500  (Doyle,  Oficial  Bayonage, 
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alien  bishops  by  Henry  VIII;  and some  temporal  peers 
who  were  not  aliens  seem  to  have  been  ign~red.~  But 
custom was  hardening  towards the  creation  of  hereditary 
right,  and  in  the reign  of  Charles I the  lords  laid  down 
the  doctrine, which  Charles disputed, that the crown  had 
lost the power  of  preventing, by neglect to summon or by 
countermanding  the summons,  a  peer  from attending  tha 
house  of  lords.  The  houses  in  the  seventeenth  century 
succeeded in reducing the crown's  control of  their flersonnel 
to the creation of  peers. 
They also  succeeded in reducing  almost  to nothing the 
legislative powers of  the crown both in and out of  parlia- 
ment.  Under the Tudors the crown had legislated  out of 
parliament  by means of  proclamations, and in parliament, 
not  only  by  the negative method  of  the  veto, but by the 
positive methods of introducing and amending bills.  Henry 
VII added  provisos  to bills  when  giving  the royal  assent, 
and the  provisos thus incorporated in the  act became law 
without  any consideration  of  them  by lords or  common^.^ 
Queen  Elizabeth  exercised  similar  powers  of  amendment 
on one occasion at least!  but she seems to have been the 
last  sovereign  who  did  so.  Parliament  retorted  on  the 
crown the limitation of  speech which Elizabeth is generally; 
though  erroneou~ly,~  supposed  to  have  imposed  on  the 
house of  commons by the mouth of  lord-keeper  Puckering. 
"  Your  liberty  of  speech,"  he is misrepresented  as saying, 
"  consisteth  in  yea  or  nay."  The  liberty  of  the  crown 
in legislation was reduced to a like dilemma, from which the 
E.  g. 
Silvester 
Campeggio, bishop of  Salisbury 
de G~alis,  Tulius de Medici, and 
(1525-341, 
Jerome de 
and John de Giglis, 
Ghinucci, bishops  of 
Worcester beh-een  ;497  and r534. 
E. g.  Robert, lord Ogle, was  not summoned  between  1529 and 1544 
(Hound,  Studies  in Peerage,  pp.  330  sqq.) ; and according  to  Chapuys 
Darcy and three bishops  were forbidden  to attend in  1534  (Letters and 
Papers, vii. 121).  Chapuys is very unreliablein these matters, but Elsynge, 
clerk of  the parliaments,  writing  as late as  1625,  says : "  Now  of  late 
the"  which  are in the king's  displeasure have had their  summons, but  -- - , 
with a letter frqfn  the  lor8  chancellor  or  lord keeper not to come, but 
to send a proxy  (Parliaments, ed. 1768, p. 59). 
8  Rot. Purl.,  vi.  182, 186-7,  460,  496. 
4  D'Ewes,  Journals, p. 341b. 
5  See J. E.  Neale in Engl. Hist. Rev., xxxi. 128-37. 
alternative  was  soon  removed.  Since the reign  of  Queen 
Anne  the  crown  has  lost  all  discretion  in  the  matter  of 
accepting  or  rejecting  bills  that  have  passed  the  two 
houses. 
The disuse of the royal veto was not so serious a loss as 
the denial of  the right of  the crown to suspend and dispense 
with the law when made.  For clearly it would not matter 
what laws were  made  if  the crown could not be forced to 
carry  them  out;  and this  compulsion was  the hardest  of 
all  the tasks  for a  legislature to impose  on  an executive. 
In  the  sixteenth  century  there  was  no  idea  of  any  such 
parliamentary  coercion  of  the  crown.  Parliament  alone 
could  make  laws,  but  the crown  alone  could  carry  them 
out,  and it  rested  entirely  with  the crown  to  determine 
when, where, how, and to what extent the laws should be 
enforced.  Parliament  passed  the  act  of  six  articles  in 
1539;  it  was  no  infraction  of  the  constitution,  as  then 
understood,  when  the  crown  abstained  for  a  year  from 
enforcing  its  d0ctrine.l  No  penalties  would  have  been 
incurred  by  any  one  had  the  crown  and  the  church  in 
Mary's  reign refrained  from  burning  a  single heretic, not- 
withstanding  the  de  hwretico  co~nbzcrendo statutes  which 
parliament  had re-enacted.  In 1559 the act of  suplemacy 
enabled  the  crown  to impose  the oath of  supremacy;  it 
was  considered  prudence  when  Elizabeth  refrained  from 
exacting that  oath  from the judges  and from Englishmen 
north of  the Trent.  Parliament, indeed, had hitherto limited 
its action to two objects : it had restrained the crown from 
moving in directions of  which  it disapproved;  it had em- 
powered the crown to move in directions of  which it approved ; 
but it had not compelled the crown to move at all. 
A legislature cannot, however, ensure the administration 
cf its own laws unless it controls the exccutive which admin- 
There are no penalties in the  act of  six articles; it is simply declaratory, 
like Henry VIII's act of  supremacy.  But common  law and statute law 
~lready  provided penalties enough for heresy ;  and the "bloodiness "  of  the 
SIX articles "merely consisted in the doctrinal direction they gave togeneral 
Powers of  persecution  with  which  Protestants themselves  were  loth  to 
dispense. 276  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
isters  them;  and  judgement  is  futile  without  execution. 
If  the executive is to judge  when and whether there shall 
be  execution, the legislatnre has little part  in government 
unless  it  controls  the  executive.  There  can  be  no  real 
separation  of  powers  in  a  self-governing community,  and 
the Long parliament, early in its career, realized the futility 
of  mere  legislation.  The  fundamental  issue  was  raised 
when  parliament, in  the  Grand  Remonstrance,  demanded 
control of  the king's  choice of  ministers and asserted their 
responsibility to it, while Charles retorted that government 
was nothing pertaining to subjects.1  Occasions upon which 
it might be necessary to suspend or dispense with particular 
laws  will  never  be  lacking  in  any  community,  however 
perfect  its laws  or  peaceful its people;  but the  judge  of 
these  occasions must  be  the maker of  the laws.  In other 
words, the  maker  of  the  laws  must  be  the  maker  of  the 
government. 
In the  sixteenth century  the crown  in council was  the 
government,  and the crown  in parliament  was the maker 
of  the laws.  Harmony was  effected by the predominance 
of  the  crown  in  both.  The  subjection  of  parliament  to 
Henry  VII was  much  more  patent  than its subjection  to 
his son ; but the  relative positions of  crown and parliament 
under  Henry  VIII have  often  been  regarded  as the  most 
striking  illustrations  of  the  unconstitutional  character 
of  Tudor  rule.  Yet  the  real  gravamen  of  the  charge  of 
unconstitutional  government  against  Henry  VIII  is  not 
that he went about to break parliaments, but that he broke 
the  bonds  of  Rome.  It  is  difficult  to discover  anything 
unconstitutional  in his  relations with  his parliaments;  no 
king had for a century relied upon parliament to the extent 
that he  did  after  1529, and none  did  so  again  until  the 
Revolution.  There was nothing unconstitutional  or unpre- 
cedented in his frequent presence in its midst, in its releasing 
him  from his  debts, enabling him to decide between rival 
claimants to the succession, or to legislate within his proper 
sphere  by  means  of  proclamations.  But  it  was  uncon- 
1 Gardiner, Select  Documents,  ed, 1889,  pp. 129,  157,  171,  285. THE CROWN  IN  PARLIAMENT  2  77 
stitutional for parliament to deprive the pope of  his spiritual 
jurisdiction,  to dissolve royal  marriages,  and pass  the act 
of  six  articles;  or  rather,  these  things  were  only  con- 
stitutional in the light  of  a theory of  parliamentary omni- 
competence which had not been recognized before, and was 
repudiated  by  older  jurisdictions.  It was  Henry's  exten- 
sion,  and not  his  restraint,  of  parliament  that makes  his 
rule unprecedented.  The claims of  parliament to deal with 
the  church  were  as  much  a  usurpation  as  any  papal 
pretension;  and it was  only  the success  of  the revolution 
that made its principles constitutional. 
Those principles were, however, established, and the crown 
in  parliament  became  an  undisputed  sovereign  with  an 
unrestricted sovereignty.  The emphasis was on the crown, 
but the crown sank beneath its weight.  One child and two 
women,  despite  Elizabeth's  vigour,  could  not  countervail 
the emphasis  of  parliament ; and  before  1603  distraction 
was  obvious  in  the partnership.  The maker  of  the  laws 
was  no  longer  at  one  with  their  executor.  A  century 
of  struggle  under  the  Stuarts resulted  in  the  victory  of 
the legislature.  The prize  was the control of  the adminis- 
tration, and the crown in  parliament  became to all intents 
and purposes the council in parliament, a  council consisting 
of  mcmbers of parliament, owing to parliament their position 
in council, and responsible to parliament  for  their conduct 
of  affairs. CHAPTER  XIV 
THE  COUNCIL  IN  PARLIAMENT 
'THE  king's  council in  parliament has, since the reign of 
Edward 1, been  the pivot  of  the English  constitution, and 
to-day  it is  a  distinguishing  feature of  British  systems of 
government  that the executive  should  be part  and parcel 
of  the  legislature.  The  novelty  of  the  cabinet  does  not 
consist in the link which  it forms  between  the crown and 
parliament, but in the fact  that by its means  parliament 
controls  the crown.  The king's council had always formed 
a similar link, but  by  its means the crown  controlled the 
parliaments.  It  is,  however,  modern  phraseology,  mis- 
applied to most  of  our  constitution~.l  history, to speak  of 
links  between  parliament  and the  crown.  We  might  as 
well speak of  links between man's mind and man;  man is 
not man without a mind, and parliament was no parliament 
without  the  crown.  Metaphors,  however,  and  especially 
the metaphors of mechanics, fail to express the meaning of 
human associations.  It is well  to remember  that  councils 
and  parliaments  consist  of  men,  and that when  a man  is 
a  member  of  a  council  and  of  a  parliament  he  is  much 
more  than  a  link  between  the  two  assemblies.  Identity 
cannot be  constituted  by  any  amount  of  connexion,  and 
much  of  the  difficulty  of  understanding  medieval  history 
arises from the habit, to which the constitutional historian 
is  prone,  of  regarding the different  activities  of  the same 
men  as  distinct  and  definite  institutions.  A  council  is 
merely a body  of  men doing certain things "  in council " ; 
a parliament is often little more  than the same men doing 
somewhat  different  things  "  in  parliament " ;  and  the 
difference between  a  council  and a  parliament  lies for the 
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most part in the different things they do and their different 
modes  of  action.  A  parliament  is  at first  no  more  than 
the counsellors of  the king sitting in  a  particular kind  of 
session called a par1iament.l 
A like anachronism of differentiation led Coke to multiply 
Edward 1's  council  by four, and to crystallize its different 
functions into so many different bodies.  But while it seems 
clear that Edward I had only one council, Edward I1 had 
one  which  was  chosen  by  him  and  was  called  his 
secret or privy council, and one which was forced upon him 
by  his  baronage  and  was  called  the  magnum  concilium. 
The  two  forms  of  council  represented  two  rival  parties, 
and  their  place  in the constitution  rose  and fell  with  the 
varying  fortunes of  the king and the lords ordainers.  No 
doubt both partieswereworking on the common foundation of 
a council without an adjective ; but the barons were seeking 
to make it mtrgnum and the king to keep it  sec~etum,  and 
there was little that was common to their finished products. 
One party produced the peerage, the other the privy council. 
The  council  has  been  the  cockpit  of  contellding  factions 
and constitutional principles.  Which was to be its master, 
the king or the barons, or, last of  all, the commons ?  Upon 
that issue it would  depend whether  the council became  a 
privy  council, a  magnum  concilium, or  a  modern  cabinet, 
and England an autocracy, an oligarchy. or a democracy. 
The contest is fought in the open under Edward  I1 and 
sometimes  on  the  field  of  battle.  But  Edward  111  was 
strong enough  to prevent open schism in  the government, 
and  the  strife  was  conducted  behind  closed  doors.  Its 
Maitland calls it a "  parliament of the council " (Memoranda, p. Ixxx). 
Prof.  Baldwin  rather minimizes the distinction  between  the magnum 
concilium and the privy council, and contends that one was merely a full, 
and the other a secret, session of  the same body.  But it seems difficult on 
this theory  to account for the definite  article in the term le grand conseil 
which we  find in Edward 11's reign, or for the description of  Wykeham 
as  capitalis secret; consilii et  magni consilii gubernatov  in  1377 (Rot. Purl., 
L".  388~);  although the fact that he held these two offices and was also 
at the same time keeper of  the privy seal indicates the common element 
In  these  councils.  It is  perhaps  significant  of  the growing  importance 
of the privy seal that Wykeham should be its keeper, after having been 
chancellor ten years before. THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
history  is  therefore  obscure,  and  we  can  say  little  more 
than that  the  struggle  was  not  one  for  the  control  of  a 
definite institution, but one to define a  vague claim on the 
part of the barons to give counsel to the crown and on the 
part  of  the crown to select its own advisers.  Nor  was  it 
even so simple as that; for the actions of  the crown were 
multifarious, and a  right  to advise it in some matters did 
not involve the right to advise it in all.  The issue cannot 
be understood without reference to the gradual differentiation 
of  the functions  of  government.  It seems  clear  that  the 
magnates established  their  claim to be  the council  of  the 
crown  for  all matters, legislative  or  judicial,  involving  an 
alteration  or  interpretation  of  the  law  of  tenure,  at least 
of  freehold tenure;  and such petitions were regularly  dealt 
with  by  legislation  in  parliaments  containing  a  nzagnztnz 
conciliz~m,  or were referred for judicial decision coranz magno 
concilio  out  of  par1iament.l  With  regard  to  matters  of 
policy and administration the magnates were less successful. 
They  did,  indeed,  succeed  in  reducing  the status of  the 
judges  in the council, both  in  and  out  of  parliament,  to 
that  of  advisers  without  a  vote;  and  the principle  was 
ultimately  accepted,  and  even  asserted,  by  the  judges 
themselves that they were "  of  council to the king " only 
for  legal  and  not  for political  busine~s.~  The  magnates 
also made  efforts to exclude the clerical element  from  the 
council;  but  they  were  naturally  unsuccessful  in  their 
attempts  to make  the  secret,  continual,  or  privy  council 
of  the king a great council of  magnates,  just  as their  pre- 
decessors  had failed  in  the  reign  of  Henry  I1 to prevent 
the conversion of  the curia regis from an occasional assembly 
of  turbulent barons into a regular  body  of  expert  lustices. 
They might be consiliarii nati of  the crown, but it remained 
with the crown to say when it wanted their counsel; and 
the  magna  concilia  of  the  fifteenth  century  were  always 
Cf. Bal2win. pp. ~79-80. 325, 334.  Possibly  the "  law of  the land " 
meant the  landlaw. 
Nicolas, Proc. of  Privy Cozcncil, i. 76,  iii. 151, V.  76-9, 268-9;  Baldwin, 
pp. 76-8,. 205. 
a  Baldwin, p. 83. 
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~+ecialiter  congregmta, while the secret council was conti.rzwum, 
and needed no special summons.l 
This secret or continual council took more or less definite 
form  in  the  reign  of  Richard  11.  Nicolas's  Proceedings 
begin  in  1386,~  and  a  Journal  of  the  council  has lately 
been  found  for  1392-3.3  This  council  had  a  clerk  of  its 
own,  charged  to keep  its  minute^,^  and Richard  I1 relied 
on it to control his unruly uncles and enable him to develop 
a preliminary sketch of the "  new "  monarchy.  His failure 
produced  a  reaction  towards  a  magnum  concilium,  and 
grands  conseils  become  frequent  with  the  accession  of 
Henry IV.6  It is possible to regard the council as a single 
institution,  of  which  the  grand  cotzseil  was  an occasional 
expansion,  and the  privy  council  a  more  continuous con- 
traction ; '  but it is obvious that these expanded and con- 
tracted sessions were tending to form  distinct institutions. 
In  1377 Wykeham  was  described  as  capilaZis  secreti  el 
magni  consilii  gubernator;  a  room,  in  Westminster Palace 
was called  camera magni consilii, and  we  find  the  definite 
article in le grand  conssil and the seigneurs du grand  conseil 
du  roy.'  We  can  no  more  regard  the  great  and privy 
councils as  a  single  institution  merely because the greater 
contained  the less,  than  we  can  identify  parliament  with 
the council  because  a  session  of  the council was  the  core 
of  every parliament;  and we  must  not  deny a  distinction 
because it is hard to draw. 
Discrimination  is  not, indeed,  easy  as regards  size, per- 
Nicolas,  Pvoc. of  Privy Council, iii. 322, iv. 262. 
'  These  Proceedings  do not represent  a  register  or regular  series of 
any kind ; and Nicolas's volumes are for  the most part made up of  scattered 
notes collected from many sources.  He  prints, however, a " council-book " 
extending  from  1421  to  1435.  and  a  coIIection  of  original  minutes  to 
1460.  Between  1435 and 1540 there IS another gap in the council-books, 
which are, however, fairly continuous from  1540 onwards. 
"aldwin,  pp. 389-90. 
There  ar:,  "  clerici " of  the council in  Edward 111's reign, but they 
are probably  clerics," rather than clerks, of  the council, in contrast with 
the "  lords " and "  bachelors " of  the council. 
'  Nicolas,  i. 102,  107, 144, 156, 180.  '  There seems  to be  little evidence  of  a  privy council  before  Henry 
\'III's  reign;  the phrase en prive  conseil which occurs in  1381 (Baldwin, 
P.  125) means "  in private conclave,"  and not "  in the privy council." 
'  Baldwin, p. 369;  Rot. Parl., iii. 388a;  Nicolas, i. 180, iii. 223.  * 282  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE COUNCIL IN  PARLIAMENT  283 
sonnel,  or  functions.  We  have  record  of  a  grand  conseil 
consisting of ninety-,two members; l but another contained 
but thirt~-three,~  while a council which is not called  great 
numbered  as many  as thirty-two.3  The same  variety  of 
"  estates "-dukes,  bishops, abbots, earls, barons, bannerets, 
bachelors,  knights,  esquires-might  be  represented  in the 
great and in the privy council ;  both were summoned under 
the privy seal, they had the same  clerk, and such  records 
as were kept were  on indiscriminate fXes.=  Nor were their 
functions  more  clearly  distinct.  That of  a  grand  consei2 
was  probouleutic,  and  in  the  fifteenth  century  it  seems 
generally to have been called to consider whether a parlia- 
ment was necessary or not.  In 1389  a larger council than 
usual  advised  the summons of  ~arliament.~  In February 
1400  a great council taxed itself in order to avoid a parlia- 
ment and taxing the common people.?  A few months later 
another great council considered whether it was possible to 
declare  war  without  consulting  parliament,  and  diverse 
views  were  expressed.*  In I430  a  great  council  agreed 
that a parliament should be held, and in 1432 a great council, 
sitting in the parliament chamber at Westminster, presented 
a petition  relating to taxation,  tallages,  and the war  with 
Fran~e.~  In 1433  a great council sat in the green chamber 
at Westminster (where another council sat in 1437 without 
being  great), and we find a distinction drawn between  the 
king's  great  council  in  parliament  and the  king's  great 
council out of  parliament.1°  Bedford in 1434 speaks of  his 
Nicolas, vi. 290-1. 
2  Ibid.,  I. 102;  the  conscil  mentioned  (ibid., i.  144)  seems  to  have 
been grand. although it had only twenty-three members. 
~gid.,  ii.  7.  - 
*  Baldwin,  p.  121 ; Nicolas, i. 18, jg,  roo, 102, 144, 156,  237, ii. 85-9, 
98-9,  156, iv. pp. xxxv-vi,  lx, lxvi, 262,  v.  64-5,  vi  214-16,  290-1,  298, 
333-4.  339-41- 
6  Council  records were "  filed,"  chancery records enrolled; one of  the 
objections  to  the councif, was  that its :;cords  were  not  enrolled,  an! 
could not, therefore, p  counter-rollei,  or controlled, "  comptroller 
being the English for  contrarotulator. 
Nicolas, i. 17; cf. Rot. Pavl., ii. 146. 
Nicolas. i. 102,  107.  Ibid., i. 144. 
9  Ibid., iv., Chron. Cat., pp. x-xi,  xxxvi. 
lo Ibid., iv. 105, 185-6,  v. 153. 
services "  as well  in your  said  parliament as in your grcat 
council," and in I430 his letters, directed "  a1 consilio privato 
regis,"  distinguish  between  it  and "  magno  concilio speci- 
aliter  congregato." l  111  1435 a  great  council  at Sheen,2 
consisting apparently of  only twenty-two  members, nearly 
all  peers,  discussed  the  Council  of  Basle,  relations  with 
France, and other matters.  In October 1454 fourteen bishops, 
two  dukes,  eight  earls,  and  seventeen  barons  were  sum- 
moned  to a great  council  (thirteen  more  were  summoned 
later)  which  drew  up  ordinances  to  regulate  the  king's 
househ~ld.~  To another great council next year there were 
summoned eighteen bishops, twenty-four abbots and priors, 
five dukes, nine  earls, the  prior  of  St. John  of  Jerusalem, 
and thirty-five   baron^.^  This list  well-nigh  exhausted  the 
peerage,  and  few  parliaments  contained  as many  as  the 
ninety-two  who  were  summoned  to  this  great  couiicil. 
Early  in  Henry  VI's  minority  it  was  asserted  that  the 
government  appertained  to the  lords  spiritual  and  tem- 
poral  assembled in parliament,  in the great council, or in 
the continual council;  and on the eve of  the Wars of  the 
Roses the great  council was little more  than  the "  house " 
of  lords  out  of  ~arliament.~  The  knights  and  esquires, 
who figured largely in  the great councils of  early  Lancas- 
trian  years,  had  disappeared.?  The  great  council  had 
grown  at once  both  greater  and less  comprehensive,  and 
the  omission  of  commoners  was  outweighed  by  including 
nearly  the whole  of  "the peerage."  The wheel had come 
full circle, and had brought  the great council  back  to the 
point  at which  it stood in 1258  and 1311.  It was the old 
alternative,  baronage  or  the  crown,  a  great  or  a  privy 
council. 
Thirty years of  civil war  disposed  of  the  claims of  the 
great  council  to  govern  England,  and  then  the  Tudors 
Nicolas, iii. 322. iv. 22 j.  Ibid., V.  64-5. 
Ibid.,  vi. 216-23.  '  Ibid., vi. 290-1.  Ibid.,  ffi. 233. 
This  assimilation  was  helped  by':he  narrowing  of  the  peerage." 
There was a broad distinction between  the great council "  and the " peers 
of the land " in 1352  (Rot. Purl., ii. 245). 
' In  1455, however,  one or two  knights or esquires  were  summoned 
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created a real and lasting privy council.  This was the work 
of Henry VIII and not of  his father.  Henry VII's council 
is an enigma ;  once or twice at least he called a great council, 
in which  appointments were  made and war was  discussed 
with  France.  Of  a  privy  council  no  mention  has  been 
found, and  it  might  seem  that his  council  was  simply  a 
number of  men whom the king consulted as individuals if 
and when and how he pleased.  Yet there were "  council- 
times " ;  and a president of  the council, whose office is com- 
monly  dated from 1530,  existed  in  1499 in the person  of 
FitzJames,  Bishop  of  London, and in 1506  in that of  the 
notorious  Edmund  Dud1ey.l  It  may  be  that  Henry VII 
felt his monarchy to be too new to risk giving it a master 
in  the shape  of  an organized  council;  he  needed  advice, 
but he did not want control, and he preferred  the private 
advice of a minister  to that of  a council meeting.  At any 
rate, the organization of  the privy council seems to date from 
1526.  Henry VIII had, indeed, a council from his accession, 
but it appears to have been a loose and unwieldy affair until 
Wolsey superseded it for most practical purposes.  In 1526, 
however, the king selected twenty of  its members to attend 
his royal  person;  and of  these twenty ten were  to "  give 
continual attendance in the causes of  his said council, unto 
what  place  soever his  highness  shall resort."  This  was 
only an outline, which was not filled in until after Wolsey's 
fall, and the inner ring of  ten does not correspond with the 
later  organization  of  the  council.  But  twenty  remained 
the average number of  privy councillors under  the Tudors, 
who were clearly marked off  from the "  ordinary " coun~il.~ 
1 Cal. Patent  Rolls, Henry VII,  ii. 471.  The obscurity surrounding the 
council is illustrated  by the fact that.this det+l  in Dudley's  biography 
remained  unknown  until the pubhcatlon  of  thls volume  of  the Patent 
Rolls in  1916. See Engl. Hist. Rev., July and Oct. I922 and Jan.  1923. 
2 Nicolas,  vii. pp. v-vl. 
a  Councillors  not sworn  of  the privy  council  are said  to  have been 
members of  the concilium  ordinarium, a  phrase unknown  apparently in 
the Middle Ages (Baldwin, p.  112): and perhaps invented by Sir E. Coke. 
Cf.  Sir R. Wingfield's  remarks :  It is above twenty-four years since I 
was first sworn  of  the king's  counyjl,  and after  of  his  private  council, 
being  his  vice-chamberlain,"  and  I  have  been  sworn  of  his  counct! 
above  twenty  years  and  of  his  privy  council  above fourteen ,years 
(Letters and  Papers  of  Henry  VZZI,  vii.  1525.  Viii.  225).  The  king's 
The grand conseil sank beneath the weight of  England's grand 
monarque. 
When  it  was  averred  in  1427  that  the  government  of 
England (during a royal minority) appertained to the lords 
spi;itual  and  temporal,  in  parliament, great  council,  or 
continual  council  assembled,  the  varying  form  of  the 
assemblies was clearly regarded  as a mere matter of  detail, 
compared with the essential identity of  their constituency; 
and the sole  advantage  of  a great over  the privy  council 
consisted in the weight  and wisdom of  a multitude.  The 
matters  discussed  in  great councils  were  also  discussed, 
and  could be  decided, in privy  councils.  When  the great 
council  advised  the  summons  of  parliament,  it  was  not 
the great but the privy council which  instructed the privy 
seal to  move  the  lord  chancellor  to issue  the writs;  and 
it could have done so without a great council at all.  There 
is  no  principle  of  discrimination between  the councils  of 
Henry  VI.  The  abeyance  of  monarchy  undermined  the 
foundations of  privy  councils, just  as its revival  under the 
Tudors  proved  fatal  to  great  councils.  "  Great "  and 
,, privy " are, in fact, simply  expressions of  aristocracy and 
monarchy  in terms of  the council.  The distinction is only 
marked while the struggle is even, as it was under Henry I11 
and Edward 11.  The predominance of  over-mighty subjects 
in the fifteenth century disintegrates the privy council, and 
the triumph  of  a  Tudor king reduces  the great  council to 
a nullity.  The council under Henry VI grew so  great and 
so  diffuse that it lost  all specific gravity,  and the lack  of 
central governance led naturally to local anarchy and civil 
war.  It was  the  iailure  of  conciliar  government  in  the 
iifteenth century that made straight the path for personal 
monarchy  in  the national  state as well  as in the catholic 
church. 
counsel learned  in the law " never formed a  council;  they were simply 
the legal members of  the council.  The commune concilium is still more 
elusive; in  Magna  Carta  it  probably  means  "  common  advice,"  but 
Thomas  Kent  is  said  to  be  described  as " clericus  communis  consilii 
domini  regis " on  the  Coram  Rege  roll,  30  Henry  VI,  m.  8  (Vernon 
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Some  discussion  of  the king's  council  was  a  necessary 
prelude  to  any  examination  of  the  position  of  the king's 
council  in  parliament.  The  question  is  obscure,  because 
the  position  is involved : habet  enim  rex  czrriam  suam  in 
consilio suo in  fiarliamentis suis.  But there is no doubt about 
the immanence of the council in parliament, and the history 
of  the conflict between executive and legislative is more pre- 
cisely the process of  determining what the council can do by 
itself  and what it can only do in parliament.  It may help 
us if  we remember that when we  speak of  parliament doing 
anything at all, we  are employing what is perhaps the most 
convenient  fiction  in  the  constitution.  It is  a  figure  of 
speech  like  that  employed  by  Americans  when  they  say 
that "  congress " does this, that, or the other, or  by Wes- 
leyans when they speak of  "  conference " settling the affairs 
of  their community.  Really, it is certain people in  parlia- 
ment, in congress, in conference, who do  these things;  and 
the  association  of  parliament  with  the  active  voice  is  a 
modem  development.  In the middle  ages  parliament  is 
always passive : the king holds  a  parliament,  summons a 
parliament, and does many things in and to a parliament. 
Others besides the king may also do things in parliament, but 
parliament itself does nothing;  it does not even grant taxes. 
The "  estates " tax themselves in parliament,  but  parlia- 
ment does not tax them.l  Justice is done and law is made 
in parliament;  but it is the  king  in  council who  judges 
and ordains.  In course of  time the reality becomes a form, 
the petition of  the commons determines the act of  the king 
in  parliament,  and  inertia  is  transmuted  into  energy. 
Parliament,  however,  remained  a  convenient  ambiguity 
1  It  is a fundamental though gradual change when, during the fifteenth 
and sixteenth centuries, taxes,  instead  of  being  several  grants severally 
made  by different  estates  in  parliament,  take a  legislative  form,  and 
derive their sanction, not from the good-will of  the givers, but from the 
sovereignty  of  the  legislature;  and  there  is  no  better  illustration  of 
(a) the amalgamation of  the estates into the state, and (b) the consequent 
growth  of  the sovereignty  of  parliament.  Taxation  became  a  part of 
positive law,  and it was against this "imposition"  that the American 
colonists, reverting to medieval ideas, rebelled.  Prof. McIlwain's criticism 
of  the sovereignty of  parliament is based  on the same idea  (see History, 
iii. 16.2-4). 
for the crown in  parliament,  the lords  in  parliament,  the 
commons  in  parliament,  as  well  as  for  any  combination 
of  the three;  and it is more decent to say that the parlia- 
ment act of  1911  was passed by parliament than that it was 
dictated by a majority in the house of  commons. 
Parliament  in  the middle  ages  was,  therefore, a  set  of 
conditions under  which  men  acted  rather  than  itself  the 
agent.  The  atmosphere  was  that  of  a  royal  and  feudal 
court, held in the "  hall "  of  a king's palace with its precincts 
marked  by the "  verge " of  the king's  lord steward.  The 
presence  of  the king's  council  was  essential  to  the curia. 
There  were  endless councils  without  a  parliament;  there 
could  be  no  parliament  without  a  council.  The  council 
was  the  first  of  the  constituent  elements  in  parliament; 
and it is very difficult  to say at what point any other element 
becomes  essential.  The  earliest  "  Rolls  of  Parliaments " 
are not concerned with the doings of  an elected or a repre- 
sentative assembly, and the acts of  councils continue to be 
entered on  the "  Rolls  of  Parliaments " down  at least  to 
1371,  and for two  generations  later, so  far as  the  council 
was  determining  matters  referred  to  it  by  parliament.1 
Indeed, one of  the reasons why council records do not begin 
until  the reign  of  Richard  I1 is that councils  and  parlia- 
ments had not been clearly enough differentiated to require 
different kinds of records.  The whole of  Edward 1's original 
work as a legislator was done in council before he summoned 
his  model  parliament  of  1295;  and  his  successors  con- 
tinued for more than a century to enter on the parliament 
rolls, which always remained in the custody of  the council,2 
Baldwin, pp. 107, 386; cf. Rot. Purl., ii. 304, iv. 334, 506.  The council 
also used  the rolls  of  chancery  and of  the exchequer for recording  its 
proceedings.  It  had no roll of its own, and used the rolls of  its three chief 
organs, the council in chancery, the council  in the exchequer,  and the 
council in parliament.  Like parliament,  the council depended  upon the 
agency of  the executive departments which had developed before either of 
the deliberative organs of  the constitution. 
Maitland  asked  (Memoranda,  p.  lxxxiii) when the parliament  roll 
passed out of  the custody of  tp council into that of  the house of  lords. 
The  answer  appears  to  be  never."  The  rolls  of  parliament  have 
always been chancery records  (since they were lost  by  the exchequer). 
The Journals,  of  course,  have,  on  the other hand, always  been  in  the 
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judicial  decisions  adopted  out  of  parliament.  There  was 
apparently  down  to I322 no  parliamentary function, save 
that  of  taxation, which  could  not  be  discharged  by  the 
council alone;  and even the saving clause needs  qualifica- 
tion.  Merchants often taxed themselves in unparliamentary 
meetings,  and as  late  as 1400  the "  estates " in  a  grland 
conseil  taxed themselves to avoid  recourse  to parliament.1 
In 1371  a great council had even varied a subsidy previously 
granted in ~arliament.~  We trace a distinction, which seems 
clear  enough  in modern  times, back  to a  period  in which 
the line is blurred and wavering, and then farther to where 
it  disappears  altogether;  in  history,  as  in  the  simpler 
biological  studies,  absolute  origins  are beyond  our  ken.3 
The  council  in  parliament  is  thus  a  session  or  series 
of  sessions of  the council expanded in ways and for purposes 
which  by  degrees  become  more  and more  definite.  The 
first purpose was  certainly to provide  the freest access for 
petitioners to the council.  It has been said that parliament 
sought,  by appointing receivers and triers of  petitions,  to 
deprive the  council  of  its jurisdiction,  as it  also sought to 
deprive it of  legi~lation.~  But this view attributes to parlia- 
ment  a  conscious  activity  the centre  of  which  is  difficult 
to locate.  Things done  in parliament  are sometimes  done 
by one  estate or  other, but more often by the council  or 
the crown.  It  is  true that the  commons  grew more  and 
more insistent that their petitions should be turned by the 
council in parliament  into statutes, but  that is not  quite 
the same thing as depriving the council  of  legislation, and 
the council had invited petitions in parliament  long  before 
1 Nicolas, i. 107.  It was possible  to speak of  the " estate " of  coun- 
cillor, which ranked next to an earl's (Baldwin, p.  402). and also of  the 
"  estates"  of  the council,  as well as of  the estates of  parliament  and of 
the estates of  the church (Nicolas, v. 88) ; but in no case was the number 
limited to three. 
2  Rot. Parl., ii. 304; cf. ibid. iv. 301.  See below, p. 330. 
There are two technical distinctions between parliaments and councils. 
Parliaments are always summoned under the great seal, councils under the 
privy seal.  Secondly, the warrant to the chancellor  to summon a parlia- 
ment mentioned no names, while they were always specified in the warrants 
to the lord privy seal to summon a council.  Cf. Elsynge, pp. 63-4. 
the  commons  developed  a  will  of  their  own  or  devised 
the means of  expressing it.  The receivers and triers were, 
moreover,  appointed  by  the council,  and probably  before 
parliament met.  Their names were  certainly announced in 
1341  some  days before the  attendance was  sufficient for 
the business of  parliament to begin.l  The appointment in 
parliament of  a bishop, two  earls, and two barons to hear 
and  determine all  complaints  against  the king's  ministers 
for infractions  of  the ordinances  of  1311,~  seems  to have 
been  an  abnormal  demand  on  the  part  of  the  lords 
ordainers;  and  the  more  usual  practice  was  for  the 
council  to appoint  triers  of  petitions  to  determine  such 
as they could  and merely refer the rest  to parliament.  It 
was  the  council  which  arranged  that  petitions  presented 
in  parliament  should be  free  of  charge,  while  writs  sued 
out  of  lower  courts  required  fees;  kept  procedure  in 
parliament  free from the petrifying formalities  of  common 
law; and provided in parliament a means for reviewing and 
correcting the whole administration of  justice.  It is a late 
development of  self-consciousness when the  creature comes 
to regard itself as its own creator. 
The second purpose for which the council held  expanded 
sessions  in  parliament  was  to  provide  for  the  grant  of 
taxation  under  the  guidance  of  those  who  required  the 
taxes  and  would  spend  them;  and the  somewhat  mono- 
tonous  series  of  addresses  with  which  parliaments  were 
opened  in  the middle  ages  played  no  small  part  in the 
slow  education  of  the  commons  in  the  sense  of  political 
responsibility.  Grants  might  have  been  extorted  locally; 
but,  granted  in  scores  and hundreds  of  local  gatherings, 
they  would  have  been  voted  without  that  realization  of 
national necessity which is the foundation of  all rcsponsible 
government;  and  it  might  have  been  thought  that  the 
inevitable  place  in  which  these  explanations  should  have 
been  made, and these taxes voted, was  the  court to which 
all  the  king's  lieges  owed  suit and service, were  it not for 
the  fact  that  outside  England  the  king's  highest  court 
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and the estates-general  were  divorced,  and taxes were not 
granted where justice might be done in return.  Fortunately 
in England the council remained  embedded  in parliament, 
while parliament came to imply an ever fuller representation 
of  all sorts and estates of  men. 
This  continuance  of  the  council  in  parliament  is  a 
feature of  the English constitution  which  parliament  itself 
in  the  seventeenth  and  early  eighteenth  centuries  en- 
deavoured  in  vain  to  efface  and  destroy.  At  the  end 
of  the middle ages the parliament  chamber is alternatively 
called  the  great  council  chamber.  In  1539 we  have  a 
detailed  statute regulating  the place  of  councillors in the 
upper house,  whether  they  are peers  or  not;  and in  I541 
we  read  that  " on  21  March  the  council  sat  not,  for 
that they  sat  both  forenoon  and afternoon  at the parlia- 
ment."  It  was not until after the Revolution that attempts 
were  made by means of  place bills to exclude  the council 
from the house of  commons.  They failed of  their purpose, 
and they never applied  to the  house  of  lords.  Historical 
development  and the spirit of  the constitution  proved too 
strong for the doctrinaire philosophy and prejudices of  the 
revolutionary Whigs. 
More  complicated  than  the retention  of  the council  in 
parliament was the definition of  the council to be retained 
therein.  We have seen that "  council " might be protean in 
its variety.  It might  be  a large council of  magnates or  a 
minute council of ministers;  it might represent a baronial 
opposition  or  a  monarchical  administration.  Which  was 
to be  its  predominant  characteristic  when  it sat  in  the 
midst of  the estates in parliament  assembled?  Would the 
council  preserve  the  shadowy  unity  which  its  growing 
diversities had not  quite destroyed  in the middle  ages, or 
would  it become  so  fixed  in  its  diverse  aspects  that all 
sense and all appearance of  identity would be  lost?  This 
seems, in fact, to have been the fate of  the council.  The 
diverse  trend  towards  a  great  and  a  privy  council  got 
beyond control, and the two aspects of  the council became 
Nicolas, vii. 329, 330. 
two different things.  In other words, the expanded session 
of  the council in parliament set up for itself  as a house of 
lords, while the privy council was preserved as the adminis- 
trative organ of the cr0wn.l  Both, however, continued  in- 
herent  in  parliament,  though  the  schism  between  great 
and  privy  councils  led  to  the  emphasis  of  the connexion 
between  the great  couricil  and parliament,  and weakened 
that between parliamerit and the privy council; and to this 
discrimination is due the differentiation between the legisla- 
ture and executive.  The great council dissociated itself, or 
emancipated  itself,  more  and more  from  the  crown,  and 
became  less and less a  council, although its members con- 
tinued  their  claim to be  consiliarii nati of  the king.  The 
privy  council,  on  the  other  hand,  came to be  more  and 
more  regarded  as  an  executive  body,  whose  claims  to 
legislate were viewed with increasing  distrust. 
The  process  by  which  the  great  council  emancipated 
itself  from  the  crown  and became  a  house  of  parliament 
was  the evolution  of  the theory  of  a  peerage.  Its earlier 
stages  have  already  been  indi~ated.~  The  possession  of 
certain  rights  of  jurisdiction,  or  the  possession  of  certain 
lands, called a barony, to which these rights were attached, 
came to be regarded as constituting a peerage of  the realm, 
and as entitling the possessor to a special writ of  summons 
whenever  a  great  council  or  a  parliament  was  held.  It 
was  originally a  liability, rather  than  a  right,  which  was 
attached  to  tenure  per  baronianz,  and  in  the  fourteenth 
century  kings  were  moved  to  impose  or  threaten  heavy 
penalties  for  disobedience  to  the  summons.  The  peers, 
indeed, were more anxious to deny to others the rights of 
The  distinction  was  less  cley when  the  council  sat  in  the  Star 
chamber and came to be called a  court "  ; it was sometimes even called 
a "  senate " (" coram dominis in regio senatu secus nuncupato the Sterre 
Chamber,"  Lords'  Journals, i.  72).  and  barons  claimed  as barons, but 
unsuccessfully, a  right  to be summoned  to it as they were to the house 
of  lords.  Their failure  to  establish  their claim was possibly due to the 
fact that cases involving  a  peer's  loss of  freehold  were dealt with, not 
in  the  Star chamber,  but  by  the peers  in  parliament;  and  their land 
was ever the main concern  of  the "  pieres  de la  terre."  Other matters 
might be left to the crown and council. 
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peerage  than  to  fulfil  their  own  duties  themselves;  and 
at the very time that measures were being taken to punish 
their  neglect of  parliament, they were insisting that other 
members  of  the council  were  no  more  than  assistants or 
attendants without  a right to vote.  This  reduction of  the 
status of  the judges  and law  officers of  the crown affected 
both the council in parliament and the council out of  parlia- 
ment.  From  the  middle  of  the  fourteenth  century  they 
ceased, it. is said, to be sworn of  the council l and became 
merely  legal  assessors.  As  such  they  continued  to sit  in 
parliament,  but  even  under  Henry  VIII,  who  was  no 
respecter  of  peers,  it  was  admitted  that the  king's  lord 
chancellor himself  had no right or interest entitling him to 
a  vote  in  parliament  unless  he  were  a  peer.  The  same 
measure was meted out to other councillors of  the crown : 
the attorney- and solicitor-general and the king's serjeants- 
at-law  continued to receive the councillor's special writ  of 
summons  to  parliament,  and  the  former  do  to  this  day, 
though they never obey the summons, and the abeyance of 
the order of  the coif put an end to another rusty link between 
council and parliament.  But constant though their presence 
was  in  Tudor  parliaments,  and  active  as their  service- 
and that of  their  colleagues,  the  masters  in chancery 2- 
was in the upper house, these legal dignitaries had no  vote 
on the legislation which  they prepared.  So, too, the other 
official members of  the council were reduced to the position 
of  advisers to the peers.  The great officers  of  state were 
given  a  place  by  statute in  the  house  of  lords  whether 
they were  peers or  not;  but if  they were not  peers they 
1 Baldwin,  p.  76.  This statement is subject to considerable  reserva- 
tions;  it can only mean  that the judges  ceased  to be  political  advisers 
of  the  king.  They  remained  his  legal  councillors,  and  the  two  chief 
justices  were,  as a  matter of  fact,  sworn  of  the privy council  in  the 
cinteenth  century.  The  lord  chancellor,  moreover,  has  never  beer 
deprived  of  his  Glace in council. 
2  In 1536 the northern  rebels  complained  at Po?:efract  that "  those 
of  the chancery " were growing neglectful  of  their  office amongst  the 
lords"  in  not  providing  them  with  copies  of  bills  before  they  were 
introduced  in the commons  (Dodds, Pilgrimage  of  Grace, i.  360;  Engl. 
Hist. Rev., v. 568; Letters  and  Papers, xil. i. 410). 
a  31  Henry VIII, c. 10. 
sat lower  than  if  they  were,  on  their  respective  benches, 
while the secretaries were banished  to the upper woolsack 
beside  the  chance1lor.l  Apart  from  the legal members no 
such  discrimination  between  peers  and  other  councillors 
was  suffered  to  disturb  the  council  out  of  parliament; 
and  commoners  like  Thomas  Cromwell  and  Sir  Francis 
Walsingham  were just  as much "  lords  of  the council " as 
their noble colleagues.  Indeed, the success of  the peers in 
parliament  was  counterbalanced  by  their  failure  in  the 
council out of  parliament.  There the council became effec- 
tively  royal  and  privy;  the  magnum dropped  off  from 
concilium, and the magnates under the Tudors almost  dis- 
appeared  from the privy  council.  Such peers as survived 
were almost all of  the newest creation.  Cromwell and Cecil 
were not of the council because they were peers;  they were 
made  peers  because  they had  long  served in  the council, 
while others, such as Walsingham, were nearly as influential 
without attaining to peerage at all. 
Nor  did  the  reduction  of  councillors to the  position  of 
assistants  in  the house  of  lords  render  their  assistance  a 
negligible  quantity.  Tudor  law  was  judge-made  law, not 
so  much  by interpretation  in  the  courts, as by discussion 
in council ; and the year-books and law reports are replete 
with  judicial  decisions  on  constitutional  principles.2  The 
judges  did, in fnct, in Tudor times fulfil to some extent the 
function  of  the  supreme  court  under  the constitution of 
the United States, and Bacon's  encomium of  the consulta- 
tion  of  judges  by  the  crown  was  a  deduction  from  his 
historical  study of  Henry VII's  reign.  It was  the judges 
who decided that Henry could not pass an act of  attainder 
without  the  consent  of  the commons, and Henry accepted 
' See above, p. 251.  Behind the lower woolsack sat or knelt the clerks 
pf parliament.  Barons of  the exchequer had apparently no  regular place 
ln  parliament.  They  were  summoned  in  1305  (Maitland, Menzoranda, 
PP. cvii-viij),  but not apparently in Edward 111's reign (cf. Cal. Close Rolk 
1374-77, 1377-81,  passjm).  Glover, however, in his Pompa Pavliamentaris 
gives them as present  in 1585, while D'Ewes'  picture represents them as 
absent ; see Appendix. 
'  Apparently  the judges  sat for  this  purpose  (among others)  in  the 
exchequer chamber,  and discussed principles  without  necessarily waiting 
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their  verdict  as final.  It  was  the judges  who,  in  the first 
two  months  of  his  reign,  discussed  what  should  be  done 
in parliament with the problem of  a king de facto  who was 
de jure  an attainted traitor, and a  Speaker who was in an 
equally  parlous  case.l  It was  the  judges,  too,  who  laid 
down the principle of  Poynings' law years before its enact- 
ment, and they also determined  the procedure  by  writ  of 
error in parliament, declared that there were things which 
parliament  could  not  do  by  statute,  decided  what  bills 
should be  promoted by the government,  and defined  the 
limits of  ecclesiastical franchise.  The precise relation of  this 
judicial  action to parliament  has not  been  explained; but 
whether the  advice was  tendered in or  out of  parliament, 
and  whether  it was  regarded  as advice  or  decision, it is 
clear that both crown and parliament  acted upon it. 
The legal members  of  the council were equally active in 
sessions that were undoubtedly parliamentary.  It has been 
thought that they were really  responsible for the provisos 
which  the  king frequently added to bills when  giving the 
royal assent, and that they exercised the chief  influence in 
that  meeting  in  the robing  chamber  of  the palace which 
decided whether  the  royal  assent  should  be  given  at all. 
Under  Henry  VI it had  been  referred  to  the  two  chief 
justices to determine which of  the acts passed in parliament 
should  be  considered  statutes and proclaimed,  and which 
should be merely handed over to the clerk of  the council ; 
and it may be that the judges were responsible for no slight 
alterations in bills between their passage in parliament  and 
their  final appearance on the statute rolls.  In parliament 
itself the lawyers of  the council had much to do with legis- 
' 
lation ; and in the first years of  Henry VIII's reign, at least, 
a bill was rarely committed to any one else.3  At every stage, 
indeed, their influence was felt-in  the preliminary discussion 
Year-Books, Henry VII,  ed.  1679, p. 4; cf my Henry VII,  ii. 10-11. 
Nicolas, iii. 22.  - 
3  Lords'  Journals, i. 1-57  passiln ;  the judges, the attorney- and solicitor- 
general,  the serjeants-at-law,  and  masters  in  chancery  were  the  usual 
committees for bills;  on one occasion  (ibid., p. 56) a bill was committed 
bv  the  lords  to the attorney-general  "  to  be  reformed " after  it had 
of  principles  before the  bills were  framed, in  their  actual 
drafting, in their  amendment during passage,  in  the royal 
provisos, and in their final form on the statute-book.  The 
laws  of  England  would  have  been  singular  things  had it 
been left to peers and popular representatives to make them ; 
and the king's  council in parliament  played  no  small  part 
in English  constitutional  history. 
Notwithstanding  these eminent services to parliamentary 
legislation, the  position  of  the council in  parliament  grew 
more precarious.  Henry's  act  of  1539,  indeed, gave some 
councillors a  statutory right to attend the house  of  lords, 
independent  of  a  peerage;  but  unless  they  were  peers 
they  could  not  vote,  and  the  act  did  nothing  for  those 
councillors  who  held  no  great  office  of  state.  It was 
anomalous  that  a  lord  chancellor  like  Sir Thomas  More 
should preside over, and day by day adjourn, the council 1 
in parliament without even a casting vote in its proceedings ; 
and the anomaly was only removed by the growing practice 
of  creating  the chancellor  a  peer, which incidentally ruled 
out from the chancellorship  any ecclesiastic who was not a 
bishop.  By the same intrusion of  peerage into the council 
in parliament  other  great offices  of  state were restricted to 
peers; and those who were not  peers were deprived of  their 
traditional  place  in parliament,  which  they had  occupied 
since its origin, when  the core  of  every parliament was  a 
session of  the council. 
From the menace of  this exclusion  from parliament the 
council was saved by the house of  commons, and the constitu- 
encies welcomed those whom  the peers had rejected.  The 
multitude  of  privy  councillors  in  the  house  of  commons 
during  the Tudor  period  has often been used as a proof  of 
the packing of  parliament;  but the contention  ignores the 
fact that so long as parliaments had existed councillors had 
received  their  special writs  of  summons.  It is  a  strange 
inversion  of  parliamentary history, and the real novelty of 
Tudor times was not that councillors sat in parliament, but 
The entry of an adjournment of  th:,house  of  lords in  its Journals 
during  the session of  1533 is frequently  hodierno  consilio soluto." 
. . 
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that they  sat as elected representatives instead of as crown 
nominees, just  as the attorney- and solicitor-general to-day 
prefer-unless  indeed  they  have no  option-the  risks  of 
contested election to obedience to a certain royal summons. 
The  change  was  twofold : councillors sat  in the  house  of 
commons in tcad of  in the house of  lords, and they sought 
election.  It  was  natural  that  they  should  think  they 
had  some  claim  upon  the  constituencies,  and  that  the 
electors were not making  any great concession  in choosing 
those  who  had,  in  any  case,  a  legal  right  to  sit 
in  parliament.  Probably  to-day,  if  peers  of  the  United 
Kingdom could sit in the house of  commons, it would  not 
be  considered  an  arbitrary  proceeding  to  offer  them- 
selves  for  election.  Under  the  circumstances  the  amount 
of  pressure actually brought to bear upon constituencies to 
elect  privy  councillors  as  their  members  seems  to  have 
been  slight;  probably they were  as glad  then to get  privy 
councillors  to  represent  them  as  they  are  to-day  to  get 
cabinet ministers as candidates. 
The  change,  by  which  privy  councillors  submitted  to 
popular election and sat in the house of  commons, is impor- 
tant as a recognition of  the growing weight of  the house of 
commons and  of  the  popular  element  in  the  constitution. 
It points in the same direction as the election of  the eldest 
sons  of  peers,  the  purchase  of  boroughs,  the  bribery  of 
electors,  the  ambition  of  aspiring  politicians  to  become 
membcrs, the abeyance of  residence as a qualification, and 
the capture of  country seats by London lawyers.  Possibly 
the  transference of  councillors from  the upper to the lower 
house  was  by  way  of  preference rather than  compulsion, 
and they vacated their place  in the house of  lords because 
they  found  greater  respect  and  an  ampler  scope  in  the 
house  of  commcns.  In the upper  house they had  become 
assistants,  if  not  servants;  in  the  lower they  were  more 
than  equzl  to  their  colleagues.  They  formed  the  link 
between  the  government  and the commons, and did their 
best to pr~duce  harmony between the two.  Both Cromwcll 
and Cecil  owed  their  influence largely  to their  position  m 
the commons, and they regularly reported to their sovereigns 
the feeling of  the house,l and to the house the wishes of  the 
government.  The  privy  councillors  always  formed  part 
of  the deputations sent by the  house  to impress  its views 
on  Queen  Elizabeth  with  regard  to such  matters  as  her 
marriage,  the  succession  to  the  throne,  the execution  of 
Mary Stuart, and abuses like monopolies ; and when supply 
was  under discussion the amount was  always referred to a 
committee  which  consisted of  the privy councillors in the 
house  and an equal  number  of  private  members2  Their 
position  was  that  of  genuine  mediators;  they  performed 
a duty to the house as well as to the crown, and they did 
not  always  agree  with  one  another  in  what  they  said in 
debate.  It was  the divorce between the Stuarts and their 
people which rendered their position untenable, and raised 
the issue whether they were servants of  the house or ministers 
of  the crown. 
It would  hardly  be  an  exaggeration  to  say  that  this 
identification  of  privy councillors with popular representa- 
tives  was  as  important  a  stage  in  the  development  of 
responsible  government  as  the  growth  of  representation 
itself;  for responsible government was  not  established  by 
summoning representatives to Westminster, but by embody- 
ing those representatives  in the government or the govern- 
ment  in  those  representatives.  If  parliament  was  to 
remain  something  more  than  an irresponsible  opposition, 
there must be unity between it and the government;  and 
responsible  government  involves  the  responsibility  of  the 
executive as well as that of the legislature.  The executive 
must  be  responsible  to  the  legislature,  but  in  an  equal 
measure  the legislature must be responsible for the govern- 
ment.  In the middle  ages a connexion, if  not  unity, had 
been  maintained by the presence of  the council in  parlia- 
Cf. Cromwell's letter to Henry VIII in 1534  (Letters and Papers, vii. 51). 
In Elizabeth's  reign the house grew sometimes restive over these reports, 
and still more so  under the Stuarts; but to make them has continued 
to be a regular duty of  the leader of the house. 
D'Ewes,  Journals.  p. 124;  Commons'  Jouvnals,  i.  53,  74, 83. 104, 
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ment,  and  by  the  advice  that  was  constantly  given  by 
councillors and magnates to the commons in their domestic 
sessions  in  the chapter house.  The  tendency  to  exclude 
councillors as such from  parliament  threatened a complete 
separation  of  powers;  and  the  danger  was  only  averted 
by  making some councillors peers  and securing for others 
seats in the house of  commons.  The council in parliament 
was thus preserved  from extinction;  and it was the council 
in its most  royal  and "  privy " form that was  saved, not 
merely  the council in  that "  great " and attenuated  form 
in which it assumed the guise of the house of  lords. 
CHAPTER  XV 
THE  PEERS IN  PARLIAMENT 
THE  house of  lords has long been  regarded  as the most 
stable and conservative element in the British constitution, 
and among the claims that have been  made on its behalf 
to the political gratitude of  the English people is the asser- 
tion that seven hundred years ago it extorted Magna  Carta 
from King John.  In reality, few elements in the constitution 
have been based upon a more ambiguous foundation or have 
suffered  more  radical  changes.  The  lords  themselves  are 
still in doubt about their origin ; and while they agree on the 
palpable  fiction  that  Edward  I  created,  and  intended  to 
create, a number of  hereditary peerages, they differ  as to the 
date  of  the  creation,  and within  recent  years  they  have 
decided that a summons to the parliaments of  1283 and 1290 
both did and did not create hereditary peerages.  Some peers 
sit in the house of  lords by a title which the house of  lords 
itself  has  declared  invalid in the  case  of  other claimants. 
At one time the title was tenure by barony, at another writs 
of  summons, and at a third creationby letters patent.  Most 
peers sit in the right of  their fathers, but others have sat in 
the right of  their mothers, and a few in the right of  their 
wives or of  their sons.  There are many peers who  cannot 
sit in the house  of  lords, and some of  the lords who do sit 
are not peers.  Some sit because they are elected by their 
fellow-peers, some  because  they  are  elected  by  episcopal 
chapters on the nomination of  the crown.  Some are elected 
for life, some until they resign, and some for a single parlia- 
ment.  Some  have  been  born  peers,  some have  achieved 
peerage by  various  means, including purchase,l and others 
1  James I instituted a regular tariff:  i~o.ooo  for a barony, ~15,000  for 
a viscountcy, ~~0,000  for an earldom (Pike, p. 355). 
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have  had  it  thrust  upon  them.  Almost  every  principle 
upon which the house was founded has been inverted during 
its construction;  and, whatever may be its defects, neither 
its history nor its composition is lacking in variety. 
In an earlier chapter an attempt has been made to trace 
the evolution of  peerage and the process by which the peers 
sought to monopolize power in the king's council, to convert 
it into a council of  magnates and, when it sat in parliament, 
into a house of  peers.  The process has been  as prolonged 
as the growth of  the constitution ; it was not finished at the 
close of  the middle ages, and the latest steps towards com- 
pleting the hereditary character of  the house  of  lords were 
not  taken until  the nineteenth  century.  It is  a  house  of 
lords, but the lords are not all hereditary, and it is not yet 
a  house  of  nothing  but  peers  who  are.  Fortunately  or 
unfortunately,  its  case  is  one  of  arrested  development ; 
and the changes that threaten in the future are likely to be 
in the direction of  reversion to its original type, at any rate 
to  the  extent  of  reducing  or  eliminating the  principle  of 
peerage  which  was  superimposed  upon  the council  in the 
later middle  ages.  For  that, if  for  no  other  reason,  the 
history of  the peers in parliament is of  immediate interest. 
The fundamental change in  the house of  lords  has been 
its conversion from the king's great council, sitting in parlia- 
ment  in  virtue  of  royal  writs,  into  a  body  of  legislators 
basing their right to legislate and their independence of  the 
crown  upon  the  principle  of  primogeniture.  As  early  as 
1346  a  distinction had been drawn between the councillors 
and  the  magnates  in  the  great  council  in  parliament.1 
Judges, for instance, were summoned to treat with the king 
and others of  his council; other councillors, who eventually 
come to be known as peers, are summoned to treat with the 
king, prdatis, proceribus, et magnatibus.  The distinction was 
not  reflected in the designation of  those who sat in camera 
magni consilii vocata le parlement chambre; they were all called 
"  seigneurs " or "  lords,"  and the term included  the coun- 
1  Elsynge, pp. 25-7;  Hale, Jurisdiction of the Lords, ed. Hargrave, 1796, 
p. 25;  Baldwin,  p.  76;  Pike, p. 247. 
cillors  as well  as  the  prelates  and  magnates.  A  knight 
might well  be  a  lord  of  par1iament.l  But the differentia- 
tion grew with the increasing stress on "  peerage," although 
peers  and  peerage  are not  words  found in  parliamentary 
records  of  the  early  Tudor  period.  Nowhere,  indeed,  in 
the  sixteenth  century do  we  find  any  clear  statement  of 
peerage  theory,  and  Cowell,  in  his  Intertreter  (1607), 
vaguely defines the peers as those whom the king summons 
by  special writ  to parliament.  The anarchy of  the Wars 
of  the  Roses  and  the  authority  of  Henry  VII  militated 
against  the  enunciation  of  a  constitutional  doctrine; 
both conditions rendered a right to sit in parliament of  little 
practical  value.  It was  not  until parliamentary  struggles 
superseded the arbitrament of  war and the autocracy of  the 
crown  that a  seat in the house  of  lords became  an object 
of  desire and a means  of  political  power. 
Henry VII was thus left to do much  as he liked in the 
parliament  chamber.  Opposition which had not been settled 
at Bosworth had recourse to conspiracy and rebellion; and 
the futility of  parliamentary opposition freed Henry from any 
temptation to interfere with traditional methods of  summons. 
Lords  who  might  have  resisted  in  council  had  already 
committed  themselves  to treason  and been disposed of  by 
more drastic methods than the refusal  of  writs.  The same 
conditions obtained in the early years of  Henry VIII;  and 
it was not until a momentous revolution in domestic politics 
was broached  that fundamental divergence of  view led the 
crown  to  consider  its  constitutional  ways  and  means  of 
success.  The  first  indication  of  the  coming  crisis  was 
connected with that famous controversy between the church 
and  the  laity which  arose  over  Richard  Hunne's  case  in 
151 j ;  and in that year the judges,  acting as interpreters 
of  the constitution, declared that the presence of  the spiritual 
lords was not  essential to ~arliament.~ 
Cf. Lords' Journals, vol. i. p. xxvi. : "  every other knight, not being lord 
of  the parliament." 
See Miss Jeffries Davis in En&.  Hist. Rev.. xxx. 477. 
Pike,  p. 327;  Letters  and  Papevs  of Henry VIII, vol. ii. pt. i.  Nos. 
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Meanwhile  practice  had  crystallized,  and  Henry  VIII 
was  too  prudent  to attempt to enforce the  constitutional 
doctrine of  his advisers in this respect.  Nor did he interfere 
with  the  routine  of  chancery  in  issuing  special  writs  of 
summons;  the fact that chancery  continues to issue such 
wits to the law officers of  the crown, which have not been 
obeyed for centuries, suggests that Henry was wise to leave 
its practice  alone.  Occasionally he  seems to have  sent  a 
private intimation to a lord that he would do well to refrain 
from  coming  to  parliament;  and  when  they  wanted  to 
abstain they had, of  course, to seek his permission.  But the 
regular writs were issued as though the crown had no option 
in the matter, and the only method Henry took to modify 
the  ;bevsonnel  of  the house  of  lords  was  the creation  of 
peers.  The dissolution of  the monasteries materially altered 
the composition of  the house, but  that was not the object 
of  their suppression.  The Italian and absentee bishops  of 
Salisbury and  Worcester  were deprived  by  statute,l there 
being no means by which the church in England  could rid 
itself  of  the incubus;  but the bill  was  not  passed  for the 
purpose of  catching votes.  It is doubtful, too, whether that 
was  the  motive  of  Henry's  few  creations  in  1529.~  The 
Boleyns would  in  any  case  have  been  ennobled,  whether 
their votes were needed or not;  and the real  question was 
not how to obtain a majority of  lay over clerical votes, but 
whether any lay majority could legally bind the church in 
spiritual matters  against  the  votes  of  its  representatives. 
The  critical  resolutions  were  carried,  not  by  a  created 
majority,  but by a conference between  the two  houses, in 
which the spiritual and temporal peers were equally repre- 
sented, and the commons voted with the latter.  The small 
number of  twenty-eight  temporal  peers summoned  in  1523 
was  quite abnormal; and even  in  1534, when  Henry had 
Lords'  Jouvnals, i. 80. 
Round, Studies in Peerage  History, pp.  330. etc.  Lord  Ogle was not 
summoned  between 1529 and  1544. Darcy was kept away in 1535-6,  and 
possibly  Tunstall in  I532 ;  but these instances are too few to justify any 
generalization,  except that the crown's  control  over its ovn summons 
Mas  not quite extinct. 
raised  the number  to fifty-four,  they  were  fewer  than  the 
temporal peers summoned in 1454. 
The dissolution of  the  monasteries  reduced  the number 
of  spiritual  peers  from  forty-seven  to  twenty-one;  and 
while  Henry  VIII  increased  the number of  bishops  from 
twenty-one  to  twenty-seven,  the  abolition  of  the  papal 
jurisdiction  and of  all  but  the form  of  capitular  election 
gave  the  crown  substantial  control  of  these  votes.  At 
the end of  his  reign  the  majority  of  the  existing  peers 
had been  created  by  Henry  VIII;  but  Mary relieved  the 
church  in  England  of  its  subjection  to  the  crown  by 
subjecting  it to  the  papacy,  and  the Elizabethan  settle- 
ment of  religion owed nothing of  its triumph to royal control 
over  episcopal  votes  in  the house  of  lords.  Her  success, 
however, placed twenty-six spiritual peerages at her disposal, 
and these, with  half  a  dozen temporal creations, made the 
house  of  lords as safe in her  keeping as a pocket borough. 
At her death the temporal  peers numbered  sixty, and the 
house  of  lords  contained  eighty-six  members,  which  was 
slightly less than its average size since  1350; only during 
Henry VII's reign  and the early years of  Henry VIII had 
the number sunk below eighty, and the difference lay in the 
reduction of  the spiritual peers from more than half  to less 
than a third of  the whole house. 
It was the Stuarts who, in seeking  to control the house 
by creations, rendered it uncontrollable.  No  doubt it was 
inconvenient  for  James  I  to inherit  a house of  lords con- 
sisting of  eighty-six members, none of  whom he had created. 
The bishoprics, of  course, gradually fell into his hands, and 
by creating fifty-four peers he nearly doubled the temporal 
peerage, but failed  to make it amenab1e.l  On  the eve of 
the Scottish Union the temporal peers numbered a hundred 
and seventy-six ; that act added sixteen, the Tories created 
twelve to pass  the treaty of  Utrecht, and these,  with the 
bishops, endowed the House of  Hanover at its accession with 
an upper  house  of  two hundred and thirty.  Nevertheless 
the  younger  Pitt was  the only  begetter  of  the Victorian 
1 See Deputy-Keeper ofthe Records 47th Repovt;  Pike, pp. 357 sqq. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE PEERS  IN  PARLIAMENT  305 
house  of  lords.  Owing  partly  to  the  Irish  union,  but 
more to Pitt's desire to enlist support among the nozhveaux 
riches of  the war and the industrial revolution, the peerage 
had grown  over  fifty per  cent. at the time of  his  death.1 
The  house  of  lords  itself  numbered  three  hundred  and 
fifty-one  members  in  1806.  The  policy  of  control  by 
creation  had  clearly  reached  its limit,  and  the house  of 
lords was  independent  at last.  For the first  time  in its 
history  it contained,  in  the  nineteenth  century, an over- 
whelming majority of  members who had been born, and not 
created,peers.  During the middle ages the spiritual peers, 
who were not hereditary, always outnumbered their temporal 
colleagues.  The bishops,  new  creations, and their friends 
among  the  old  enabled  Elizabeth,  the Stuarts, and even 
Pitt, to  counterbalance  hereditary  independence;  and the 
sons of Pitt's house of  lords were the first generation of  peers 
by primogeniture  to be  undisputed  masters  of  their  own 
house.  It was not a mere coincidence that that generation 
brought  the  country  to the  verge  of  revolution  in  1832. 
The hereditary  principle  is  not  the rock  upon  which  the 
house  of  lords  was  founded,  but  the  rock  on  which  it 
foundered. 
The multiplication of  the size of  a council six- or sevenfold 
involved a radical change in its functions and composition ; 
and  the  house  of  lords  became  less  and  less  a  council, 
less and less judicial, less and less a body to get things done, 
and more and more an opposition.  A body of  six hundred 
men  can hardly be more than a  public meeting, and both 
houses  of  parliament  are  now,  in  fact,  public  meetings 
which do  most of  their useful discussion by way of  private 
conversation.  The  difference  is  that  while  the  house  of 
commons  is  a  public  meeting  of  plenipotentiaries,  the 
house  of  lords  is  a  public  meeting  of  private  persons 
with  very unequal  qualifications for the discharge of  their 
1 It  has been more than doubled again since 1806, and 433 new peerajies 
were created between  1880 and 1920.  The total membership of  the house 
of  lords was 741 in 1923 ; and the original proportions of  ecclesiastical, and 
representative  Scottish and Irish, peers to those of  the United Kingdom, 
have entirely disappeared;  see Appendix 111,  note (r). 
public duty.  The  best  apology  for  the  house of  lords as 
a  political  authority is  the  fact  that for  five-sixths  of  its, 
business it consists of  less than one-sixth  of  its members; 
but it is a precarious title, which depends upon the non-user 
of  rights by the great majority of their proprietors,  and the 
house of  lords is a serious  drawback to  the  advantages of 
allowing a  constitution to grow, instead  of  construct~ng  it 
on  a  plan.  It does  not  represent  any  conscious  design, 
and it would never  have entered into the mind  of  man to 
construct  a second  chamber  on  the  principles which  it is 
presumed to embody. 
The  original  obligation  out  of  which  it  grew  was  the 
liability of  tenants who held land from the crown to render 
suit  and  service  at the king's  court.  The service was  of 
value because it was largely military, and great holders of 
land were in a better position than others to provide armed 
forces.  But  the advice  that was  also  expected  would  be 
expert,  because  in  the  middle  ages  the  management  of 
England was a problem akin to that of  the management of 
the domains  which the tenants-in-chief  possessed.  A  peer 
like Thomas of  Lancaster, who held five earldoms, might be 
presumed  to  enjoy  the  practical  experience  which  would 
make  his  advice  of  value  to the  crown.  But  the  crown 
also  possessed  the  right  of  selecting,  by  special  writ  of 
summons,  the tenants-in-chief  whose advice it valued  and 
desired;  and it was not from among them exclusively that 
kings formed their  council.  Others were included for legal 
skill not  possessed by the barons, and later on there were 
added men of  colnnlercial experience and political wisdom, 
as English policy grew more complex and embraced multi- 
farious  interests.  The  holders  of  land  were,  however, 
entrenched  in  the  council,  and gradually  the  breach  was 
widened between baronial councillors, whose point  of  view 
was local and territorial, and those new men who depended 
on the crown, and viewed politics from the centre as royal 
or  national  business.  This  divergence  differentiated  the 
great from the privy council, and left the former in  parlia- 
ment as the embodiment  of  the landed interest;  it was on 
I 
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questions relating to the tenure  of  land  that the nzagfzum 
concilium  claimed  and secured  the decisive  voice,  and it 
was  the  policy  of  strict entails,  designed  to preserve  the 
integrity of  great estates, that led to the recognition of  primo- 
geniture as the main  title to a  seat in  the house of  lords. 
This  development  was but  slowly affected  by the growth 
of  industry  and  commerce,  because  the  wealth  derived 
therefrom was so largely invested in land that the interests 
of  the two classes always tended to coincide, and wealth in 
land  continued  to  be  the  basis  of  the  house  of  lords; 
indeed, one of  the motives of  the di:jsolution of  the monas- 
teries  was  to  provide  new  lands  for  the nouveazcx  riches, 
and many of  our ducal houses were founded on the spoliation 
of  the church. 
Wealth in land and wisdom in council are not, however, 
synonymous terms, and the conciliar character of  the house 
of  lords was  obscured  by the  peerage.  While  the  house 
asserted  with  growing  emphasis  its  claims  as  a  strictly 
hereditary  peerage,  it clung  tenaciously  to powers  it had 
possessed as a council ; and its history for some two centuries 
has consisted mainly of  struggles to retain rights of  jurisdic- 
tion  and legislation  which  were  growing  more  and  more 
anomalous.  Most  of  the privileges of  the  house  came to 
it in its capacity as a royal council ; and as recently as the 
Act of  1876  appeals  to the house of  lords were  described 
as being heard "  before her Majesty the Queen in her Court 
of  Parliament." l  But  the  sovereign  had  gradually  been 
deprived  of  all  discretion  in  determining  the composition 
of  his court and council in parliament.  In the Bristol and 
Arllndel cases, in the reign of  Charles I, the lords  declared 
that a writ of  summons could not be refused to a peer, and 
that the king could not prevent him from obeying it.2  At 
Pike, pp. 268, 306. 
Gardiner, History of  England, vi. 91-1x5;  Hallam, i. 379-80;  Lords' 
Journals,  iii.  544;  Elsynge,  pp.  59-60,  192-242.  AS  recently  as 1601 
Elizabeth  had  afforded  a precedent  for  Charles I by  directing Rutland, 
Bedford,  Cromwell, Sandys, and  Montague not to appear in parliament 
although writs of  summons had been sent  them  (Acts P.C. 1601-4,  pp 
218-19,  221). 
the  Restoration  they  re-affirmed  the  inalienable  right  of 
peers to their seats, while  they repudiated all  the medieval 
principles  from  which  those  rights  were  deduced.  They 
abolished  all  feudal  services,  of  which  attendance at the 
king's  court was one; l they decided that  the possession of 
a barony, the original ground for the exercise of  jurisdiction, 
constituted 20 right  to a peerage;  and they denied their 
obligation to obey the royal  summons to parliament, while 
claiming the right to come if  they chose.3  All conception of 
duty was merged in privilege ; and, taking a leaf  out of  the 
Stuart  note-book,  the  lords  grounded  their  privilege  on 
indefeasible hereditary right.  Peerage became indelible save 
by  attainder;  no  misdemeanours  and no  incapacity could 
deprive a  peer of  his  dignity;  and the Revolution  of  1688 
left the peerage in possession of  rights which it denied to the 
crown.  The  peer  might, indeed,  be  excluded from parlia- 
ment  for his faith or  misconduct, but he did not  thereby 
ccase to  be  a  peer. 
The claim of  a body of  landlords to be the highest  court 
of  appeal over the whole  complicated sphere of  civil juris- 
diction was the most  singular of  the anomalies arising from 
the simultaneous retention  by the lords of  the powers of  a 
council and their repudiation  of  the principles on which it 
was constituted.  Edward  1's "  parliaments of  the council " 
had  been  held  to  determine  the  law's  delays  and  the 
judges'  doubts, matters which  were commonly settled after 
the  barons  and elected  commons  had  departed;  and the 
sentence  of  the high  court  of  parliament  was  that of  the 
king  in  council.  As  late as the reign  of  Henry  VII  the 
judges  are the  exclusive  arbiters  of  this jurisdiction;  but 
Pike, pp. 356-7. 
In the Fitzwalter case (16691, reaffirmed in the Berkeley case (1801). 
The principal ground for this decision was the reasonable argument that 
a "  barony " was devisable  by will, and that if  peerage  attached to a 
barony, and a seat in the house of  lords to a  peerage, the holder  might 
dispose of  political  power by sale or by bequest.  The objection did not 
lie against the medieval tenure by barony,  because the tenant could not 
then dispose of  lands which  belonged to the crown. 
Disobedience  to the royal writs of  summons became  common  form 
with the peers as time went on, and no  king since the Restoration  was 
in  a position  to impose  the penalties for dereliction  of duty n-hich had 
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by  the middle  of  the nineteenth  century  the  peers  had 
turned the council  so  topsy-turvy  that not  only had they 
arrogated  to themselves, a  non-judicial  body, the supreme 
decision  on  points  of  law, but  they had reduced  the  real 
lawyers  to  assistants  and  advisers.  The history  of  this 
blue-blooded revolution requires  a little attention. 
No  doubt  a  claim  to  jurisdiction  seemed  natural  to a 
baron; for a barony in the middle ages consisted  largely in 
the jurisdiction and profits therefrom which it implied.  But 
a barony was valued by its medieval possessor, not for the 
opportunity  which  its  courts  afforded  him  of  displaying 
legal wisdom, but for the emoluments which accrued  from 
the dispensation  of  justice;  it was the lord's steward who 
judged, while his master received the proceeds of  judgement. 
Moreover, the king, as lord paramount of  the land, occupied 
in the high court of  parliament the same position of  privilege 
that the baron held in his baronial franchise;  and the only 
right the barons possessed in the king's court was to be tried 
by their  peers, not  to try other  people.  When  Edward I 
made parliament  the common receptacle  for  his  subjects' 
petitions, it was  to  himself  and his judges in council, and 
not to  a  public meeting of  peers,  that he provided access. 
The  commons,  however,  having  sifted  the  petitions  and 
made the important ones common, took to the practice of 
referring  the rest  to the council  and departing without  a 
reply.  Presently direct access to the council, and through 
the council to chancery, by means  of  bill  or  petition, was 
accorded by  statute;  the stage of  reception  and reference 
by parliament  to the council was  omitted,  and  from  the 
reign of  Henry IV original jurisdiction in parliament rapidly 
decreased.l  The  petitions which had flowed  in  thousands 
to parliament  were  diverted  to  chancery,  the  courts  of 
star chamber and requests, and  other  departments  of  the 
council.  This  was  a  characteristic  feature  of  the  Tudor 
period,  and during  the  first  seventeen  years  of  James  1's 
1 Hale, Jurisdiction of  the Lords, ed. Hargrave, 1796,  p. vi; Palgrave, 
Report on Public Petitions (Parl. Papers, 1833,  xii. 19)  ; McIlwain, p. 133  ; 
Nicolas,  Proc.  of  Privy  Council, i. 73, v.  p.  xi; Leadam,  Star  Chamber 
(Selden Soc.), i. pp. xxiii-iv,  lix-lx;  Baldwin, pp. 243-9. 
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reign  there  is  said  to  have  been  only  one  writ  of  error 
brought before par1iament.l 
Dissatisfaction,  however,  with  the  uses  to  which  the 
Stuarts put the jurisdiction  of  their prerogative courts led 
to a demand for its revival in parliament ;  and the popularity 
of  the impeachment of  Stuart ministers afforded  the lords 
an easy re-entry.  But in the interval  the lords had  con- 
verted  the  king's  council  in  parliament  into  a  house  of 
peers, and under the guise of  restoration a supreme appellate 
jurisdiction was vested in men  the like of  whdm had never 
possessed it before.  The commons, indeed, were not  quite 
content  with  this restoration;  they wanted a  place in the 
sun  of  parliamentary  jurisdiction,  and a  grand  contest  of 
legal wits was  waged over the  question whether or not the 
commons  were  judges  in  ~arliament.~  Their  distrust  of 
the Stuart judges  distorted their history  and precluded  a 
real  restoration;  and they had in the end  to be  satisficd 
with the part of the grand inquest of the nation, presenting 
offenders against the state for the judgement  of  the peers. 
From this jurisdiction,  which was of  first instance with the 
commons as prosecution,  the lords proceeded, in  the  reign 
of  Charles 11, to claim an appellate jurisdiction  without any 
intervention  of  the  commons.  The abolition by the Long 
parliament  of  the prerogative  courts, to which  the council 
had  delegated  much  of  its  jurisdiction,  had  left  a  void 
in  that  sphere  which  the  common  law  courts  could 
not  fill;  and  the  peers  stepped  into  the  breach.  Their 
Elizabeth had provided in 1585  for the hearing of  writs of  error from 
the queen's  bench  in the exchequer  chamber  when  parliament  was  not 
sitting. 
Floyd's case in 1621,  in which the Commons inflicted severe penalties 
on one who was not a member of  their house, is well known  (Gardiner, 
iv. 119-21;  Hallam, i.  360-z),  and is  supposed  to  have  been  unprece- 
dented.  But in 1529  Henry VIII writes  to Lady Worsley forbidding her 
to molest any further a clerk accused of attempting to poison her husband, 
"  as the House of  Commons has decided that he is not culpable " (Letters 
and Papers, iv. 5293,  v. I I  7  ;  his case had apparently been brought up from 
king's bench to parliament on a writ of error) ; and the house, before passing 
the bill  of  attainder against Thomas  Seymour in  1549,  resolved that it 
would hear the evidence "  orderly as it was before the Lords"  (Commons' 
Journals, i. g), though the answer was that it was not necessary in that 
"  court."  Each part of  the high court of  parliament was claiming to be a. 
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assumption  was  not  unchallenged,  but  the  commons were 
engaged upon a similar assumption in the sphere of  finance ; 
and  when  the  peers  asked  for  records  establishing  the 
monopoly  af  supply  claimed  by  the commons,  the  lower 
house retorted with a similar demand for the evidence upon 
which  the  lords based their  assumption of  appellate juris- 
diction.  Both houses were, in fact, appropriating the effects 
of  a languishing  monarchy,  and they agreed  to divide the 
spoil.  The  divergence  of  parliament  into  two  houses 
prevented  the  common enjoyment  of  the  fruits of  parlia- 
mentary  triumphs;  and  the  lords  acquiesced  in  the 
commons' control of  taxation, while the commons  accepted 
the  claims of  the  lords  to the sole  exercise of  appellate 
jurisdiction. 
The subservience of  the judges to the Stuarts relieved the 
peers of  any sense of  obligation  to share with  them  their 
newly-won  p3wers;  and the position  of  the judges  in  the 
high court of  parliament grew steadily worse.  Having been 
limited to judicial functions, they were reduced  even there 
to giving  advice;  then their  advice was  rejected,  and at 
length,  in  1856,  the peers  refused  to consult  them.'  The 
revolution had reached its limit when the supreme court of 
appeal refused  to consult the judges,  whose  presence alone 
gave a shred of  historical and moral support to the claims of 
the peers;  and  the  judges  soon  had  their  revenge.  The 
mere pressure  of  public opinion  drove  the  peers  from  the 
position they occupied, and no  peer  who neither holds nor 
has held high  judicial office under the crown now ventures 
to sit when the  house of  lords is  acting as a supreme court 
of  appeal.  The  efficiency  of  the  house  of  lords  in  its 
judicial  capacity  depends  upon  the  rigorous  abstention 
from its proceedings of  every peer who owes his position to 
primogeniture;  and so  far as jurisdiction is concerned, the 
peers  have  abandoned  the  hereditary  foundation  of  their 
house. 
This abdication was not without  awkward logical  conse- 
quences, and the question arose why primogeniture should 
qualify peers to make the laws which it did not qualify them 
1 Pike, p. 377. 
to interpret.  The question was emphasized by the increasing 
stress laid by the peers upon peerage as the sole qualification 
for membership  of  their  house.  The judges  were not  the 
only victims of  this exclusive principle ; one by one the non- 
hereditary  and conciliar elements were excluded even from 
the  subordinate  position  of  advisers  to  the  house.  The 
serjeants-at-law  have  been  abolished;  the  law  oficers  of 
the crown and the masters in chancery have ceased to attend, 
and privy councillors are reduced  to standing on the steps 
of  the  throne,  where  they  may be  seen,  but  may not  be 
heard.  The  lord  chancellor  and  other  great  officers  of  ., 
state  have only been retained by the practice of  forcing upon 
them the livery of  the peerage ;  and the bishops alone remain 
to testify that a reputation ior wisdom was once considered 
a necessary qualification for membership of  the king's great 
council  in  parliament.  Even  they  have  suffered.  They 
have  been  denied  the  status of  peerage,  notwithstanding 
their  assertion in  parliament  in I352 that they were peers 
for precisely the same reason as earls and barons ;  and the 
grounds for this astonishing denial are worthy of  it.  Bishops 
do not inherit their  bishoprics, but attain them by merit; 
and if  they commit treason or felony, they are nottried by 
the peers.2  The house  seems to have based  itself  on  the 
reason  for  which  Palmerston  approved  of  nomination  for 
the  civil service: "  there was  no  damned merit  about it." 
The bishops survived this attack on their dignity, but not 
without  loss.  Their  number  had  been  reduced  to  com- 
parative insignificance by the enormous creations of  temporal 
peers,  and they formed but a twentieth part of  the house 
in the nineteenth century.  But the possibility of  increasing 
this  exiguous  figure  alarmed  the  temporal  peers  or  their 
nonconformist  supporters;  and  in  1847  it  was  enacted 
that, however much  bishops might  multiply, their seats in 
1 See above, p. 65.  This principle had been  laid down in the Constitu- 
tions of  Clarendon : "  archiepiscopi,  episcopi  . . . habent possessiones 
suas de domino  rege sicut baroniam,  et inde. . . . sicut  barones ceteri, 
debent interesse curia: domini regis cum baronibus " (c. xi). 
The reason, of  course, was that in the middle ages  the  prelates had 
claimed  the  higher  privilege  of  being  tried  by  spiritual  men  in  the 
ecclesiastical  courts. 
10  &  11  Vict., c. 108;  Makower, pp.  211-12. 31%  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
the  lords  should  never  exceed  twenty-six.  The  two 
archbishops  and  the  bishops  of  London,  Durham,  and 
Winchester l  are  always  members  of  the  house,  but  the 
rest have to wait until the chances of  seniority entitle them 
to rank with those whose wisdom comes by birth. 
Logic is not perhaps an important ingredient in political 
institutions, but defiance of  logic has been carried to extremes 
in the  house  of  lords.  It claims to be  founded on  right, 
but it has made havoc of  that right by its own resolutions. 
Episcopacy  entitles  some,  but  not  other  bishops  to  sit; 
peerage  entitles  a  peer  in England  to sit, but not  one  in 
Scotland  or Ireland, unless he is  also elected.  The crown 
could create as many peers in perpetuity as it pleased, but 
it  could  not,  until  1887,  create a  single peer  for life.a  It 
could "  ennoble " a man's blood and limit its flow to eldest 
sons ;  but it could not exert discretion in the sending out writs 
of  summons which no one else could issue.  Inasmuch as no 
mention was, naturally, made of  heirs in the writs of  summons 
by which peers were first begotten, the house of  lords has 
presumed that descent was intended to heirs-general, whereas 
when descent is first suggested in the creation  of  peers by 
letters patent, it is only to heirs male;  so that the heirs of 
a man who was never intended to have a hereditary peerage 
are better provided than those of  one who was.  The house 
of  lords is not, in fact, founded  on any principle;  its basis 
is a patchwork of  legal fictions, inconsistent rights, illogical 
decisions,  and  palpable  absurdities.  It  represents  an 
attempt to reduce the variant ideas and conditions of  different 
ages within the compass of  a legal formula, and to erect that 
formula into an absolute right defined and definable by its 
possessors alone. 
That autonomy  claimed  by  the  peers  has  fortunately 
never  become  the law  of  the land;  and their attempts to 
1 These  three  bishoprics  are  given  precedence  over  the  others  by 
31 Henry VIII, C.  10. 
2  The Appellate  Jurisdiction  Act  of  1876  gave the crown  power  to 
create two lords of  appeal in ordinary, and  to summon  them to sit  and 
vote in the house of  lords so long as they fulfilled  their judicial  functions; 
in 1887 this period was extended to the term of  their lives. 
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limit by statute the crown's power of  creation have always 
been defeated.  The crown cannot, it is true, create more 
than a limited number of  Irish peers;  and it cannot create 
any Scottish  or  English  peers  (as distinct  from  peers  of 
the United Kingdom) at all.  Nor can it add to the ni.irnber 
of  bishops  in  parliament.  But  these  restrictions  on  the 
peerage have little reference to the composition of  the house 
of  lords.  No creation of  Scottish or Irish peers would add to 
the  number  entitled, by  the  respective  acts  of  union,  to 
election as representative peers;  and there are obvious limits 
to  the  erection  of  episcopal  sees.  More  serious was  the 
peerage bill, which was passed by the lords in 1719,  and only 
thrown out by the commons on a division after a masterly 
speech  by  Walpole.  By  one  of  the ironies of  history the 
Tories  had, in  1712,  provided  the only  precedent  for  the 
creation of  peers with the express purpose of  carrying a bill 
in the house of  lords ; and the Whigs in 1719  attempted to 
make its repetition impossible by providing that the  crown 
should never create more than six new peers at a time.  It 
has been thought that the success of  the peerage bill would 
have prevented reform;  it would  certainly have  promoted 
revolution, from which the country was only saved in  1832 
by the power of  the crown to create in the last resort  suffi- 
cient peers to override the opposition of  the house of  lords. 
The crisis recurred in 1911  in the same form ; and the same 
arguments  and even the same phraseology were  used  as in 
1832. 
The problem of  the  house of  lords has been complicated 
by the fact that peerage has from first to last been  a social, 
rather  than  a  political  question,  and  its  intrusion  into 
parliament  was  as  much  an  anomaly  as  the  attempted 
intrusion  of  an  estate  of  mcrchants  in  the  fourteenth 
century.  From the sixteenth  century  onwards  no  states- 
man  gained  politically  by  translation  from  the  house  of 
commons to the house of  lords; and from Walpole's  time a 
seat in  the house  of  lords has been regarded  as a positive 
drawback  to  political  ambition.  Front-rank  politicians 
only accept promotion to it as a sacrifice in the interests of 
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their party, as an easy stage on the road to retirement, or as 
social gilt for a vice-royalty  or  dominion  governorship.  It 
is  for  its  social,  rather  than  for  its political  attractions 
that a peerage is sought, and it is sought most  keenly by 
those who feel the need of  social status.  The few instances 
in  which  it has  been  used  as  a  reward  for  distinguished 
service,  as a  means  of  providing  for  the  conduct  of  the 
business  of  liberal  governments in  the  house  of  lords, or 
as an expedient to secure a place  in parliament  for wisdom 
which shrinks from the turmoil of  popular election, are only 
exceptions to the general rule.  The political responsibilities 
which  once  attached  to  peerage  are  commonly  evaded; 
the work of  the  house  of  lords is done  by a  tenth  of  its 
members ;  and the abstention of  the rest is as much a political 
portent  as was  the avoidance  of  parliament  by the great 
majority of  abbots during the later middle  ages.  Whatever 
form the reconstruction of  the  house of  lords may take, it 
would be well to guard against a political trust being treated 
as a means  of  social gratification. 
Meanwhile the house lingers on under sentence  of  death. 
The  preamble  to the  parliament  act  of  1911  held  out  a 
promise  of  reconstitution  of  which  more  urgent  affairs 
have postponed the fulfilment ; and the party truce following 
on  the war  precluded  discussion of  even  the  principles  of 
reconstruction.  One  or  two  points  are,  however,  almost 
beyond the stage of  debate.  It  has been pretended that the 
principle  of  primogeniture  could not  logically be  excluded 
from  the house  of  lords  and retained  in  the  monarchy; 
and it is true that, if  the political claims of  the crown and the 
house of  lords  were identical,  the  principles  which  deter- 
mine their position could not be divorced.  But the Stuarts 
were  ejected  from  the  throne  because  they  clung  so 
tenaciously  to  what  they  regarded  as  their  hereditary 
rights, and the crown has remained hereditary only because 
it has abandoned its veto on legislation.  Had the house of 
lords  practised  a  similar  self-restraint, its hereditary basis 
would have been equally secure. 
Such inactivity would have been the negation of  what the 
house  of  lords  considers  its proper  function  as  a  second 
chamber.  The difficulty is that political powers, even those 
of  a second chamber, cannot be divorced from responsibility, 
and hereditary right is incompatible with  responsible rule. 
That is why James  I1 fled to France in 1688  and the peers 
were  compelled to  pass  the  parliament  act in  1911.  NO 
second chamber which claims a right of  veto can nowadays 
be based  on  anything but popular election.  But a second 
chamber  may  be  very  useful  without  merely  obstructing 
the work of  the first;  and there  is  ample scope in modcrn 
legislation for revision, suggestion, and amendment without 
the right of  rejection.  Such work might well be done by a 
non-elective body  of  experts,  whose  advice  would be  wel- 
comed so long as it was not given by way of  dictation.  Nor 
is  it  indispensable  that  the  two  chambers  of  parliament 
should both cover the same and entire field of  activity.  One 
of  the old distinctions between  council and parliament was 
that  the  council  could  regulate  foreign  relations,  while 
parliament  controlled  domestic  affairs1  The  house  of 
commons is little adapted for the work of  diplomacy;  and 
foreign policy is,  as a matter of  fact, settled by agreement 
between  a  few  politicians  on  the two  front benches.  The 
committee of  imperial  defence is a more  formal  expression 
of  the same political necessity ; and there seems no adequate 
reason  why  these  two  functions  should not  be  associated 
with a small and efficient second chamber.  It  is not essential 
to the maintenance  of  the  party system  that party lines 
should  overrun the whole  field of  domestic,  imperial,  and 
foreign  politics;  and  some  discrimination  is  inevitable  if 
the common sentiment, which pervades the British realms 
and  transcends  their  party  divisions,  is  ever  to  find  an 
organized  expression  in a  common  imperial  government. 
Congenital  disqualifications have  impaired  the  health  of 
the second  limb of  the body politic, and it might well  be 
made the subject of  an imperial operation. 
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CHAPTER  XVI 
THE  COMMONS  IN PARLIAMENT 
IN the  middle  ages  the  commons  only  appeared  "  in 
parliament " with the Speaker at their head, and  save for 
his  orations  they  were  dumb.  To-day  when  men  talk  of 
parliament, in nine cases out of  ten they are thinking of  the 
house of  commons; and to say that the house of  commons 
wields  nine-tenths  of  the  sovereignty of  parliament  is  an 
under-  rather  than an over-statement  of  the  truth.  This 
predominance  is  almost  entirely  the  result  of  growth 
during  the  last  four  centuries;  for,  in  spite  of  the 
idealistic  pictures  drawn  of  the  constitutional  progress  of 
the commons during the fourteenth  century, their position 
at the end of  the fifteenth was precarious, and there seemed 
no  obvious reason why  they should not  fall into the same 
condition  of  impotence  or  abeyance  as  third  estates  in 
France  and  Germany,  the  Netherlands  and  Spain.  Not 
only did parliaments  grow less  frequent,l  but  the number 
of  members  showed an alarming  tendency  to shrink, and 
whereas Edward  I summoned  322  representatives  of  cities 
and boroughs, Henry VI in 1415  summoned but 198. 
The deductions which  have been drawn from the writs of 
summons and the returns thereto  may, however, be wrong 
in this respect, as they certainly are with regard to the size 
of  a medieval house of  commons.  Just as there was  many 
a  slip between  judgement  and  execution, so  there  was  a 
considerable  hiatus  between  a  member's  return  in  the 
sheriff's writ and his bodily presence in parliament ; and an 
See above, p. 131. 
a  O&cial  Return of Members of  Parliament  (1878).  pt. i. 
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examination  of  other  records  suggests  that  the  members 
elected viere regarded merely  as a panel  from which  a  far 
smaller attendance was actually secured.  These other records 
are  the writs de  ex$e?zsis,l which  members who did attend 
sued  out to recover  their  wages  and their  expenses  from 
thei~  constituencies.  They are careful documents, giving the 
exact number of  days during which members served on their 
journeys  and at Westminster, and the sums vary with the 
distance  fr~m  London  of  the  different  constituencies.  A 
comparison  of  the  details  they  provide  with  the  official 
return  of  elections  reveals  a  startling  discrepancy.  The 
number  of  members  "  returned " to  fourteenth-century 
parliaments  was  sometimes  nearly  three  hundred;  the 
number  of  those who  actually attended,  according to the 
writs de  expensis, was  seldom a hundred,  and never more 
than a hundred and fifty.  To these the shires contributed 
their  regular  seventy-four-two  knights  for  each  of  the 
thirty-seven  shires;  but  the  cities  and  boroughs  whose 
names occur during the fourteenth century vary in number 
from three to thirty-eight. 
It might be thought that these writs, as entered on the 
close  rolls,  are  defective,  that  many  burgesses  were  too 
proud and independent to claim their wages, and that their 
numbers may have been far larger than these writs indicate. 
But there are few voids in the writs obtained by knights of 
the shire, and if  these landed gentry were not too proud to 
claim  their  wages,  the business-like  burgesses  can  hardly 
be credited with contempt for such considerations.  London 
and York, it is true, made their own arrangements for feeing 
their members without recourse to these writs, York paying 
its members double the usual rate ;  and a similar arrange- 
ment may account for the absence of  Bristol,  Winchester, 
These are entered on the Close Rolls, which have now been calendared 
for nearly the whole of  the fourteenth century.  q,  Davies, York Records, p. 15 ; on p. 138 the York members are described 
as  citizens and knights of  the parliament for this honourable city and 
shire."  On  June  6,  1483,  Richard  I11  ordered  four  members  to be 
returned  for York, and four were elected, contrary, says Mr.  Davies, to 
all precedent;  but cf. Sir T. Smith, De Republics, ed. 1906, p. 42, line 6. 318  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  THE COMMONS  IN  PARLIAMENT 
Salisbury, Southampton, Norwich, and Yarmoutll from  the 
writs de expensis.  The Cinque  Ports also do  not  figure in 
them ; but although summoned from 1322 they apparently 
made no return until 1366, and a return to  the writ is no proof 
of  actual presence at Westminster.  When we  find Oxford, 
Canterbury,  Newcastle,  Hull,  Cambridge,  Northampton, 
Nottingham,  Portsmouth,  Lincoln,  Leicester,  Gloucester, 
Derby,  Bedford,  Rochester,  Southwark,  Warwick,  Wor- 
cejter,  Exeter,  Ipswich,  Shrewsbury,  Stafford, and Carlisle 
among the cities and boroughs to which  writs de  expensis 
were addressed, it is difficult to discover more than half  a 
dozen  constituencies  to  put  with  London, York,  and the 
Cinque Ports, as making their own arrangements and thus 
adding largeiy to the numbers given in the writs.  Save for 
these  exceptions  those  writs  may  be  taken  as a  fairly 
accurate indication of  the size of the house of  commons. 
On  their  showing  the  fullest  house,  after  1335,  in the 
fourteenth century was in the famous Good  parliament of 
1376.  But even then only twenty-two cities and boroughs 
appear  on  the  writs  de  expensis;  and  the  addition  of 
London, York, and half  a dozen others would bring up the 
total attendance to 134  members, sixty from  the cities and 
boroughs,  seventy-four  from  the  shires.  Earlier  in  the 
century twenty-six  boroughs  have  writs  enrolled  for  the 
February  parliament  of  1328,  thirty-eight  for that of  the 
following  April,  thirty-four  for  that of  ,March  1334,  and 
twenty-six for the parliament held at York  in May  1335.1 
But on no later occasion during the century did the number 
exceed twenty.  There were eighteen in  the parliament of 
February 1371,  sixteen in that of  1362,  fifteen  in 1351  and 
1358,  and thirteen  in 1352  and 1357.  In other years  the 
figure descends to eleven, nine, eight, six, and five, six being 
the  most  frequent  number.  After  the  Good  parliament 
there is some improvement in numbers and a great increase 
in regularity;  and in the six succeeding  parliaments  the 
boroughs receiving writs de expensis were never fewer than 
1  See Appendix 11. 
1377 (two parliaments), 1378, 1379, 1380 (two parliaments). 
eleven  nor  more  than  thirteen.  But  these  cities  and 
boroughs  are  not  by  any means  the  same.  Thirty-eight 
boroughs in all appear in the writs for one or more of  these 
six  parliaments;  but  Oxford alone  is  represented  in  all. 
No  other  borough  appears  in  more  than  four  of  these 
parliaments;  nineteen  of  them  send  representatives  only 
to one,  and ten  only  to two, though  the attendance from 
cities  and boroughs,  which made  their  own  bargain  with 
members, was probably far more regular. 
These figures explain some familiar facts and suggest some 
novel reflections.  They help to account for the predominance 
of  the knights of  the shire in the medieval house of  commons, 
and for the fact that the house  of  commons-domus  com- 
mu9zifatum-really  means  house  of  the  shires.  When 
seventy-four knights were regularly present, and the number 
of  burgesses varied from sixty to twenty-six,  numbers and 
regularity  of  attendance  combined  with  social superiority 
to give the knights control of  the house.  They also explain 
how the  house found room for its sessions in  the  chapter 
house  of  Westminster abbey.  But more  important  is the 
light  they throw on  the position  of  medieval  parliaments. 
Reluctance to attend was not an isolated phenomenon, but 
a general and successful attitude.  Constituencies accepted 
taxation to which their absence gave consent, rather  than 
send and pay members to protest;  and only in imagination 
can medieval  parliaments be regarded as representative  of 
a  nation.  They were  mere  representative  specimens,  and 
aloofness from national  affairs, rather than  participation  in 
them, was the characteristic of  the age.  We have thus to 
alter the perspective in our views of constitutional develop- 
ment.  The activity of  parliaments  from the middle of  the 
fourteenth  to  the  middle  of  the  fifteenth  centuries  was 
transitory  and unsubstantial; it was  due  to the weakness 
of  the  monarchy  and  the factions  of  the  peerage,  and 
was not based  upon  any broad national ambition  for  self- 
government  or sense  of  political  responsibility.  Political 
consciousness  was  active among the  landed gentry of  the 
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express their ideas as Magna  Carta does those of  the greater 
barons.  But  middle-class  politics  could not develop  until 
far more than a score of  cities and boroughs would trouble 
to send their spokesmen year in and year out to Westminster ; 
and the Lancastrian Fortescue who wrote at the end of  the 
period has nothing to say of  the constitutional importance 
of  the house of  commons. 
It was a slow growth, and its birth must be connected with 
that general  stirring of  national  impulse  in  English  bones 
of which Wycliffe, Langland, and Chaucer were some of  the 
exponents.  A desire for self-expression in English language 
and literature was followed by a desire for self-expression in 
English politics ; and the generation which saw the founding 
of  schools like Winchester  and Eton, and a  dozen. colleges 
at Oxford and Cambridge, also witnessed the beginnings of 
a political efflore~cence.~  It was not a renaissance, for there 
is no evidence that the lower classes in England had ever 
desired  expression  before;  their  legal  designation  was 
"  cattle,"  and it is probable that that was a truer description 
than our romanticists would have us believe.  It is assumed 
rather than proved that the mass of  these "  chattels "  were 
baptized  in  the  early  middle  ages  or  regarded  as having 
souls of  their  own.  The peasants' revolt  of  1381  is their 
first expression in politics, and it did not stand alone.  The 
Lancastrian statutes limiting the country franchise to forty- 
shilling  freeholders are  only intelligible on the assumption 
that  villeins  had  begun  to  undertake  an  attendance  at 
county  courts  which  their  betters  had thought  a  burden. 
Municipal and even national  records  were beginning to be 
kept  in  a  language  they  understood,  and their  economic 
emancipation was followed by their intrusion into politics. 
Only, of  course, a  minority of  villeins  rose  to  reinforce 
the  freeholders  and  stimulate  the  middle  class;  but  it is 
at one  of  the  lowest  ebbs in  English  politics, the  middle 
of  Henry  VI's  reign,  that  we  can  trace  the  beginning 
of  the  flow  of  popular  interest  in  politics.  The  writs  of 
summons  to  parliaments  issued  by  Edward  I  had  been 
See above, p. 157. 
admonitions from  above;  and the inertia of  the  mass  to 
which they were addressed caused a steady decline in their 
number.  But about 1445 the tide begins to turn.  Hitherto 
the desire had been to escape the burden of  representation, 
but now new boroughs begin to send members to parliament, 
and within a generation the number  of  burgesses returned 
rose from 198  to 224.  The number of  new boroughs created 
in Wiltshire suggests a connexion with the growth of  clothing 
towns  in  that  county.  More  marked  was  the  growth  in 
actual attendance; and within a century the miserable two 
or three score of borough members who had feebly supported 
the knights of  the shire had swollen to some two hundred or 
m0re.l  In 1533 a  borough  member was  for the first  time 
elected Speaker of the house of  c~mrnons,~  and from the reign 
of  Henry VIII there is no discernible  distinction in dignity 
or  influence between a  knight  of  the shire and a borough 
member.  Thomas  Cromwell sat for Taunton and William 
Cecil for Stamford, though doubtless the eminence of  these 
borough representatives was  due to the weakness of  feudal, 
and strength of  monarchical, influence  in  the boroughs  as 
well  as  to  the  growing  political  weight  of  the  middle 
classes. 
The house of  commons had become a place of  importance. 
In  1455  the Duchess of  Norfolk had written of  the need of 
securing  the  election  of  members  who  belonged  to  her 
husband  and  were  his "  menial  servants."  But  it  was 
Henry VIII  who thrust the house of  commons into political 
prominence.  Before 1529 there is hardly a reference to its 
proceedings in the dispatches of  any foreign diplomatist or 
The  figures  given  by  contemporary  writers  are  always  grossly 
exaggexated.  In  1549  the  privy  council  itself  speaks  of  nearly  four 
1,undred members being present in the house of  commons  (Acts of Przzy 
Coutzril, ii. 260) ; but the recorded  divisions in the house seldom reach three 
hundred  votes  in  the sixteenth century.  On  19  April,  1554,  however, 
321 members  took  part in a  division,  and in  1555  the blll  to restore 
firstfruits  and  tenths was  carried  by  193  to  126 votes;  in  1593  the 
commons agreed with  Bacon's  views on  the financial  relations between 
the two houses by 217  to 128 votes, and this would appear to have been 
the biggest  division  in Tudor times. 
2 Humphrey  Wlngfield,  M.P. for Yarmouth.  T. Williams, Speaker in 
1562-3,  was M.P. for Exeter. 
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observer; from  that  time  onwards the correspondence of 
French,  Venetian, and  Spanish ambassadors becomes  one 
of  the main  sources of  parliamentary  history,  and  papal 
nuncios and imperial envoys vie with one another in trying 
to influence its  decisions.  With nearly half  the peers, and 
at least  four-fifths  of  the clergy  against  him,  Henry  had 
need  of  the house of  commons, and  he cultivated  it with 
sedulous care.  The  commons had  always been  the main 
source of  petitions  to the crown,  and it was  an  obvious 
tactical advantage if  Henry's desires could come before the 
lords of  the council in parliament in the guise of  petitions 
or  bills from the commons.  It would  appear  from  Lord 
Darcy's complaint in  1536  that the lords  had  developed 
the practice of  securing from the masters in chancery copies 
of  bills and petitions before they were read in the commons, 
and even of  pronouncing on their admissibility.  This prac- 
tice was now discouraged, and henceforth Tudor and Stuart 
sovereigns used  the  Speaker,  and  not  the  lords  of  the 
council in parliament,  as the medium for  expressing their 
views  on the propriety  of  bills  which  members sought to 
introduce.  It was to the interest of  the crown to shift  the 
balance of  legislative power from the lords to the commons ; 
and in 1536 the Speaker is first recorded to have asked for 
access  on  behalf  of  himself  and  of  his  colleagues to the 
king in per~on.~ 
The result was an enormous increase in the prestige of  the 
lower house.  Its domestic proceedings had never appeared 
on  the  rolls  of  parliaments, but  in  or  soon  after 1547 
it began  to keep Journals  of  its own.  The eldest  sons of 
peers  thought  it  becoming  to  seek  election;  magnates 
1 Letters and Papevs of  Hcnvy VIII,  xii. pt. i. 410 ;  Dodds, The Pilgrimage 
of  Grace. 19x5. i. 360. 
2  Lords' Jwvwals, i. 86, 167;  Elsynge, p. 176. 
3 The extant Journals begin  with  1547, but probably the record was 
not compiled until later in Edward VI's relgn. 
Two of  the earliest instances were Francis Russell,  eldest son of  the 
first  Earl  of  Bedford,  who  was  M.P.  for  Buckinghamshire  1544-52 
(Commons' Jouvnals, i. 15), and Francis, eldest son of  the second earl, who 
was M.P.  for Northumberland in  1572.  Cf. Sir R. Ragnal's  request for a 
seat  to  the Earl of  Rutland  on  the ground,:hat  he wanted  "for  his 
learning's  sake to be made a parliament man  (Rutland MSS., i. 207). 
bought up boroughs to provide themselves or their friends 
with  seats,  and were  besieged  with  applications for  their 
influence.  Candidates began to pay, instead  of  being  paid 
for  e1ection.l  Boroughs which had let their representation 
fall into abeyance sought for its restoration, and those which 
had  never  had  writs began  to seek  them.2  Lawyers and 
other aspiring politicians went about looking for seats, and 
the obligation of  residence was ignored in spite of  the rejec- 
tion by the house of  commons of  a bill  to relax it in 1571.9 
Parliament was providing a career, and in Elizabeth's reign 
we  hear  for  the first  time  of  some  one  being  a "  great 
parliament  man "  who  was  not  a  member  of  the privy 
council.  A  score  of  members  in  Elizabeth's  reign  made 
names  for  themselves  throughout  England  by  what  they 
said and did in the house of  commons. 
The growth of  the house of  commons was reflected in the 
expansion  of  its numbers, the increase  of  popular  interest 
in elections and in the proceedings of  the house, and in the 
development of  its privileges and powers.  Wales, Cheshire, 
Berwick,  and  Calais  were  brought  within  the  sphere  of 
parliamentary  representation,  and  the  creation  of  new 
boroughs was  slightly, if  at all, due to the crown's  desire 
to  pack  the  house.  Under  Henry  VII  and  Henry  VIII 
forty-five  new  members  were  added,  under  Edward  VI 
thirty, under Mary twenty-seven, and under Elizabeth fifty- 
1 The  first  known  case  of  bribing  electors occurred  in  1571.  when 
Thomas Long, "  being a very simple man,"  gave the mayor and another 
citizen of  Westbury ;54  to secure his election  (Commons' Journals, i. 88; 
D'Ewes,  p.  182).  Returns for this parliament are among the De Tabley 
MSS.  The mayor  and his  colleague  in  corruption were  condemned  to 
restore  the ;54  to Long and pay Lzo  to the Queen.  Long  himself  was 
simultaneously put in the'pillory,  not for this affair, but for reporting the 
Queen's death (Hooker's  Journal of  the House of  Commons"  in Trans. 
Devon.  Assoc., xi.  483).  In the same session the house was troubled  by 
reports of  the bribery of  its members  (ibid., p. 488;  Commons'  Journals, 
i. 93).  For an attempt to bribe a member in Edward IV's reign see Trans. 
Devon. Assoc., xlvi. 481. 
State  Papers,  Dom.  Eliz.,  xxvii.  23-4;  Cwmons' Journals,  i.  83; 
D'Ewes,  pp. 156-7,  159.  It was owing to the learning and activity  of 
William  Hakewill  (see D.  N. B.)  that several boroughs  recovered  their 
representation. 
3 Commons'  Journals, i. 84-5 ;  D'Ewes, pp. 160, 168-71 ; the debate as 
reported in D'Ewes is of  exceptional interest. 
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nine.  From 297  members at the accession of  Henry VIII 
the house  had grown  to 458  by the  death of  Elizabet1i.l 
There is evidence, too, that the number of  electors who par- 
ticipated in the choice of  their members  largely increased, 
though this is more marked in the county than in the borough 
elections.  In the boroughs the franchise was generally at 
the beginning of  the Tudor period, and it remained to the 
end, confined to members of  the borough council;  and it 
was not until the days of  the Long parliament that we  find 
instances, like that of  Reading, where the number of  electors 
leapt up from a dozen to over a thousand.3  At the county 
elections  there  were  large  and  tumultuous   gathering^,^ 
sometimes ending in riots, in proceedings before the privy 
council, and in disputes between chancery and the commons 
over the decision  of  election  petition^.^ 
These contests were, perhaps, as much the embers of  local 
faction as the dawn  of  national  politics;  and although in 
Henry VIII's reign members were told to discuss with their 
constituents what they had seen and heard at Westminster, 
any instructions given by constituencies to their representa- 
tives seem to have been of  purely local intere~t.~  The idea 
of  deciding  questions  of  national  policy  by  reference 
to  the  electors  can  hardly  be  traced  before  1640;  and 
the  parliamentary  debates  on  monopolies  at the  end  of 
1 See above, pp.  162-3. 
a  See my Reign of  Henry  VII,  ii. 181-9;  Davis,  York Records, p.  138; 
W. J. Harte in Trans. Devon. Assoc., xliv. 206, XIV.  409-10. 
a  Reading MSS., Hist. MSS. Comm., I ~th  Rep. App., vii. 187,189,192-4 ; 
cf. Guilding, Reading Records, iii. 488-9,  507, iv. 167-8,  171-2,  298-9.  '  Letters and Papers, x. 1063; Townshend, Collections, pp. 22, 286, 295, 
298-9,  329-30.  A realistic  account of  " the tumult and tempest"  of a 
poll in 1623 is given in the Stiffhe?, Papers (Camden Soc.), p. 41, where a 
candidate "  sounded his trou~es  againe . . . and caused all his forces to 
charge,"  and secured election by Gery literally "  routing "  his opponents. 
6  See  the Maidstone and  Norfolk  election disputes, fully  reported  in 
D'Ewes.  pp. 393-7. 
6  Letters and Papers, v. 171.  An excellent example of a sixteenth-century 
"  mandate "  from a constituency to its members is given by Prof. W. J. 
Harte in  Trans. Deuon.  Assoc.,  xliv. 213 : "  A remembrance of  certeyn 
articles for Mr.  Thomas Williams and Mr. Geffray  Tothill, burgesses for 
the Citie [of  Exeter] at the parlayment in January. 1562."  Williams was 
elected Speaker in that parliament, and was given k20 by the corporation 
for his services "in preferring  the suits and business of  the City" (ibzd., 
X~V.  409). 
Elizabeth's  reign  were  apparently  the  earliest  occasion on 
which  proceedings  in  the house  of  commons evoked any 
popular  agitation.  Cecil  then  heard  cries  in  the  street : 
" God  prosper  those  that  further  the  overthrow  of  these 
monopolies;  God  send  the  prerogative  touch  not  our 
liberty " ; and he remarked in the house that some "  would 
be glad that all sovereignty were converted into popularity." 
It is ever the economic problem  that drives democracy to 
think  of  politics, and even  then  the thought  is  mainly a 
matter  of  feeling;  but  it  was  with  a  novel  sensation of 
horror  that  Cecil  exclaimed in the house  in  1601,  "  Why, 
parliament-matters are ordinarily talked of  in the streets."  1 
Hitherto  the  commons  in parliament  had had to fight 
their  constitutional  battles  without  much  support  from 
outside, and the popular  naval  heroes  of  Elizabeth's  time 
were, when  they sat in  parliament, always on the side of 
the  royal  prerogati~e.~  But  the  corporate  feeling  which 
members developed during the long sessions of  the Reforma- 
tion and other  sixteenth-century  parliaments gave  them a 
novel  confidence.  The  medieval  sessions  of  two  or  three 
weeks had given little opportunity to members, who for the 
most part never attended another parliament, to know one 
another and develop a common sense.  But the seven years' 
parliament  of  1529-36,  with each of  its sessions extending 
over months, produced a body  of  common experience, the 
effect of  which was never lost ;  and the Journals,  commencing 
in 1547, began to record its results and to provide a firm hold 
of  precedents which gave solidity to the claims of  the house. 
It assumed, step by step, control of  itself  and its members; 
and privileges,  which had beenreferred in the fifteenth century 
to the lords and the judges  to determine, were now asserted 
on its own a~thority.~  The riglit  of  the Speaker and of  the 
house to license  the absence of  members was recognized by 
Townshend, p. 251; D'Ewes, p. 653. 
E.  g. Sir Humphrey Gilbert, Sir Richard Grenville, Drake, and Raleigh. 
In 1553 it  was a committee of  the house which decided that Alexander 
Nowell, having a seat in convocation, could not have one in the commons. 
For the growth of  capacity and outlook in the commons cf. the debate 
on Goodwin's  case in  1604, Commons'  Journals,  i. 159-60,  939-40. THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
statute in 1515.'  In 1553 the house  insisted on inspecting 
the charter to Maidstone, to see if  it justified thenovel appear- 
ance of  burgesses from that town ; pending its decision they 
were ordered to absent themselves,  and Maidstone had to 
wait until  1563  to secure its repre~entation.~  In 1581  the 
house succeeded  in establishing  its control  of  the issue of 
writs for bye-elections ;  and it began to compete with the 
crown's  powers  of  creation  by  initiating bills  to increase 
parliamentary  representati~n.~  Liberty  of  speech,  which 
had been claimed for the Speaker when he appeared at the 
head of  his colleagues in the parliament chamber, was now 
claimed for the individual member in the house of  commons. 
The commons, who had been a mere part of  the high court 
of  parliament,  now  claimed to be an independent court of 
record  themselves,6  with  complete  jurisdiction  over  their 
own members, their own proceedings, and their own organ- 
ization.  From being petitioners themselves, they assumed 
the position of  arbiters of  the petitions of  others. 
This is one of  the obscure but important  aspects of  the 
development  of  the  house  of  commons;  and  both  its 
obscurity and its importance  require  some  recapitulation 
in an effort to elucidate the growth of  the legislative func- 
tions  of  the house.  Difficulty arises not  merely  from  the 
absence  of  Commo~zs' Journals  before  1547, but  from the 
impossibility  of  tracing  definite  stages  in  the growth  of 
customs,  conventions,  and  institutions  which  were  not 
made  and  did  not  proceed  by  definite  steps.  We  have 
7 Hen. VI11, c. 16. 
3  Commons'  Journals,  i. 25, 63; Oficial Retuvn of Melnbevs of  Pavlia>nent, 
Z'D'Ewes,  pp. 281-3,  308. 
4  On  January 18, 15ij3, a bill was introduced into the commons "  for 
levying fines in the County Palatine of  Durham, and to have two knights 
from  thence  into  the  parliament ";  but  it reached  the  statute-book 
shorn, at some unknowd stage, of  the I.~tter  provision. 
6  The first recorded claim is that made by Speaker Moyle in I542 (LoY~s' 
Jot~rnals,  i. 167; Elsynge, p.  176). 
6  " This is a court of  record. . . . We have a clerk and a register. . . . 
It is  now  come  to  this  question,  whether  the chancery  or parliament 
ought to have authority"  (Com~nons'  lol~vnals,  i.  159-60).  A5  ea~ly  as 
I 549 the clerk  of  the house  of  commons  referred  to lt as " this court" 
[tb.  i.  14). 
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also  to disabuse  our  minds  of  preconceptions  due  to an 
inevitable  tendency  to  generalize  from  our  evidence  in 
order to simplify  our  conclusions.  The evidence  itself  is 
often accessible only in a form which fosters false assimila- 
tion;  and the uniformity  of  the printed "  Rolls of  Parlia- 
ments " obscures the diversity of  their contents.  Legisla- 
tion may arise from many different sources and take many 
different  forms.  Nearly  all  of it  in  Edward  1's  reign  is 
legislation  by the crown  either on  its own  motion  or  on 
petition  from some other body or individual;  but no  one 
except  the villeins is precluded  from  access to the freest 
place in England, and freemen may petition as individuals 
or as any kind  of  class or group.  The crown has just  as 
much  authority to grant  redress  to  one  group  without 
consulting the others as it has to do justice to one individual 
without  the leave of  his fellows;  it is equally entitled to 
legislate without any petition  at all.  Edward I, however, 
developed  the habit  of  doing  these things in parliament, 
and the growth of  the house of  commons depended largely 
on its gradual establishment of  a monopoly of  access to the 
crown and of  control over the crown's responses. 
The house could not begin the process until it had acquired 
solidarity and a claim to be the commonalty of  the realm. 
But this claim was secured during the fourteenth century, 
and  the  commons  proceeded  tentatively  to  assert  an 
influence, firstly over all petitions presented in parliament, 
and then over the initiative of  the crown.  They managed 
to exclude the merchants as a separate estate from parlia- 
ment,  thus debarring  their  direct  access to the crown  in 
parliament.  Next they successfully demurred to the  crown 
legislating on a clerical petition in parliament without their 
concurrence;  and  in  I420  they  petitioned  against  the 
validity of  bills endorsed per  auctoritatern flarliamenti  with- 
out their assent or request?  Thus we  find clerical petitions 
in parliament  reduced in I429 to the vanishing point  of  a 
single petition  that the clergy in convocation  may enjoy 
the like privileges as the laity in parliament,2 and the clergy 
Rot. Purl., iv.  127.  Zbid.,  iv.  347. 328  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
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themselves to relying on the commons to back and present 
their  petitions in par1iament.l  Individuals, however  high 
and mighty, condescend  to the same assistance-an  arch- 
bishop  of  Canterbury,  dukes,  princes,  queens,  and  even 
lings accept the common  fate with  royal  compensations; 
and ex mandato regis  bills of  resumption and attainder and 
provisions for the royal household and royal family assume 
the guise of  petitions of  the commons. 
No  doubt  these dignities stooped  to conquer, and their 
submission  was  somewhat  feigned.  It  was  pure  assump- 
tion on the commons'  part to assert a veto on royal legis- 
lation, and there was nothing in their writs or in the law 
to justify  the claim.  The  petition  of  1420 was  refused, 
and per  auctoritatem fiarliamenti  long continued  to appear 
on orders taken in parliament to which the commons had 
not  agreed.s  The  clergy,  too,  continued  to legislate  in 
convocation,  and  in  1444 "a certain  act  was  made  in 
parliament by the king with the advice and assent  of  the 
lords  spiritual  and  temporal " without  any reference  to 
the ~ommons.~  There was no monopoly for the commons 
yet, but on the other hand, they had their independence 
of other estates, and no consent  save that of  the king was 
needed  to gve effect  to their  petitions  and their  grants. 
The Modus declares that king and commons are sufficient 
for  a  parliament, and in  1480 counsel  held  that  a  grant 
by  the  commons  was  valid  without  the  consent  of  the 
lords.6  Nor,  when  we  first  get  records  of  the  various 
readings  of  bills  and petitions  by the lords,  do  we  find 
that  the  communes  petitiones  are subject  to that  process 
1 Rot. Purl.,  iv.  393. 
2  Cf. Ibid., v.  8 et passim. 
3  The specific  reference by parliament of  business,  with which it had 
not had time to deal, to the determination of  the council (e. g. Rot. Parl., 
iv.  334,  506)  justified  the application of  the  phrase  to such  measures 
taken when  parliament  was not sitting.  A  similar use or abuse of the 
autl~o~.ity  of  convocation  in connection with the Forty-Two Articles  has 
been  much  criticized  without  reference  to  precedents  (cf.  Gairdner, 
Lollavdy and the  Reformation, iii.  374-9). 
4  ~ot  Parl.,  v.  68;  cf. ibid., vi.  49, for a similar instance. 
6  Year Book, ed. Maynard, 21  Edward IV, p. 48;  Hallam, Middle Ages, 
iii.  108 n.  See above, p.  144, and Appendix 111, note (n). 
of  examination;  only  the royal  assent  is expressed,  and 
that is apparently en0ugh.l 
There  are thus at least  half  a  dozen  different  kinds  of 
parliamentary  legislation  in  the  middle  ages,  and  con- 
fusion results from treating them all as one and attempting 
to compress their history into a single line of  development. 
There  was  legislation  by  the crown  in  parliament  (i) on 
its own  motion;  (ii) on  petition  of  the council;  (iii) on 
petition  of  the  clergy ; (iv) on petition  by the commons ; 
and  the  fourth  category  itself  falls  into three  divisions : 
(a) communes petitiones ;  (b) petitions of  individuals adopted 
ex  parte  by the commons,  and  (c) financial  grants.  But 
side by side with the amalgamation of  estates there went a 
simplification  of  legislative  practice.  The  crown  ceased 
in  time to legislate in parliament on its own  motion, pxe- 
ferring the forms of  popular  action;  the petitions  of  the 
council became  either government  bills  or bills introduced 
by the house  of  lords; and clerical  petitions  disappeared 
into  convocation.  There  were  left  the  commons'  bills, 
of  which  the communes  petitiones  became  public,  and the 
ex parte  petitiones  private, acts, while the grants of  money 
were given a special legislative form. 
Singularly  enough  it is in connexion  with  the private 
ex parte  petitions that we  get the earliest  evidence of  the 
now familiar practice of  three readings.  The form of  acts 
into  which  the communes  petitiones  were  cast  apparently 
discouraged  their amendment in the parliament  chamber, 
and there is nothing about three readings  of  them in the 
" Rolls "  ; in the absence of  Comnzons'  Journals  we  know 
nothing of  the practice in that house, where the custom may 
well have been originated.  We know little more of  the rules 
adopted  by  the house  in  debating  finance, though  Hall's 
amusing story of  the grants in I523  shows that the "  com- 
mons " and knights  of  the shire  retained  separate action 
with regard to their respective tenths and fifteenths, goods 
and lands.2  These grants emerged from the house  during 
These communes petitiones  are kept separate from other petitions on 
the Rolls until Henry VII's reign.  Chronicle, ed.  1809, p. 657. 3 30  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
the  fifteenth  century  in the form  of  an indenture  which 
was not always observed;  and in 1426  the crown and the 
lords,  after  mature  consideration  of  the judges  in parlia- 
ment,  determined  to  ignore  the  conditions  imposed  by 
the commons on  the  grant  of  a  subsidy  in the previous 
parliament. l 
As  a rule, however, supply was accepted as it came from 
the house of  commons, and details of  procedure in the lordsJ 
house are first recorded in connexion with its more appro- 
priate  judicial  business  arising  upon  petitions  presented 
by  individuals  with  or  without  the  er~dorsement  of  the 
commons.  From the beginning of  Henry .VJs reign, if  not 
earlier, the clerk notes of  such bills or petitions that they 
have been  lecta,  auditrz,  et  intellects  coram  domino  nostro 
rege  ac  dominis  spiritualibus et  temporalibus  in  pradicto 
$arliamento  existe~ztibus.2 In 1492  we  first  hear  of  their 
having been read more than once, sape, sapius, or pers~pe, 
and in  1495  we  light  upon  readings  ter  and trina  vice.3 
Three readings took some time to become the stereotyped 
procedure;  in  1515 we  have  reference to a  seventh  and 
an eighth reading  in the Lords'  Journals,  while the dwind- 
ling "  Rolls " of  Henry VIII's reign drop their mention  of 
three readings  and revert  to the less  specific record  of  a 
century  bef~re.~  More  important  is  the  fact  that  these 
various readings spread to bills of  all sorts, except such as 
were of  grace and, being recommended by the crown, needed 
only  one.  The  contagion  of  uniformity  developed;  and 
the commons, who in earlier days had been content with a 
single reading,  a  mere  verbal  acceptance,  or even  a  tacit 
acquiescence, began  to give  three  readings  to bills  which 
both the crown and the lords now condescended  to submit 
for  their  approval.  The  process  of  assimilation  reduced 
to a single rule of  three readings in either house the various 
methods  of  medieval  parliamentary  legislation;  but  the 
crown retained its right of  legislating out of  parliament  by 
Rot. Parl., iv. 275-6,  301 ; cf. above, p. 288.  '  Ibid., iv.  18  et  passim. 
Ibid., vi.  451-2,  460, 492-3,  512 : denuo recatatis et intellectis  occurs 
in 1485 (zbid., vi. 275). 
Lords'  Journals, i.  55-6. 
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and orders in  council,  and the church  her 
right  of  legislating  in  convocation,  without  the  crown's 
participation  until 1532, and with it afterwards. 
The  control  of  the  house  of  commons,  however,  over 
parliamentary  petitions  steadily increased, and in  Henry 
VII's  reign  an  act was  repealed  on  the  petition  of  the 
commons on the ground that it had been passed at the suit 
of a private person in the absence of  the members for Lanca- 
shire, to which it referred.l  The direct access accorded to 
chancery and the council had not debarred, though it had 
diverted, petitioners from the commons ;  and, while poorer 
litigants  went  as a rule  to other courts, powerful  suitors 
resorted more and more to parliament.  The commons, by 
adopting private petitions and presenting them as their own 
ex  parte  the petiti~ner,~  succeeded by steps which have not 
been traced in establishing the presumption that the crown 
could not legislate on private petitions in parliament without 
the  commons'  consent.  The  principle  was  recognized  by 
Henry VII when he sought an act of parliament  authorizing 
him to annul certain attainders in 1504, and this precedent 
was followed in the early years of  Henry VIII; but it was 
not fully established until the Stuart claims to a dispensing 
power were repudiated at the Revolution.  The authority of 
the commons  over  private  petitions  had  been  recognized, 
and perhaps enhanced  by a practice, which  begins early in 
the fifteenth century and develops rapidly during its course, 
of  petitioners  addressing  their  petitions  to the commons 
instead of  to parliament, the crown, council, or chancery; 8 
for  when  petitions  were  addressed  to  the commons  they 
clearly had the option of endorsing them or not. 
The rapid development  of  the prestige  of  the  house  of 
*  Rot. Parl., vi. 456-7. 
There are  innumerable instances of  this practice in Henry VII's reign. 
"ven  peers  addressed  petitions  to  the  commons;  cf.  the  earl  of 
Wiltshire's  petition  in 1472  "to the full wise  and discreet commons of 
this present parliament"  (Rot.  Parl., vi. 62).  There is abundant evidence 
from the sixteenth century to justify  Prof. McIlwain's  doubts about the 
permanence of  the commons'  renunciation in Henry IV's  reign  of  any 
sharein judicial power (High Court ofParliament, p. 203).  In the Commons' 
Journals, i.  45, there is a  record of  the hearing of  evidence, presence of 
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commons  during the sixteenth century led to the abandon- 
ment by the crown of  the coercive measures it had not very 
successfully employed to secure attendance, though  as late 
as Mary's reign members who had gone home without leave 
were  prosecuted  in  the  quecn's  bench.l  Early in  Henry 
VIII's reign the clerk of  the lower house had been enjoined 
by statute to keep a register of  the names and attendance of 
members  of  the house;  and from this register  may have 
ccme the idca of  instituting  journals.  But if  it was  kept, 
all  trace  of  it has  d~sappeared,  and  the Journals  of  the 
commons, unlike  those  of  the  house  of  lords,  have  ncvcr 
~ncluded  lists of  the names of  those present.  In Elizabeth's 
reign  the  house  took  control  of  its own  attendance,  and 
frequent  resolutions  were  passed  for  calling of  the roll  by 
the  clerk;  but  apparently  no  penalties  were  inflicted  for 
absence, and it was left to the constituencies, and afterwards 
to  the  party  organization,  to  control  the  attendance  of 
members.  But while  the  scanty  presence  of  members  in 
medieval  parliaments  and the measures adopted to ensure 
attendance  indicate  that  the wages  paid  had  become  an 
inadequate  consideration, the abeyance of  those  measures, 
and the full attendance after 1529, show that the political 
importance  of  the house had become a sufficient incentive. 
Assuredly  during  the Tudor  period  the  average  presence 
in  the house was  at least double what  it had been  in the 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 
Possibly  this  increase  suggested  its  removal  from  the 
chapter house  to  St. Stephen's chapel, an  important  step 
in the consolidation of  parliament.  We are so accustomed 
to associate parliament with magnificent buildings at West- 
minster, and to think of  houses built of  brick or stone, that 
it  requires  a  mental  effort to realize  that  tlie  house  of 
commons,  like  the  house  of  Lancaster  or  the  house  of 
York, was made of  men, and might be anywhere.  Parlia- 
ment  sat  in various towns during the middle ages, and its 
paraphernalia  was  easily mobilized.  A  few woolsacks and 
1  Coke, Institutes, iv. 17; Strype, Eccl. Mem., 111.  i. 262-4. 
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executed  on  22  August, 1553, for  his  share in  Northurn- 
berland's  conspiracy.  Stow remarks l that the chapel was 
thenceforward used  as "a parliament  house "; but  even 
so, it does not appear to have  afforded accommodation for 
committees, which generally met at the inns of  court.2 
Ostensibly the reunion of  the two houses under one roof 
was a sign of  concentration;  but the commons came back 
on  very  different  terms  from  those  on  which  they  had 
originally departed from the open  parliament  chamber  to 
seek  seclusion  in  the  cloisters  of  the  abbey  for  their 
domestic  discussions,  and the difference  did  not  tend  to 
the unity of  parliament.  They had gone forth in the middle 
ages  merely  as a  group  anxious  for  private  debate,  but 
carrying  with  them  little  of  the  glamour  and  authority 
of  the high  court  of  parliament  which  they  left  behind 
them in the seat of  power.  They came back as one of  two 
houses, claiming an equal share in the dual control of  parlia- 
ment.  Henceforth,  whatever  the  commons  said  or  did 
was  said and done  in  parliament;  one roof  covered both 
commons and lords, and one constitutional halo surrounded 
their  actions.  The  commons  returned  to  parliament  to 
1 Stow's  Survey,  ed.  Kingsford,  ii.  377-9.  Tl~e  reference  (Acts  of 
Privy  Council,  1550-2,  p.  172) to  an account,  dated  2  Dec.,  1549, for 
"works  about  the parl~ament  house"  may  concern  the alteratlons  to 
St. Stephen's chapel ; for "  the parliament  house "  was coming to be used 
instead of "  the parliament chamber," and to include both houses of  parlia- 
ment  (cf. ibid. I 547-50,  p. 248, I 552-4,  p:  20; Exeter  Records, Hist.  MSS. 
Comm. 1916, p. 51).  Foxe, in his recension  of  his authorities, frequently 
changes parliament chamber into parliament house.  "  Domus " is often 
used  of  the parliament chamber in the Lor?'  Journals for Henry VIII's 
reign, and less frequently " domus superior  for it, and "  domus inferior " 
for the commons  (Lords' Journals, i. 5, 7,,:5,  21, 45).  In 1536 Cromwell 
writes of  the "  nether  and upper houses  (Merriman,  Cromwell, ii. 47). 
In 151  j (Lords' Journals, i. 46) it is suggested that indentures for knights 
of  the shire be  brought "  into the parliament house " as usual;  and in 
later days each house claimed that this meant its own.  In the grant to 
Vane the house of  lords is called "the lords' parliament house,"  and the 
house of  commons the domus parliynenti. 
2 Apparently  there  was  one  committee-chamber  of  the  house " 
(D'Ewes,  p.  253).  but the following  are some  of  the places  in which 
committees met during Elizabeth's  reign : the Star Chamber,  Treasury 
Chamber,  Exchequer  Chamber,  Inner  Temple  Hall,  Temple  Church, 
Parlour of  the Middle Temple, New  Hall in the Temple, Lincoln's In11 
Hall,  Serjeants'  Inn, Savoy,  Guildhall,  Rolls  Chapel,  Marshalsen,  and 
Court House at Southwark  (D'Ewes, pp. 221,  249. 250, 253.  298-9,  300, 
363). 
dispute  its  control with  the lords, and eventually to oust 
them from  authority.  Some, as Sir Robert Cecil remarked 
in  1601,  would  convert  all  sovereignty  into  popularity; 
and  popularity made  less  allowance  for  the peers  than  it 
did for the crown. 
Cecil's phrase is a significant omen for the constitutional 
history of  the century, in the opening year of  which it was 
uttered.  It is also a useful reminder of  the strides which the 
commons had made in the sixteenth century.  But for that 
preparation  under  the  Tudors  there  could  have  been  no 
successful  struggles under  the Stuarts.  No  parliament  in 
the middle ages had been able to wage a civil war or depose 
a king;  its function had merely been to confirm the work 
of  rival factions and provide  titles  for successful usurpers, 
to  recognize the fait  accompli, but  not  to accomplish  it.l 
There had been  baronial cliques, but never a parliamentary 
party, because parliament  had possessed  no  esprit  de corps 
and no self-consistency; it was a mere conference in which 
things were done by kings or by baronial factions.  Under 
the Tudors it became an entity and an authority, active and 
independent,  claiming  to  speak  for  a  nation  in  tones  to 
which  lungs  must  give  ear.  The  petitions  of  grace  had 
ended, and petitions of  right  assumed a political guise. 
The commons had, they told James I in his  first parlia- 
mentary  session, yielded much  to Elizabeth on account of 
her age and sex;  yet they had spoken in terms of  insistence 
about her marriage, the succession, the execution of  Norfolk 
and Mary  Stuart which no  medieval parliament would have 
adopted.  It is an obvious criticism of  the commons under 
Edward I11 and the Lancastrians that they objected to the 
measures of  the crown, but had no policy themselves.  They 
did not, indeed, think  policy was  their  business, and they 
1 Little importance can be attached to parliamentary statutes entailing 
the crown  upon  successful claimants  like Edward  IV and Henry  VII; 
for parliament  had  no  option in the matter.  Unless the king  de facto 
was also  king  de jurc,  his writs were  null  and void, and the assembly 
summoned  thereby  was  no  parliament  and  could  make  no  statutes. 
Henry IV  had taken the precaution  of  compelling Richard I1 to issue the 
writs for the parliament which accepted his abdication. 
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invariably  pleaded  incapacity  when  asked  for  advice  on 
matters of  state.  But their tone was different under Elizabeth ; 
they had ideas of  religious policy, of  economic policy,  and 
of  foreign policy which they had not derived from authority 
and wanted to force on the crown.  Even under Henry VIII 
the commons  could be  stubborn enough  when  they liked; 
attacks  on  the government were  often made by individual 
members, and the house as a whole refused in 1534 to make 
spoken words treason, and rejected or amended various bills 
promoted by the g0vernment.l  The parliament of  1545 has 
generally  been  t;ken  as  the  highwater-mark  of  Henry's 
autocratic power;  and eminent historians have depicted in 
sombre  hues the servility of  the  common^.^  A letter from 
Secretary  Petre, written  on  the  last  day  of  the  session,* 
puts its history  in a truer and very  different  light : "  the 
book [i.  e. bill] of  the colleges," he writes, "  escaped narrowly, 
and was driven over to the last hour, and yet then passed 
only by division of  the house. . . . The bill of  books, albeit 
it  was  at the  beginning  earnestly  set  forward,  is  finally 
dashed in the common house, as are divers others."  More- 
over,  several  of  those  which  passed  both  houses were  so 
distasteful to the king that he vetoed them ; and the picture 
of  the  king  "  having  his  own  way  in  everything " is 
imaginary.  Parliaments  and  people  cannot  change  their 
character  in  a  moment;  and  if  Tudor  parliaments  had 
been  servile,  Stuart parliaments  would  not  have  achieved 
their  independence. 
The  Stuarts,  however,  expected  greater  subservience 
from their parliaments than the Tudors had looked for; and 
their doctrinaire royalism hastened  a  struggle which  could 
only have been  avoided by submission on the part  of  king 
Letters axd Papers, vii. 51 ;  Lords' Journals, i.  71,  73, 80, 89; Pollard, 
Henry  VIZI, pp. 288-93. 
Cf. Stubbs, Lectures on Medieval and Modern History, 1887,  pp. 288-9 : 
"  Clearly the independent spirit has nearlv evaporated.  The ecclesiastical 
bills  withouf  a protest.  . . .  The ~ournals  [there are none  for  the 
commons] record  no opposition or protest; the king  has his own way in 
everything "  ;  and the Political History, v. 470, speaks of the king "securing 
by  his  repeated  presence  at the  debates  a  tranquil  passage  for  both 
measures " (the subsidy act and the chantries or colleges act). 
Vetters  and Papers, XX.  ii. 1030-1. 
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or parliament.  The conimons had developed a will of  their 
own, and  the  only question was  how far that will  should 
encroach.  They were  firm  in  their  protestantism  and in 
their determination to control supplies; their protestantism 
provoked an ambition to dictate a protestant domestic and 
foreign policy, and their  determination  to control  supplies 
led  them  to  attack the instruments  by  which  the crown 
sought to enforce non-parliamentary taxation.  They were 
thus brought into collision with the whole administration of 
the  crown, and  civil war  could  alone decide whether  king 
or  parliament  should  dispose of  the national forces.  The 
commons  appeared  to triumph  over  the lords  as well  as 
over  the crown in 1649;  but the permanent  lesson of  the 
struggle was that civil war leads to military dictation, and 
the  common  subjection  of  crown  and  parliament  to  the 
army produced  a  national  resolution  to avcid the cure of 
militarism  for  the future.  James  11's  attempt  to support 
his government by military force deprived him of  any party 
willing to fight ;  and without force at its command the crown 
was at the mercy of  parliament. 
The Revolution of  1688 did not, however, establish respon- 
sible government in England  in the sense we  attach to the 
phrase.  For in that sense responsible government involves 
two  things :  firstly, the responsibility  of  the executive to 
the legislature, and secondly, the responsibility of  the legis- 
lature to the people.  The second is the more important of 
the two, for the American constitution has shown that it is 
possible  to secure  popular self-government without  making 
the executive responsible to the legislature.  But no popular 
self-government is possible unless the legislature is responsible 
to  the  community;  and it  was  in  this  respect  that  the 
Revolution was defective.  The mere exsitence of  the house 
of  lords, and its claim to co-ordinate powers with the elected 
house of  cornnions, hampered the operation of  this respon- 
sibility.  But  more  important  than the  irresponsibility  of 
the house  of  lords in the eighteenth century was  the  irre- 
sponsibility of  the house  of  commons.  The commons had 
in  the seventeenth  century claimed as autocratic a  power 
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as the Stuarts.  They asserted for their ~esolutions  the force 
of  law;  1  and by  their  own  authority  they had in  1649 
abolished  two out of  the three branches of  the legislature. 
They  prolonged  their  own  existence,  and  excluded  their 
opponents, not merely from the house of  commons, but from 
the rank of  electors.  It was their "  horrid " arbitrariness, 
as Cromwell  called it, which  opened the way for the more 
horrid arbitrariness of  military despotism. 
The  exclusive spirit  was  still  strong in  both  houses  of 
parliament  during  the  eighteenth  century.  The  reporticg 
of  debates and the publication of division lists were denounced 
as giving colour to the idea that members were responsible 
to some authority outside the walls of  parliament.  Expres- 
sions  of  opinion  unfavourable  to the house  of  commons, 
such as the Kentish petition, were voted scandalous, and the 
house  attempted to punish  the petitioners as though they 
had committed a  crime.  It claimed by resolution  to dis- 
franchise electors;  it decided  disputed elections by  party 
votes  in the house;  and  even  went  so  far  as to unseat 
members who had been duly elected and co-opt candidates 
who  had been  duly  defeated.2  Its criterion  was  its  own 
privilege, and it had little respect for any one else's liberty. 
The Revolution had transferred power from the crown to 
parliament,  but  not  from  parliament  to the people.  The 
merest  fraction possessed votes:  and the voters themselves 
Prothero, Select Documents, 1898, p. 290 ; Gardiner, Documents, 1889, 
pp. 26-7.  In  the former, thz "  Apology"  of  ;6oq, the commons assert that 
the power of  parliament is  above the lf,w,  and in the latter document 
Charles I complains  that some of  them  have not doubted to maintain 
that  the  resolutions of  that house  must bind  the judges,"  and that 
"their  drift  was  to . . . erect  an  universal  overswaying  power  to  .  -- 
themselves." 
On  April  13, 1769,  the house  declared  Colonel  Luttrell,  who  had 
been  twice  defeated  by  Tohn  Wilkes,  to have been  duly  elected, and 
falsified the return accoraingly. 
8  An  important  but  less  familiar  struggle  was  waged  in some  con- 
stituencies over the franchise.  Thus, at Reading,  on October 22, 1705, 
the corporation resolved that "  for the time to come the mayor, aldermen, 
and bureesses in their common counsell. in case of  members to serve in 
parliam&t  for  this borough,  doe first  determine  and resolve  amon5st 
themselves whoe shall be deemed fitt representatives  for that purpose  ; 
but on March  4, 1761, it issued a  declaration  that it never intended to 
deprive the inhabitants paying scot and lot of  their votes at  parliamentary 
elections  (Hist. MSS. Comm., 11th Rep., vii. 204, 206). 
little power.  Elections  simply  meant a  choice of  masters, 
and not a decision of  policy.  Only twice in the eighteenth 
century was a general election held to settle a public question, 
once  in  1701  when  William  111  appealed  to  the  country 
against  a  Tory house  of  commons, and  secondly  in  1784, 
when the younger Pitt appealed to it against  Whig domina- 
tion.  For the rest ministers were changed, policies adopted 
and discarded,  war  declared  and peace  made, without the 
least  reference to the electors.  Each election  was  a  local 
and pcrsonal contest, and not a political conflict of  principles. 
A member did what he liked in  parliament, subject to the 
whim of  the owncr of  the borough for which he sat, and the 
same territorial magnates decided the contests in the shires. 
The commons in parliament enjoyed the fruits of  a victory 
they had won as representatives of  the people, but they did 
not wish to share them. 
George  I11  interrupted  this comfortable state of  affairs, 
and  turned  against  parliamentary  magnates  their  own 
political  arts.  Their  lack  of  public  support  facilitated 
George's operations.  He could never have bribed and cajoled 
a  really  representative  house  of  commons,  but  an almost 
self-constituted body of  landlords and their clients could be 
met with the weapons they used, and it was the success of 
the "lting's  friends " which  opened the eyes  of  the Whigs 
to  the need  for  reform.  Unless  corruption  were  checked, 
George  might  recover  by  influence what  the  Stuarts had 
failed to retain by force.  On the other hand, if  corruption 
were  checked and  parliament  reformed, there would be an 
end to the Wliig system of  government.  Distracted between 
fear  of  corruption by the crown and of  reform by popular 
pressure, the old Whigs and Tories were saved for a time by 
the  French  Revolution, which  made  reform  a  nightmare; 
and for another generation the breach between the commons 
in,  and  the  commons  out  of,  parliament  grew  wider. 
Political reform might be stayed by the French Revolution, 
but industrial changes were not, and the old representative 
system became inconsistent with every principle of  represen- 
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The reform act of  1832  was, however, essentially a bour- 
geois achievement ; it enfranchised  the middle  classes, but 
not the poor, a number of  whom actually lost the votes they 
possessed before.  Not  until  1867  were  the town  artisans, 
nor until 1885  were the agricultural  labourers really  repre- 
sented by the commons in parliament.  Meanwhile religious 
and other disabilities were removed, and it became possible 
for all sorts and conditions of  men, Roman Catholics, Non- 
conformists,  Quakers,  Jews,  Mohammedans, Free-thinkers, 
to sit and vote in parliament.  Within two generations of 
the reform  act the house of  commons was  converted  from 
a political  club, with its membership limited practically to 
one class, into a microcosm of  the nation.  It comprehended, 
not merely one or two estates of  the realm, but all ; and it 
monopolized all their powers.  It extended its sway, because 
it abandoned its privilege, and accepted the position of  agent 
to the community.  It ceased to claim independence, and so 
it won legal omnipotence.  Once or twice in the later middle 
ages a  clerk with  a  prophetic soul described the commons' 
house as  the cornmunitas communitatztm ;  the  communities 
have  become  a  community, the  estates have  become  the 
state; and when we  speak of  the state we  mean the state 
in parliament. 
CHAPTER  XVII 
THE  STATE  IN PARLIAMENT 
THE  State is a word which does not appear in the English 
language until the close of  the middle ages, because the idea 
it seeks to express  had not  before  dawned  on  the English 
mind.  It cannot be translated into ancient Greek, because 
the Greeks  could  not  divorce  the  idea  of  the state from 
the particular form in which it was made manifest to them; 
and so they had but one word, no).is, for both city and state. 
The Latin respublica and civitas come nearer to our meaning, 
because  the wider  experience  of  the  Romans  made  them 
familiar with a greater variety of  states;  but the Romans 
hesitated  to apply either  civitas or  respublica to Persia or 
even  to their  own  imperium,  while  both  Persia  and  the 
Roman  empire  are, to  our  minds,  as much  states as the 
cities  of  Athens  or  of  Rome.  It is  the  modern  diversity 
of  political  organization  that  makes  both  necessary  and 
possible  some  generic  word  to  express  the  idea  without 
denoting any particular manifestation.  Nevertheless, every 
member of  a  state does habitually associate with  it in his 
mind  some  peculiar  characteristic.  The  German  used  to 
conceive of  might as the essence of  the state, with a soldier 
as its embodiment and a Hohenzollern  at its head.  To a 
Russian  the  state was  largely  the  tsar, to  a  Frenchman 
Z'administration,  and  to  an  American  himse1f.l  To  an 
Englishman  its  embodiment  is  parliament. 
This English conception rests on a sound historical basis. 
A British judge  once addressed an American in court as "  one of the 
subjects of  the United  States,"  to which the American objected that he 
was one of  the sovereigns of  the United States.  But the point of view is 
changing, and some Americans would say that the States are the state. 
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The state is a fusion of  estates, and the fusion was brought 
to pass  in parliament.  The indefinite  number  of  estates 
which gathered at Westminster  in  the fourteenth century 
gradually merged into three, which in the sixteenth century 
were  authoritatively  defined  as  crown,  lords,  and  com- 
mons ;  l and the  three  estates  of  the  realm  were  melted 
into the national state by the fervour of  sixteenth-century 
nationalism.  Under Henry VIII its complexion was royal, 
in  the  eighteenth  century  aristocratic,  and  to-day  it is 
popular.  But the unity wrought in  parliament  has never 
been seriously disturbed since the Civil War and the Revo- 
lution; and  within  England  itself,  whatever  we  may  say 
of  Scotland,  Ireland, or  realms  beyond  the sea, there has 
been  no  greater  danger  of  two  states than  its division, 
of  which  Disraeli  spoke,  into a  nation  of  the rich  and  a 
nation of  the poor. 
Out  of  this  fusion  grew  the  supremacy  of  parliament. 
When  in  the  twelfth  and thirteenth  century  the founda- 
tions  of  an  English  constitution  bcgan  to  emerge,  only 
an estate could  tax itself.  Thanks to Edward  I  it  could 
only tax itself  in  parliament, and the conference in which 
the  taxing  was  done  gradually  became  the  authority  for 
the  act.  By a  somewhat  subtle  and  protracted  process, 
estates which had taxed themselves in parliament assumed,. 
under  the garb of  parliament, the  power  to tax,  and to 
bind  in various ways,  other estates as well;  and both the 
Anglican  clergy and the nobility have lost  their  medieval 
right  to tax themselves,  and  are  taxed  by  the  house  of 
commons,  from  which  they  are  both  by  law  excluded. 
The merging of  the individual in his "  estate " involved the 
surrender  to  that  estate  of  his  individual  liberty;  the 
merging of  the "  estates "  in the state involved the surrender 
to the state of  their medieval autonomy.  In  England it was 
a  slow  and  gradual  process  of  parliamentary  evolution : 
and  as  late  as  the  reign  of  James  I  parliament  itself 
1  Burghley, at a  joint  committee of  lords and commons in  February 
1585  (D'Ewes,  p.  350).  Cowell,  however,  in  1607,  gives  the  modern 
version (Prothero, p. 410). 
speaks of  "  the state  ecclesiastical " as  well  as  of  "  the 
whole  state of the realm,"  while  the king talks  of  "  the 
state of  monarchy."  l  In France the fusion took the form 
of sudden combustion known as the Frencli Revolution, the 
critical  stage  in  which  was  the  agreement  of  the  three 
estates  to  sit  and  vote  together  as a  national  assembly, 
submitting to a majority.  The state in parliament has thus 
become  an embodiment of  Hobbes's  Leviathan, and Austin 
expressed its essence in juridical  language when  he defined 
law as the command of  the state. 
The sovereignty of  parliament  is, however,  only a legal 
sovereignty; behind it lies the political  sovereignty of  the 
electorate and the general will  of  the people, which parlia- 
ment is supposed to reflect with more or less fidelity.  But 
the "  people " is so  indeterminate  an expression  that its 
use,  let  alone  its abuse,  obscures  almost  all  political  dis- 
cussion.  Who  are "  the people,"  and to what  extent  do 
they  really  govern ?  Abraham  Lincoln's  famous  rhetoric 
at Gettysburg to the effect "  that government of  the people 
by the  people  for  the  people  shall  not  perish  from  the 
earth," has achieved a world-wide vogue, because it expresses 
a common aspiration without attempting to define it.  His 
words did not state the problem with which he had to deal, 
nor suggest a solution.  Every southerner against whom he 
fought could subscribe to his principle, and its enunciation 
no more defined the issue than it provided a basis of  recon- 
ciliation.  The  south  believed  that  under  this  specious 
phrase  Lincoln  was  asserting a claim to  the  government 
of  the  people  of  the  south  by  the  people  of  the north 
for  purposes  of  which  the  north  alone  approved; and 
the remark,  which  a  well-known writer (t) directs  against 
the  British  empire,  that  "  a  democracy  pretending  to 
sovereignty  over other democracies is either a phantom or 
the most  intolerable  of  oppressions,"  is not  without  rele- 
vance  to  the  conquest  of  the  southern  by  the  northern 
States.  So  far  as  the  south  was  concerned,  Lincoln's 
recipe  was  that  of  Oliver  Cromwell-"  what's  for  their 
1 Prothero, Documents, ed. 1898, pp. 288, 291,  293. 344  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
good,  not  what  pleases  them-that's  the  question ";  and 
at Gettysburg he was  a unionist  rather than a  democratic 
statesman. 
His real  meaning  was that government  of  the people  as 
a whole, by the people as a whole, for the people as a whole 
should  not  perish  from  the  earth; and his  essential  prin- 
ciple  was  the  right  of  majorities  to  coerce  minorities. 
Probably  Edward I meant  much  the same thing with  his 
maxim  qzlod  omftes tangit  ab  omnibus appro3etzlr;  and the 
purport  of  the  principle  in  application  was  to  exclude 
such  claims  of  those  of  Peter  des  Roches, who  asserted 
immunity from  taxation to which  he had not  consented. 
The issue  of  north  against  south was  to determine what 
was the whole, and what was a  part.  The south stood to 
the  north  in  1861  in  a  stronger  numerical  relation  than 
the  thirteen  colonies did  to the  mother country in  1776; 
by  what  right  could  those  who  claimed  for  the  part  its 
independence  of  the  whole  in  1776  deny  the  right  of  a 
larger part to assert its indi:pf:ndence  of  the whole in 1861 ? 
And if  the part is bound to and by the whole, by what right 
did  sections  of  the  catholic  church  separate  from  the 
whole  and  reform  themselves  in  the  sixteenth  century? 
The  right  to  secede  has  been  the  political  and  religious 
making  of  the  American  people,  and  an  indispensable 
weapon  of  human  progress.  We  can  get  no  nearer  to  a 
principle  on  Abraham  Lincoln's  lines  than to  say  that  a 
group of  men  may, if  it can, make and call itself  a nation, 
and may then  deny to other groups the rights they them- 
selves  claimed to exercise.  Ireland  illustrates better than 
any hypothetical case the crucial ambiguities which Abraham 
Lincoln's wisdom concealed.  Government of  the people by 
the people for the people is not in dispute, and all the parties 
take their stand upon unity, unionists on the unity of  the 
United  Kingdom, nationalists on the unity of  Ireland, and 
Ulstermen  on  the  indivisibility  of  Ulster.  The fact  that 
men hold a common principle  does not prevent  them from 
waging war to define its application.  One faith in  parlia- 
mentary government  will  not  save us  from  diversity  of 
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parliaments;  and so  fully has  the state been  merged  in 
prliament  that  diversity  of  parliaments  has  sometimes 
meant disruption of  an empire. 
Nor  is  the  problem  a  mere  numerical  difficulty,  for  the 
claim that the whole is greater than the part is nothing but 
a  mathematical  dogma  without  significance  for  human 
or  practical  affairs.  To  the  thirteen  colonies in  1776,  as 
to the  southern  states in  1861,  the  part was greater than 
the  whole;  and  to  many  an individual  his  single  soul  is 
more  than  all  the  world.  It is  the  essence of  all religion 
that man's relation  to God  and conscience makes his rela- 
tion  to  the  state conditional  and  not  absolute;  and  the 
absolutism  of  the  state is  a  form  of  pagan  idolatry.  It 
is only within  limits  and  upon  conditions  that  the  whole 
can  dictate to the part,  even  to  so  small  a  part  as  the 
individual citizen.  To determine those limits and to define 
those  conditions  is  the  function  of  human  progress  in 
politics.  To ignore  them or  to deny their  existence,  and 
upon that denial to build a parliament or a state, is to build 
it upon the sands.  Man is a great deal more than a political 
animal; and the best parts of  the best  men  are those with 
which parliament has nothing to do.  Politics are a second- 
best  business of  second-best men, and we  do not rank our 
politicians with our poets and philosophers.  Whatever a man 
may render to Caesar, he may not surrender his soul.  Govern- 
ment  of  the people  by  the people  only  implies control  of 
an indeterminate  part  of  hurnan  affairs  by  indeterminate 
parts of  the human race. 
Nor, indeed, is government by the people anything more 
than a rhetorical phrase; and it is somewhat  ironical that 
the most  progressive  of  Lincoln's  admirers have  found  in 
government  by  commission  the  highest  interpretation  of 
government  by  the  people  in  municipal  affai~s,  and  in 
national  affairs  a  popular  dictatorship.  Government  by 
the  people  is government  by  those  whom the people send 
to Westminster or Whitehall, in either a direct, or a round- 
about way, for reasons  that may have  nothing to do with 
administration.  Questions  of  war  and  peace,  of  foreign 
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poiicy,  of  public health,  of  education  are not  determined 
by popular election ;  and the nearer a public body approaches 
to  direct  popular  sovereignty, the more  circumscribed  its 
powers  will  be.  A  parish  council  is  the authority which 
embodies most  fully  Rousseau's  ideal, and its powers  are 
narrowly  limited  by  act  of  parliament  and  carefully 
controlled  by  a  non-elective  local  government  board. 
Extended powers are only entrusted to bodies elevated high 
above  the  average  elector.  Even  in  casting  a  vote  for 
those to whom his rulers will be responsible, the voter does 
not consciously express an opinion on more than one or twb 
issues; and the opinion lias to take the form of  a blunt yes 
or no, when the solution will  probably be a compromise for 
which no one would have spontaneously voted at all. 
Government  is,  in  fact,  a  technical  matter  with  which 
only experts are fitted to deal.  In the rudest  of  primitive 
societies every individual did a more or less equal amount 
of  everything,  including what  government there was;  and 
sorrle small communities, like ancient Athens, clung to the 
idea  that office  should go  by  rotation  and be  determined 
by  lot.  But  long  before  national  states  were  evolved, 
functions  were  highly  specialized.  Individuals  gave  up 
attempting  to  do  everything  equally  in  order  that  they 
might do  some things better.  Instead of  all fighting pell- 
me11  by the light of  nature, some were made soldiers with 
nothing to do except to make themselves expert.  Instead 
of  all keeping  watch  and ward  in  turn and  pursuing the 
hue and cry,  a  standing police  force was  created to keep 
the community's  peace.  Instead of  all meeting in popular 
councils,  some  were  chosen to manage the politics  of  the 
people.  From being jacks-of-all-trades men have sought to 
be masters of  one; for  the rest  they rely upon  representa- 
tion,  and the  community  only  performs  its functions  by 
vicarious  skill.  Democracy,  if  it involves a  reversion  to 
the original  type of  society, in  which  every  man  took  an 
equal share in politics, is a hopeless form of  reaction. 
But it is only the crudest of  doctrinaires who think that 
people  can govern themselves in the sense of  administering 
their  own  complicated  affairs.  No  employer  can  do  all 
the work  of  the men  he employs;  and the best  that the 
public can do  is  to judge  of  the work  that is done in its 
service without  attempting to do the work  of  its servants. 
1t is not a bad judge of  the effects of  legislation and govern- 
ment,  because  it is  the public  which  feels  them; and, as 
Washington  said,  people  must  feel  before  they  can  see. 
They are not, however, good judges of  legislative proposals, 
because  to  foresee  effects  requires  a  natural  imagination 
combined  with  expert  political  intelligence.  For  this 
reason  both  initiative  and  referendum  are  doubtful  ex- 
pedients.  Aristotle's  remark  that  the  best  judge  of  a 
dinner is not the cook, but the diner, is valid in politics; but 
the diner is not, therefore, a competent cook.  The public 
is a bad legislator, but a competent judge of  legislation.  A 
wise  public  will,  therefore, not  attempt to legislate itself, 
but  will  insist  on  the responsibility of  its legislators, and 
dismiss them if  they  fail.  Parliament  is the skilled legis- 
lative agent of  the electorate, and there is no reason for its 
existence  unless  it  is  more  expert  in  politics  than  its 
employers. 
The  case  for democracy  does  not,  indeed,  rest  on  the 
wisdom  of  the electorate; and no  one can have any doubt 
that every extension.  of  the franchise has lowered the average 
intelligence of  the voter(u).  It is not, however, the brains 
of  the voter, but his interests  that justify  his claim  to a 
vote.  Every class governs in its own interests when it has 
the  chance  and  is  irresponsible; and  the  only  tolerable 
foundation for the  state in parliament is one on which all 
estates  can  stand.  It was  Hobbes's  plea  for  monarchy 
that the monarch was superior to all class interests; and it 
is  conceivable  that  an  all-powerful  bureaucracy  might 
adjust the interests of  the various cla~se~  with less friction 
and a finer discrimination than is possible as a result of  the 
rough-and-tumble of  British  politics.  The chief  argument 
for parliamentary government  is that  results are  obtained 
by  discussion  between  the  divergent  interests,  and  are 
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average of  humanity than the most scientific of  despotisms, 
But it is for parliament to frame those compromises, which 
we  call  laws,  between  clashing  interests.  Not  even  the 
most rabid democracy has proposed to graduate an income- 
tax  by  popular  referendum;  and  an  actual  incident  in 
municipal  politics  illustrates  its humours and its  dangers. 
Six improvements were once submitted  to the burgesses of 
a  particular  town  for  approval;  all  were  carried  by large 
majorities.  A  seventh  proposal  was  to raise  a  twopenny 
rate  to pay  the  expense;  it was  rejected  by  a  majority 
about  as large  as  that  which  voted  the  improvements. 
It is  obvious  that the  government which  carries  reforms 
should  be responsible for raising  the  revenue;  there  is  no 
sounder  rule  in the  house  of  commons than  that  which 
prevents  any one who  is  not  a  responsible  minister  from 
proposing  additional  expenditure,  and  there  is  nothing 
more  vicious  in  the  United  States  congress  than  the 
practices  which  arise  from  neglect  of  this  precaution. 
There  would  be  little  endowment  of  higher  education  in 
England if  it depended on the votes  of  those who  do not 
aspire to profit by it, and little promotion  of  scientific or 
other research if it were referred to the masses who cannot 
judge of  its value. 
The validity of  popular judgement  is limited to problems 
which  the  public  feels,  and the  bearings  of  which  it  can 
grasp.  Practically  it is only upon such questions that the 
mass of  voters have any desire to cast a vote.  A proposal 
to close public-houses will  in England excite more popular 
interest  than  any  question  of  foreign  policy;  and  the 
technical  arguments about  free  trade  and  tariff  reform 
have to be reduced in the forum to the vulgar shape of  the 
little  loaf,  two  jobs  for one,  or  taxing  the  foreigner  for 
England's  benefit.  The reason  for  submitting  such  ques- 
tions  to  popular  judgement  is  that  the  people  feel  the 
pinch, and to feel the pinch without the means of  relieving 
the pressure creates a sense of  social injustice and friction, 
which, in its turn, hampers  the efficiency and impairs  the 
peace  and  energy  of  the  community  to  a  greater  extent 
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than  the  lack  of  trained  intelligence  Whether  wage- 
earners  should  be  paid  in kind,  and what  is a  dangerous 
trade or a living wage, are questions better left to the political 
sense of  the community than to the highest skill of  supreme 
courts  of  justice  A court of  law is not the place to deter- 
mine questions of  politics, and the fact  that the high court 
of  parliament  has become more  political  and less  judicial, 
while retaining the sole control of  legislation, is one of  the 
reasons why in England we  have no election of  judges and 
no proposals for their "  recall " by  popular vote. 
There  is,  however,  nothing  final  in  politics.  The  best 
constitution  is that which  adapts itself  best  to the actual 
state of  society.  The increase  of  popular  education auto- 
matically  widens  the  legitimate  sphere  of  popular  judge- 
ment; and when  the  mass  of  the voters  comprehend  the 
conditions  of  foreign  policy  there  is  no  reason  why  they 
should not  claim  its  control.  It is  a  matter which  rests 
with  themselves,  and  the  control  will  only  come  when 
electors  feel  keenly  enough  about  foreign  policy  to  sub- 
ordinate to it the petty considerations  of  personality, local 
interest, and party feeling, by which most  votes are deter- 
mined  at present.  But  under  no conceivable  conditions 
will the mass of  electors become so expert in the increas- 
ingly complex problems of  politics as to render superfluous 
the advice  and guidance  of  specially trained intelligence. 
Government  by the people  can, in existing circumstances 
mean  no  more  than  government  by  agencies  which  are 
responsible  to the  people  and regard  their  authority  as a 
trust to be  exercised for the people  as a whole, and not  in 
the  interest  of  themselves  or  of  the  class  to  which  they 
belong. 
Man  is, however,  a  complex creature, with  many needs 
and feelings for which he requires  expression;  and it does 
not  follow that any single agency  is the best  medium  for 
all  the  requisite  forms of  expression.  For half  a  century 
or more  there has been  a  tendency  to make  the  state in 
parliament  the universal  and omnicompetent  exponent  of 
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exceptions.  The German might make the state his religion 
and  the kaiser  his great  high-priest;  but  the  Englishman 
has, for the  most  part, rejected  parliament  as  the proper 
exponent of  his religion, and  free  church principles appeal 
to a wider  circle than  that of  the free churches.  A  sym- 
pathetic  echo  is  repeated  from  opposite quarters,  and the 
syndicalist is one who wants to apply free church principles 
to  his  bread-and-butter.  He  thinks  that  each  group  of 
workers  should  determine  the  wage  and  the  hours  for 
which it should work, and the price at which it should sell 
the product  of  its labour.  A  preliminary condition would 
be  the elimination of the capitalist, and the control by the 
group of  the capital as well as of  the labour it required ; but 
a more serious difficulty consists in the extent of  the bargain- 
ing  involved with  other  groups.  Before  one  group  could 
produce  anything  at all,  agreements  would  be  necessary 
with countless other groups engaged in making the instru- 
ments  needed  by  the  first,  and  the  regulation  of  these 
relations by  endless independent  sovereignties,  instead  of 
by parliament, would seem to involve an amount of  friction 
not far removed from anarchy. 
Indeed, the movement has the appearance of  a reversion 
to the medieval system of  liberties from which England was 
redeemed by the growth of  parliament.  It is a reaction to 
vocational, and not to local particularism, but it is none the 
less an effect of  restricted consciousness and retarded political 
education; and it is based on a determination to exalt the 
group  at the expense  of  the  community.  It arises  from 
impatience with the slowness of  communal action compared 
with the rapidity of  the results secured by strikes and other 
forms  of  action by which  the group, in moments of  parlia- 
mentary weakness, can blackmail the community.  It is also 
an imitation of  the unprincipled methods by which superior 
groups of  landlords and merchants have "  cornered" commo- 
dities  and  taken advantage of  national needs to fleece the 
nation for individual gain.  Miners are as much entitled as 
mine-owners to extort what profit they can from monopoly, 
and the producer who demands higher wages is on the same 
moral  plane  as  the  trader  who  raises  his  prices.  The 
monopoly is the source of  the evil; like every other liberty 
it cannot remain uncontrolled by parliament.  It was once 
said by a statesman of  moderate views that the state must 
control the trade in drink or the trade in drink would control 
the state.  There is a corresponding antithesis between the 
state and every other form of  interest; and  the problem 
again is one  which  Abraham  Lincoln's  democratic maxim 
gives us no help in solving.  Both syndicalism and socialism 
are  government  by  the  people; the  question  is,  whether 
that government is  to  be  by  the people  in guilds  or  by 
the people  in  parliament. 
The  fundamental  difference  between  syndicalism  and 
socialism is that one is, and the other is  not, fatal to parlia- 
ment.  Syndicalism is disruptive, anarchic, and illogical.  It 
aims at providing a sort of  government, not merely by isolat- 
ing  one  group from another, but by isolating one aspect of 
life-the  economic-from  all the rest, and making the cash- 
nexus the bond of  human society.  In the middle ages the 
guild  or group  concerned  itself  with  almost all  aspects of 
human activity,not merely with the livelihood of  its members, 
but with their education, their religion, and their amusements. 
Each guild was a little state and church within itself, with 
its patron saint, its ritual, its technical education, its rules, 
which  regulated the minutest  affairs of  each member from 
the cradle to the grave.  The system had its advantages, 
but it was incompatible both with individual liberty and with 
national organization ; it was a less expanded form of  selfish- 
ness than patriotism.  Presumably its modern imitators do 
not  propose  to  make  education,  religion,  domestic  and 
foreign  policy  subject  to  group  control,  and  therefore 
dependent  on  group support.  But a group which depends 
on  the community as a whole  to supply most of  its needs 
can  hardly  expect  independence  in  the  sphere  of  its 
choice.  Even  economic  independence is  a  chimera;  it is 
impossible  to  segregate groups  of  men  in  a  community, 
and still more  so to isolate the different instincts of  man- 
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The isolation of  the "  economic " man is as fatal to syndic- 
alists and to Mr.  Norman  Angel1 as it was  to the classical 
economists.  There  are  things  for  which  men  will  fight, 
however little war may pay, and there are objects for which 
they will vote in defiance of  all their economic interests. 
These  imponderabilia are the stuff  of  which  politics  are 
made,  and sentiment is the  most  stubborn of  facts  with 
which  the statesman has to deal.  It may  be  that, while 
the economic interpretation  of  history supplies the key  to 
the past,  the key  to the future is  in the idealist's  hands. 
Man  is not  precluded  from  aspiration  because  he  sprang 
from  something like  primeval  slime, and  the  state is not 
limited to material interests because it grew out of  material 
necessities.  We  are not  obliged to fix our  vision  on  the 
depths from which we  have risen,  and the future may lie 
in  aversion  from  the  past.  The  growth  of  the  state in 
parliament has been in vain if it is still to be bound  to the 
conditions  from  which  it  has  won  emancipation.  The 
essence of  its success has been  its constant adaptation to 
circumstances,  and  a  fresh  orientation  of  the  state  in 
response to moral  development  is  not  less  feasible  to-day 
than it was yesterday and the day before.  It is a childish 
mind which only sees in history its superficial repetitions. 
The state has, it is true, been  made by the selfishness of  . 
men; and it consists of  the burdens and obligations which 
they have transferred from their shoulders.  Nowadays we 
are impressed by the magnitude of  the  responsibilities the 
masses  have  thrust  upon  the  state  since  they  gained 
control of  parliament-free  education, free  food for school 
children,  free  treatment  in  hospitals,  public  parks  and 
museums, and a host of  other amenities open to those who 
do not pay, as well as to those who do.  But the process is 
not  new,  nor  are  the  masses  those  who  began  or  have 
profited most by the transference.  When William the Con- 
queror disposed of  the land, he merely leased it on terms of 
service at his court and in his army; and the whole burden 
of national defence lay on the holders of land.  By degrees 
these holders were  enabled  in parliament  to  fix and limit 
this obligation, then  to reduce  it, and finally to  escape  it 
Each  step in  their  emancipation  involved an 
increased burden on the state, until the whole was transferred 
from the  land  to  the  people.  What landlords did  in  the 
middle  ages  merchants  achieved  by  their  parliamentary 
influence in  modern  times.  When  new  worlds  were  dis- 
covered and the seas made highways of  traffic, the merchant 
adventured at his own risk and expense.  It was his enter- 
prise and his concern, and no one else assumed any liabilities 
if his vessel were robbed by pirates or wrecked on uncharted 
shores.  But  gradually  the  merchants,  as  they  acquired 
political  power,  transferred  this  burden  to  the  state, and 
it  became  a  matter  of  national  obligation  and  expense 
to survey the oceans, build lighthouses,  deal with  pirates, 
and render  the high  seas as safe from  human violence as 
the  king's  highways  on  land.  Merchant  ships  need  no 
longer  go  armed  in  time  of  peace, nor  sail  in  convoys; 
and taxes  voted  in parliament  diminished  the  risks  and 
increased  the traders'  profits.  It was these two processes 
which  created  the English  army  and navy,  and provided 
the state with its fighting forces. 
Other  activities  of  the state have  developed  in  similar 
ways  by parli~mentary  agency.  Instead  of  a  system  of 
blood-feuds by which each family redressed its own wrongs, 
or of  trial by battle, we have a  national system of  justice. 
Instead  of  each  man  being  sworn  to  arms  for  the 
preservation  of  the peace, we have a national police force. 
English  trade-interests  abroad, which were once supervised 
by  the  agents  of  individual  guilds  and  companies,  are 
now  in  the  hands  of  a  national  consular  service;  and 
the  foreign  office  controls  diplomatic  relations  which 
were,  in  the  middle  ages,  largely  relations  between  one 
corporation  and  another,  and  not  between  national 
states.  One  of  the  difficulties  in  the  early  days  of 
diplomacy was the little control which each state exercised 
over  its  subjects,  and  fifteenth-  and  sixteenth-century 
treaties  have  elaborately  to  lay  it  down  that  they  are 
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tions,  which  were  originally  founded  at the  expense  of 
chartered companies, and ruled  by  them, have been taken 
over by the state, and the colonial  office is the result.  In 
fact, every department of  government represents some o.bli- 
gation or burden which has been transferred by p  ar  1'  lament 
from individuals to the state.  The state consists of  burdens 
of  which individuals have been relieved;  and every subject 
considers he has a  right  to innumerable national services. 
Socialism is not  a  sudden growth  of  latter days; it is the 
product of the parliamentary  development of  the state. 
The  English  state has  thus  been  created  out  of  the 
material  needs of  individuals working  by means  of  parlia- 
ment;  it  does  not  follow that  it exists merely  for  their 
satisfaction.  There  is  clearly  a  limit to  the process  by 
which  every individual  seeks  to  get all  he  can out of  the 
state; and the costliness of  modern socialism is due to the 
extension of  the numbers  entitled  to vote  for parliament. 
Occasionally  general  elections  have  resembled  public 
auctions,  at which  votes  are  knocked  down to those who 
promise  the greatest  amount  of  parliamentary assistance; 
and signs have  been  discovered of  ultimate national bank- 
ruptcy, unless the rush  to draw more and more out of  the 
state can be met by a move to pay more and more in.  That 
is the basis of  national service.  The state has consisted of  the 
burdens  thrust upon  it; it should  consist  of  the sacrifices 
men  offer.  The historical  process  must  be  inverted,  and 
the rights of  man  subordinated to his  duties and respon- 
sibilities.  The  test  of  future  citizenship  will  be  what  a 
man  gives,  not  what  he  receives;  and  there  is  good 
authority for the belief  that to give is the better condition. 
The  function  of  parliament  has  been  to  distribute  the 
burdens imposed on the state by the shirking of  individuals; 
it should be to distribute the benefits accumulated through 
personal service.  The debt should become an endowment, 
the duty a satisfaction. 
There is, however, no  virtue in compulsion, and sacrifice 
ceases  to have  any  value  when  it  ceases  to be  free.  It 
becomes an  imposture  by imposition.  The  strength  of  a 
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state consists in the extent of  the sacrifice its people offer; its 
in the extent of the sacrifice it extorts.  The state, 
moreover,  consists of  the sacrifice made; it is not  a  deity 
to  which  the  sacrifice  is  offered.  That  is  idolatry.  The 
state, like parliament, is made of  men and women ; without 
them  it  is  nothing.  It is not, therefore, an external  and 
entity. It  consists of  one's neighbours and oneself, 
and most of  our differences  depend upon the emphasis we put 
upon the egotistic or the altruistic aspect of  the state.  It 
is an expression  of  the mind, or of  part of  the mind of  its 
members ; no quality in which they are deficient can charac- 
terize  their  state, and  their  predominant  attributes  will 
decide  its  nature.  When  Treitschke  said  the  state  is 
might, he was merely expressing in other words the German's 
belief  in the duel; and when  he  repudiated  the  idea  that 
any international tribunal  could bind the national state, he 
was simply applying to the state that exemption from the 
rule  of  law  which  the  duel  secures  for  the  individual. 
Germany's  methods  of  making  war  merely  magnified  the 
characteristics of  German personal  relations.  The state is 
merely man raised through parliament to the power of  the 
state. 
It is doubtful whether the word has not outlived  its use- 
fulness.  It means  too  many  different  things  to different 
people to have much meaning left at all; and in the British 
Empire, at any rate, we  should  express our meaning more 
precisely  by speaking of the community than of  the state, 
for  confusion is inherent in the use  of  the same term for 
the community and for its government.  The German had 
no difficulty in imagining a  state whose will  and interests 
were  independent  of  the community, because  he felt  that 
he  needed  a master.  British peoples, on  the  other hand, 
believe  in  governing  themselves,  and  to  them  the  state 
means  nothing  apart  from  the community;  it  is  simply 
the  organization  of  the  community  on  a  parliamentary 
basis.  But  it  is  idle  to  speak of  the  claims  which  the 
community has on  the community ; and, if  the sovereignty 
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it is a  meaningless term to a self-governing people,  unless 
it  means  unlimited  duty to  one's  neighbour.  There  are 
clearly  limits to that duty, and therefore  to the claims,of 
the community. 
These,  indeed,  are  recognized  in  practice.  Parliament 
does  not  impose  a  common religious  service  or  political 
opinion;  and, though it doe::  impose a common obligation, 
there  are  lengths  to which  ihat  common  obligation  does 
not  go.  The  problem  is  to  define  the limits of  commm 
obligation in terms  compatible with  individual  liberty.  It 
is something to have  made the obligation  common; it was 
differential  in  the  days  of  privilege.  Being  common,  it 
tends  towards  equality; for  if  the  basis  of  the state be 
obligation, the obligation  must be equal.  If, on the other 
hand,  the  basis  of  the  state  is  oblation  rather  than 
obligation,  there  is  ample  scopc  for  aristocracy.  No  one 
can ever be compelled to give  his best, or will  ever  give  it 
on compulsion.  Compulsion  only  yields  a  common mean; 
and the community  is  ill-occupied  when  its  activities  are 
devoted to reducing effort to a common level.  The trades- 
union descends to such methods  only because its members 
work for a master; and if  the state is regarded as a similar 
master its service will  sink to a similar  level.  There is no 
limitation of  output when each is a volunteer in a cause that 
is his own. 
The  value  of  the  state in  parliament  is  that  thus  it 
becomes  common  property  administered  by  consent.  Its 
obligations,  like its taxes,  come  by  way  of  grant and not 
of  imposition.  The  grant  is  a  matter  of  compromise, 
average,  and negotiation; and  our  efforts  to avoid  com- 
pulsion involve a vast expenditure of  energy.  We maintain 
our army by advertisement, and upon appeals to voluntary 
aid  our  army relies  for  its nurses.  Upon  similar  appeals 
depend our  hospitals, our  system of  higher education,  our 
societies  for  the  prevention  of  cruelty,  and  hundreds  of 
other  organizations  performing  functions  which  might  be 
performed with greater dignity, efficiency, and economy by 
the state.  To achieve  the economy, efficiency, and saving 
of  dignity  secured  by  the  performance  of  these functions 
by  the  state would,  however,  involve  a  conscription  of 
capital; and whatever may happen to lives or labour there 
must,  it  seems,  be  no  conscription  of  wealth.  That the 
claim to men's  lives should be thought reasonable and the 
claim to their  capital  unjust  is perhaps  the most  striking 
illustration  of  the  extent  to which  in  a  capitalistic  state 
capital  takes precedence of  human life, and to which, even 
under  a  democratic  franchise  in  a  parliamentary  state, 
wealth  can  make its influence prevail  over numbers. 
But it is only in a  parliamentary state that  these rival 
claims of classes and of  interests can be adjusted.  Syndi- 
calism is no  remedy,  and direct action  in the form  of  the 
initiative  and referendum  is  little  better.  The  essential 
vice  of  syndicalism is  that  it is  a  form  of  dissociation 
rather  than  association,  and  minimizes,  if  it  does  not 
destroy, the responsibility of  each group to others.  Power 
must  always  be  a  matter  of  responsibility,  whether  it  is 
exercised  by  an  individual,  a  parliament,  or  a  trade- 
union.  It is  a  trust,  and  the  idea  that its  possessor  is 
responsible to and for no one but himself  is as pernicious 
for  the  voter  as  for  the  monarch.  No  one  is  really 
entitled  to a  vote  except  in so  far  as he  feels  in  using 
that vote  that he  is  exercising  a  trust for  other people. 
Representation is a means of  developing responsibility, and 
the wider the interests and the group for which  the repre- 
sentative  is  and  feels  responsible,  the  broader  and  the 
deeper will be his sense of  responsibility.  Indirectly, too, 
he educates his constituents in a similar sense.  The presence 
of  trade-union  leaders  in  parliament  forces  upon  them  a 
sense  of  national  obligation  in  addition  to  their  group- 
responsibility,  and  in  turn  the  trade-unions  which  have 
representatives  in  parliament  will  think  more  nationally 
than  those  which  have  none.  The  particularism  of  the 
American  colonies before  the war of  independence was  so 
pronounced  that the  mother  country  had,  on  occasion, 
to  pay  them  to  defend  themselves,  and  they  were  quite 
incapable  of  concerting  a  common  colonial  policy.  The 358  THE EVOLUTION  OF PARLIAMENT 
reason  was that they had no  representation  in  the  parlia- 
ment  responsible  for  their  defence,  and  no  common 
parliament  of  their  own.  The  problem  exists  to-day  in 
a  modified  form,  and  it  underlies  the  national  .and 
imperial  politics  of  the  British  realms;  the  narrower  the 
responsibility,  the duller the yeitical capacity.  It is only 
by  contact  with  wider  issues  that  the  political  sense  of 
groups  and individuals  is  quickened,  and the  greater  the 
emphasis  on  the  particular  the  feebler  the  perception  of 
the general.  La petite  fiolitique, c'est  l'ennemi de la grande. 
Hence  the  need  of  an imperial parliament  to  broaden 
the  outlook  of  its members, and by  their means  to  com- 
municate that wider sense to their constituents.  A member 
of  parliament  serves  the  nation,  and not  merely his  con- 
stituency.  His  constituents  do  not  merely  elect  a  local 
representative, but  cast  a  vote  on  national  and  imperial 
politics.  Local  government  may  bring  politics  to  the 
cottager's  door;  a  parliamentary  vote  should  raise  the 
cottager  to  a  higher  level  of  political  vision.  Only  in 
that vision will  he  see the need  of  sacrifice  and  service, 
bridge the distance which  separates and unites his interest 
and the common weal, and learn the lesson of  accommoda- 
tion.  The salt, unplumbed, estranging sea long turned the 
Englishman's  gaze inwards upon his self-sufficient liberties ; 
and a parliament which satisfied his insular dspirations ful- 
filled his  conditions  of  constitutional  perfection.  Our  kin 
from afar may train our  eyes to scan a wider  horizon.  It 
remains  to be  seen whether the parliament, through which 
we  escaped  from the valley  of  parochial  politics  into the 
sphere of  national  action, can lead to even  more  extended 
views.  In parliament  all  the  estates  of  the  realm  were 
absorbed  and made one for  the  cornmon weal of  England. 
Can British dominions be absorbed and made one for their 
common weal  in a parliament  which  shall  be  no  longer a 
parl~ament of  estates  but  a  parliament  of  the  British 
realms ? 
CHAPTER  XVIII 
THE  BRITISH  REALMS  IN  PARLIAMENT ' 
THE  design of  the foregoing chapters has largely been to 
indicate the transitional  character of  every phase of  parlia- 
mentary  development and to emphasize the  elastic nature 
of  parliament  itself.  That  elasticity  has  been  somewhat 
impaired in modern  times, and conservatives loved to dwell 
on the impregnable rocks and rigid foundations of  the British 
constitution, ignoring the fact that rigidity is the death of 
every  living  organism.  At  a  period  when  the  elasticity 
of  parliament is of  supreme importance to the future of  the 
British realms and of  parliamentary institutions themselves, 
it is well to remember that parliament, which seems to us 
so definite an institution, was for long nothing more precise 
than a  method  of  government  by  debate,  and  that  the 
sovereignty of  parliament is  merely an attempt to realize 
the supremacy of reason.  It is well also to remember that 
when  an institution  becomes  the slave  of  its  own  forms 
and  loses  the  capacity  of  adaptation  and  expansion,  it 
courts  extinction.  The  formalism  of  Anglo-Saxon  juris- 
prudence  involved  its  supersession  by  the  practice  of 
Henry 11's judges ;  and the conservatism of  the common-law 
courts at the close of  the middle  ages nearly  led  to their 
destruction  at the hands  of  Roman  lawyers,  prerogative 
courts,  and  Tudor  despots.  If  parliament  undergoes  a 
similar process of  petrifaction, it will in time become a fossil. 
It is  not  that  Anglo-Saxon  peoples  with  parliamentary 
This chapter was written in August 1915; a sentence or two  relating 
to  the German and Russian  constitutions have been  changed  from the 
present to the past tense. 
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marrow in their bones are likely to seek rmlge in non-parlia- 
mentary methods of  government.  The question is, whether 
the high  court of  parliament, the  particular institution in 
which  those  methods have been  enshrined  and developed 
for  national  purposes,  can  adapt itself  to wider  purposes, 
or whether new needs will provoke new methods, growing into 
other institutions.  The  imperial  conference might become 
an imperial parliament, or  the  British  parliament 1 might 
absorb the imperial conference.  In either case parliamentary 
institutions  would  be  preserved;  but  in  the  former,  the 
existing imperial parliament would sink to a local legislature, 
and in the latter it would have to undergo  a far-reaching 
transformation.  There  are,  indeed,  signs  that  the  tra- 
ditional  English  method  of  settlement  by  discussion  is 
stronger than the newer omnicompetence  of  a  crystallized 
house  of  commons;  and,  to  the  discomfort  of  pseudo- 
constitutional  purists,  the  decisive  discussions  over  the 
Insurance  Act  in  1912 took  place  outside the  house  and 
between  representatives  who  were  not  its  members.  In 
point of  fact, this was an unconscious reversion to medievai 
practice by which the estates had settled details  of  finance 
and their attitude towards petitions outside parliament, and 
had merely reported the result by the mouth of  their Speaker 
to the high court for acceptance or rejection.  The precedent 
of extra-parliamentary debate is likely to be followed on an 
ever-extending  scale;  and there  seems  no  reason  why  it 
should not, provided  that the representatives  of  the com- 
munity, who  bargain  with  the parties, are  responsible  to 
parliament  and  that  parliament  retains  the  power  of 
ratification or rejection.  Legislation is growing too complex 
for profitable  discussion of  its details  by a  body of  seven 
hundred  general practitioners  of  politics;  and it  is  better 
debated-in  its details, at least-between  the expert bureau- 
crats who  inform the minister  and will  have to apply the 
1 The  term  imperial  parliament,  as applied  to  the  existing  British 
parliament.  is bound  to become  more and more an anachronism  From 
~ts  cognizance are already in practice excluded  the commercial relations 
of  the great dominions; and the more British foreign  policy is made a 
matter of  common  concern  to  British  dominions,  the less will  be  the 
control exerted over it by a parliament of  the British Isles. 
legislation,  and the spokesmen  of  those who  will  suffer or 
profit from their administration. 
Parliamentary  government  does  not  therefore  involve 
government  of  everything  by  one  parliamentary  method 
or  by  a  single parliament.  The exigencies of  the  empire 
have long ago disposed of  that sort of  unity and uniformity ; 
and the problem is how to preserve a common bond between 
the  various methods  and institutions,  and to prevent  the 
specialization  of  functions  from  developing  independent 
species.  In other words, is the British empire a  state or a 
collection  of  states?  The  question was  once  asked  of  a 
British  student  who  had  spent  some  years  in  Canada 
whether  he would  describe  the  British  empire  as a  state, 
and  he  said  "  Yes."  He  was  then  asked  whether  he 
would have given the same answer in Canada, and he said 
" No."  Events  are  moving  rapidly,  but  that  dissonance 
remains  a  faithful  reflex  of  the  imperial  situation;  and 
with it remains  the  doubt  how long it will  be  possible in 
different parts of  the empire to give  diametrically  opposite 
answers to the same question.  Our  immediate  concern is 
to consider whether, if  at all, parliament will be the means of 
finding a  solution. 
It is not  theoretically essential that parliament  should be 
the bond of  unity in an empire.  It was  not  the reichstag 
which  gave  substance  to  the  unity  of  Germany,  nor  did 
Roman  unity  owe  aught  to  parliamentary  institutions. 
Religion has sometimes formed a basis, and it was, perhaps 
unfortunately, the strongest tie between  all  the Russias  of 
yesterday.  But  churches,  inasmuch  as  their  ultimate 
appeal is to the individual soul, tend to be fissiparous;  and 
the amalgamation  of  churches  has been  of  the rarest and 
most local occurrence.  No  church could provide a founda- 
tion of  unity for the British  realms.  The crown has to be 
presbyterian  in  Scotland  and  anglican  in  England;  and, 
had  not  the impossibility  of  identifying church  and state 
been  recognized in time,  the crown  might  also  have been 
roman catholic in Ireland and heaven  knows what in  other 
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religion, the effect was rather to distract the crown than to 
unite the churches.  Race has been a commoner bond than 
religion, but race breaks down as the link of  British unity, 
and racialism is rather the bane than the basis of  the empire. 
Language is in  a somewhat better case;  but the events of 
1776 proved that language was no specific against disruption, 
and there are millions of  white  citizens  in  British  realms 
who  speak  no  English.  Customs,  again,  traditions  and 
history are as diverse as they could be in the British empire ; 
indeed, in these respects there is no more unity in the empire 
than in  the world.  Where  then is  that  differential  basis 
to be found on which to build a British state of  such diver- 
gent elements ?  Race, religion, history, and language stand 
for so much in men's culture that they leave but little room 
for the other foundations of  community. 
It is clear  that those  foundations  can  only  be  political, 
not  racial  or  religious.  The  greatest  political  failure  of 
any people in the world's history has been that of the Jews, 
and  that  wonderful  race  failed  in  politics  because  of  its 
racial  purity and its religious concentration.  The jealousy 
of  their  God  left  no  scope  for  the state;  and it  needed 
Christianity  to find  room  for  Caesar  in a  Jew's  allegiance. 
Ever a  church, but never a state since the  dispersion, the 
Jews owed their failure  to their repulsion of  gentile elements. 
A Jew can assimilate almost any quality, but he cannot draw 
gentiles into his fold.  So, too, the German  can transform 
himself  into  any other  nationality,  but  he  cannot  make 
others  German  to  any appreciable  extent, and within the 
heart  of  Germany  there  are  alien  colonies  which  have 
resisted for generations the permeation  of  German  culture. 
For  this  reason  the  German  was  driven  to  force  as  his 
panacea;  the lack  of  political  attractiveness  made  him  a 
repellent  militarist ; and,  however  brilliant  the  triumph 
of  military  genius  and  organization,  empires  won  by  the 
sword have a habit of  falling on their own weapon.  Bfili- 
tarism, at any rate, is not the bond which binds the fabric 
of  the British realms.  They are only held together by con- 
sent, and that consent is based upon political considerations, 
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some of  them  merely sentimental, some of  them idealistic, 
and others severely practical in character. 
It is only in the political sphere that the essential claims of 
the state are valid  or will  be admitted.  So  discordant  is 
the voice of  the state from those of  the churches, that there 
is no longer an established church, outside  England, in the 
whole of  the British empire, and free churches  mean  every- 
where a limitation of  the state.  The absolutism of  the state, 
upon  which  Hobbes  and  Austin  dilated,  is,  in  fact,  an 
ambiguous term.  Within its sphere the state, whatever its 
form, must  possess  a  final  authority,  but that authority, 
while absolute in degree, is not unlimited  in  extent.  The 
state therefore  can  only  be  built  on  foundations  that lie 
within  its jurisdiction;  and it is  only  by recognizing the 
limits  of  its sphere that the  state can  expect  recognition 
of  its authority within that sphere.  Theology, if  not religion, 
certainly  lie  outside;  the state does  not  now  dream  of 
establishing truth and is even shy of  creating legal fictions. 
The circumstance that Germany acted on Hobbes's maxim, 
"in  the  right  governing  cf  opinion  consisteth  the  right 
government  of  man,"  indicated  a  fundamental  distinction 
between  British  and  German  conceptions  of  the  state. 
Attempts  on  the  part  of  the  state to determine  language 
are  also  illegitimate,  and  constitute  a  manifold  cause  of 
friction.  Social  customs  are  an  equally  dangerous  field 
of  interference;  and, in spite of  recent  appearances,  there 
are grounds for maintaining that the absolutism of  the state 
has been purchased by the limitation of  its sphere, and that 
its theoretical omnicompetence depends upon the widening 
circle of  things it does not attempt.  It is at least perfectly 
clear  that if  the  British  realms  are  to  be  a  state,  the 
jurisdiction  of  that state will be severely restricted. 
But again, the problem may be obscured by the inevitable 
use of  the term " the state."  It is easier to conceive of  the 
British realms forming a community, or perhaps a common- 
wealth;  and the absolutism of  the community does not sug- 
gest  the  same perplexities  as the absolutism of  the state. 
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It does not, in fact, isolate one aspect of  human activity and 
proclaim its supremacy over all the rest.  Even those who 
hold that the state is man in the  state, often lose sight of 
man in  the  state, just  as others lose  sight of  man in  the 
church.  This veiling of  humanity breeds a greater antithesis 
between church and state than  there is between  man as a 
political animal and man as a religious being;  and the com- 
munity or commonwealth embraces both, promoting concord 
in the place of  conflict.  Concord, however, is only possible 
in the  British realms through  the surrender of  much  that 
clings to the state, its uniformity and its omnicompetence, 
if  not also its appearance of  unity.  The  old French ideal 
of  une  foi,  une  Zoi,  un  roi  is  clearly  unattainable;  the 
British  realms  have one  king, but they have many faiths 
and many legal systems, and only such  unity is  possible  as 
is compatible with an infinite variety. 
Underlying  these  varieties  there  is,  however,  room  for 
one foundation.  Indeed, it is no  paradox  to say that the 
greater is  men's  attachment to their particular  culture, the 
greater is their need of  the British empire.  The self-sufficient 
independence  and  seclusion  of  small  communities  is  in  a 
parlous  state to-day, when might  is  ever  growing and the 
world  is  ever  shrinking;  and  liberty  within  the  British 
empire  is  a  better  security than  independence beyond its 
pale.  The  case  would  be different  if  the  purpose  of  the 
British  empire were, as it has  been  alleged, to  give  each 
of  its citizens an English  mind.  The  idea  of  the  British 
empire is, rather, to provide its citizens with the means of 
developing minds of  their own, and no  sane Briton  wishes 
to make a French-Canadian  indistinguishable from a South 
African  Boer,  or  even  a  Welshman  exactly  like  a  Scot. 
There  are many  mansions  in the  British  empire,  and no 
one wants to build them all  alike or fill them with  a  homo- 
geneous population.  For that and for other reasons, empire 
is  not  a  happy  term;  it  implies  an  unconstitutional 
authority, military domination, and rigid uniformity.  The 
essence  of  the  British  realms  is  govelnment  by  consent, 
liberty, and heterogeneity. 
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This freedom to develop  along lines of  their own is the 
quality  in  the  empire  which  its  dominions  value  most; 
and it might seem that here was substance enough without 
gasping at  the  shadow  of  an  imperial  sovereign  state. 
Indeed, the imperative, exigent tone of  the absolute claims of 
state sovereignty involve no  little risk to the finer threads 
of feeling which  really unite the British  realms.  It is not 
as a state which extorts, but as a community which grants, 
that  a  British  commonwealth  may  develop  a  common 
organization.  No  British realm will merge itself in an abso- 
lute British  commonwealth, after Hobbes's  conception of  a 
commonwealth by institution, when every man was supposed 
to have  surrendered  all his  rights,  including his  rights  of 
conscience  and  private  judgement,  to a  common  despot. 
The compact would necessarily be a combination of  Hobbes's 
and  Loclte's  ideas : it would be an agreement  among the 
British realms to set up a  single imperial  government, but 
only  for  certain  purposes,  and  the  compact  would  be  a 
treaty  by  which  the  imperial  state would  be  bound.  It 
could not be an absolute state.  Even in that model union 
of  1707  Scotland reserved its religion, its law, and its justice, 
and required specific advantages.  It will be long ere British 
realms consent  to a uniform tariff policy, or  to a  common 
taxation.  Indeed, a common taxation is impossibIe  where 
conditions are so divergent : import duties on  corn, which 
Canada  would  not  feel,  would  ruin  the  English  working 
classes.  Land  taxes  which  Australia  and  New  Zealand 
bear with equanimity, would revolutionize English  society. 
Neither the dominion of  Canada nor the commonwealth of 
Australia has yet been able to impose direct taxation on its 
component provinces and states (v),  and to imagine a central 
government in London imposing on the dominions what  the 
dominions cannot impose on their provinces is a phantasma- 
goria of  visionary enthusiasm. 
Political unions which last are not made in a moment nor 
without  the co-operation of  deep-seated  causes;  and there 
is always danger in arbitrarily selecting one out of  the many 
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as a standard on others.  The Anglo-Scottish and the South 
African unions, even if  we  add New  Zealand, do not consti- 
tute  a  rule.  Against  the  Scottish  must  be  set  the  Irish 
union, by way of  warning and not of  example;  and against 
the South African and New  Zealand  constitutions  must be 
set the federation of  Canada and the still Iooser combination 
of  the  states  of  Australia.  There  remain  the  disunited 
West  Indies,  scores of  other  colonies,  and  the  emplre  of 
India, with its hundreds of  semi-independent  principalities. 
They represent  every stage of  political  development ; and 
democratic  expedients  which  suit  Canada  and  Australia 
would  be  disastrous  in  other  realms  of  the  empire.  No 
common standard of  self-government  is  applicable, and it 
is irrational to suppose that a central  authority could rule 
these diverse dominions so well as the expert and specialized 
governments which control  them at present.  The govern- 
ment of  the empire is, in fact, only possible through a diver- 
sity of  method5 adapted to s diversity of  needs;  and only 
the elasticity of mind, which comes of  political aptitude and 
experience, tolerates such diversity.  If  the average British 
elector really determined such questions  as  the locality of 
an  Indian  capital  or  the  careful  adjustment  of  Indian 
self-government  and  the  Indian  civil  service,  he  would 
decide them by  the sort of  criteria he  applies  to  his own 
local environment, and the result wocld be chaos. 
No doubt men are heedless of  things for which they are not 
responsible,  and the  increase  of  responsibility  is  a  potent 
factor  in political  education;  but the imperfection  of  the 
result  in matters  for which the responsibility  is  immediate 
and  direct,  counsels  caution  in  our  expectations  from  a 
responsibility  which  cannot  be  felt.  It  has  often  been 
said that a democracy cannot govern an empire;  the truth 
is, that an empire such as the British cannot be governed on 
exclusively democratic principles, and democracy  is apt to 
regard its principles as valid at all times and under all circum- 
stances,  and as matters of  simple  right  and wrong  which 
only original sin leads men to dispute.  It  is easy to say that 
imperial questions should be decided  by an imperial elector- 
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ate ; it is less easy to define that electorate, and still less so 
to  create it.  We  doubt  the  expediency  of  giving  a  vote 
in Indian affairs to an Indian electorate which cannot read 
or write;  to give them a vote on all the affairs of  the British 
realms would be a fantastic form of  imperial suicide.  The 
problem of  colour would be accentuated and not exorcised by 
a popularly-elected  parliament representative of  the empire ; 
and no principle is sounder in practice t11a1i that which denies 
responsible  self-government  even  to  Englishmen  who  are 
a  handful  among  a  vast  coloured  population.  The  great 
dominions deservedly call for a greater share in the  control 
of  imperial  policy,  but  we  cannot, in  reconstructing  the 
empire, ignore our own West Indian history, or the practical 
limitations under which the United States pretends to com- 
bine democratic principle with the facts of the negro question, 
Practically the problem of  an imperial parliament which 
shall  represent  more  than  the  British  Isles  resolves  itself 
into a  question of  how  to include  Canada, Australia,  New 
Zealand,  South  Africa,  and  Newfoundland;  and  thus 
limited, it  is not  entirely  impracticable,  provided  that an 
enthusiasm as unhistorical in its outlook as that of  the first 
French  Revolution  does not seek to solve it wholly at one 
gigantic  a~to-de-fe.l  There  are  common  foundations  on 
which to work.  Common politics, as the genesis of  parlia- 
ment has shown, are the outcome of  common law, and English 
law  is  the  groundwork  of  all  colonial  constitutions.  A 
judicious  admixture of  Roman  law  and  other  systems  is 
not  inadmissible,  as  we  know  from  Scotland  and  South 
Africa ; but one of  the most fruitful suggestions for empire- 
building  was  made by  Lord Haldane, when  he  outlined  a 
proposal that the  judicial  committee of  the privy  council 
should periodically appear in sessions throughout the British 
realms.  By  such  judicial  eyres  Henry  IT  had  brought 
royal  justice  home  to  his  subjects  and,  more  important 
from our point of  view, had made the same law common to 
1  Auto-de-fe is properly an "  act of  faith "  ; it came to mean a holocaust, 
and the auto-de-fe  proposed  in some quarters would involve a holocausi 
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all England.  Thus he had done more perhaps than any one 
else to create an England out of  a congeries of  tribes.  The 
diversities of  law throughout the empire to-day are not more 
multifarious than those in the mother country in the eleventh 
century;  and the court that could hammer out and apply a 
common law of  the British realms would be doing as m;ch 
to create a united empire as Henry I1 and his  judges did to 
make England by creating its common law. 
Without  this  common  law  parliament  could  not  have 
grown;  and, indeed, it was well that the commnn law was 
the plastic work of  judges, and not the cast iron of  a parlia- 
mentary statute.  No  one could have drafted it or  put  it 
into  an act;  it had  to  grow  from  case  to  case  through 
centuries of  judicial  argument and experience, and various 
m7ere the materials moulded together into the final product. 
It was  but  partly Anglo-Saxon;  and an imperial  common 
law would  leave out a great deal that is Eng:ish,  particu- 
larly in the sphere of  real  property, and would incorporate 
some  things  that  are  not.  So, too, it will  not  be  made 
by statute or embodied  in a  code;  it  must  needs  be  the 
outcome  of  judicial  experience  garnered  by  the  highest 
legal  minds  in sessions throughout  the empire.  Statutes 
might come later : the judges  of  the king's  court not only 
gathered experience on their eyres, discussed it in common 
sessions of  the council, and applied it in Westminster Hall ; 
they also drafted their deductions into statutes, which were 
promulgated  in  the  high  court  of  parliament.  So  our 
imperial justices-in-eyre  might  draft into statutes for  sub- 
mission to an imperial parliament the fruits of  their imperial 
missions. 
Their  labours  would  be  facilitated  and  their  prospects 
improved by their restoration to something of  their original 
status in  the  constitution.  Their gradual  degradation, as 
the king's council in parliament was perverted into a house of 
lords, was doubly unfortunate ;  it impaired the constitutio~lal 
authority of  the judges and the legislative skill of  parliament ; 
for, however expert may be the staff of  our present drafting 
department,  its members  have  not  the  experience of  the 
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judges  who were wont to determine the form of  legislation. 
It led also to the illogical growth of  two supreme courts of 
appeal.  The judicial committee of  the privy council repre- 
sents the king's  council out of  parliament;  the  law  lords 
represent  the king's  council in parliament.  But these two 
courts were not in earlier times co-ordinate;  the medieval 
king's council in parliament was superior to the king's council 
out of  parliament, could resolve its doubts, remedy its errors, 
and direct its action.  It might have retained its superiority 
but for the reduction of  the judges of  the council in parlia- 
ment to the status of  assistants in a  house of  uninstructed 
peers.  The  intrusion  of  an  hereditary  caste  into  the 
technical sphere of  appellate judicature was the cause of  the 
disjunction;  it was  removed  when  the  peers  abstained 
from exercising the judicial functions they had assumed ; and 
there seems no adequate reason why the two courts should 
not be united into a single supreme imperial court of  justice. 
The personnel of  the two courts has much in common; but 
the lords sit in some state to hear appeals from the British 
Isles, while the  judicial  committee shrouds itself  in  mean 
obscurity to hear those from great dominions overseas 
The house  of  lords might  possibly be  used  for  further 
imperial  purposes.  No  sane politician  wantonly  interferes 
with vigorous institutions, but  the house  of  lords is mori- 
bund ;  it has, in any event, to undergo a radical reformation, 
and  the  peers'  necessity  is  the  statesman's  opportunity. 
It is, at any rate, worth inquiry whether the house of  lords 
could not be reconstituted to meet in some degree the desire 
for a more adequate representation  at Westminster of  our 
overseas dominions.  An attempt at reform jn  this direction 
would necessarily involve the abandonment of  the principles 
of  heredity  and  primogeniture.  None  of  the  overseas 
dominions has tolerated the introduction of  these  principles 
into  their  councils or  their  legislatures;  and an imperial 
chamber  based  upon  them  would  have  no  attraction  for 
the empire as a whole.  Nor, as a matter of  fact, would it 
receive much serious support within the British Isles. 
The d~fficulty  is to find some principle that does commend 
N 370  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
itself as the basis for a second chamber.  Various expedients 
have been  tried  in different  parts of  the empire.  Second 
chambers have been selected  by nomination, sometimes for 
life, sometimes for a period of  years.  They have been consti- 
tuted by election, sometimes on a restricted, and sometimes 
on a democratic franchise, sometimes by small constituencies, 
sometimes by provinces as a whole.  The result has every- 
where  been  much  the same, and second  chambers are the 
political failure of  the British empire.  It is not only in the 
British  Isles  that  a  second  chamber  is  threatened  with 
mending or ending : the cry is also heard in Canada, wherc 
the second chamber js  filled by nomination, and in  the states 
of  Australia, where it is elected.  The truth seems to be this : 
it is doubtful wisdom to set two bodies of  men to do the same 
work;  but, admitting the wisdom, the two bodies should not 
be  alike.  The  house  of  lords  has  probably  given  more 
whole-hearted  satisfaction, albeit  to a  minority,  than any 
other second chamber in the empire, because it is so unlike 
the house  of  commons.  If  the British  realms are  to be 
asked  to  abandon  any  part  of  their  constitutions  to the 
imperial  melting-pot,  they  will  one  and a11  find  it easier 
to sacrifice their  second  chamber than anything else;  and 
it is not  at all impossible that something might  be  made 
of  this refuse in the imperial crucible. 
A hint might perhaps be borrowed from the United States. 
Its senate is not by any means an ideal  body, though the 
recent  change  to the popular election of  its members  may 
make it more responsible ; but it is undeniably the strongest 
second  chamber in any Anglo-Saxon  community,  and its 
strength is due to the fact that it is based on a clear principle, 
distinct from that  of  the  house  of  representatives.  The 
house represents the people of  the United States as a whole ; 
the senate represents the states of  which the union is formed, 
and it is the special guardian of  their rights.  The house is 
based  on numerical  population;  the senate  contains two 
representatives,  and  no  more,  from  every state, whatever 
its population.  A  house  of  lords,  reconstituted  so  as to 
comprise representatives from every British realm and colony 
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would not be more out of  touch with the British electorate 
than it is at present;  it would be vastly more capable, and 
its value as the king's imperial council in parliament would 
be far-reaching.  The vast majority of  electors in the British 
Isles  would  gladly  see  some  such  body  substituted  for 
their existing house of  lords, and it is quite possible that the 
dominions would consent  to a  similar  substitution.  There 
would  thus  in  the  British  empire  be  a  variety  of  first 
chambers,  but  a  single  second chamber,  constituted on  a 
principle  which  would  give  it  weight  and  independence. 
It would possess a qualification indispensable in an efficient 
second chamber, namely,  a  differential basis from the first. 
There would be no doubt  about  its strength;  there might 
be  some  fear that  its strength  would  impair  the  demo- 
cratic  self-government  of  the  individual  realms,  but this 
danger  would  be  met  by  differential work  corresponding 
to its differential basis. 
Politics stand in constant need of  searching analysis, and 
nothing confuses political  thought more  seriously than the 
assumption that democracy means  the determination of  all 
political  issues  by  popular  vote.  In  practice democracy 
combines  with  it  a  strong  admixture  of  monarchy  and 
aristocracy;  a British prime minister is more of  a monarch 
than many who bear the title, and some  have  approached 
dictatorship;  a  cabinet  is  a  genuine  aristocracy,  because 
cabinet  rank  is  (as  a  rule)  attained  by  merit  and  not 
by  inheritance.  Both  institutions are essential  to  modern 
democracies.  It has,  moreover, already  been  pointed  out 
that  whole  categories  of  public  questions  are  decided 
without  reference  to  the  electorate.  Tlie  dividing  line 
between  those  which  are, and those  which  are not  deter- 
mined by the ballot, is naturally  and properly  determined 
by the electors, not consciously, but  through the influences 
to  which  their  minds  are  subject.  An  issue  on  which 
many votes will  be turned will  infallibly be  brought  with 
prominence before  the  electors;  an issue to which they are 
indifferent will  be decided without  a  popular consultation. 
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was  an issue of  supreme importance;  but no  one dreamt 
of  fighting a general or even a by-election upon it.  Even the 
sanction of  the house of  commons was not  required  for it, 
or for such a step as the grant of  responsible self-government 
to the Boer colonies.  On the other hand, no cabinet  could 
sanction  a religious catechism in elementary schools, limit 
the number of public-houses, or carry a scheme for national 
insurance without risking shipwreck on the rock of  popular 
indignation.  The line between the two categories of  public 
questions  is  not,  of  course, hard  and fast;  but it is  deep 
enough to provide  a  discrimination  between  the functions 
of  a popularly-elected house of  commons and an imperially- 
constituted second  chamber.  The latter would  thus  have 
differential work as well as a differential foundation. 
The change would  involve an act of  imperial union,  an 
expansion of  sphere, and a specialization of  function.  The 
second chambers of  the empire would  be  formed into one, 
the  sphere of  which  would  be  expanded;  and instead  of 
each realm having two chambers performing similar  func- 
tions,  the  imperial  second  chamber  would  specialize  on 
imperial  questions,  and the  first  chambers  on  domestic 
questions.  This, it may be objected, provides for two cham- 
bers,  but not for the functions assigned by  convention  to 
a  second chamber.  Both would, so to speak, be courts of 
first instance, and there would be no court of  appeal.  The 
objection is not irrelevant ; but the inadequacy with which 
second chambers have fulfilled  their  function as courts of 
appeal from the first, however they have been  constituted, 
suggests  the  doubt  whether  it  is  a  legitimate  function. 
No  second chamber, in fact, claims any right to decide the 
appeal,  and a  court  of  appeal  which  cannot decide seems 
somewhat  superfluous.  The  real  court  of  appeal  from  a 
first chamber is not the second chamber, but the electorate ; 
and of  recent  years second  chambers  have  generally  con- 
fined their claims to a right of  reference.  The necessity for 
this safeguard clearly  depends upon  the  period  for  which 
the first chamber is immune from a  general election;  and 
a shortening  of  that period  might  be a simpler method of 
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bringing home responsibility than the somewhat spasmodic 
action  of  second  chambers.  If,  however,  this  power  of 
reference  were  retained,  it  would  be  exercised  to  Inore 
general  satisfaction  by  an imperial chamber than it is by 
existing institutions.  The  universal  complaint  is  that the 
power  of  reference  is  invariably  used  for  party  purposes, 
and the general demand  is for its impartial exercise.  Now 
~mpartiallty  can surely be expected with greater confidence 
from a chamber composed of  members drawn from all parts 
of  the empire,  and  mostly  without  party  interest  in  the 
dispute,  than  from  local  chambers  consisting  almost 
exclusively of  members  belonging to the parties  involved. 
Independence would accompany impartiality, and inasmuch 
as  the  issues  are  always  between  two  political  parties of 
which neither chamber is now independent, the question of 
reference to the electorate would better be left to a  body 
containing at least a large external element. 
A more fundamental problem would be the control by the 
lower  chamber of  the  functions and powers  of  the  upper. 
There is  no  escape from  the tyranny  of  finance :  he who 
pays the piper calls tlle tune, and the chamber which  finds 
the revenue  will  determine  its destination  and define  the 
objects  upon  which  it shall  be  expended.  The deduction 
will  be  drawn  that there can  be  no  imperial  unity unless 
the single imperial second chamber controls imperial finance. 
If  that deduction is valid, imperial unity is a distant prospect ; 
for a single taxing assembly for the whole empire is not yet 
possible,  however  complete  its  representative  character 
might  be.  Taxes are things which  electors feel, and upon 
which they really do vote at elections.  The parts  are not 
so  lost  in the whole  that Australians  and Canadians  will 
pay  taxes imposed  by a  chamber in which  Australia  and 
Canada would have a vote, but not a, veto ;  and Polish history 
tells  the  tale  of  assemblies in  which  individual  delegates 
have  a  liberum  veto.  Whatever  lmperial  revenue  may be 
required will have to be granted by the individual representa- 
tive  chambers  of  the  several  realms.  Those  chambers 
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financial  needs of  the empire would  be  laid before  them, 
and each would make its own response in the form of a grant. 
Each, too, would be responsible for its methods of  assessment, 
incidence,  and  collection.  In one  dominion  the  imperial 
contribution might be raised by a tariff, in another by income- 
tax ; in one by a tax on land, in another by an excise duty 
on  spirits.  Tlie  essential  condition  would  be  that  each 
would  manage its own finance, for no British realm  would 
tolerate  intervention  in  so  domestic  a  matter.  The  one 
source of  revenue which might conceivably be at the disposal 
of  an imperial second chamber would be an imperial tariff; 
but the reorganization of  the empire will  have some time 
to wait if  it is postponed to the adoption of  that proposal. 
No  one can circumscribe the future, and the British realms 
may  grow  so  close  together  that not  merely  an imperial 
tariff,  but  an imperial  income-tax  might  be  levied  by  a 
single  imperial  chamber.  We  are considering  less  distant 
possibilities. 
It does  not  follow  that  even  during  this  interim  the 
imperial chamber would be impotent in finance because  it 
could not levy taxation.  A chancellor  of  the exchequer  is 
not  powerless  because  he  cannot  tax by  edict, and it  is 
quite possible to conceive the financial recommendations of 
an imperial council having as much weight with the voters 
of  taxes  as  the  proposals  of  a  chancellor.  The  imperial 
council would frame estimates of  the expenditure needed for 
imperial purposes;  it would  suggest the distribution of  the 
burden;  and from  a  body,  in  which  all  the realms  were 
properly represented, it would not be unreasonable to expect 
an equitable allocation.  Given  these  conditions,  the  indi- 
vidual chamber which refused to provide its share of  supply 
would be incurring a grave responsibility  and a serious risk 
of  forfeiting  the  confidence  of  its  constituents.  Common 
feeling and public opinion is already keen enough throughout 
the empire to guarantee the readiness of  each of  the realms 
to shoulder a share in the common burden. 
So far we  have got, in our  imaginary  constitution, one 
crown and one  imperial chamber,  combined with a variety 
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of houses of  commons or representatives.  The crucial point 
is  the  question  of  the  executive.  The  anomaly  of  the 
existing constitution is the existence of  an imperial executive 
without any regular relation or responsibility to an imperial 
chamber.  It is  responsible solely to the  British  house  of 
commons, and other British  realms  have  no  formally  re- 
organized constitutional right to any share of  control over the 
foreign policy in which they are involved, or the declaration 
of  wars in which they spend their lives and trcilsure.  Tenta- 
tive steps have, indeed, been taken to mitigate this anomaly : 
at the last imperial conference before the war, Sir  Edward 
Grey admitted its members to the secrets of  British foreign 
policy, and more recently the prime  ministers  of  Canada, 
Australia, and South Africa have attended British  cabinet  . 
meetings.  It is well  that the elasticity of  our constitution 
should  permit  of  such  experiments and should  oppose no 
bar to the growth of  a really imperial cabinet.  Much of  the 
constitution has been erected in this tentative way without 
formal legislation;  and it would  be rash  to abandon that 
method for the alternative plan of  constitution spinning. 
But even tentative steps must have a direction and goal ; 
and we  might have a  clearer idea of  direction if  we  could 
know  what  was  said  to and by  Sir  Robert  Borden,  Mr. 
Hughes, and  General  Botha  during  the  cabinet  meetings 
made famous by their presence.  We might also gather some 
hints  from  Lord  Kitchener's  attitude  during  the  cabinet 
deliberations  on  the  Welsh  church  suspensory  bill  or  the 
home rule  act in  September 1914. He was  in  the cabinet 
for the purposes of  the  war, and Sir  Robert  Borden,  Mr. 
Hughes,  and General  Botha  were  asked  to attend in the 
interests  of  the empire.l  What would  they have  said on 
peaceful  domestic  topics  like  Mr.  Lloyd  George's  budget 
of  1910  or insurance bill of  1912? The r61e  of  a  sleeping 
partner  would  have  been  the  most  convenient  attitude; 
and a cabinet of  the empire would be atrophied for domestic 
'  From  1917  to 1919  General  Smuts was a full member of  the war 
cabinet; and the problem  now  is to adapt the temporary  expedients  of 
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purposes,  just  as  a  domestic  British  cabinet  too  nearly 
approaches atrophy for  the  purposes of  the  empire.  The 
divergence  leads  straight  towards  two sets of  executives : 
a single executive  for imperial  purposes responsible to the 
single imperial chamber, and a series of  domestic executives 
for each self-governing realm responsible to their respective 
domestic  legislatures.  The  control  at  present  exercised 
by the  British  government  over  India  and those  colonies 
which  do  not  possess  responsible  self-government  would 
naturally be vested  in  the  imperial  cabinet  and  imperial 
chamber. 
Such an arrangement  would involve both a definition of 
functions and the provision of  means to prevent a division 
of will.  The evil to be avoided is the conflict of  jurisdictions, 
and  two  independent  sets  of  executives  and  legislatures, 
one  dealing  with  imperial  and  the  other  with  domestic 
affairs, would be  certain to come into conflict unless there 
were  means  of  regulating their  relations with one another 
Here again finance would be the determining factor ;  and the 
chambers, which controlled supply and the domestic execu- 
tives, must also control, directly or indirectly, the imperial 
chamber and  the  imperial  cabinet.  The  imperial  cabinet 
would be immediately responsible to the imperial chamber, 
hut  the  imperial  chamber  itself  would  be  responsible  to 
the  d0minions.l  Its members  might  be  selected by  three 
alternative methods:  they  might  be the nominees of  the 
domestic  dominion  executives;  they  might  be  chosen  by 
the domestic dominion legislatures ; or they might be elected 
by the peoples of  the dominions.  The objection to the last 
method is that imperial issues do not, as a rule, evoke any 
wide and intelligent popular interest, and the local qualifica- 
tions which commend candidates to so many constituencies 
arc  singularly  out  of  place  in  an imperial  election.  The 
objection  to  the  second  is  that  indirect  election  usually 
fails of  its object : the American college of  electors,  which 
was intended to collect the wisdom  of  the nation,  consists 
of  ciphers ; while  the  conduct  of  United  States  senators 
1 The word is intended to include Great Britain and Ireland. 
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has been  explained  on  the ground  that they were  elected 
by legislatures, and not by the people, and election by legis- 
latures has recently  been  abandoned  in favour of  popular 
choice.  An  American  senator  is,  however,  the  special 
representative of local interests ;  the members of  an imperial 
British chamber would  be  chosen for an  exactly contrary 
purpose, and a different method might be more appropriate. 
They  would resemble the agents-general  of  the dominions, 
and might be appointed by similar means.  The superficial 
resemblance of  such  a  chamber  to the  old  bundesrath  of 
the  German empire may  be enough to condemn  it for  the 
moment.  But there would be two fundamental differences : 
firstly,  the members of  the bundesrath were appointed by 
governments  which  were  not  responsible to the people  of 
the states they represented;  and secondly, our  imaginary 
chamber would not possess the extensive control which the 
bundesrath exercised over domestic  legislation.  It would, 
no  doubt,  be  desirable  to  synchronize  general  elections 
throughout the empire, and the new dominion governments 
would  thus  simultaneously  select  their  representatives  to 
the imperial chamber.  But this would  hardly be possible; 
and a change of  dominion government would not necessarily 
involve a recall  of  imperial  representatives any more than 
it does a substitution of  agents-general, or a  change in the 
British  government  involves  a  re-appointment  of  ambas- 
sadors or of  members of  the imperial defence committee. 
There remains the problem of  delimiting the spheres and 
powers  of  the imperial  chamber and the dominion houses 
of  commons.  It is  thorny enough, but  there is no reason 
to  think  it more  insoluble  than  the kindred  problem  of 
defining the  respective  spheres of  don~inion  and provincial 
parliaments in  Canada or Australia.  Most of  the functions 
of  government  are  sorted  by  nature  into  one  or  other 
category.  Foreign  affairs,  imperial  defence, issues  of  war 
and  peace,  belong  obviously  to  imperial  government; 
questions of  religion, education, the franchise, social reform, 
labour  problems,  public  health,  insurance,  appertain  no 
less  distinctly  to  the  domestic  sphere  of  the  dominion 
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parliaments.  Between the two spheres there lies an impor- 
tant  borderland,  including the  treatment  of  native  races, 
commercial policy, naturalization, citizenship, and marriage ; 
and it would be essential to leave its frontiers as elastic as 
possible.  There  might be  concurrent -rights of  le;;islation, 
while the growth of  unity would facilitate a gradual increase 
of  imperial influence in this sphere.  There would have to 
be a written constitution, but the less of  it the better.  The 
working  of  a  constitution  never  really  depends  upon  its 
form, but upon the spirit which informs it.  If  the peoples 
of  the British realms want a united empire with a common 
government, they will get it and will work it, whatever the 
defects of  its constitution.  If  they do not, no constitutional 
machinery,  however  artistic  its construction,  will  attract 
them. 
Nor  is it of  much  use  attempting to frighten them into 
political upheaval  by logical dilemmas, after the fashion  of 
Hobbes's idea of  the social contract.  According to him the 
life of  man in the state of  nature was "  nasty, short, brutish 
and mean,"  so  intolerable,  in  fact,  that  he  was  left  no 
option  but  to submit himself  to an absolute sovereign as 
protector.  According to some of  our modern  imperialists, 
the  British  realms  are  in  an  equally  parlous  condition; 
there is no alternative to disruption but  fusion in a single 
state.  Such logical dilemmas have no terror for the historian, 
for history consists for the most part of  solutions of  logical 
impossibilities ; solvuntur ambzdando.  The empire is not in 
the  parlous  condition  depicted :  it  will  not  split  into 
fragments  because  its  parts  decline  to  fuse.  It lightly 
evades  the  horns  of  the  dilemma,  of  being  " either  a 
phantom  or  the  most  intolerable of  oppressions," because 
it  is  not  "  a  democracy  pretending  to  sovereignty  over 
other democracies."  Canadians and Australians are not our 
subjects, but our fellow-subjects, or rather partakers in the 
sovereignty  which  is  the  capital  of  the  empire.  The 
partnership  is  not  perfect;  but  it is  none  the  less  real 
because  its  terms  have  not  been  stated  in  a  written 
constitution. 
Neither  was  it  a  phantom  that the crucial  test of  the 
great  war  revealed.  For,  when  all  is  said  and  done, 
political unity is a  thing  of  the spirit, and not  a  bond  of 
~archment  ;  and Germany's challenge to all for which parlia- 
mentary government stands could not have met with a ficer 
response from the British realms, had they all been merged 
in  a single state.  The heart and the head  of  the empire 
were sound.  Its peoples grasped  the fundamental issue  of 
the war.  The Germany, which provoked it, began  with Bis- 
marck's  defeat  of  a  parliament  and  its  principles,  and 
developed a natural alliance, first, with the Hapsburgs and 
then, by a logical consummation, with  the Turk;  and the 
conflict  ended,  as  it  was  bound  to end,  in defeat  at the 
hands  of  parliamentary  peoples,  after  a  struggle in which 
the one autocracy among them went to pieces.l  Upon those 
parliamentary  principles  the  British  empire  is  based ; it 
stands for  the force  of  argument  against  the argument of 
force, for the  rule of  law  against  the  rule  of  the  sword, 
for  popular  consent  against  the  will  of  monarchy  or 
militarism  masquerading  as the state.  If  the  Allies  had 
failed, parliamentary government might have perished from 
the  earth.  Through their success peace will  be  placed  on 
the broad foundation of  common acceptance by  the world 
of  principles,  dimly  discerned  in  the  middle  ages  and 
wrought  out  in  hundreds  of  parleys,  until  the  parleys 
themselves grew into a parliament and a mother of  parlia- 
ments,  and  their  reason  supplanted force  as  the rule  of 
human affairs. 
1 This passage, as originally written in August 1915,  ran : "  it  will end 
in defeat at  the hands of  parliamentary peoples after a  struggle which 
bids fair to convert the one autocracy among them to belief in responsible 
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APPENDIX  I 
PICTURES  OF  PARLIAMENT 
THE  illustrations herein  reproduced  refer  exclusively  to 
the development,  in  the "  parliament  chamber,"  of  those 
"  parliaments " of  the king  in  council  with  other  repre- 
sentative  and non-representative  elements  of  the nation, 
which  in  modern  times became the house of  lords.  That 
development  is  historically  the  essential  feature  in  the 
evolution  of  the English  parliament,  and it  is the most 
difficult to grasp.  The growth  of  the house  of  commons, 
from  its  original  sessions  in  the  refectory  and  chapter 
house  of  the abbey  to its transference  to St.  Stephen's 
chapel  in  the palace  and subsequent  encroachment  upon 
the neighbouring "  parliament chamber,"  is another story, 
simpler  in  its details, subordinate in its historical, though 
not in its political importance, and lacking pictorial repre- 
sentation until we  come to the seventeenth  century.  We  . 
are here dealing with the pictorial  evidence for the earlier 
stages of our parliamentary history. 
The first of  our reproductions is the earliest  which  pos- 
sesses  much  historical  value.  There  are  pictures  of  an 
older  date representing. the king in parley with  some half 
a  dozen  or  more  councillors,  which  are correctly  entitled 
"  the king in parliament " and are valuable as illustrating 
the fact that the first  parliaments were simply parleys  of 
the king  in  council.  But  they represent  only  the  germ, 
and are without  exception  centuries later than the parlia- 
mentary  conditions  which  they  profess  to portray.  Our 
first illustration, on the other hand, while it correctly con- 
tains  traces  and  relics  of  earlier  stages  of  parliamentary 
development, is an exact and contemporary representation 
of  the parliament  of  1523.  Its date and provenance  can 
380 
be determined with some precision.  It was first reproduced 
by  Richard  Fiddes  (1671-1725)  in  his  Life  of  Cardinal 
Wolsev, published in I724 (p. 302) ; and the drawing, from 
which  the  reproduction  was  made,  was  sent  to  Fiddes 
from the  Heralds'  College  by  John  Anstis,  then  Garter 
King  of  Arms-in  whose house  at Putney Fiddes died in 
1725-with  a long explanatory letter which is dated 2  Jan., 
1722-3,  and is printed by Fiddes  (ib. Collections, pp. 108- 
14).  In  this  letter  Anstis  remarks  that  "though  this 
draught  be meanly performed, yet it  must  be  allowed  to 
be  of  authority . . . since  it  was  designed  by  the order 
of  the then Garter King of  Arms  and preserved  in  a  fair 
velom manuscript which hath his name and arms in several 
places  and likewise represents him performing his duty at 
this parliament in his proper robe and place."  The "  then 
Garter  King  of  Arms " was  Sir  Thomas  Wriothesley  (d. 
1534), of  whom  Anstis  gives  an elaborate  account in his 
Order of  the Garter (i., 369-73).  He had been created Garter 
in I505 and confirmed in that office on Henry VIII's acces- 
sion ; he was  father of  Charles Wriothesley the chronicler, 
and uncle of  Thomas Wriothesley, lord-chancellor and earl 
of  Southampton. 
The  picture  represents  the  opening  of  parliament  on 
I5 April,  1523.  The last parliament  had been  opened  on 
5 February, 1514-15,  but Wolsey was not then a cardinal, 
while  he  is  here  represented  as  sitting  above  Warham, 
archbishop  of  Canterbury,  and  next  to the  throne, with 
a  cardinal's  hat  over his  head  and above it the arms of 
the see of  York impaling  Wolsey's  own;  and it was only 
after 1515  that Wolsey took precedence of  Warham.  The 
figure  standing  behind  the traverse,  between  Wolsey  and 
the king, is Tunstall who, as lord  privy seal, delivered  the 
opening  speech  in  1523.l  The  other  two  figures  behind 
the archbishop's  seat are two priests bearing, according to 
Anstis,  Wolsey's  two  crosses  as cardinal  and  archbishop, 
and not one belonging to him and one to Warham (Fiddes, 
Rot. Purl. 14, Hen. VIII,  prcfixed  to Lords'  Jouvnals, vol. i. p. lxxv; 
Letters and Papers of  Henry VIII,  iii. 2956.  The Lovds'  Journal for 1.523 
1s  not  extant.  Wolsey,  as legafus a latere, seems to  have  d~sdained  the 
parliamentary functions of  a chancellor ; hence Tunstall's oration. APPENDIX  I  383 
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Collectiolls,  p.  110).  On  the  front  bench  running  down 
from the right of  the throne and of  the cloth of  state sit 
the bishops in their order of  precedence, and behind  them 
the abbots, the latter extending on to a cross-bench.  Dimly 
seen behind that cross-bench are the commons, standing at 
the  bar, with Sir Thomas More, their Speaker on this occasion, 
in their midst.  On  the front bench stretching down from 
the left of  the throne sit the temporal peers.  First comes 
the duke of  Norfolk, who holds in his hand the Lord High 
Treasurer's  staff;  next  to him  is  the  duke  of  Suffolk. 
There were only two dukes in  England  in 1523, and only 
these two  wear the four  ducal bars  of  white miniver  on 
their robes.  The earls, who come next,l have only three. 
The barons  begin  on the cross-bench,  and the first is the 
"  premier  baron  of  England,"  namely  the  Prior  of  St. 
John's,  who, although reckoned  a  spiritual  peer  in earlier 
times, is described as the "  premier baron "  in Edward IV's 
and succeeding  reigns  down  to 1540;  he is indicated by 
his  different  robe.  The line of  barons is continued  from 
the cross-bench to the bench behind the dukes and earls. 
Returning to the cloth of  state, we see three earls, one of 
them,  apparently Worcester, on the king's  right,  bearing 
the cap of  maintenance, and the other two, on the left, the 
sword and the earl marshal's  baton;  the latter was borne 
by a  deputy for  Norfolk, who  was  both  earl marshal  and 
lord high  treasurer.  The two  figures behind  the traverse 
on the king's left are non-episcopal and non-baronial  coun- 
cillors, and to their left is a throng of  eldest sons of  peers, 
preceded  by  Garter  King  of  Arms  (E.H.R. 1898,  p.  708). 
On the highest of  the four woolsacks, where usually sat the 
chancellor, are the two chief  justices.  Other judges sit on 
the woolsack running down from the right of  the tlu-one, and 
on the left, according to D'Ewes,  who  follows Glover, are 
the master of  the rolls, the chief  baron of  the exchequer, 
the king's  council learned  in the law,  and the masters in 
chancery.  But D'Ewes is writing a century later;  and it 
1 D'Ewes,  Jouvnals,  p.  11:  the  figure  next  to  Suffolk might  have 
been  Dorset, England's  only marquis at that date; but he was serving 
on  the Scottish borders.  Marquises had only three bars of  miniver, like 
earls. and viscounts only two, like barons. 
is more probable that in this illustration the occupants of 
these two woolsacks are all judges, the fourth woolsack being 
occupied by masters in chancery and king's council, behind 
whom  kneel the clerk of  the parliaments and the clerk of 
the crown.  The points of  general interest are : (I)  the pre- 
eminence of  the crown, which  Henry VIII further empha- 
sised in 1539 by enacting that no one not a member of  the 
royal family should presume  to sit on  the cloth  of  state; 
(2) the inner ring or square formed by the council in parlia- 
ment ;  the  specially  summoned  spiritual  and  temporal 
peers  are  accretions  on  that  parliament  of  the  council, 
which Maitland has called the core of  every session ; (3)  the 
presence  of  the  commons,  headed  by  the  Speaker,  who 
alone  and  for  himself  alone  claims  liberty  of  speech  in 
these parliaments ; and  (4) this scene is not laid at West- 
minster, but at Blackfriars, where the parliament  of  1523 
sat until its transference to Westminster in July.  Parlia- 
mentary paraphernalia were still comparatively simple, and 
could be  carted without  difficulty from  one meeting-place 
to another. 
Our second illustration can be dated as precisely as the 
first.  It  is  taken  from  Robert  Glover's  De  Nobilitate 
Politicn vel  Civili, which was edited from his MS.  and pub- 
lished by his nephew, Thomas Milles, in 1608, folio.  Glover 
was Somerset herald, and both Camden and Dugdale owed 
a good  deal to his  antiquarian  labours.  He died in April 
1588, and this picture illustrates his account of  the opening 
of  p:~rliament  on  22 Novcmher, 1584,  which under the title 
of  Pompa  Pavliarnentaris  forms  part  of  the  volume  pub- 
lished  by  Milles  in  1608.  The text  of  that tract  is  the 
best  commentary  on  the illustration,  although  some  ad- 
ditional  light  is  thrown  by  the  account  of  Elizabethan 
parliamentary  ceremonial  which  Sir Simorids D'Ewes  in- 
corporates in his  Journals  (pp. 11-12). 
There are notable changes since 1523.  The abbots and 
prior of  St. John's have disappeared;  there is no  cardinal 
and  no  place  for  archbishops on the cloth  of  state;  and 
monarchy is still more aloof  than it was in the early years 
of  Henry  VIII, while his  statute of  153') has given  secre- 384  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
taries  of  state and  other  non-baronial  councillors  places 
on  the woolsacks.  The scene now  is laid in the  Painted 
Chamber, which  ran east and west  at right  angles to the 
old house of  lords (see plate 5) ; the throne was at the west 
end,  which  the queen  approached  through  her  majesty's 
robing-room;  and, as the shadows indicate, the south side 
of  the  chamber  was  on  her  right.  Immediately  on  her 
right stands the lord chancellor, then Sir Thomas Bromley, 
and  on  the  left  Lord  Burghley  as lord  high  treasurer. 
The two  groups  on  either side  are described  as procerum 
Primogeniti, though  the  first  figure  on  Bromley's  right  is 
in  ecclesiastical  garb.  The  cap  of  maintenance is  borne 
by the marquis of  Winchester, the marshal's baton  by the 
earl  of  Worcester  vice  the earl  of  Shrewsbury, who  had 
been created earl marshal in 1573, and was present on this 
occasion, but  was  disabled by gout.  On  the  queen's  left 
was  the earl of  Kent, bearing  the sword, and apparently 
the earl of Leicester, the lord steward, with Garter King of 
Arms to flank him.  The upper woolsack has by this time 
been  monopolised  by  the  chancellor,  and  is  called  his 
seat, though when the queen is present he stands at her right 
hand.  Glover does not specify the places  on the two side 
woolsacks, beyond saying that on them sat the master of 
the rolls, the queen's  secretaries, the judges,  the barons of 
the exchequer,  and the counsel  learned in  the law;  but 
D'Ewes  avers that on the woolsack  to the right  "of  the 
Estate " (i. e. the throne), which he wrongly identifies with 
the north  side of  the chamber,  sat the two chief  justices 
and other judges,  and on  the left  side the master of  the 
rolls,  lord  chief  baron,  the  queen's  learned  counsel  and 
others.  He  then  makes  the  confused  and  contradictory 
statement that "  all these may properly  be said to sit on 
the inner  side  of  the woolsacks, and the  queen's  learned 
counsel on the outside next the earls.  The masters of  the 
chancery sat, two on the same side, and two on the other 
side, next  the bishops."  He only  accounts  for two occu- 
pants  of  the lower woolsack, the clerk of  the parliaments 
and the clerk of  the crown, and assumes that the kneeling 
figures, now increased  to four, were all clerks to the clerk 
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of  the parliaments.  He notes  the table which  now  first 
makes its appearance.  The Speaker on this occasion was 
Sir  John  Puckering. 
Our  third  illustration  is  less  satisfactory.  It  is  the 
frontispiece  to  D'Ewes'  Jozirnals  of  the  Parliaments  of 
Queen  Elizabeth,  which  were  compiled  in  1629-30,  and 
published by his nephew, Paul Bowes, in 1682 (2nd ed. 1693, 
3rd 1708).  It professes to represent a parliament of  Eliza- 
beth's reign ;  but in spite of  the queen on the throne and the 
unauthorised location  of  Walsingham  on her left, 
it illustrates a seventeenth- rather than a sixteenth-century 
parliament.  Neither  the picture  nor  the parliament  can 
be  precisely  dated;  but  the  costumes  are those  of  the 
parliaments of  Charles I, and it is probably a fair represen- 
tation of  a parliament of  that reign.  I am inclined to think 
that  D'Ewes'  frontispiece is more  accurate  than  his  text 
in  identifying  the four  occupants  of  the lower  woolsack 
with the masters in chancery, and in reducing all the clerks 
to the kneeling posture.  The changes since Glover's time 
are :  (I)  the appearance of  an official  with  the  mace  of 
the house of  lords ; (2) the increase in the number of  barons, 
owing to James  1's creations,  and the consequent  multi- 
plication  of  the cross-benches and proportionate reduction 
of  the conciliar element in parliament ; and (3) the increase 
and  growing  emphasis  of  the  attendant  commons.  The 
Spea.ker bulks  larger  than  before;  on  his  right  is  seen 
Black  Rod,  and on his left  the serjeant-at-arms with  the 
mace of  the house of  commons. 
The fourth illustration is from the British Museum Print 
Room,  and is a representation  of  the close of  the session, 
after  Walpole's  fall,  in  February  1732;  it was  engraved 
and published in 1749  by John  Pine, who had in 1743 been 
appointed Bluemantle pursuivant-at-arms, and had already 
published  valuable  engravings  of  the  tapestries  of  the 
house  of  lords.  It illustrates  in  a  remarltable  way  the 
constitutional  changes  of  the  Revolution,  and  exhibits 
monarchy in tutelage : so far from no one being permitted 
on the cloth of  state except  the king, he is overshadowed 
by  his magnates, and parliament  is  swamped  with  peers. 386  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
The judges  and other  elements of  the council  have beell 
reduced to a handful in a house of  hundreds ; but the peers 
themselves  are  threatened  by  the  dominating  figure  of 
Speaker Onslow and the commons below the bar. 
The last illustration is a reproduction of  an undated and 
unsigned  pencil  plan  in  the  library  of  the  Society  of 
Antiquaries.=  On  the back  of  it, however,  is  a  reference 
to Capon's engraved plan, published in  Vetusta Monuments 
in 1828.~ This led  Mr.  Somers Clarke to believe that the 
one  was  "  in  some  respects  at least " an  original  from 
which the other was produced;  but, whereas the engraved 
plan  shews the lowest level  of  the Palace,  the one repro- 
duced  here illustrates the arrangement of  the floor  above 
(when such exists) where most of  the important apartments 
were  situated.  However,  the  two  certainly  bear  much 
evidence of  a common authorship, and there is little doubt 
that both were drawn by  Capon.  The plan  published  by 
the Society of  Antiquaries is definitely stated to have been 
drawn between  1793  and 1823.  Other plans and drawings 
of  the  Painted  Chamber  by  the  same  artist  were  made 
between  1795  and 1800;~  and the one here reproduced  is 
certainly near that period;  for the house of  Lord Thurlow, 
Teller  of  the Exchequer, is shewn,  and he  only  obtained 
that office in 1786;  while the placing of  the House of  Lords 
in its pre-1801  quarters, and the references to the houses of 
John  Hatsell  and Edward  Delaval  (see D.N.B. for  both) 
indicate the same date. 
1 In the volume entitled "  Houses of  Parliament,"  No. 11. 
2  Vol. V.  plate xlvii.  It was purchased by the Society of  Antiquaries 
in  1826 and  engraved  by  Basire.  See D.N.B.  under  Capon,  William. 
For Mr.  Somers Clarke's  remarks see Archaeologia, vol. 1.  p.  10. 
There  are two  coloured  drawings  :f  the Painted  Chamber  in  the 
Library of  the Society of  Antiquaries,  Houses of  Parliament,"  Nos.  I 
and 2,  and a coloured  Plan of  the Painted  Chamber, Crace Collection. 
Maps  and  Plans.  Portfolio  XI, No.  47.  I  have  to thank Mr.  H.  S. 
Kingsford,  of  the Society of  Antiquaries, for his kindness in shewing me 
the plans and drawings in the library. 
As the original is a pencil plan, reproduction was difficult.  The method 
adopted was to photograph the original and make a tracing of  the photo- 
graph.  Care  has  been  taken  to avoid  error,  but the drawing  is  very 
detailed,  and  the pencil  faint.  For  other  than  purely  minor  details, 
however,  the reproduction  may be  taken  as accurate.  There has been 
no attempt to reproduce the actual handwriting on the original.  I have 
to thank Mr. J. Hill for his care in making the tracing.  [I. M. C.] 
PARLIAMENTARY  REPRESENTATION  IN  THE  FOURTEENTH 
CENTURY 
THE suggestion on pp. 316-20  that the writs de  ex$ensis 
may  provide  a  more  accurate  indication  of  the  actual 
attendance  at  a  medieval  parliament  than  the sheriffs' 
election returns has provoked some criticism, and it seems 
desirable to discuss a little more fully the evidence on which 
it is based.  The main point, that election returns are no 
evidence of  actual attendance in parliament, is too obvious 
to need much elaboration.  A summons to serve on a jury 
is no proof  of  actual service : many more jurors are sum- 
moned  than  are  actually  required.  Some  stay  away, 
relying on the chance of  not being called in court, or prefer- 
ring to pay their fine if  they are called;  others attend, but 
produce an exemption from  service;  and even those who 
are actually sworn serve for but a part of  the business and 
time of  the court.  Scores of  summonses are issued in order 
to ensure a jury  of  twelve  for  each  particular  case;  and 
even though  it were proved  that every member of  parlia- 
ment returned by the sheriff journeyed  to Westminster,  it 
would  prove  nothing  about  the  attendance  when  any 
particular bill or tax was under discussion.  Most  of  the 
peers disregard to-day, as  they did in the fourteenth century, 
'.heir special writs of  summons, and in the house of  commons 
itself the test of  attendance is the division-lists and not the 
election returns.  There would be no point in the clause of 
the Act  of  1918  confiscating  the deposit  of  the successful 
candidate  who  never  attends, if  his  election  return  were 
proof of his having taken his seat;  and no penalties seem 
to have  been  actually inflicted  in  the  middle  ages  either 
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on boroughs which failed to make returns, on members who 
failed to put in an appearance, or on their manucaptors or 
sureties. 
There is thus good reason for discounting the '  evidence ' 
of  the election returns, quite apart from the writs de expensis. 
But these writs, while proof of  the attendance of  the members 
who obtained them, are not disproof of  that of  those who 
did not; and there is the further difficulty that, apart from 
stray copies  of  the writs  themselves  entered  on  borough 
records  or  preserved  elsewhere, we  have  only  enrolments 
on the close rolls,  and the enrolments may be incomplete. 
Indeed,  after 1414  they  cease  altogether,  although  writs 
de  expensis undoubtedly continued to be issued down to the 
seventeenth century.l  They  are but one of  the items on 
the  close  roll  which  appear  and  disappear  without  any 
obvious reason, and apparently the last enrolment of  any 
kind of  writ  on  the close roll  dates from 24  Henry VIII. 
Conjecture  might  connect  this particular  disappearance  of 
writs  de  expensis  with  a  petition  of  members  for  their 
expenses in 1413  and a  suggestion in answer  on  the part 
of  the crown that the records should be searched for evidence 
of  their  claims2  This  only  referred  to  the  payment  of 
M.P.'s  for attendance at a parliament dissolved by Henry 
IV's  demise;  but  the  reference  to  the records  raised  a 
delicate  question.  Some members,  like  those  for  London 
and York, were conscious of  receiving double the rate which 
the enrolments  prescribed;  on  the  other hand, boroughs 
which  were paying only zod.,  18d.,  16d.,  15d., and 12d.  a 
day might not be pleased  with members who  established 
1 For some late references to writs degxpensis, see Guilding, Reading 
Records, i. 80, IOI  [1504];  Hereford  MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm.,~jth  Rep., 
App. iv.  306-7  [1j14]);  Shrewsbury MSS.  (ibid., 15th Rep., App.  x.  22 
[1568]) ; Exeter MSS. (ibid.,  pp. 188-9 [1629]) ;  and Prynne, Briefe Register 
of  Parl. Writs, iv. 527-9.  535-50,  1187  Prynne mentions London, York, 
llristol, Norwich, and Exeter as still [166z] paying expenses "  voluntarily 
wlthout writs,"  and notes that no more than 4s.  and  2s.  "can be legally 
demanded " (ibid., iv. 610-11).  Payment was prescribed  for Wales and 
Cheshire in Henry VIII's statutes giving them parliamentary  representa- 
tion  (27 Henry VIII, c. 26;  34  & 35 Henry VIII, c. 24;  35 Henry VIII, 
c. 11).  See also Sir Robert Atkyns' Parl, and Pol. Tracts, 1734. 
Rot. Parl.,  iv. g. 
their  claim  to  2s.  There  were  many  complications. 
Sheriffs were inclined  to collect  as much as they could in 
virtue  of  the writs,  pay  as little  as might  be  thereof  to 
members, and use the surplus to make up an account which 
it was never easy to ba1ance.l  The taxpayer's interest was 
to evade payment  altogether or keep it as low as possible, 
while  members  desired  at least the accustomed  or official 
wage.  It may  be  that magnates, who, like  the  Duke of 
Norfolk, desired the election of  "  such persons as longe unto 
him and be of his menyall servaunts,"  also wished them to 
look to their lords for recompense instead of  depending upon 
kings'  writs.  Borough  practice  was  more  heterogeneous 
than that of  the shires.  "  The agreement of  the parties will 
prevail against the law,"  and boroughs were getting close 
by  the time their records  say much  about paying  M.P.'s. 
It was  generally a matter of  arrangement  among twenty- 
four or forty-eight burgesses, most of  whom might have been 
or might hope (or fear) to be members themselves ; and the 
issue was a conflict between  communal economy and indi- 
vidual desires, in which the growing lure of  a seat in parlia- 
ment tended at first to lower the demand for remuneration, 
was temporarily counteracted by the inflation of  the currency, 
and finally  caused  the disappearance of  wages  altogether. 
Boroughs which had paid less than 2s. a day in the four- 
teenth  and  fifteenth  centuries,  found  themselves  paying 
3s. 4d. in 1586, 5s. in 1604, 6s. 8d. in 1606, and nothing at all 
a hundred years later.4 
The enrolment of  writs may have ceased for some simpler 
or more technical reason.  In 1515  it was made a statutory 
Prynne  (Briefe Register,  iv. 259-60)  describes  a  case  in  which  two 
deputies of  the sheriff  of  Lancashire  in  1362 elected themselves, did not 
attend, but levied their wages from the shire : cf. ibid., iv. 532.  AS late 
as  1446 the commons  petition  against  this  abuse  (Parry, Parliaments, 
n  182)  I. 
Paston Letters, i. 337; cf. Rot. Purl., iv. 350. 
"oldsworth,  Hist. English Law, 3rd ed. iii. 102.  '  Whitley,  Pad.  Repres.  of  Coventry,  pp.  61,  65.  Some  boroughs 
occasionally  paid  as much  in  the fifteenth  century;  Lynn's  rate was 
6s.  8d.  in  1431  (Archaologia, xxiv.  320).  Four  London  M.P.'s  at the 
Cambridge parliament of  1388 ran up their bill for expenses to 14s.  4d. 
a day for each of  them (English Hist. Rev., xxxix. 521). 390  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
obligation on the second clerk of  the parliaments alias the 
clerk of  the house of  commons to keep a book or register of 
attendance.l  Much of  Henry VIII's legislation gave merely 
a statutory sanction to previous custom, and the '  roll-call ' 
of  the commons,  of  which  we  first  hear  in  the reign  of 
Richard 11, may have provided in time a register of  attend- 
ance which superseded, as evidence for the writs, the entries 
on the Close Rolls.  That some record  was kept is almost 
certain.  In 1462  the Reading town  council resolved  that 
the mayor should purchase a new writ de expensis in place of 
the one he had lost, or else pay the wages hi~nself,~  and it is 
difficult to see how a new writ could be issued unless some 
record had been kept.  Two things at least are clear : the 
cessation of  the enrolments implies no cessation or climinu- 
tion of  the writs themselves;  it indicates an abrupt change 
in method of  record, not a gradual decay in the payment of 
members or in their pract.ice of  suing out  writ^.^  There is 
ample evidence in local and other records of  members suing 
their writs in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries : 
the  commons  themselves  in  1430  petitioned  for  the con- 
tinuance of  their customary writs ;  4  parliament re-en.>\  red 
the practice in the legislation it passed in the reign of  Clri~ry 
VIII for the extension of  the parliamentary system to Wales 
and  Cheshire;  and  on  18  March,  1580-1,  the  commons 
resolved that no writ de expensis should be issued without 
warrant  from  the clerk  of  the house. 
So,  too,  the  enrolments  continue  with  no  abatement 
until  they  suddenly  stop  in  2  Henry  V.  Those  for  the 
knights of  the shire  are indeed more  complete than they 
were  a  century  earlier.  It may  be  hyperbole  to ascribe 
regularity to the borough writs de expensis at any period, 
1 Henry  VIII, c.  16.  I suspect  that  the early ' roll-calls ' were  in- 
tended,  not to ensure  that  the  commons,  who  were  called  into  the 
White chamber from that very public place,  Westminster  Hall, included 
all authorised persons, but excluded all who were not (Rot. Parl., iii. 122). 
Guilding, Readzng Records, i. 54. 
a  It  may be a premonitory symptom that no writs are enrolled for the 
last three parliaments of  Henry  IV (Prynne, iv.  493,  makes  them into 
five). 
Parry, pp. 178-9. 
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but they were as regular and as numerous for the beginning 
of the Lancastrian period as in the time of the Edwards or 
Richard 11, with the exception of  the first decade of  Edward 
111's reign and the period of the Good parliament;  and the 
average for such Lancastrian enrolments as exist is precisely 
the same  as the  average  for  the fourteenth century.1  If 
there are no borough writs enrolled for 20 Rich. 11. and only 
six for 21  Rich. I1 and five for 6 Henry IV, there are also 
none  for either 18  or 19  Ed. 11, and only two for 17,  four 
for 16,  and five for 15  Ed. 11, and no more for half  a dozen 
parliaments of  Edward I11 ; and if  the thirty-eight boroughs 
which received writs de ex$ensis for the Northampton parlia- 
ment of  April 1328  marks the peak of  enrolment, the Good 
parliament of  1376  with  its twenty-two  borough  writs  de 
expensis attains a higher  figure than any of  Edward 1's  or 
Edward  II's, while  the 16,  14,  15,  and 16  of the first four 
parliaments of  Henry IV maintain a steadier level than any 
other  four consecutive  parliaments  can  show.  Whatever 
may have been  the cause for the paucity of  enrolments of 
writs for wages compared with the returns of  members elected 
-whether  neglect of  members to sue for writs, negligence 
of  clerks in enrolling them, private  arrangement between 
members and their constituencies, or failure of  members to 
attend the parliaments to which they had been elected-it  is 
a cause which operates in the same way and with the same 
effect throughout medieval parliaments. 
Prynne, whose vast and pioneer labours as keeper of the 
records in the Tower have not yet been quite superseded even 
by  the Calendar of  Close Rolls, suggested all these reasons 
in the first part of  his Briefe Register  . . . of  Parliamentary 
Writs, which  runs to 2,250  pages  and consists n~airlly  of 
statistics;  but, as he went  on  with  his work  he slipped, 
with  some  efforts  to avoid  it,  into  the  assumption  that 
There are about 674 borough writs enrolled for 67 parliaments frorn 
1327 to 1395. and 108 borough writs enrolled for eleven parliaments from 
1397  to 1414.  The average for the earlier period is just above 10 per cent., 
for the later it is just under 10 per cent.  The fact that London, York, 
and Nonvich have completely disappeared in the later period makes the 
difference.  Most writs of course are for two members. APPENDIX  I1  393 
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negligence of  the recording clerks rather than the absentee- 
ism  of members was to blame  for the hiatus between  the 
sheriffs'  election  returns and the record  of  wages paid  for 
attendance.  He was a hero, as well as a giant, of historical 
research,  but no one  who  has perused  the  results  of  his 
labours can fail to detect his bias as a parliamentarian not 
less zealous for its restoration in 1659-60  than he had been 
for its triumph in 1640-2.l  He was less unhistorical than 
nineteenth-century  votaries of  parliamentary  legends,  but 
his constant appeal to medieval precedent tended to dim his 
insight  into the weakness of  the parliaments he  invoked; 
and  his  assumption  that  members  necessarily  attended 
parliaments because the sheriffs returned their names is not 
substantiated by any attempt at proof. 
Proof  is hardly, indeed, possible either of  the attendance 
or absence of  the great majority of  members whose names 
were  returned by  the sheriffs.  If  those  returns create  a 
presumption  that members  did  attend,  their  failure  to 
establish any record of  their payment creates a presumption 
that they did not;  otherwise  we  have to find some other 
explanation  why  some  constituencies  get  their  writs  de 
expensis  enrolled,  and,  if  shires,  get  them  enrolled  with 
unfailing  regularity,  while  others get  them  enrolled,  if  at  . 
all, in varying degrees of  infrequency.  In view, however, 
of  the general acceptance of  the sheriffs' election returns as 
proof of  actual attendance at  parliament it may be well first 
of  all to adduce specific evidence to rebut that presumption. 
On  12  Dec., 1382,  Colchester, on account of  its expense in 
repairing its walls, received from Richard I1 letters patent 
exempting  it from  sending  members  to parliament  for  a 
period of five years ; the exemption was renewed for another 
five years on 21  Sept., 1388,  for three years  on  3  March, 
1394, for six years in  1404,  and for twelve  in  1410;  and 
when Henry V confirmed it on 25 May, 1413,  Colchester paid 
He claimed that the fitst two parts of  his Briefe Register, published in 
1659 and  1660, had  been  very instrumental ' in promoting Charles 11's 
peaceful restoration (dedication of  pt. iii. to the king, dated 24 Jan., 1661). 
Rot. Parl., iii. 395-6;  Cal. Patent Rolls, 1381-5,  p.  214, 13859, p. 505, 
1391-6,  p. 379, 1401-5,  p. 355, 1408-13,  p. 199, 1413-16,  p. 23. 
40s. into the hanaper for the privilege.  Yet the sheriffs of 
Essex return two members  to parliament for Colchester to 
27 parliaments during the period  of  its exemption.  There 
is nothing  inexplicable  in this.  The sheriff was instructed 
in  the  writs  he  received  "  to  cause  to be  elected " two 
burgesses  from  the  more  capable  boroughs  in  his  shire. 
They were to be elected in his county court, but there was as 
yet nothing in his writs to say that they must be returned 
by  means  of  indenture between  him  and each  particular 
borough ; nor was there anything about a poll.  ' Election ' 
meant what is now called nomination : indeed, the word is 
used in that sense in the Act of  1918,  where (2nd Schedule, 
pt. i.) it prescribes that the day fixed "  for the election shall 
be  the eighth day " after the king's proclamation, and the 
day appointed "  for the poll shall be the ninth day after the 
day  fixed  for  the  election."  Whether  or  no  there  were 
burgesses present at the county court, it was  the sheriff's 
duty to "  cause to be elected " there and then  persons  to 
represent the chief  boroughs within his jurisdiction, and to 
return their names into chancery.  It  was no concern of  his, 
if  higher authority dispensed with the attendance due, any 
more  than  it  is  for  the  under-sheriff  who  summons  our 
modern jurors to determine whether they will be exempted 
from servicein court. Prynne  l  argues that Colchester's dispen- 
sation was invalid as being inconsistent with the statute of 
1382  requiring  sheriffs to make returns from  their  accus- 
tomed boroughs, and avers that Colchester "  received no ease 
or exemption at all."  The sheriff in point of  fact did make 
his accustomed returns, but it was very much a seventeenth- 
century mentality which  concluded  that Richard I1 could 
not  dispense  with  members'  attendance merely  because  a 
Brief Register, iii.  241b.  It may also be noted that, while the names 
appear in the sheriff's returns, no dates of  their election are given.  None, 
of  course, occur  until after the Act of  1406, but neither Colchester nor 
Maldon have dates till 1453.  Another point of  interest is the gradual way 
in which  the  different shires adopt the practice of  giving different dates 
for the different borough elections instead of  dating  them all the day of 
the county court.  This indicates the growing importance of  the boroughs' 
replies to the sheriffs' precept, compared  with that of  the sheriffs' returns 
in the county court.  Cornwall is the last to make the change, but all have 
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statute required their election ; and, dealing with Close and 
not with Patent Rolls, his eye had not lit upon the repeated 
exemptions by Henry IV and Henry V nor upon the record 
that Colchester paid 40s. for the renewal of  a privilege from 
which it "  received no ease or exemption." 
Colchester does not stand alone.  Maldon, the only other 
parliamentary borough  in Essex,  obtained  similar exemp- 
tions in 1388,  1392,  and  1407;  yet the sheriff  of  Essex 
continues  to  make  returns  for  it  as  well  as  for  Col- 
chester throughout  the  periods  of  exemption.  There  is, 
however,  no  return  from  Hull  to  the  parliaments  from 
which  it  was  excused.2  Torrington's  familiar  exemp- 
tion 3  was not for a term of years but for ever.  The less- 
known details of  the story throw some light on our problem. 
The borough repeated in the parliament of  1368  a petition 
granted by the king in 1366  for relief  from  the burden of 
parliamentary representation;  it averred that it had never 
sent members  to parliament before  24 Ed. 111, when  the 
sheriff of  Devon,  in the words  of  the exemption  granted, 
dictam villarn  de Toriton burgum et  duos  homines pro  eodern 
burgo  ad  veniendum ad  parliamentum  nostrum  dicto  anno 
vicesimo  quarto  tentum,  sunzrnonitos  fuisse  malitiose  in 
cancellaria nostra  retornavit ;  and pretextu  retorni pradicti 
Torrington was burdened with labours and expenses to its 
damnum  non  modicum  et  depressionem  manifestam.  It is 
exonerated  in $erpetuum  on  18  May,  1368.  Nevertheless 
the sheriff returned two members  for Torrington in 1369, 
and according to Prynne until 45 Edward 111. 
Again Prynne opines that the exemption was void in law, 
and ascribes to the realization of  that fact the continuance of 
the sheriff's returns ; but his explanation singularly fails to 
account  for  their  discontinuance  after 45  Edward  111, if 
not earlier, and ignores the fact that the second exemption 
was granted per petitio~~enz  9arliamenti.  His ground for the 
1 Cal. Pat. Rolls, 1385-9, p. 508,  1391-6,  p.  187 (z Oct.  1392), 1405-8, 
p. 376 ; Prynne, iii. 200. 
Ibid., 1381-5,  p. 475. 
3  Ibid., 1364-7,  p. 246, 1367-70, p. 115; Rynler, Fadera, new ed. 111  ii. 
790; Prynne, iii. 196, 1239-41.  iv. 946-7,  1175-6. 
illcy.plity  is his discovery that the sheriff had made returns 
for Torrington to twenty-two parliaments before 24 Ed. 111 ; 
Torrington was therefore an '  ancient ' borough which the 
king could not exempt from service,l and the scrutiny which 
Edward I11 said had been made of the rolls and memoranda 
in chancery must have been superficial.  Torrington, how- 
ever, does not deny that the sheriff had made returns for it 
before 24 Ed. I11 ; it merely  asserts that the borough had 
sent no members ; and the clerks in chancery confirmed the 
assertion.  It  is also confirmed by the writs de expensis, and 
they likewise support the efficacy of  the letters patent of 
exemption : none  is  enrolled  before 1351  and none  after 
1363~~  It seems fairly clear that in Torrington we have an 
instance of  the sheriff returning, for 22 parliaments before 
24 Ed. I11 and for at least one parliament after 42 Ed. 111, 
the names of  members who did not attend.  Colchester and 
Maldon  tell  the  same tale:  during  the period  of  their 
exemption  they  get  no  writs  de expensis  in  spite of  the 
sheriff's continued returns. 
The sheriff's returns are, in short, evidence of  a servitium 
which  he thought, for reasons which  did not always bear 
scrutiny, was debitum from what he chose to consider the 
potentiores  burgos  in  his  shire.  They do not  express the 
views of  the boroughs themselves on what  they owed nor 
prove that the service  was rendered.4  The sheriff's  writs 
Prynne  is arguing throughout his  Briefe  Register,  though  not  quite 
consistently, for  a  fixed parliamentary constituency,  immune alike from 
royal dispensations and from frivolous creations at  the sheriffs' whims. 
Torrington's  grievance may have been  enhanced by the exceptional 
number of  writs de expensis it had to meet.  It received seven during the 
twelve years, 1351-63,  which is more than any other borough has enrolled 
for that period.  How far that was due to the ' malice ' of  the sheriff it 
is impossible to say ; but a few years later Barnstaple complained that it 
was asked to pay wages for an M.P. who was not resident in and had not 
been elected by the borough. 
All of  them received writs de experzsis with at least average regularity 
until  their  exemption.  Torrington's  was  perpetual  and  Colchester's 
extended until after the enrolments cease;  but Maldon receives writs in 
4 Henry IV, 5 Henry IV, and I Henry V (its seven years' exemption from 
1407 having lapsed on the demise of  Henry IV). 
'  Parliamentary representation was, as Prynne remarks (iv. 1182). "  no 
franchise, but a  service ";  and it was  never  ' granted ' in  a  medieval 
charter of ' liberties '  (cf. Pasquet,  Essai, pp.  1839, 260;  Purl.  Writs, 
i. 44,  177, 187, ii. 337;  Riess, Gesch. des Wahlrechts, pp. 18-21). 396  TIlE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
were generally worded ; they never specified the boroughs 
to which he was to issue his precepts, and the latitude and 
inconsistency with which successive sheriffs exercised their 
discretion  provided  the  boroughs  with  ample  excuse  for 
ignoring  their  precepts.  Fifteen  towns in Yorlcshire  had 
made  returns to parliament  before  1306  when  the sheriff 
omitted  all  but  two.  The  sheriff  of  Worcestershire  re- 
turned six boroughs and the city of  Worcester in 1295 but 
only the city in 1307,  1314, and 1319.  In 1298  the sheriff 
of  Buckinghamshire returned no boroughs as fit for or liable 
to representation.  Two years later his successor returned 
Amersham, Wendover, and Wycombe.  Two years later again 
another successor returned Wycombe but neither Amersham 
nor Wendover.  In 1308  the sheriff returned all three and 
Marlow  as well, but in  1311  made no return for any but 
Wycombe, which did not respond either then or in 1315.  In 
1353 a later sheriff sent a precept to Buckingham and entered 
it in his return, but neither then nor to any medieval parlia- 
ment did Buckingham malce any election.  In  spite of  all these 
efforts  to extract  a  servitium debitum  out of  boroughs  in 
Buckinghamshire, Wycombe alone submitted to the burden. 
No boroughs were ever returned for Rutland, and the sheriff 
of  Lancashire  returned  none  after  1331,  though  both 
Lancaster and Preston had received precepts in earlier years. 
The sheriff  of  Hertfordshire declares  there are none in his 
shire after 1336, though Hertford, St. Albans, and Bishop's 
Stortford had all elected to some previous parliaments, and 
Hertford  reappears with a  precept  (and  also  a  writ  de 
exfiensis)  in  1376.  Sheriffs,  says  Prynne,  "made  and 
unmade, continued, discontinued,  and revived " boroughs 
''  at their wills." 
But boroughs  frequently  refused  to make returns  after 
as well as during the reigns of  Edward I and 11.  Between 
1327  and 1397 four  boroughs  in  Yorkshire  summoned  to 
send members to parliament-Beverley,  Hedon, Richmond, 
and Ripon-never  responded, though  Hedon  appears four 
times  in  the  sheriffs'  returns.  Hindon  in  Wiltshire, 
Ibid., iii. 233. 
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sun~moned  to nine parliaments, made no election  to any. 
Out  of  twelve  boroughs  summoned  for  that  county  in 
1361,  six make no return;  out of  11 summoned in Sept. 
1388,  five  make  no  return;  out  of  seven  summoned 
in 1368,  four make none;  three make none in five parlia- 
ments,  and two  in  five  other parliaments.  Bedwin  and 
Calne reply to less than a third of  the precepts they receive ; 
and these figures are irrespective of  the parliaments for which 
no  returns have been  found.  Of  the 170 boroughs  which 
did make returns to some parliament or other between 26 
Ed. I and 12  Ed. IV, Prynne reckons that 22 returned only 
once, 8 but twice, 4 thrice, 4 four times, 4 five times, 4 six 
times, and 5 seven times.l  For at least a third of  the so- 
called  '  parliamentary '  boroughs  a  parliamentary  return 
was a rare, if refreshing, experience;  and in the face of  this 
record of  successful reluctance to go through the form of a 
return,  what  presumption  is there  that the  return  itself, 
not necessarily representing any choice by the borough and 
sometimes a bare nomination  by the sheriff, involved  any 
actual  attendance  at Westminster?  Abstention  was  not 
disobedience to a royal writ, because no boroughs, and still 
less any persons, were specified by the king in those writs; 
there is no hint of penalties before the vague and ineffective 
statute of  5  Rich.  11;  and clearly  it required  no  special 
exemption to make an occasional return or no return at all. 
"  A much simpler way of evading the duty,"  says Stubbs, 
"  was to disregard the sheriff's precept."  When a wealthy 
borough like Coventry, which stood fourth  among the English 
boroughs in wealth and p~pulation,~  could, after making two 
returns to parliament in 1346 and 1353, escape representation 
for a  century,  even  in  parliaments  held  within  its walls, 
there  is  no reason  to wonder  that insignificant  boroughs 
escaped  with  a  casual  and  spasmodic  attendance, even 
though  they  appeared  in  sheriffs' returns.  No  law  yet 
required attendance, and, when in 1321  the mayor of  Lincoln 
Ibid.,  iv. 223. 
Subsidy  Roll for 51 Ed.  I11 printed in Archcaologia, vii. 340-3 :  Whitley, 
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reports that one of  its burgesses-although  he had Consented 
to his election-ne  se deygne venir par riens q.ue  nous savoms 
faire, he can only suggest another e1ection.l 
The  problem  is  to  ascertain  the precise  effect  of  this 
inertia  and  irregularity  upon  the  actual  composition  of 
medieval  parliaments.  An  analysis  of  the returns  them- 
selves is sufficient to show that their personnel was shifting 
and uncertain, though there was a solid residuum consisting 
of  the knights of  the shires and the representatives of  London, 
York,  and other boroughs, some of  which  rarely failed  in 
their representation and others were fairly regular ; and the 
enrolled writs de expensis serve for the most part to strengthen 
and to develop this impression.  The number of  boroughs 
appearing  in  the  sheriffs'  extant returns  to  a  medieval 
parliament  (from  1295)  ranges  from  none  to  114;  2  the 
number having enrolled writs de expensis ranges from none 
to 38.  A model parliament, containing two members from 
each shire and two from  all the 170 boroughs for which  a 
return was ever made, would have had 414  members.  The 
highest specific return before the sixteenth century was for 
114  boroughs to the Model parliament of  1295 ; and these, 
with  the shires,  would  have produced  a  ' house ' of  302 
members.  The  average  number  of  election  returns  to 
fourteenth-century  parliaments  gives  about  135  borough 
members and 70 knights of  the shires.  The highest specific 
number  of  enrolled  writs  de  expensis  yields  76  borough 
members  and 74 knights  of  the shires;  but  the  average 
number of  enrolled writs de expensis for boroughs is between 
10  and 11  and gives about 21  burgesses,  to whom must be 
added the 74 knights of  the shires, about a dozen members 
from London and other cities or boroughs which dispensed 
with  writs, and  (after  1365)  a  similar  number  from  the 
Cinque Ports, which also had no writs de expensis enrolled. 
Parl. Writs, I1  i. 252 ; Stubbs, iii. 43  5. 
The number has hitherto been given as I 10, but the missing return of 
the sheriff of  Norfolk and Suffolk has now been found and is printed in the 
Bulletin of  the Institute of  Historical Research (November 192  5). He  returns 
Norwich,  Lynn, Ipswich,  and Yarmouth, but reports that he has had no 
answer from Bury St. Edmunds, Dunwich, and Orford, to the steward and 
bailiffs of  which he had sent his precepts. 
This would give a house of about 120 members, the majority 
of  whom  would  be  knights of  the shires.  Which of  these 
figures comes nearest to the truth and helps us best to under- 
stand the parliamentary insignificance  of  the boroughs in 
the fourteenth century?  The ideal maximum of  414  can, 
of course, be ruled out.  So can the actual maximum of  302 
in 1295.  Just as the number of specially summoned barons 
sank from more than a hundred to less than fifty, and the 
abbots from 72 to 27, so the number of boroughs returned 
by the sheriffs  dwindled from 114  to an average of  65 or 70. 
Is it also true that, just as the special summons to spiritual 
and temporal peers was no proof  of  their presence in parlia- 
ment, so the general summons through sheriffs was no proof 
of  the actual attendance of burgesses ? 
Apart from personal references in the rolls of  parliament 
and in the chronicles we  have no specific evidence  of  the 
presence  of  particular  members  in  parliament  except  in 
the  enrolled  writs  de  expensis  and  the  scattered  details 
provided by borough records, of which the former are much 
the  more  comprehensive  and  systematic.  The  hiatus 
between  their figures and the sheriffs' returns can be  ex- 
plained in two ways : either the enrolments of  the writs de 
expensis exclude many members who  actually sat, or the 
sheriffs'  returns  include  many  who  did  not.  But  both 
statements are true to some extent.  There is no doubt that 
some  members  returned  by  the  sheriffs  did  not  attend 
parliament;  it is equally true that members sat for London 
and other constituencies whose wages are not recorded  on 
the close rolls in chancery.  But none of  the great cities and 
boroughs, commonly thought to have dispensed with writs, 
is entirely absent from the rolls.  Even London has writs 
enrolled down to 1336,~  Norwich to 1335, York to 1352,  and 
Calendar of  Close Ro22s.  1333-7,  p. 707.  The writ de exflnnsis is only 
for two M.P.'s for 2s. a day each ; the writs never require a  higher rate for 
bo-.oughs, not even when they are made counties.  On the other hand, no 
objection was ever taken to boroughs paying either more money or more 
members.  If  London chose to send and pay four (or even more) members 
Instead of  two, it was welcome to do so.  There was no known voting by 
division in a medieval house of  commons;  and if  there was voting at all 
apart from the coliective vote of  estates, it was almost certainly by con- 400  THE  EVOLUTION  OF PARLIAMENT  APPENDIX  I1  401 
Bristol till the last extant enrolment in 2 Henry V.  South- 
ampton also appears in that enrolment ;  and Lincoln, Netting- 
ham, Leicester, Exeter, Salisbury, Winchester,  Oxford and 
both the Newcastles figure in the Lancastrian close rolls.  Uni- 
form absence is limited to London, York, and Norwich after 
1352 ; and irregular, arbitrary, and incalculable negligence 
on the part of  the clerks seems to be the only explanation 
of  the erratic entries on those rolls, unless their vagaries are 
due to a correspondingly casual attendance of  members of 
parliament. 
Official negligence is, however, a somewhat facile solution 
of  archivistic  problems.  It  is  quite  possible  that  the 
occasions,  on  which  the  enrolments  break  off  without 
recording any writs for boroughs at  all, are due to negligence ; 
but these  only  amount to about half  a  dozen  for over  a 
hundred parliaments,  and hardly affect  the main obstacle 
to this explanation.  For there is no negligence, either by 
the makers or keepers of  records, so far as the writs for the 
shires go.  Throughout the whole period the knights of  the 
shires  get writs  for their wages enrolled  with  remarkable 
regularity, and the substance of  these writs is no matter of 
common form.  From the beginning of  Edward 111's reign 
they specify  each  member's  name,  the  exact  number  of 
days he served, and the total sum to which he was entitled. 
If  one knight only attended, one name only appears in the 
writ ; if  one serves for the whole parliament and another for 
but part of  the time, the partial length of  service is specified ; 
if  some members remain at the king's request after the first 
leave to depart is given, their namcs and days of  additional 
service are recorded, and allowance is made for their extra 
expenses.l  When  clerks  were  so  punctilious  about  the 
attendance of  knights, why should they be so negligent  in 
recording that of  the burgesses ? 
The theory would be more plausible if  we  could establish 
a considerable category of  boroughs to which writs de expensis  --  - 
stituencies and not  per capita.  The London writs in Edward 111's reign 
are for  132:.  1328, and  1336, the Norwich writs for  1328, 1334 bis, and 
1335, the York writs for 1334 bis, 1337, and 1352.  Bristol has eleven in all. 
Ibid., 13379,  p. 388. 
were never issued or never enrolled ; but, as we  have seen, 
there were only three for which  this rule  was established, 
and then  not until the middle of  the fourteenth  century. 
We  could also more readily believe that boroughs found it 
easier than shires to dispense with the writs,l if  it were not 
the potentiores  burgi which most often get writs de  expensis 
as well as sheriff's precepts, and if, having once realized this 
alleged advantage over the shires they had pursued it with 
some consistency.  But why,  for instance, should  it have 
been easier for Leicester to dispense with a writ de expensis 
for the first, than for the second, parliament  of  1332,  and 
for the second, than for the first, parliament of  1380  ?  Why 
so easy for a dozen boroughs to do without writs for a dozen 
parliaments before 1376 and then all at  once to discover that 
an enrolled writ de expensis was necessary to secure payment 
for their signal attendance at the Good parliament, relapsing 
thereafter  into  their  accustomed  independence?  Why, 
again, if  the negligence of  clerks or independence of  boroughs 
be the explanation, do we find enrolled for the York parlia- 
ment of  February 1334 writs de  expensis for both members 
from twenty-four boroughs  and for single M.P.'s  from ten 
others, and five out of  fifteen boroughs receiving writs for 
only one member apiece in the next parliament six months 
later?  IS there not a reason, less arbitrary than neglect of 
the clerks to record them, for the facts that, out of  thirty-four 
boroughs which sent members to a parliament at York in 
February, only thirteen should send members to a parliament 
at Westminster in September; that out of  the thirteen eight 
should have two members apiece in one of  the parliaments 
and only one in the other ;  and that only five boroughs should 
have  two  members  apiece in  both?  Is it not  also  odd, 
for  instance,  that  in  the  four  successive  parliaments  of 
1327-8,  held at Lincoln, York, Northampton, and Salisbury, 
the clerks should happen to have enrolled writs for Leicester 
English Hist. Rev., xxxix. 512. 
If  writs were omitted from the enrolments in order to save the clerks 
trouble, it would have saved them so much more to omit a writ altogether 
than merely one member's name ; the same writ served for both members 
for a constituency, whether it was a county or a borough. 
0 APPENDIX  I1  403 
402  TZiE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
to the two nearer parliaments of  Lincoln and Northampton, 
and to have neglected  to enrol those for the more distant 
parliaments of  Salisbury and York ? 
The argument that boroughs were independent of  writs 
is,  however,  somewhat  beside  the  point.  There  is  no 
doubt of  the value  of  writs,  whether  or  not  those  writs 
were  enrolled.  There  are  repeated  petitions  from  the 
commons  that  they  should  have  their  writs  de  expensis 
as usual;  the  chancellor  or his  deputy, in  dismissing  a 
parliament  regularly  enjoined it upon members that they 
should sue out their writs ;  and they continued to do so long 
after those writs had ceased to be enrolled.1  The suggestion 
that is really arguable is not that burgesses were independent 
of  writs,  but  indifferent  to  their  enrolment.  Even  that 
argument has to ignore the fact that most boroughs return- 
ing  M.P.'s  have  occasional  writs  enrolled  so  long  as 
enrolment  lasts.  Some of  course cease, but most  of  these 
also cease to appear in the election returns.  The practical 
value of  enrolment is illustrated by a letter on the close roll 
for  1341.2  It  recites  that  sheriffs  of  '  all '  counties, 
bailiffs of  boroughs, and others have levied excessive wages 
for members  of  parliament,  and announces  that the king 
has therefore sent down extracts from the rolls in chancery 
containing  the  names  of  knights,  citizens,  and burgesses 
and the specific sums assigned to them for wages in order 
that the justices  may be able to adjudicate upon the com- 
plaints that have been made;  and the judicial use to which 
the enrolments were thus put helps to explain the meticulous 
detail in which they abound. 
So far as the knights of  the shires are concerned, the theory 
of  negligence on their part to sue out writs or on the part of 
the clerks to enrol them  can be  definitely  rejected.  With 
the exception of  Cambridgeshire in the second parliament of 
1383  there are enrolled writs de expensis for every shire for 
every  one  of  the  twenty-four  parliaments  held  between 
1376  and 1395  inclusive.  For eight  of  these parliaments 
the writs are for two knights for every shire :  for another 
1 See above, p. 388, n. I.  a  Cat. Close Rolls, 1341-3, p. 109. 
eight of  these parliaments there is only one absentee in one 
shire;  for three parliaments  there  is  an absentee  in  two 
shires;  for  one  parliament  there  are  two  absentees  in 
one shire and  one  in  another;  for two parliaments there 
is one absentee in three shires, and for another two parlia- 
ments  there  is  one  absentee  in  each  of  four  shires.  In 
other words, the enrolments record the attendance of  all the 
74 knights throughout eight parliaments;  of  73 throughout 
another  eight,  of  72  throughout  three,  of  71  throughout 
another  three,  and  of  70  throughout  the  remaining  two 
parliaments.  The total possible attendance of  74 knights 
in  twenty-four  parliaments  is  1776,  the  total attendance 
recorded in the enrolments is 1745.  If there was negligence, 
it does not amount to much;  and since the clerks took the 
trouble  to  record  those  1745  attendances,  specifying  not 
only the names of  the members but the exact sums to which 
they were entitled and exact length of  service for which they 
were paid, even calculating the difference of time allowed for 
travelling from each county, and making a fresh calculation 
for each  different  place-Westminster,  Gloucester,  North- 
ampton, Salisbury, Cambridge, Winchester, and Shrewsbury 
-at  which parliament  was  held,  the inference is that the 
thirty-one omissions were due, not to negligence on the part 
of  the  clerks,  but  to a  perfectly  natural  and amazingly 
small  proportion  of  absences  on  the  part  of  members 
themselves. 
It was, however, only by degrees that the knights of  the 
shires worked up to this exemplary standard of  attendance. 
Early in Edward 111's reign we  may find in a single parlia- 
ment  as many  absentees  as  in  a  dozen  parliaments  in 
that of  Richard 11.  For the parliament of  March 1329-30 
all the shire election returns except that for Northumberland 
are extant, but eight shires get no writ de ex$ensis  and for 
six 1  others  the  writs  are  for  single  members  only.  In 
February 1339 nine shires have no writs de expensis, and in 
Prynne, iv. 107-9;  the Cale~zdar  of  Close Rolls, 1330-3.  p. 137, omits 
Leicestershire from Prynne's list, but  the  total,  i54 4s., givenfor  that  county 
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the July  parliament of  1340  seventeen shires are omitted. 
That was the third parliament within six months,l and the 
bad attendance does not perhaps require any negligence of 
the  recording  clerks  to  explain  it.  The  attendance  of 
burgesses  dwindles  in  the  same  way  during  that  year. 
Nine boroughs get writs for two members each in February, 
four  get writs in March  (three of  them for single members), 
and only one in July.  It was  immediately after this that 
the complaints of  excessive levies for wages by the sheriffs, 
bailiffs, etc. led the king to provide the justices with extracts 
from the enrolments to guide them in their decisions.  We 
can hardly afford to brush them aside on the bare suggestion 
that the election returns were sufficient proof of  attendance. 
It is not the election returns but the enrolments de expensis 
that are cited as proof to the justices.= 
All these records, nevertheless, exhibit a process of  develop- 
ment which it is interesting to note, if  only to show how much 
growth there was within a single century of  the supposedly 
static middle ages.3  This applies to the sheriff's returns as 
well as to the writs de expensis.  At first, as we have seen, 
his discretion was almost unlimited : he was simply required 
to cause to be nominated two citizens or burgesses from the 
more capable cities and boroughs in his shire.  But which 
those boroughs were (if any) and how the burgesses were to 
be '  elected ' was left to his discretion, and parliament does 
not appear to impugn it until 5  Rich. 11.  Till, if  not after, 
then he made his selection of  boroughs with impunity.  He 
also, on occasion, selected the burgesse~.~  There was nothing 
1 The first was in January and the second in March ; there had also been 
two parliaments in 1339. 
a  This is proved by the reference to the sums paid as wages. 
8  This, of  course, makes it irrational to treat the reign of  Richard I1 as 
though  it were typical of  the rest of  the century.  There was progress 
throughout  the  middle  ages,  and  parliamentary  development  in  the 
fourteenth century was fairly rapid.  The statute of  1382 was followed 
in  1384 and  1385 by  the earliest  known  petition  (Shaftesbury) against 
false returns (Prynne, iii. 286;  Return  of  M.P.'s,  i. 220;  cf. ibid., i. 225); 
and the pluralism of returns declined (see below, p. 412). 
As late as 1410, 1437, and 1446 the commons assert in their petitions 
that sheriffs often return  for cities  and boroughs  persons not  '  elected 
(Parry, Pavliamenls, pp.  168-9,  181,  183;  Prynne, ii. 117-18,  iii. 234-7, 
241-3). 
in his writs  to say that they must be  chosen  by their re- 
spective  boroughs.  Even  when  the  indenture  system  is 
developed, it is at first a simple indenture between him and 
casual suitors present in court, who may or may not include 
suitors from  the  particular  boroughs  whose  members  are 
thcre  elected.  It was  not  apparently  until  the  fifteenth 
century that the practice  (there was no specific legislation 
on the point) became at all general of  making the indenture 
between  the sheriff  and a group of  suitors containing four 
from each borough  in the shire returning members.  Thus 
in 2 Henry V the members for seven Dorset boroughs are 
returned by an indenture between  the sheriff  and twenty- 
eight nominators, four from each of  the boroughs concerned, 
and the members for four Somerset boroughs are returned in 
the same way.  But as late as 27 Henry VI the knights of 
the shire for Devon and burgesses for seven Devon boroughs 
are  returned by an  indenture with twenty-eight indiscriminate 
 nominator^.^  Meanwhile parliament had in 1382 attempted 
to restrict the sheriffs' discretion by requiring them to send 
their precepts to '  ancient ' boroughs and no  others, and to 
return only such members as were chosen by the boroughs 
themselves.  But repeated  parliamentary  petitions  in  the 
next three reigns  complain of  extensive  breaches  of  these 
principles ; and so far as later constituencies are concerned, 
Prynne is full of  invective against the "  practice of  sheriffs 
and ambition of  private gentlemen," which down to his own 
day multiplied  constituencies  without  any royal  or  legal 
watrant.3  The  practice  seems,  however,  to  have  been 
temporarily checked at the end of  the fourteenth century, 
and Prynne says no new constituencies were created in the 
reigns of  Richard I1 and Henry  IV and V; but it began 
again about 1445,~  and while the number of  constituencies 
became stable about the time of  the Good parliament, that 
stability did not necessarily  affect  the attendance of  their 
It  existed much earlier in some shires ; there is a separate indenture for 
Derby borough  as early as 2 Ed. 111, and others for Bedford  (Prynne, iii. 
262, 266). 
Ibzd., iii. 254-8.  Ibid., iii. 229. 
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representatives.  Members  of  parliament  were,  in  fact, 
much  less anxious to go to parliament  than to get paid if 
they  went;  and the growth  of  specific precision  was  less 
marked in the sheriffs' writs and precepts than it was in the 
writs de expensis. 
These, too,  had been  in the beginning  vague and void. 
The earliest simply direct the sheriffs to pay members their 
'  reasonable expenses,'  but by the accession of  Edward  I1 
there  is  added  respectu  habito  ad  loci  distantiam.2  In 
2 Ed. I1 the writs seek to restrain the sheriff from levying 
too much on the pretext of  wages, and in 5 Ed. I1 they begin 
to specify the number of  days that parliaments lasted.  In 
1315-16  the sheriffs are required so to levy wages as not to 
cause complaints to reach the king's ears, and in 1322 rates 
of  payment are for the first time prescribed, 3s. a  day for 
knights and IS. 8d. for burgesses ; a schedule of  the number 
of  days required for travelling, eundo et redeundo, from and to 
the  different  counties has been  worked  out and becomes 
stereotyped.  All  the  boroughs  in  a  shire  are generally, 
but not always, reckoned as equi-distant from Westminster, 
and no allowance  is made for the distance of  private resi- 
dences from  the county-court where  the election  was held. 
At first some account seems to have been taken of  slower  . 
travelling in the winter, and of  such accidents as blizzards 
and floods, the breaking of  bridges, and the laming of  horses ; 
but claims on such accounts were difficult to check and lent 
themselves to abuse;  and eventually the travelling  allow- 
ance becomes sterotyped for each county, except, of  course, 
when parliament was held  elsewhere than at Westminster. 
For  the second  parliament of  1322  the rates  of  pay  are 
increased to 4s. and ZS., though knights of  the shire who have 
not been  knighted receive a lower rate than their colleagues 
and sometimes no  more  than burgesses.  This distinction 
is  soon  ignored  and the 4s. and  2s. rates are  practically 
fixed  from  I  Ed. 111.  From 4 Ed. I11 the clerks make the 
1  The total absence of  references to contested elections before Richard 
11's reign seems in itself almost enough to negative the vlew that burgesses 
coveted electlon (cf. Stubbs, Const. Hzst., ill. 432). 
Prynne, op. cat.,  lv. 2-3,  19, 24-8, 31, 49-51,  53, 66-8,  71, 84,  I 14. 
writs still more specific by doing the necessary  arithmetic 
and  entering  the  precise  sum  to  which  each  member  is 
entitled  eundo, nzorando,  et  redeundo.  Generally  the writs 
for knights of the shire state that wages are to be  levied 
tam infra libertates quam extra;  and when  this clause was 
occasionally omitted, as in 28 Ed. 111, it provoked a protest 
in parliament and was restored in subsequent issues.  The 
object was to reach the tenants of lords who held franchises 
but were  not  specially summoned  to parliament ; but  a 
prolonged dispute was apparently waged over the question 
whether  boroughs  which  had  ceased  to  make,  or  were 
irregular in, their returns could  be  made to contribute to 
the wages of  knights of  the shire.  An occasional return by a 
borough of  members of  its own may have been some insur- 
ance against regular assessment to wages for knights of  the 
shire.  There may have been some connexion between this 
and  the  petitions  in  parliament,  which  were  occasionally 
presented  as late as Henry  VI, that the writs de expensis 
for burgesses as well  as for knights should be  sent to the 
sheriffs.  l 
The obvious policy  of  the Crown  to establish, so far as 
precision  in  writs  could  effect it,  a  uniform standard  of 
parliamentary service and remuneration could not, however, 
be achieved at once.  The knights of  the shires rose to it 
more readily than the burgesses, and after the middle of  the 
fourteenth century their  attendance was  as exemplary  as 
their predominance in the house of  commons was marked. 
It would  not perhaps  be  fair to say that burgesses  were 
more  class-conscious  than  the  knights,  for  the  rolls  of 
parliament bear ample witness to the fact that the knights 
regarded themselves as la commune and the law of  the land 
as equivalent  to the land  laws.  But burgesses  were  less 
confident of  making  their  views  and  interests  prevail  at 
Westminster, and they were more locally- and economically- 
'  Rot.  Purl., iv. 350,  352; to both these petitions  the government in 
1430 refused  the royal  assent.  As  late as  17 Ed.  I11 writs  de  expensis 
for Wanvick borough and Shaftesbury had  been  addressed to the sheriffs 
of  Warwickshire  and  Dorset  respectively  (Prynne,  iv.  196;  cf.  ibid., 
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minded  than the landed gentry.  Two or four shillings  a 
day was  a heavier  burden for a single borough  than four 
or eight shillings for an  entire county ;  there was less chance 
of  evading  or distributing  its weight;  and the increasing 
length  of  parliamentary  sessions  was  always  magnifying 
at least the appearance of  the exaction.  The wages bill for 
the  city  of  York  for  a  single  parliament  mounted  from 
£3 4s. and ;GI  16s. in two parliaments of  1334  to £83 4s. for 
one  parliament  in  1472,~  and  eventually the oligarchical 
councillors  had  to  shoulder  the  burden  themselves. 
"  Although,"  resolves  the  Reading  council  in  1555, "  the 
charges  thereof  ought  of  right to be  borne and paied  by 
th' enhabitantes of  the borough,"  they reluctantly assess it 
on themselves, 8d. for each "  burgess of  the bench " and 6d. 
for each other burgess3 
The earliest writs de expensis, which had sanctioned lower 
rates  than  2s.  a  day,  were  themselves  an  obstacle  to 
acquiescence in the higher rate which became almost uniform 
in the writs  after  1330.  There  are occasional  exceptions. 
In 8 Ed. 111, when all the other boroughs have writs for 2s. 
a day, the two burgesses for Nottingham have one for only 
40s for  twelve  days, i.e.,  IS.  8d.  a  day, the original  rate 
of the writs;  and as late as 1437  its council resolved that 
its representatives should receive IS.  qd. a day and no more.'4 
But in the other parliaments for which Nottingham receives 
a  writ  de  expensis  its burgesses  are allotted  2s.  a  day.5 
Northampton  provides  another  exception  in  1361;  after 
receiving a number of  writs for 2s. a day it then gets one for 
one member only at IS.  qd. a day.6  But Northampton again 
1  Stubbs, Const. Hist., iii. 465-6. 
2  Davies, York Records, p. 45 ; Return of  Members, i. 362. 
3 Guilding, Reading  Records, i. 249-50. 
4  Nottingham  Borough  Records,  ii.  423-4;  Prynne,  iv.  132.  In  I427 
Cambridge made an arrangement to pay only IS.  a day (Cooper, Annals, 
i.  178, 186). 
6  In  1348 Prynne  (iv.  208) gives them  L4  4s. for fifteen days, but I 
think  he  has omitted  six days'  travelling;  the Notts knights  for that 
parliament get A8  8s. for twenty-one days.  For the same parliament the 
40s. assigned to two Reigate M.P.'s for fifteen days is apparently a mis- 
print for 60s.  All the other burgesses get 2s. a day. 
@  Cal. Glosc Rolls. 1360-4, p. 252. 
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gets 2s. a day in the other writs it receives;  and after 1330 
that is the established  rule  for almost  all burgesses  who 
obtain  writs  de  expensis.  Another  rule  is  that writs  are 
available  only  for members  who  attend  throughout  the 
session.  They were not issued  until the last day, and no 
one who left without leave got his writ.  Slight relaxations 
were  occasionally  made  for late comers,  especially from  a 
distance.  Helston,  for instance, gets a  writ  at 2s.  a  day 
for thirty-two days in 25 Ed. 111 when it should have been 
for thirty-six ; and in 10  Ed. I11 Tavistock is also four days 
short.  In 17  Ed. I11 four shires have different attendances 
specified for the two knights who represented each of  them ; 
the  difference  between  the  two  Bedfordshire  knights  is 
two days, between  the Shropshire knights six, the Stafford- 
shire knights seven, and the Hampshire knights eight days. 
This appears to be the maximum  discrepancy in the writs 
except for the unique case of Cambridgeshire in the second 
parliament  of  1340,  where  one  of  the  knights,  Rishton, 
was paid for fifteen days only, while Colville, his colleague, 
was  paid for forty-eight (the session lasted for forty-five). 
Prynne suggests that Rishton was elected during the session 
to replace a dead predecessor, but his name appears with 
Colville's in the original return ; more probably Rishton fell 
ill  after the first  fortnight, but was  allowed  his  expenses 
for the time he attended. 
There is one general concession made in the writs to the 
difficulty in securing a  perfect  attendance.  No  knight or 
burgess  is penalized  on account of  his colleague's absence 
We have noted the rare occasions after 1376 on which asingle 
knight for a shire obtains a writ de expensis.  The occasions 
on which the same thing happens to a burgess are far more 
numerous,l amounting sometimes to three-quarters  of the 
burgesses obtaining writs  for  a particular  parliament, and 
at other times to three-quarters  of  the burgesses  from a 
particular shire.  Thus in March 1340  three out of the four 
boroughs receiving writs have them for single M.P.'s,  and 
I have not, however, noted a single case in which one member for a 
borough gets one amount and the other a different sum.  * APPENDIX  I1  41 ' 
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in  October  1362 three  out  of  the  four  Devon  boroughs 
receiving  writs  have  them  for  only  one  member  apiece.' 
For the rest it is clear  that a  member  who wants a  writ 
de expensis must attend throughout the session and be paid 
the standard rate.  The rule was not a very effective means 
of  compulsion, but the government ventured upon no other. 
It was weak in the middle ages, but chancery could at  least 
refuse  to give  official  sanction  and  aid  to  the breach  of 
the rules it adopted in its writs  de expensis.  Richard 11, 
indeed, threatened  to amerce his burgesses  and knights of 
the shire  as he  did  his  barons  for non-attendance;  but 
evidence is lacking for any effects of  the threat, and the 
crown was of  course  interested principally  in securing the 
attendance of  some, rather than all, of  the representatives 
of  the various estates.  The grant by some borough repre- 
sentatives of  a  tenth, and by some knights of  a  fifteenth, 
made  it binding on  all;  there was  no more  need  for  all 
boroughs to participate  in taxing themselves than for all 
peers  to participate  in the  trial  of  one  of  their  number. 
It met  all the obligations of  the law  if  the trial were by 
some peers and the taxation by some burgesses and knights. 
The evolution of these rules of the writs does, however, 
help us a little in bridging the gulf  between them and. the 
sheriffs' returns.  Members  might,  and did,  attend parlia- 
ment and yet  fail to obtain writs  for their wages,  either 
because their attendance fell short of  the requisite standard 
or  because  their  constituencies  refused  to pay the wages 
prescribed  in the writs.  Obviously  neither  cause  affected 
the shires, which all as a rule met both requirements.  Nor 
is  it probable  that brevity  of  attendance  deprived  many 
burgesses  of  their  writs,  except  possibly  in constituencies 
near to Westminster.  A  member was not likely to spend 
sixteen days in  travelling  to and from  London  and then 
forfeit his writ for payment  for those days, as well as for 
his  actual  attendance,  by  absence  if  he  could  avoid  it. 
The rate of payment did not, however,  depend upon him, 
and economical  boroughs  tried  all sorts of  expedients  to 
Cal. Close Rolls,  1339-40,  p. 468:  1360-4,  p. 440. 
evade or reduce their commitments in this respect.  Again 
and again boroughs bluntly refused to make any return at 
all, and with many of them repeated refusals developed into 
total abstinence from parliamentary representation.  Some 
of  them  bound  their  Recorders,l  others  their  mayors  or 
 bailiff^,^ to serve ex officio ; occasionally representation was 
thrust on a sheriff's clerk who had other business in town.' 
In Wessex there flourished for a time the practice of  making 
one representative serve for several constituencies, even as 
many as half  a dozen. 
This  curious  expedient  deserves  further  investigation 
than it has yet re~eived.~  It seems to have started in 1344, 
when  Robert de Bridport is returned  both for Exeter and 
Bridport.  In 1346 Thomas de Trente is  returned  simul- 
taneously  for three Dorset boroughs, Bridport, Dorchester, 
and Shaftesbury.  In January  1347-8,  Robert de Bridport 
is returned for Bridport and Lyme, and again for those two 
constituencies in the next parliament, to which also Roger 
of Maningford is returned for three other Dorset boroughs, 
Blandford, Shaftesbury, and Wareham.  Bridport and Lyme 
both chose one Robert Beyminster in 1351,  and he was also 
returned  for  Exeter,  where  his  colleague  was  a  more 
notorious pluralist, Nicholas Whyting.  Whyting had ousted 
Robert  de Bridport  from  Exeter  in  1348,  as Beyminster 
ousted him from Bridport and Lyme in 1351  ; and Whyting 
was now returned not only for Exeter, but for the county 
of  Devon  and  Dartmouth  as  well.  He  went  further  in 
1352,  when  he  was  simultaneously  returned  for  Devon, 
See,  for  instance,  Salisbuvy  Corfioration  MSS.  (H.M.C.  "Various 
Collections "),  iv.  245 Shrewsbury  MSS.  (H.M.C.  XV. x.  5, 12,  13) ; 
Nottinghaln  Records,  111.  320.  Shrewsbury in  1553  says membership of 
parliament  "is supposed  to be incident to his  office of  Recordership." 
At Reading the "  Recorder or Steward "  had the return of  writs (Guilding, 
i.  225,  226).  Elsewhere it was more usually the mayor and  (or) bailiff 
who, failing others, might feel bound to return themselves. 
2  E.g. in 1382 Northampton  resolved  that the mayor should  normally 
be elected M.P.  (Markham and Cox, Borough Rec. of  Northampton, i. 248). 
In 1555 the mayor of  Reading was paid  ;GI  instead of  ;G5  as M.P. for the 
borough  (Guilding, i. 249-50.  Cf. Engl. Hist. Rev.. xxx~x.  517). 
a  In February 1333-4  Richard Foxton, "  sheriff's  clerk,"  was M.P.  for 
the borough of  Le~cester  (Bateson, ii.  14;  Off.  RR. i.  102). 
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Dartmouth,  Tavistock,  Torrington,  and  Totnes.  Henry 
Percehay, his colleague in the representation of  the county, 
was  also  his  colleague at Torrington, and John  Mille, his 
colleague at Tavistock, was  also  returned  for  Barnstaple. 
The infection had spread to Cornwall ; John  Tremayne was 
returned  for  both  Bodmin  and Helston,  and his  son  for 
Launceston.  For the 13.54 parliament there are only three 
Devon  returns  extant,  but  Whyting  appears  in  two  of 
them,  Devon  and  Tavistock;  and  in  Dorset  Robert  de 
Beyminster,  senior,  and  Robert  de  Beyminster,  junior, 
are both  returned  for  both Bridport  and Dorchester, the 
senior finding a third seat at Lyme.  No Cornish boroughs 
appear in the returns for 1354, but in  1355 six gentlemen 
monopolize the fourteen seats in the duchy.  Three of  them 
modestly have but one apiece, but the other three members 
divide  the  remaining  eleven  seats between  them.  John 
Tremayne is returned for the shire, Bodmin, and Liskeard ; 
John Caeron for Bodmin, Launceston, Lostwithiel, and Truro ; 
and John  Hamely for Helston,  Liskeard,  Lostwithiel, and 
Truro.  Dorset has one pluralist, who is returned for Dor- 
Chester and Weymouth ;  and Somerset another, who sits for 
Bridgewater and Taunt0n.l 
This record  of  pluralism  in  1355  is not again  equalled, 
although in 1362, to John Hill's six seats and John Wonard's 
four  must be  added  Cary's  representation  of  Devon  and 
Launceston,  and  Beyminster's  continued  occupation  of 
Bridport and Lyme, which lasted till 1363.  Wonard remains 
a  pluralist  till  1384, but  is  not  returned for  more  than 
two constituencies in any one parliament.  Dartmouth and 
Barnstaple return  the  same  two  M.P.'s  in October  1377, 
and each of  the  two  finds  a third  seat in the shire.$  In 
Cornwall the same member continues occasionally to appear 
for three constituencies in the same return ; but even Corn- 
wall was by the end of  the century able to find a different 
1 These details can all be found, under their respective dates, in Prynne's  ' 
Briefe  Register  (part iv.), the Oficial Return  of  M.P.'s  (pt. i.), and  the 
Calendar of  Close Rolls. 
See above, p. 155 n. 2.  3  Oficial Return, i., App. p. xv. 
member  for  each  of  its  fourteen  seats,  and  pluralism 
grew  rare,  if  not  extinct, elsewhere.  Its significance is a 
nlatter of  speculation.  Was greed on the part of  members 
or economy on that of  constituencies the motive?  In 1346 
Thomas de Trente secured writs de expensis in respect of  all 
his constituencies, in two of  them for himself and a colleague, 
in the third for himself  a1one.l  Similarly in 1348 Maning- 
ford gets writs for his three seats, involving, of  course, treble 
pay  not  only  for  attendance  but  for  travelling  as well. 
Nicholas Whyting in 1351 gets half  of  £6  12s. for Exeter, 
the same sum for Dartmouth, and half of  L13  4s. as knight 
of  the shire.  In I352  he  gets half  of  sixteen guineas as 
knight  of  the shire and half  of  eight  guineas for each  of 
his  four  borough  constituencies.  This  would  give  him 
twenty-four  guineas for his forty-two days'  service as against 
the eight guineas to which a knight, and the four to which 
a burgess,  was  entitled for that parliament.  Possibly  he 
was a contractor for the CrCcy and Calais campaigns. 
His fellow-profiteers seem to have been  equally grasping 
and successful  down  to 1362.  But in that year Cary gets 
a writ de expensis for Devon, but not for Launceston; and 
Hill gets one for Exeter but not for any of  the five other 
boroughs for  which he was returned.  The profiteering game 
was  up.  Members  might  get  returned  for  various  con- 
stituencies ; they might even get some pay from more than 
one, but they would not get more than one writ giving them 
the  full  rate  of  remuneration.  Pluralism  was  also  dis- 
couraged  by parliamentary  protests  against the return  of 
non-resident  members,  and  possibly  by  a  growing  local 
desire for self-expression, though we may be sure that, when 
Barnstaple protested against a stranger in 1385, it was the 
payment  and not  the person  to which  it  objected;  the 
protest was provoked by the writ de expensis and not by the 
sheriff's  return.  So West  Derby  had  protested  in  I324 
against the sheriff's  nomination of two knights of  Lancashire, 
not because he had violated electoral rights, but because he 
1 This, at  least, seems fairly conclusive evidence that his colleague in the 
third constituency did not attend. APPENDIX  11  4r.5 
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levied £20 for the wages of  his nominees when other members 
could have been procured for £10  or even 10  marks.1 
Pluralism may have promoted economy in the matter of 
wages;  but it was  an arrangement  which  could  only  be 
manipulated successfully in the court of  a county returning a 
number  of  borough  members.  Hence  its  prevalence  in 
Cornwall,  Devon,  Dorset,  and  occasionally  Wilts  and 
Somerset, each with  from  half-a-dozen to a  dozen  parlia- 
mentary  boroughs.  A  more  regular  method  of  reducing 
expenses  was  persistence  in  the  older  and lower  rates of 
payment;  and this undoubtedly accounts for the absence 
of  many members' names from the enrolled writs de expensis. 
The boroughs were not, however,  quite consistent  in their 
cheese-paring policy.  All, except those which rarely made 
a return, felt it desirable at more or less regular intervals 
to pay members at the full rate and get writs de  expensis. 
Leicester  is a  case in point.  It received four writs in the 
first seven years of  Edward 111, and then none in the next 
seventeen.  The reason seems clear ; the borough would not 
raise its rates of  payment  to the level now specified in the 
writs.  Members continue to be paid for some parliaments, 
but the rate is usually IS.  6d., and it falls to IS.  gd. and to  IS. 
in 1340-1.  We also have such entries in the borough records 
as the payment of  £1 to R. Donnington for one parliament 
and 13s. qd. for the next, and "  W. Brid and John of  Stafford 
for their expenses at parliament and for scrutinizing a tally, 
IOS."  But from  1341  to 1350  the borough records  fail to 
note, by any payment  at all, the presence  of  members in 
parliament,  in  spite  of  sheriffs'  returns  for  1344,  1346, 
and twice in 1348.~ But in 1351  Leicester  comes fairly up 
to the mark, pays £4  16s.  to its two burgesses, and has a 
Oficial Return, i. 225 n.;  Purl.  Writs, 11,  ii.  315. 
Bateson,  Leicester  Borough  Records,  ii.  14-15,  17,.  40,  45, 47.  48; 
the payment  (ii. 28) of  L6  18s. 61d. to "persons " going  to parliament 
"  and to the king"  in  1337 might be an exception, but the MS. is torn, 
no  names and not even the number of  persons are forthcoming, and the 
sum bears not the remotest relation to the wages paid for that parliament, 
which only sat eleven days and would therefore have entitled a Leicester 
burgess to 34s.  Persons, of  course, went to the king and to parliament 
for various purposes without being  members of  parliament.  See below, 
p. 426. 
writ.  The writ, indeed, is for £5  8s., being as. a day for a 
twenty-one days' parliament  and six days' traveUing;  the 
twelve  shillings  were  perhaps  deducted  for  incidental 
expenses paid by the borough, such as the cost of  the writ 
-a  deduction against which members sometimes protested.1 
This level is not, however, maintained.  In 1353  the two 
members are: paid at IS.  6d. and get no writ.  In 1354 they 
get a writ for £5 I~s.,  but are only paid £4 4s., the rate not 
being specified.  In 1358  their rate is specified at IS.  8d. a 
day and no writ is enrolled.  There are, in fact, no  more 
writs for Leicester till 1371,  unless it received an unrecorded 
writ for the spring of  1360.  The parliamentary history of 
that spring is anomal~us,~  no writs de expensis exist, and the 
names  of  the Leicester  burgesses,  retu~ned  by the sheriff, 
do not agree with  those paid by the borough;  the rate is 
2s.  a day, but only for six days.  This may have been for 
that one of  the five simultaneous provincial assemblies which 
was held at Leicester in March, in which case the absence of 
writs de expensis is easily understood;  if  it was for the May 
parliament at Westminster, the whole of  the sum would have 
gone in travelling expenses.  Apart from  an omnibus sum 
of  £11 6s. 8d. for parliaments  which  cannot be  identified, 
the wages until 1371  are below the standard ; one Leicester 
M.P. alone is paid as a rule, and he receives in 1362  £2 4s., 
when £4 10s. would have been his proper wage, and in 1363 
has only IS.  8d. a day for twenty-four days instead of  2s. for 
thirty.  In 1369 two members are paid the sum due to one. 
In February 1371 we have a case which illustrates the defects 
and conflicts of  our evidence.  There are no sheriffs' returns 
for  that  parliament.  Leicester,  however,  has  a  writ  de 
expensis for its two members, Taillard and Knighton, who 
are allotted the proper amount of  £8 4s. for the thirty-five 
days that parliament sat and six days' travelling.  Taillard 
was one of  the M.P.'s nominated by the crown to attend al:;o 
the ' council ' held  at Winchester in June,  which  sat  for 
1 Some boroughs at least paid for the cost of their members'  writs (cf. 
Bacon, Annals of  Ipswzch, p.  185). 
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nine days.  The borough records note his payment of  28s., 
apparently for this council, but say nothing about paying 
the heavier expenses for him and Knighton at the preceding 
parliament.  By this time the borough clerk Who  kept the 
mayor's  accounts seems  almost  to have  decided  that,  if 
there was  a  writ  de  expensis,  there was  no need  to enter 
M.P.s'  wages in the borough  accounts.  Thus in  1372  and 
1373 there are borough accounts of  payments but no writs, 
in January 1375-6  (the Good parliament) there is a writ for 
full attendance, but no reference in the borough  accounts, 
and for January 1376-7  no writ though full wages are 1 paid 
to two Leicester  M.P.'s.  But then the  mayor's  accounts 
cease "  and the chamberlain's accounts, which should have 
supplied their  place,  have been  lost."  However  obscure 
and contradictory  may  be  the  conclusions  they  suggest, 
they agree with the writs de expensis in containing no record 
of  payment for many members whose names appear in the 
sheriffs' election returns. 
Reading  is  another  borough  whose  published  records 3 
yield some information.  It appears with almost unfailing 
regularity  in  the  sheriff's  election  returns,  and  has  nine 
enrolled writs de expensis between 1327 and 1351,  then none 
till the Good parliament, and none after it except in 1403 
and 1414.  The borough  records unfortunately do not give 
any details until the parliament of  February 1357-8,  when 
W.  Warde, one  of  the members,  pro  expensis suis versus 
9arZiamentum pro ix. diebus, receives an unspecified or obliter- 
ated sum.  But that parliament sat for nineteen days, and 
1 Or  at least  credit is claimed  for the payment in  the chamberlain's 
accounts a  year  later.  The clerk  originally  wrote "  R.  Knighton  and 
R. Gamston,"  who were M.P.'s  in October, not January 1377, then crossed 
them  out and substituted  the correct  names.  Gamston  or  Gamelston, 
one of  the M.P.'s in October, had been in January one of  the chamberlains 
in whose account the entry occurs ! 
a  Bateson,  Introd.,  vol.  i. p.  xvii.;  the other references  to Leicester 
M.P.'s  (not specified in the index) are ibid., ii. 80, 91,  106, 108, 110, 141, 
147-8,  158. 
Hist. MSS. Comm., 11th Rep., App. vii. 171 sqq.  These are, of  course, 
merely extracts, but my impression is that Dr. Macray extracted all the 
references to payment of  M.P.'s  that he  noted.  He certainly  gives  all 
those which occur before 1500 in Guilding's subsequent verbatim publica- 
tion of  the Reading Diary (4 vob..  1892-6).  Unfortunately it does  not 
begin till 1431. 
neither Warde nor his  unpaid  colleague gets a writ.  The 
next  reference  is  to  the  parliament  of  May  1368,  when 
two members received 50s. between  them pro parliamento. 
Since that parliament sat for twenty-one  days, they were 
obviously paid less than the proper  rate 1 or attended but 
part  of  the  session,  and  no  writ  was  forthcoming.  The 
borough  records  yield  nothing more till the parliament  of 
January 1379-80,  when one of the members receives 4s. for 
four days' attendance, and the other 6s. far six days.  That 
parliament  sat for forty-eight days.  There is,  of  course, 
no writ, but Reading pays an unspecified sum to Richard 
Budd, its mayor,  who  was  not  M.P.,  for his  expenses in 
eundo  et  redeundo  London.  et  ibidem  morando pro  licencia 
habenda  pro  hominibus  villae  de  parliamento.  For  the 
Northampton  parliament of  November 1380,  two Reading 
M.P.'s  are paid  31s.  qd.;  again there is no writ  because 
parliament  sst for thirty-three days, and Reading paid its 
two members less than half  the wages due to one.2  The 
next payment is one of  10s.  each to the two M.P.'s  in the 
parliament of  October 1385, which sat for forty-eight days, 
and a full attendance at which would have entitled them to 
£5 apiece.  The same paragraph assigns to Thomas Drovere 
pro  mora  sua apud  Westmonasterium in 9arZiament0, 40d,, 
and to John  Balet pro consimili,  15d. ; neither was M.P., 
but  both  attended  it for  some  business  relating  to  the 
borough.  Balet,  however,  is  mentioned  as M.P.  with  a 
colleague at the Cambridge parliament of  1388,  but without 
any record of  their wages, though 3s. qd. was then paid to 
a third person pro licencia  petenda de  parliamento.  From 
1393 to 1413  the account rolls are wanting;  but in 1403 two 
Reading  M.P.'s  have  a  writ  for  £14  4s.  for  seventy-one 
days, and in 1414  for £7 for thirty-five days.3 
Details are abnormally scanty elsewhere than at Reading 
Reading was only  allowed one day's  travelling  expenses each way; 
its proper  wage  for  a  twenty-one  days'  parliament  was  therefore  46s. 
for each M.P. 
For  a parliament meeting  at Northampton  the Berkshire  travelling 
allowance was two days each way;  a single burgess's  proper  wage was 
therefore L3  14s. 
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for the early part of  the fifteenth century;  and if the defect 
of  records  justifies  any political  inference,  it suggests that 
the Lancastrian experilllerlt was a parliamentary oligarchy, 
which  had  succeeded  in  preventing  the  creation  of  new 
boroughs, then regularized nominations, and went on to limit 
the franchise in the counties.  But the oligarchy  broke up 
into factions, and schism liberated  forces surging up from 
below.  New boroughs appear and others revive in the reign 
of Henry VI.  The specification of  dates in election returns 
after 1406  restricted the sheriffs' opportunities for manipu- 
lation;  the general adoption of  the indenture system gave 
at least a handful of  suitors from each borough some voice 
in the return the sheriff made on its behalf  in the county- 
court ; contested elections grow more frequent ; and before 
the end of  the century some boroughs at least were making 
careful regulations for the election, attendance, and payment 
of their burgesses.l  With or without kings' writs de expensis 
boroughs pay the full rate for the full attendance of  members. 
In spite of  its resolution that no burgess should have more 
than IS.  qd. a day, Nottingham pays 2s.  in 1497,~  tho~gli 
the lower rate obtained as late as the reign of  Edward IV. 
Reading  also  pays  two  members for  the whole  session of 
1504,  though  it  relapses  into 40s.  for a single M.P. for a 
hundred  days'  session in  1515.  The fall  in  the value  of 
money gradually made it easier for boroughs  to rise  to the 
fixed level of  the writs, facilitated the extension of  represejil- 
tation, and eventually rendered their stereotyped standard 
obsolete.  Neither  members  who  sought  seats  for  their 
"  learning's  sake "  and  obtained  them  on  a  promise  to 
acquit their  constituencies of  their  obligation to pay,4 nor 
1 Flemming,  England  under  the  Lancastrians,  pp.  160-3;  Thornley, 
England under the  Yorkists, p. I37:.. 
2  Nottingham Borough  Records, 111.  70;  in  1504 its Recorder is pald  as 
M.P. for the whole session but, being Recorder, only at the rate of  IS.  a 
day (ibid., iii. 320. 325). 
3  Rutland MSS. (Hist. MSS. Comm.), i. 207. 
4  Cf.  H.  J. Moule,  Charters  of  Weymouth  and Melcornbe,  pp.  128-9; 
Chanter and Wainwright, Barnstaple Records, ii. 255-7  ; Hist. MSS. Comm., 
"Various Collections," iv. 230 (Salisbury), 271 (Orford). The last reference 
is  to an acquittance from Sir Adam Felton discharging Orford from  any 
wages it mav owe him.  It is dated  2  November,  1695, and is  the latest 
refknce I have to payment of  wages for M.P.'s. 
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members who were paid 5s. or 6s. Sd. a day, had any use for 
kings'  writs  which  imposed  a  beggarly  florin.  The local 
communities of  the middle ages, which paid members out 
of  their rates, turned into a nationalized aristocracy which 
met the expenses out of  its own well-lined but individualistic 
pockets, and eventually into a social democracy which paid 
them out of  the national funds. 
Reading and Leicester cannot, however, be taken as  typical 
of  more than a very limited number of  boroughs, and even 
their imperfect attendance probably reaches a higher stan- 
dard than most.  "  There be  a dozen towns in England," 
writes John  Paston to his brother  as late as 21  September, 
1472, "  that choose no burgesses which ought to."  When 
Reading, but one day's journey  from London, jibs  at the 
payment of  wages, what can we expect from distant boroughs 
which have  to provide  eight  times  as much  in  travelling 
expenses ?  And when Leicester, with a tax-paying popula- 
tion of  2101  in 1377, will not pay 2s. a day, can we predicate 
a greater liberality on the part of  Bath and Rochester, each 
with a tax-paying population of  570, of  Carlisle with 678, of 
Chichester with 869, or of  Dartmouth with 506  ?  There is 
little wonder  that eleven Cornish seats should be filled by 
three members,  that writs de  exfiensis should be scarce for 
It does not really help us to dwell on the wealth of  London, Bristol, 
or Nonvich  (E~glish  Hist.  Rev.,  xxxix. 517-21),  as evidence that poorer 
boroughs sent members without  getting writs de  expensis.  The poorest 
of those  three had  a wealth  and population  several times greater than 
the average  borough,  and  even  wealth  was  no  proof  of  parliamentary 
service.  Coventry  and  Plymouth  were  richer  in  1377  than  Nonvich 
(Archaologia, vii.  340-3),  yet they did  not  even  make returns.  Wages 
may  have  been  of  small account to such a  man  as William  Canynges, 
the "  great Bristol merchant."  but that did not prevent him from suing 
out his writ  de expensis (Prynne, iv. 366; Cal. Close Rolls, 1381-5, p. 291). 
nor  did  it prevent  Edward  Taverner  of  Gloucester  and John  Stokes of 
Bristol, whose wealth is also cited  to prove a like independence  of  writs 
de expensis (Prynne, iv. 306, 352;  Cal. Close Rolls, 1374-7, p. 430;  1381-5, 
p.  107).  Nor  did  John  Plumtre's  benefactions  to Nottingham prevent 
it from refusing  to pay its M.P.'s more than  IS.  qd. a day.  The reason 
xhy most boroughs did not get writs was not that they got higher wages 
without them, but that the boroughs  refused  to pay even  2s.  SO, too, 
the  argument  that burgesses  must  have been  numerous  in  parliament 
because they are called an estate is odd in view of  the fact that the same 
sentence  mentions  the  judges  as another '  estate.'  The official Return 
c:  Members  of  Parl$maent is not, by  the bye, published  by  the P.R.0.. 
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members who attended parliaments throughout the sessions 
and were paid the prescribed rate of  wages. 
Another feature of  interest appears from a comparison of 
these  writs.  Insufficient  meaning  has  sometimes  been 
attached  to Stubbs's  remark  that the  medieval  house  of 
commons was a concentration of  county-courts.  We have 
noted the fact that the elections for the boroughs as well as 
the shires were made there.  The shires are the units which 
supply the respective quotas of  suitors to the king's  high 
court  at Westminster;  the  sheriff  makes  all  the returns 
(except those of  the Cinque  Ports after  1366) l; and it is 
from his jurisdiction that a few boroughs escape when they 
are  made  into  shires  themselves.  Now,  grouping  the 
burgesses'  writs  de  expensis  under  the various  shires,  as 
the sheriffs grouped the returns, the writs indicate far more 
equality  in  actual  representation  in  parliament  between 
different shires than the number of  boroughs would suggest. 
Devon,  with  its seven  boroughs,  does  indeed  get  54,  the 
largest  number of  borough  writs  de  ex$ensis,  but Oxford- 
shire, with its single borough, comes next with  40;  Kent 
and Lincolnshire, with two boroughs each, get 39, the same 
number as Sussex with seven boroughs ; Herefordshire, with 
two boroughs, gets 38;  Surrey, with four, but 36;  Dorset, 
with seven, but 35;  and Wilts, with nine, but 33.  On the 
other hand, Bedfordshire  with one borough gets 32 writs; 
Shropshire and Cornwall each get 29, though Cornwall has 
six boroughs and Shropshire only two.  Somerset with seven 
boroughs has 28 writs, but Worcestershire with only one gets 
25.  It seems also natural that, when there is only one parlia- 
mentary borough in a county and that is the county borough, 
it should get far more than the average number of  borough 
writs de  expensis.  Thus Oxford comes highest with 40 and 
Bedford next with 32.  Even where there is a second borough 
in the county, the county borough remains high and generally 
has more  writs than the other.  Thus Hereford  has 29  to 
1 Even when merchants  alone  are summoned, they are summoned  by 
the sheriffs del corps du countze (Hot. Purl., ii. 120; this, however, was not 
always the case;  see Return of  M.P.'s,  i. 113 and 115  n.). 
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Leominster's 8, Lincoln 27  to Grimsby's 8, Reading  12  to 
Wallingford's  6,  and  Ipswich  11  to  the  3  of  Dunwich. 
Where there are several boroughs in a shire, the number of 
writs  is equally  discrepant.  Thus Exeter has 24,  but no 
other Devon  borough  more than 8; Chichester has 24, no 
other  Sussex  borough  more  than 4;  Salisbury  (including 
Old Sarum) has 18,  no other Wiltshire borough  more than 
3.  On the other hand, Rochester with 19  is nearly equal to 
Canterbury with 20, Bridgnorth with 14  to Shrewsbury with 
15, Southwark with 13 to Guildford with 17;  while Shaftes- 
bury with 11  outdoes Dorchester  with 8; Maldon with  9, 
Colchester with 8; Bristol with 11,  Gloucester with 5.  In 
Cornwall Helston has 7, Launceston 6, Truro and Bodmin 5 
each, Liskeard  4, and Lostwithiel 2.  In Buckinghamshire 
Wycombe has g, while Buckingham never makes a return.] 
The effect of  distance from London is also marked; in spite 
of  parliaments held in the north, no borough  north of  the 
Trent gets any great number of  writs;  Newcastle  has 13, 
Hull 8, Carlisle 6. 
Oxford's record suggests one further comlnent.  Between 
1376  and the end of  Richard  11's  reign  it obtained writs 
de expensis for 23 out of  24 parliaments.  Yet from Oxford 2 
comes the suggestion that boroughs get few writs enrolled, 
compared with the shires, because it was so much easier for 
them to collect their wages without any writs at all.  Why 
then these enrolments for Oxford ?  Is  not exemplary attend- 
ance on  the part of  members a  better  explanation of  the 
enrolments  than  an imaginary  surcease  of  an  imaginary 
independence of  writs, which, whether enrolled or not, con- 
tinued to be issued down to the seventeenth century?  We 
might look for light from the local records, but if  the accounts 
exist  at Oxford  they have  apparently escaped  attenti~n.~ 
1 It  has a solitary summons in 1353, but no return to it has been found 
(Return of  Members, i. 153). 
2  English Hist. Rev., xxxix. 512. 
a  Andrew  Clark's  edition of  Wood's  City  of  Oxford  (Oxf. Hist.  Soc.) 
merely copies the names of  its M.P.'s  from the official Return, and Thorold 
Rogers'  Oxford City Documents, while it contains a good deal about pay- 
ment of  taxes, says nothing  about the payment of  members.  No other 
of  the Society's  36 volumes appears to deal with the subject.  One of the APPENDIX  If  425  424  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
It is only from local sources that the problem of  the actual 
attendance in  medieval  parliaments  can  be  solved;  and, 
so far, few  of  those borough  records  have been  edited  or 
examined in such a way as to give much help.  Generally 
editors print an extract or two as samples without attempt- 
ing to determine whether the extracts are examples or excep- 
most  recent  volumes  on borough  records  (Farley's  Winchester Records, 
1923)  illustrates the information required but not provided for our purpose. 
Little more than a page is devoted to the subject (pp. 110-11),  though 
even  that supplies evidence of  irregularity in  parliamentary attendance 
from a constituency where we should hardly expect it.  Only eight parlia- 
ments are instanced.  In 26 Ed. I11 "  only one burgess was sent," and he 
received but 20s. ; the parliament lasted thirty days, and a single member 
was entitled to ;53 and his travelling expenses.  In 27 Ed. I11 two members 
attend and receive A3  15s. ; this was pretty full payment at 2s. a day each 
for a parliament which  sat for eighteen days, though it leaves only  3s. 
instead of  12s. for travelling expenses.  The names of  these three members 
are given but they do not agree with those returned by the sheriff.  For 
the Winchester '  parliament'  of  June 1371 there is no item for payment 
in  the borough  records,  though  Stephen  Haym was  nominated  by the 
king to attend.  He is said, however, to receive 2s.  a day for the parlia- 
ment  of  2 Rich. I1 and A3  0s. qd. for divers  business  in London.  But 
we  are not told for how many days he was paid; there were two parlia- 
ments  in  2  Rich.  11, Haym's  name  does  not  appear  in  the  sheriff's 
returns for the firs;:  and there is no return for the second.  In 1394 we 
are  told  that the  parliament  at York"  cost  Winchester  LIO  15s.  in 
members' wages.  No parliament was held at York in Richard 11's reign : 
one was summoned there in 1392, but was prorogued sine die before it met. 
The members'  names are not given;  if  the parliament was that held at 
Westminster in January 1394, they were well paid, for it sat for thirty- 
nine days and the normal wage for two Winchester citizens would have 
been  ,67  16s.,  excluding  travelling  expenses.  But  in  21  Rich. I1  two 
burgesses, whose names again are not given but can be found in the official 
return, were only paid  but 53 instead of  A5  10s. for a parliament which 
sat for twenty-five days, not counting  travelling  expenses  to and from 
Shrewsbury, to which it was adjourned after twelve days' session at  West- 
minster:  possibly  the Winchester  members  did  not  go  (the travelling 
expenses  for this parliament  are apparently  calculated  on  the singular 
assumption  that it had sat all along at Shrewsbury and for twenty-five 
days; Prynne, iv. 442-6).  A parliament of  8 Henry IV  cost Winchester, 
we are told, LI~  16s. 8d. : the members'  names are again not given, but 
this may be the parliament  which had three sessions, two of  them in 7, 
and one in  8 Henry  IV  (Parry, Parliaments,  pp.  164-5).  and  sat  the 
unprecedented  length  of  171  days.  If  so,  the  Winchester  members 
received  a writ for ,636  12s.  (Prynne, iv.  481)  for the whole session and 
six days' travelling, and the extract from the borough  records may refer 
only to the last session.  Otherwise the members were scandalously under- 
paid.  In 9 Henry IV, for which parliament no extract is given from the 
borough  records,  two  other  Winchester  M.P.'s  received  a  writ  for  LIo 
for fifty days.  These writs, of  course, were at the standard  rate of  2s. 
a day each, but Winchester may not have paid it.  The last extract states 
that in  1422 the two burgesses  (whose names are once more  given  and 
agree with the official return) were only paid a shilling a day for twenty- 
four days, with 15s. to one and 2s.  to the other for uncovenanted services. 
tions.  The  records  themselves  are often  defective,  and, 
even when  printed  irt  extenso like  Stevenson's  Nottingham 
Records or Guilding's  Readieg Records,  they contain  very 
meagre references to the payment  of  M.P.'s  in the middle 
ages.  There is no more promising soil for the activities of 
branches  of  the  Historical  Association,  or  for  historical 
students anxious to write a thesis but debarred by distance 
from regular access to the Public Record Office.  The above 
figures will many of them need correction in detail, and the 
conclusions  which  they  seem  to  indicate  might  even  be 
completely  overthrown.  Unrevealed  borough  accounts 
might conceivably show that boroughs, especially boroughs 
on  the  ancient  demesne,  were  amerced  for  not  sending 
members to parliament. 
But before pursuing detailed investigations it is well  to 
acquire  some  knowledge  of  what  a  medieval  parliament 
was like and to avoid such assumptions  as that litigation 
in parliament involved the election  of  the litigants to the 
house of  commons, or that "  it is impossible to believe "  1 
that  bodies  were  not  represented  in  the  parliaments  to 
which  they presented  petitions.  The petitions mentioned 
above  show  what  a  curiously  comprehensive  and  ill- 
assorted  assembly  a  parliament  under  Edward  I  must 
have  been,  if  its  petitions  from  foreign  potentates  and 
prisoners  in  gaol,  paupers,  friars,  and  Jews  prove  that 
petitioners  were  present  or  represented  there.  Are  we 
really  to believe that Oxford University sent members  to 
parliament  in I305 because  it presented  a dozen petitions 
to  that  parliament;  that  Ireland,  Wales,  Scotland, 
Gascony, "  and other lands beyond the sea, and the isles " 
Engl. Hist. Rev., xxxix. 514, 520. 
2  Pp.  38,  42,  52.  The receivers  and  triers of  petitions appointed at 
every  parllament  were  not  appointed  to receive  and try  the petitions 
of  the house  of  commons;  and their report on many a petition  is non 
est petitio de parliamento. 
3 Printed in  Maitland's  Memoranda, pp. 44-7;  other Oxford petitions 
(mainly city) are collected  by Miss  L.  Toulmin  Smith in the Oxf. Hist. 
Soc.'s  Collectanea, iii.  (1896), pp. 79-161.  Cambridge  as well as Oxford 
university  and  the four mendicant  orders  complained  in  1366 pav  lour 
petitions mis devant le  roi  en parlement  (Rot. Parl., ii.  290;  cf. ibid., ii. 
310).  For petitions from Ireland and Calais, see ibid., iii. 66, 85-6. 426  THE  EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
were  represented  because  at  the  beginning  of  every 
medieval  parliament  persons  were  appointed  to  receive 
and  to  try  their  petitions;  and  that  Manchester  and 
Birmingham in 1831  and the Chartists in 1848  were repre- 
sented in parliament because  they petitioned  for represen- 
tation?  This is the old fallacy  of  Haxey's  case;  Haxey 
was  not  a  member  of  parliament,  but  chief  clerk  of  the 
court  of  common  pleas,  and  Richard  I1 was  naturally 
indignant  at his  trahison.  Parliament  was,  of  course,  a 
body to which everyone was from its beginning invited by 
proclamation to present all sorts of  petitions;  and, in the 
form of  private bills, they still come from all sorts of  bodies 
and  companies  which  have,  as  such,  no  representation. 
It should also be remembered  that then, as now,  all sorts 
of persons who were  not members of  parliament had busi- 
ness  at  Westminster.  Lobbying,  though  not  by  that 
name,  was  well  enough  known  in  the  middle  ages,  and 
even  parliamentary  boroughs  sent  other  persons  'to 
parliament ' than  their  members.  When  Leicester  pays 
its steward "for  carrying bills to parliament for obtaining 
pontage " and "  other jurats and honest men before parlia- 
ment at London," it was not paying the wages of  members1 
Salisbury in 1305  sent four citizens to parliament to plead 
against its bishop's right to tallage,  and two of  them only 
to  do  the  king's  business  as '  members.'  One  of  the 
duties of  a mayor, whether an M.P. or not, was to run on 
errands to London for his borough.  '  Members ' were not, 
indeed,  summoned  to  parliament  by  the  king  to present 
petitions at all;  they could do that without  being '  mem- 
bers.'  It was  powers  and not  petitions  with  which  the 
king  insisted  that '  members ' should  be  armed, and they 
were  summoned  by  the  king  ad faciendum  quod  de  com- 
muni  consilio  ordinabitur in pramissis,  which  in  practice 
meant  consenting  to  taxation;  a  handful  were  all  that 
were legally required or were anxious to come.2 
Bateson, Leicester Borough Record, i. 345, ii. 77; cf ibid., ii. 42,  108. 
a  Maitland, Memoranda, pp. Ixxviii. 265-79.  '  Member of  parliament ' 
is not, of course, fourteenth-century terminology, and to modern  ears it 
conveys a mass of false analogies, due to the consolidation of  innumerable 
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The  difficulty  of  securing  attendance  at county-courts 
is  familiar enough  to students of  the  thirteenth  century. 
It would  have been  a  miracle had Edward I  encountered 
less difficulty  in his far harder task of  securing a full attend- 
ance at his more  distant high court at Westminster.  His 
sheriffs issued  precepts  to about 150  boroughs, just  as he 
summoned  over  a  hundred  temporal  peers  and  over  70 
abbots.  All estates fell short of  his vision,  and the writs 
of  summons sank to half.  But  even  they prove  nothing 
in the way of attendance.  The writs de expensis prove the 
full attendance of  a solid and fully-paid phalanx of  knights 
of  the shire and of  a nucleus of borough members.  Borough 
records  further  testify  to  the  presence  and  payment  of 
burgesses who receive no writs  de  expensis, either because 
they  attend but  part  of  the session  or  because  they  are 
underpaid.  The  numbers  in  this  category  can  only  be 
ascertained from borough  records.  If  many of  them were 
like the Reading M.P.'s  in 1380, who put  in but ten days' 
attendance between them instead of  a hundred, they would 
not increase the size of  the house very much.  It is, how- 
ever, unlikely that members from any constituencies except 
those near London fell into this habit.  On the other hand, 
members  from  distant boroughs  would  be more  likely  to 
shirk attendance altogether, and no penalty, save the loss 
of  wages, appears to have been  imposed  on them or their 
mari~captors.~  The most  probable  reinforcements  of  the 
brief  colloquies  ilnto  an  almost  continuous  unity.  Cf.  Pasquet,  Essai, 
p.  80;  early par1 aments were summoned  ad hoc,  to assent to one thing 
only, and medieval  parliamentary history consists mainly in the develop- 
ment of  a custom into an institution. 
1 Manucaptors were not always appointed (Prynne, ii. 50-1,  iii. 182-4). 
and they seem to have been little more than a form; sometimes the knights 
of  the shire and burgesses have the same manucaptors, clearly nominated 
in the county court  (Riess,  Wahlvecht, pp.  104-5);  the M.P.'s  returned 
by  tlir:  sheriff  for  Colchester  during  its  exemption  have  manucaptors 
(ibid.,  iii.  n41b).  The  old  story  of  the  Modus  Tenendi  Parliamcntum 
that boroughs were amerced for failing to send representatives was severely 
criticised by Prynne (ibid., iv. 571--92;  cf. ii. 52, and Pasquet, p. 192  n.) : 
"there is no president in history, Parliament rolls, or Fine rolls to warrant 
it" (Prqmne, iv. 575). and there appears to be no  record of  such amerce- 
ments  In  the  Public  Record  Office.  The  statute of  1382  was  merely 
quoad tcrrorem populi, and the passages cited to prove its effect will  not 
bear the interpretation put upon them.  No specific absences are recorded 428  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT  APPENDIX  II  429 
M.P.'s  who receive  writs  de expensis are the members  for 
boroughs which  paid  less than the standard rate. 
Pending  the extensive  and co-operative  research  which 
alone can answer that specific question, the general indica- 
tions lead us to the conclusion that, while some additions 
have to be made to the numbers named  in the writs  de 
expensis, parliament  fell  shorter  of  Edward  1's  ideal  (if, 
indeed, he really  expected all those his sheriffs summoned 
to attend) than even the diminished returns of  the fourteenth 
century suggest.  The shrinkage was mainly due to reaction 
against  Edward's  attempts  to ignore  feudal liberties  and 
treat all boroughs like  those  on  the king's  demesne;  and 
most of  the refusals  to act on  the sheriff's  precepts  came 
from  franchises  where  his  writs  did  not  run.  Edward's 
real policy was  expressed  not so much in pacturn  serva  or 
in Justinian's  quod  omnes  tangit ab  omnibus approbetur  as 
in his own curt phrase rex  non vult  aliquem medium;  and 
feudal  liberty  consisted  largely  in  freedom  from  parlia- 
ments which helped  to curb whatever impeded the course 
of  common 1aw.l  It  is not till I529  that the sheriffs' returns 
to the  Reformation  parliament  rise  again to the level  of 
Edward's Model parliament of  1295. 
There  is nothing  surprising in  this.  Government,  and 
particularly self-government, depends upon the mentality of 
the governed ;  and Edward I could not by some magic stroke 
create in one generation a national out of  a local conscious- 
ness.  Even his  writs were vague and lacked  that specific 
detail which subsequent experience showed to be necessary 
before they would be  obeyed.  Medieval government lived 
from hand to mouth in its struggle for existence.  Many an 
after the "  roll-calls "; and if  the lack of such mention proves that all 
were present, then we  must make the absurd assumption that thereafter 
every single peer,  prelate,  councillor,  knight, and burgess  summoned  to 
parliament actually attended.  The act, like a good deal else in Richard 
11's policy, was a hasty effort to anticipate the discipline of  Tudor times. 
Henry VIII was more slcilful and successful in the matter than Richard 11 
(see my Henry  VZZI,  p. 265). But the discipline was not really effective 
until it was exerted by the commons themselves (see their resolutions of 
18  March.  1580-1.  Commons'  Jouvnals, i.  135-6); even then they had a 
good deal of  absence to correct. 
See Pasquet and his references, pp.  244-50. 
effort broke like a wave  against the rocks of  local inertia 
and the strongholds of  sectional privilege.  Kings got what 
service they could in the field, in court, and in parliament; 
but they could  not  get  all they wanted  nor assemble  all 
whom  they summoned.  Their one great success was with 
the  knights  of  the  shires;  but  boroughs,  as Prynne  re- 
mark~,~  "  rather reputed "  parliamentary service "  a charge, 
burthen, and oppression than an honour."  Their inadequate 
representation, concludes Bishop Stubbs, "  will account in 
great  measure  for  their insignificance  in  action  and their 
obscurity in history."  a 
1 ~viefe  Registev, iii. 233b. 
Const. Hist., iii. 613; cf. ibid.,  ii. 643,  648;  iii. 4283,  432,  466,  577. APPENDIX  111  43  I 
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ADDITIONAL  NOTES  AND  REFERENCES 
Page 5 (a).  "  Post conquestum forms no part of  the style 
of any king of  England before Edward 111, and its insertion 
is due to  the  fact  that  two  Edwards  reigned  before  the 
conquest " (C. G. Crump in History, April 1921,  p. 46). 
Page 14  (b).  This requires some modification.  See Prof. 
Rait's  The  Parliaments  of  Scotland,  1924, and  The  Times 
Lit.  Suppl.,  25  Nov.,  1920;  also  Dr.  Tait  in  English 
Hist.  Rev.,  April  1921,  p.  255,  and  Principal  Barker  in 
Edinburgh Rev.,  July  1921,  pp. 64-5. 
Page 21  (c).  The phrase "  high court of  parliament " is 
not of  sixteenth nor even fifteenth, but fourteenth-century 
origin.  The rolls of  parliament have it under Henry VII 
(1489)  and  Edward  IV  (1472),  but the earliest  reference 
I  have found is  its use  by  Chief-justice  Thirning in  pro- 
nouncing judgement  upon  the Lords Appellant on 3 Nov., 
1399  (Rot. Parl., iii. 451,  v. 6, vi. 422).  The mental process 
by which it was reached  is indicated in an earlier passage 
of  11  Richard I1 relating to the Appellants  (ibid., iii. 244), 
where  it is  recorded  that "  in  this  parliament  the lords, 
spiritual as well as temporal, then present claimed as their 
liberty and franchise that the great matters moved in this 
parliament,  and to be moved in other parliaments in time 
to come,  touching  peers  of  the land, should  be  handled, 
judged,  and discussed by the course of  parliament and not 
by the civil law, nor by the common law of  the land, practised 
in other and lower courts of  the realm ; which claim, liberty, 
and franchise the king graciously admitted and accorded in 
open parliament ." 
Page  32  (d).  Prynne  (Briefe  Kegister  of  Parl.  Writs, 
iv. 567) says the earliest record  he had found of  the word 
43" 
parliamentznn is on the dorse of  membrane  12  of  the close 
roll  for 28  Henry  111, referring  to the  parleamenturn  de 
Rumened'  [sic] between John  and his barons;  there is, he 
says, another reference on the dorse of  membrane 13 of  the 
close roll for 32 Henry 111.  Both  Prynne's  references are 
correct (Cal. Close Rolls, 1242-7,  p. 242;  1247-51,  p. 107). 
Page 33 (e).  " I  am sure,"  writes Prof.  Rait, "  that in 
Scotland  plenunz  ~arliamentum  =  open  parliament "  (cf. 
his  Parliaments  of  Scotland, pp.  420-1).  Professor  W.  A. 
Morris has also shown that plenus  comitatus means '  open ' 
rather  than '  full'  county-court  (English  Hist. Rev.,  July 
1924). 
Page 39  (f).  Professor  AlcIlvvain  (Amer. Pol.  Sci. Rev., 
1921,  p. 296) demurs to this iilterpretation of  the distinction 
between  '  original '  writs  and  writs  de  cursu ;  but  cf. 
IIoldsworth,  Hist.  of  English  Law,  3rd  ed., i. 398 : "  the 
barons did not wish to leave the chancellor an uncontrolled 
power to issue original writs-a  power which was equivalent 
to a power to make new law."  See also my references on 
p. 248, and Stubbs, Charters, ed. 1900,  pp. 389, 393, where 
the chancellor swears "  he will seal no writ, excepting writs 
of  ccourse,"  without direction.  In vo!.  ii.  193  Dr.  Holds- 
worth,  referring to "  the distinction between  original and 
judicial  writs,"  says, "  Some writs, e.g.  the writ  of  right, 
are original,  that is they originate an action.  Others are 
only issued in the course of  the proceedings."  But "  among 
the domestic and more especially legal duties of  the clerks 
of the chancery was the issue of  original writs " (ii. 228), 
and "  there  were  indeed  a  growing  number  of  writs  of 
course which could not be changed without the consent of 
the common council of  the realm " (ii. 245).  In 1347  the 
fee for an original writ was 6d. and for a judicial  writ 7d. 
(Rot. Parl., ii. 17oa). 
Page 47 (g).  The statement about the "  Rolls of  Parlia- 
ment " beginning  in  1278  refers  to the  printed  volumes 
entitled  Rotuli  Parliamentorum  ut  et  petitiones  et  placita. 
They  have  petitions  and  pleas  from  1278,  but  *thing 
the editor calls a rotulus till 1290;  even  then the word  is 432  THE EVOLUTION  OF PARLIAMENT  APPENDIX  111  433 
wrongly used.  This chapter should be compared with and 
checked by M. Pasquet's third chapter on Les Parlements de 
Edouard  I@. 
Page  66  (h).  The  identification  of  knights  or  milites 
with barones minores is not, of  course,  complete.  Usually 
knights of  the shire were smaller military tenants-in-chief; 
but in the first place even a greater baron was not neces- 
sarily a knight in the fourteenth century;  secondly, many 
barones minores were not knights of  the shire;  and thirdly, 
men who had not been  knighted  were occasionally, if  not 
frequently, elected  knights of  the shire (see p.  114)  : some 
of  Edward 11's writs de ex$ensis prescribe a lower wage than 
a knight's for their parliamentary service.  The discrimina- 
tion between miles and chivaler is simply due, as Mr. Crump 
says, to the fact that "  when the editor of  the Oficial Return 
of  Members of  Parliament described a man as miles et  chivaler, 
he did so because  he found  the same man called miles in 
one part of  the return and chivaler  in another"  (History, 
April 1921,  p. 461.  Professor McIlwain, in referring (Amer. 
Pol. Sci. Rev., 1921,  p. 296)  to my "  identification of  knights 
and barones minores,"  has, I think, overlooked my remark 
in  the  same  note : "  nor  must  we  identify  milites  with 
barones  minores." 
Page 68 (i).  An adequate edition of  the Modus  Tenendi 
Parliamentum  is yet  to seek,  and the need  of  it may be 
inferred from the comments of  a reputable  critic (London 
Mercury, April 1921,  p.  681),  who, after remarking that it 
has for nearly a  generation "  been  an ordinary subject of 
undergraduate teaching at one English university at least," 
proceeds  to  confuse  it  with  Maitland's  Memoranda  de 
Parliamento.  Pending that edition all its statements must 
be received with a caution which Dr. Tait suggests that I 
have ignored  when he refers  to my accepting it "  without 
reserve " (Engl. Hist.  Rev.,  loc.  cit.).  He  has,  I  think, 
overlooked  my  reservations  (p.  73) that  the "  Rolls  of 
Parliament do not support " the theory of  the Modus "  in 
its entirety " (p. 74), that "  if  the picture  drawn  in  the 
Modus ever represented  actual practice,  that practice  was 
greatly  modified  during  the  fourteenth  century,"  and 
(p. 95) that an inference from it "  would not be safe."  I 
doubt if the Modus is more scientific than Tacitus' Germania, 
though the author's opportunities of observation must have 
been  far closer,  and an earlier  MS.  than that quoted  by 
Dr. Tait says, not that "  two knights of  any shire have a 
greater voice in parliament than the greatest earl in England," 
but  that habent  plus  vocis  in concedendo  vel  negando  pro 
comitatu  suo  quam  comes  ejusdem co.initatus, which  no one 
could  deny.  Its  original  draft probably  dates from  the 
latter  half  of  Edward  11's  reign,  the  considerable  dis- 
crepancies  between  the two  extant MSS.  of  Richard 11's 
reign  suggesting a  common origin  a good deal earlier.  It 
seems  to have  emanated  from  Lancaster's  entourage;  it 
is  undoubtedly  tendencious,  and I  am not  aware that  I 
have accepted any statement in it that is not corroborated 
by  other  and better  authority.  Still,  it is undeniably  a 
tract  contemporary  with  fourteenth-century  parliaments; 
and a pamphleteer, however reckless, does not deliberately 
make  himself  unintelligible  to  his  readers.  Mr.  Hilaire 
Belloc does not,  for instance,  in  his  strictures on  Parlia- 
ment  ignore  the  two  houses,  and  the  Modus  could  not 
have talked a lot about "  six grades " and said not a word 
about three  estates,  if  three  estates had been  the essence 
of  the parliaments he was describing.  Even a revolutionary 
says something about the things he wants to eradicate. 
The  ' authority'  of  the  Modus  does  not,  moreover, 
depend  merely  upon  its  anonymous  author,  nor  on  the 
suggested  desire in 1509  of  a clerk of  the parliaments and 
of  chancery  (who sat in the house  of  lords  and was  also 
clerk of  convocation) to emphasise "  the superiority of  the 
commons  over  the lords."  We  have  also  to account  for 
the transmission of  a version  of  it in 1418  under the great 
seal  of  Henry  V  to  the  Lord-deputy  of  Ireland,  and  its 
attestation  by  two  obscure  but  identifiable  clerks  of  the 
Irish hanaper  (see Steele, Tudor and  Stuart Proclamations, 
vol. i. pp. clxxxviii-cxcii).  Nor does the text quite justify 
the charge of inconsistency  in asserting that " there can be 
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no parliament without  the presence  of  the communitates " 
while admitting that if  any of  the "  sex gradus " is absent 
a parliament is none the less valid.  The Modus  does not 
say  that  all  the  communitates  must  be  present.  That 
would, indeed, be a hard saying in the fourteenth century, 
when there were many parliaments from which some shire 
or other was absent, and never a one in which all boroughs 
were  represented.  The absence  of  any one  individual or 
commanitas, if  properly  summoned, always gave  consent ; 
and the Modus  does not hedge  in  its six grades with  the 
sanctity with which we  have sometimes invested the Three 
Estates :  it admits that one (possibly more) may be absent 
without holding up the crown in parliament;  and no one 
can say, in view of  the absence of  clerical proctors from the 
English house of  commons and of  the protests of  prelates 
in the lords, that consent on the part of each of the three 
estates was essential to legislation. 
The "  validity  of  a parliament " is a question  to which 
I  cannot  propound  an answer,  because  I  cannot  find  a 
definition  of  parliamentum  which  fits  all  the  assemblies 
called  by  that  name  in  the  fourteenth  century.  There 
are, I  believe, in the city records  of  London  early indica- 
tions of  the view that no one but a king or his deputy can 
hold  a  parliament;  but  there  were  exceptions  in  abbeys 
and inns of  court, and even  this does not carry us very 
far in the way  of  definition.  The vagueness of  the word 
is perhaps  most  conveniently  illustrated  in  Parry's  sum- 
maries of  the writs in his Parliaments and  Councils of England, 
but the ambiguity of  his  title saved him  the task of  dis- 
crimination.  The Oj'icial Return of  Members  of  Parliament 
attempts to discriminate by means of  a list of parliaments. 
But it has refined  the meaning  of  parliamentum  and has 
relegated to notes a good many summonses which  Prynne 
regarded as parliamentary writs.  Still, even it will include 
among '  parliaments ' as  late  as  June  1371  an assembly 
consisting  of  "  certain  specified  knights,  citizens,  and 
The sex  gradus  are  simply  ranks,  and  the  best  MSS.  have  gradus 
parium parliamenti  (see Engl. Hist. Rev.,  xxxiv. 209-25). 
burgesses"  all  nominated  by  the  king.  When  does  a 
parley  with  the  king  cease  to  be  a  valid  parliamentum.~ 
We  have  indeed  many invalid  parliaments  on  our hands 
if we  apply any one definition  to them  all;  and we  need 
not  quarrel  overmuch  with  the  author  of  the  Modzcs, 
especially if  he lived in Edward 11's  reign,  for describing 
the way in which ought to be held what he thinks a parlia- 
ment  ought  to be.  He does not  think  that all the com- 
munitates  nor  even  all  his  gradus  need  be  present;  he 
might  even have hesitated  to deny-in  Edward 11's reign 
-the  word parliamentum  to a conference between the king 
and a single estate, or legal validity to an agreement reached 
between  them.  It is not until Richard 11's  reign that the 
other communitates attempt to deny the binding character 
of  petitions from  the clergy  granted by  the king.  When 
and how  do we  get,  out  of  communitates,  a  communitas 
communitatum ? 
There is, it seems to me, a substantial grain of  truth in 
the idea of  the Modus that the essential element in a parlia- 
ment is the conjunction of  the king with one, more, or all 
of  the communitates.  Every parliamentum was a tractatus ; 
and like the '  treaty ' at Runnymede (also called  a parlia- 
mentum by Henry I11 in 1244)  it was a matter of  give and 
take  between  parties  which  had  the power  to  give.  In 
1215 the  parties  were  substantially  the  barons  and  the 
king,  but in the fourteenth century they are substantially 
the king  and the communitates.  The greater barons have 
been  inveigled  into  accepting,  and  indeed  claiming,  the 
position of  consiliarii, and the peers reduced to born advisers 
of  the crown.  The judges may have manceuvred them into 
it; but I doubt if  there is any sanction for the view that 
counsellors had any legal  right  of  treaty with  the crown. 
In strict modern theory no one has;  but there was a good 
deal in the fourteenth century to give colour  to the view 
of the Modus  that a parliamentum was essentially a means 
of  treaty, mainly about supplies, between the king and the 
communities.  The communitates were outside the council, 
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(cf.  Pasquet,  Essai,  pp.  82-3,  156).  This  was  a  theory 
which succumbed in England to the doctrine of  sovereignty, 
but the American  view of  English history, essential to the 
logical  justification  of  American  independence,  is  that 
Magna  Carta  was  a  treaty,  compact,  or social  contract, 
and parliament  a  Congress  of  estates  (see my  Factors  in 
American History, 1925,  pp. 32-48,  302-6). 
Page  71  (j).  A  few  further  illustrations  of  the  use  of 
the  words  '  estates '  and  ' states '  may  be  added.  In 
1533  the  Constable,  Marshal,  and  Steward  are  termed 
"  the three high estates " at the coronation of  Anne Boleyn 
(Letters and Papers of  Henry VIII,  vi.  396).  On  16  Jan., 
1594-5,  an "  ordinance or decree made by the commissioners 
of  the office of  Earl Marshal of  England " fixes "  the pre- 
cedency of  all estates, according to their birth and calling " 
(Hist. MSS.  Comm., 11th  Rep., App. vii.  273).  The first 
of  the  political  questions  which  William  Thomas  pro- 
pounded  to the young Edward  VI  runs :  "  Whereof  hath 
growen th'  aucthoritie  of  Astates, and howe many kindes 
of  Astates  there  be? " (Ellis, Original  Letters,  2nd  series, 
ii.  189;  Strype,  Eccles.  Menz.,  ii.  100).  The  Authorised 
Version  of  the  Bible  has "  the  chief  estates  of  Galilee " 
(Mark vi. ZI), and Milton "  the bold design, Pleas'd  highly 
those infernal states " (Paradise Lost, ii. 386).  Even Burke 
says  that  the  English  people  at the  Revolution  of  1688 
"  acted  by  the  ancient  organized  states in  the  shape  of 
their  old  organization"  (Rejlections  on  the  French  Rev., 
ed.  Payne,  p.  25).  Each  American  colony  claimed  to be 
a "  perfect state " because it had a "  complete  legislature 
within  itself " (Factors in American History, p.  43).  The 
most  familiar use  of  ' states ' for '  estates ' is  in "  States- 
General " of  the Netherlands. 
The  modern  idea  of  the  three  estates  appears  in  the 
"  Rolls  of  Parliament " (vi.  39,  98,  '' Dominus  Rex  ac 
Tres Status Regni,"  1473 ; and more fully in English "  the 
thre Estates of this Reame of  Englond, that is to wite,  of 
the  Lords  Spiritualls  and  Temporalls,  and  of  the  Com- 
mons"  in  1483,  ib.,  vi.  240);  and in  1581  the  commons 
refer  to  "the  Common  House  or  Third  Estate  of  the 
Parliament,"  Journals, i. 126). 
Page 72  (k).  See Fuller,  Church History  (1656)) Bk. vi. 
p.  352 : "  Such  priests  as have  the  addition  Sir before 
their  Christian  name,  were  men  not  graduated  in  the 
University,  being  in  Orders, but not in  Degrees."  In the 
account of  the opening of  Henry VIII's first parliament in 
I510 the style of  the chancellor  has been  corrected in the 
MS.  from "  doctor  William  Warham " to "  lord  William 
Warham " (Letters and Papers, new ed., I. i. 342).  Wolsey 
appears as "  Sir Thomas,"  and other priests  likewise  (ib., 
No.  1046). 
Page  75  (1).  Dr.  Tait  demurs  (Engl. Hist.  Rev.,  April 
1921,  p. 255) to the importance here attached to the sub- 
ordination of  the  ' estates ' to the  '  high  court of  parlia- 
ment,'  as  a  means  of  avoiding  revolutions  in  English 
history, on two grounds :  firstly, that the cortes of  Castille 
and  estates  of  Scotland,  which  resembled  the  English 
parliament  in  receiving  petitions  and  in  other  respects, 
nevertheless collapsed ; and secondly, that Scottish legisla- 
tion without  a maiority in each of  the estates shows that 
such  a  requirement  was  "  not  inherent  in  the  system." 
No  one,  of  course,  would  contend  that  the  character  of 
the English parliament as a high court was the sole reason 
for  the avoidance  of  revolutions  in  English  history;  the 
causes go deeper than that, but it was assuredly an indis- 
pensable  element  in  orderly  constitutional  development, 
and the Scottish and Spanish analogies support that con- 
clusion.  It is  no  doubt  true  that  Scottish  kings  could 
override a  recalcitrant  majority  in  a  Scottish  estate,  and 
James  VI said he "  ruled Scotland with a pen."  He could 
not have made that "  no idle boast " (Rait,  Parl. of Scotland, 
p.  60) had  Scottish estates been  fused  into  a  parliament 
like the English;  and that failure  to fuse  made  Scottish 
constitutional  history  anything  but  an  orderly  develop- 
ment.  The requirement of  assent from each several estate 
may not have been "  inherent in the system,"  but it was 
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fully-,in  France, in Germany, and in Poland.  The theory 
was  put forward in England in Elizabeth's  reign  and has 
been  used  ever since as an argument to prove the uncon- 
stitutional character  of  her  ecclesiastical  settlement ; and 
only the reserve power in the crown to override the claim 
of two '  estates,'  the lords spiritual and the lords temporal, 
to veto legislation  saved England from revolution in 1832, 
if  not later.  There may be "  no necessary divorce between 
a  high  court  of  parliament  and a  division  of  estates  on 
class lines "  ; but where estates are so divided, the division 
precludes  that  predominance  in  the  high  court  which 
fusion promoted in England.  It was the absence of  funda- 
mental distinctions between an indefinite number of  estates, 
and their association in and with the high court of  parlia- 
ment which  gave that composite  entity the elasticity  and 
strength it developed  in  England  alone.  The collapse  of 
the cortes of  Castille is surely not  to the point.  Castille 
became  one with  half-a-dozen  other monarchies in  which 
its system did not prevail;  and it is very doubtful whether 
the  English  parliamentary  system  would  have  survived 
if  Henry V's  policy  of  union  with  France had succeeded, 
let alone other realms. 
Page  130  (m). The  famous  discussions  in  the  house 
of  commons in 1601  and 1628  whether it should  proceed 
by way of  petition or bill  have stamped on the minds of 
historians  the  almost  indelible  impression  that  parlia- 
mentary bills and petitions had always been fundamentally 
different  methods  of  procedure;  and  the  most  recent 
historian  of  the law  refers  to "  the  change  in  procedure 
from legislation  by way  of  petition  to legislation  by  way 
of bill " as "  gradually solving " constitutional difficulties 
(Holdsworth, ii. 429, 438).  It is necessary, therefore, (i) to 
point out that in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries 
there  was  no difference between  a  parliamentary  petition 
and a parliamentary bill, and (ii) to suggest some explana- 
tion of  the fact that a century later men drew a distinction 
between them.  It should be remembered that the earliest 
legislative records  are simply narratives;  the roll records, 
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but does not make the act, and the narrative form persists 
from the  fet  a remembre of  Henry I11 and Edward I,1 through 
the  memoranda  of  his  successors  down  to "  the king  re- 
membreth " of  Henry  VII.  But  these  '  remembrances ' 
gradually subside into our preambles, and, with the growth 
of positive law, the substantive part of  an act ceases to be 
its narrative  and  becomes  an expression  of  will, "  Be  it 
enacted,"  the nuances  of  which varied  from time to time. 
It  might  imply  a  petition  from  the  commons;  it  often 
meant an injunction from the crown.  There is not much 
doubt of  its meaning in most of  the acts of  the Yorkists and 
first  two  Tudors;  what  it meant under  the Lancastrians 
has never been ascertained.  The meaning was not affected 
by  calling  its  formal expression  a  '  bill ' or a '  petition.' 
Both words often occur in the same do~ument.~  In these 
cases it is more usual for the clerk to call it a petitio  at the 
beginning, and a billa when he is recording the royal assent, 
but in at least one instance in Henry VII's reign that order 
is  re~ersed.~  Moreover,  a  9etitio  is  described  as formam 
actus  in se  continens  almost as often as a  billa ;  and the 
bills  which  are  turned  into  so-called  '  public  acts ' are 
always  entered  on  the  rolls  as communes  petitiones.  As 
late as 1530  an act for the Duke of  Norfolk is called a 9etitio 
throughout,  and  is  immediately  followed  on  the roll  by 
quadam alia  billa  concerning  John  Roper's  will.4  Neither 
in form, substance, nor procedure is there yet any difference 
between a petition and a 
But there is a difference between one bjll and one petition 
and another;  and that difference is marked by the careful 
insertion of the words formam  actus in se continens.  They 
mark  that  change  in  procedure  which  has  been  wrongly 
1 E.g. in  the Provisions of  Oxford  and Confirmation  of  the Charters 
(Stubbs, Charters, ed.  1900, pp. 390, 392, 496). 
Rot. Purl., vi. 478. 488-9,  492-3,  530. 
Ibid.,  vi. 452-3. 
Ibid.,  Supplement  ibound  up  with  vol.  i.  of  Lords'  Journals], 
pp. cliii.-clvi. 
6  The student in search of  a basis of  discrimination between  le roy lc 
veuit and soit fail comme il esl desird would do well to begin with the answers 
recorded,  ibid., pp. ccxliii.-ccl. APPENDIX  111  44 1 
440  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
ascribed  to  the  alleged  substitution  of  billa  for  petitio. 
What happened  was that billa gradually came to be more 
and more  restricted  to parliamentary  requests drafted in 
the form of  acts, leaving 9etitio to such as merely made the 
request without prescribing the remedy.  There was political 
subtlety  underlying  the  change  in  parliamentary  ritual. 
It may be suspected that even over-mighty subjects of  the 
Lancastrians found it convenient to represent their petitions 
to the crown  as emanating  from  the  commons;  many  a 
great lord adopted the practice, and then the new monarchy 
took a leaf  out of  their  book.  Jf  lords could  inspire and 
inform petitions to the crown,  why  should not the crown 
suggest and even draft petitions to itself?  The idea grew 
very  attractive when  Henry  VIII  after  1529  found  the 
comrnons inclined  to support him  but more than half  the 
lords  in  opposition.  "  Be  it  enacted "  was  imperious 
enough to cast no slur on the king's most excellent majesty; 
le roy le veult expressed  most of  the facts better than soit 
fait comme il est desirt ;  and the king's grace which granted 
suits might  be  left  out of  matters  of  state, and omitted 
from petitiones  rempublicam conce~nentes.~ 
So bills formam  actus in se  continentes became the order 
of  the day and the conveyance of  positive law.  The Tudor 
Frankenstein  died  before his leviathan  came to maturity. 
But substance grew  into  the form  of  parliamentary  par- 
ticipation,  and "  Be it  enacted " began  under  Elizabeth 
to sound  less  like  an  order  from,  than  an  order to,  her 
majesty.  The commons themselves shrank from its rever- 
berations in 1601  and even in 1628, and fell back on petitions 
rather than bills.  It was  the '  form  of  an act ' at which 
they shied. 
Page I44 (n). Some of  the obscurity in the law  about 
taxation is  due to reading  back  more  modern  ideas into 
the fourteenth century.  Taxation then was not so much 
an act of parliament as a series of  gifts made in parliament 
by representatives of  those  who  would have to pay.  No 
estate  could  tax or veto  the  grant  of  any  other  estate. 
Ibid., p.  lxxiii. 
Even  tonnage and poundage  came  under  this  rubric:  in 
1372  the knights  of  the shires  were  dismissed  while  the 
citizens and burgesses were retained to vote it.l  Similarly 
a  fifteenth  was  granted  "by  earls,  barons,  freemen,  and 
the communities of  all the counties of  the realm,"  a tenth 
by "  all the cities, boroughs, and ancient demesnes of  the 
king,"  and a clerical tenth by the clergy.  Such external 
advice as was given was given by peers and others, not as 
estates of  parliament but as members of the king's council, 
great  or  small.  There  might  be  differences  of  opinion 
between  peers  and  knights  of  the  shire  over  a  fifteenth 
because both classes voted and paid it; but peers as such 
had  nothing  to do with  tenths granted by  the clergy  or 
by cities and boroughs.  Neither  had the latter anything 
to say when in 1400  the lords spiritual and temporal, "  in 
order  to avoid  the  summoning  of  a  parliament  and  the 
consequent imposition of  a tax or tallage upon the common 
people,"  made in council a grant to be paid by them~elves.~ 
As  late as 1523  the  burgesses  voted  their own  taxation, 
leaving the knights of the shires to vote theirs;  and only 
the laborious persuasions of the Speaker, Sir Thomas More, 
brought them to agree on a compromi~e.~ 
By that time the fusion of  estates was fusing taxation, 
and the growth of a common authority to deal with com- 
mon  taxation  was  creating  the modern  problem  of  pre- 
dominance  in  the  partnership.  The  point  was  discussed 
by the judges in connexion with tonnage and poundage as 
early as 1454.  It was then held that the lords could reduce 
but could not increase a grant made by the commons;  for 
the greater included  the less,  and the commons'  grant of 
tonnage  and poundage  for four  years  would  imply  their 
assent if the lords reduced it to two.5  The lordsJ assent 
was now required  because  grants were taking the form of 
bills and being "  enacted."  The sanction was no longer the 
Rot. Purl.,  ii.  310. 
a  Ibid.,  ii.  447. 
a  Nicolas, Proceedings of  the Pvivy  Council, i.  104. 
a  Hall, Chronicle, p. 657. 
Year-Books, ed. Tottell, 33 Henry VI, fol. xvii. 442  THE EVOLUTION  OF  PARLIAMENT 
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gift from  the representatives of  those who would  have to 
pay, but the act of  a parliament feeling its way to sovereign 
power.  Counsel who argued the case in 1480 were harking 
back  to the past, but the argument is clear  enough  if  we 
remember  that by cornmunitas is meant the knights of  the 
shire and that a  fifteenth is the tax referred  to;  counsel 
goes on to remark  that a clerical tenth is granted by the 
clergy.  Presumably a fifteenth granted by the communitas 
would not be paid by peers and their tenants, any more than 
the  knights  and  theirs  would  pay  the  lords'  taxation  in 
1400;  and  in  spite  of  Professor  Holdsworth's  remarks,l 
it is by no means clear that counsel was not right in assum- 
ing that the lords had no more  control over  the grant of 
fifteenths by knights  of  the shire  than  knights  had  over 
the  self-taxation  of  peers.  The  Year-book  case  of  33 
Henry VI does not refer  to fifteenths but to tonnage and 
poundage. 
Page  155  (0).  Stubbs,  Const.  Hist.,  iii.  465-6  :  "  The 
most  influential cause of  this diminution was undoubtedly 
the  desire  of  the  country  towns  to be  taxed  with  their 
country neighbours, to be  rated to the fifteenth with the 
shires  and  not  to the  tenth  with  the  boroughs.  Whilst 
avoiding  the  heavier  rate,  they  were  also  relieved  in  a 
perceptible  degree in  the matter of  the  members'  wages. 
It was much cheaper for a town  to pay its fifteenth  and 
contribute to the payment of  the knights than to pay the 
tenth  and remunerate  its own  burgesses."  The criticism 
of  this view,2 on the ground that it ignores the stereotyping 
of  tenths and  fifteenths  after  1334,  cannot  apply  to  the 
seventy  boroughs  or  so which  Stubbs calculates  to have 
escaped making returns by that date, and the whole question 
is  complex.  Tenths were  supposed  to  take the  place  of 
tallage, and it was natural that boroughs should pay them. 
But what was a borough  for the purposes of  taxation and 
representation ?  It  was  from  villa  that  representatives 
were summoned in  1213  to what  has been  called  the first 
Hist. English Law, ii.  440.  Cf.  the passage from the Modus quoted 
above, p. 433.  a  Engl. Hist. Rev., Oct.  1924, p.  514. 
real  national  council.  When  Exmouth  excused  itself  in 
1337, it was on the ground that it was not a  vitla and had 
no bai1iffs.l  How much negligence on the part of  sheriffs 
or of boroughs themselves was required  to enable seventy 
or so to escape, between  1295 and 1334, from the category 
of  tenth-paying  boroughs  into  the  more  privileged  class 
which  only paid  fifteenths with  the shires?  In the four- 
teenth century the argument was that boroughs paid tenths 
because they were boroughs ;  in 1628 the house of  commons 
argued  that  boroughs  were  boroughs  because  they  paid 
tenths,  and on  that ground  restored  their  parliamentary 
representati~n.~  But  neither  age  attempted  a  definition, 
and Prynne, revising his former opinion, came to the con- 
clusion  that  parliamentary  boroughs  were  made  neither 
by custom,  prescription,  nor charter, but by the whim or 
discretion of sheriffse3 No  need was felt in the fourteenth 
century for a precise definition of  a parliamentary borough. 
It was  enough  to get  samples  together  in  parliament  to 
make an ' estate ' and bind the rest.  The idea of  defining 
a category and summoning all who came within the definition 
was limited in the middle ages to bishops ;  custom determined 
the rest. 
Nor  was  there any hard-and-fast rule  about tenths and 
fifteenths.  In 1346  parliament  granted  two  fifteenths  to 
be  levez  en citees,  burghs, et  aunciens demeignes auxi come 
des communes des co~ntees.~  London had secured the lower 
rate in 1327 and it was confirmed by Edward I11 in 1335.6 
In 1357  Leicester was pardoned certain fines in return for 
the grant of  "  a  certain yearly  fifteenth."  Bridgewater 
refers to the E26 it paid whenever a fifteenth was granted.' 
Pasquet, Essai, pp.  47-52;  Off.  Return  of  M.P.'s, i.  I 13.  Parlia- 
mentary  boroughs  are  often  called  villa,  e.g.  Ipswich,  Bridgewater, 
Newcastle-on-Tyne,  Bodmin,  Arundel,  Dunwich,  Scarborough,  South- 
ampton, Nottingham, and Yarmouth  (Rot. Parl.,  ii.  147.  178, 180,  185. 
210, 221,,3,46, 350, 352); cities and boroughs are briefly called "  villes " 
In  1377 (zbzd., 111.  7). 
Commons'  Journals, I May,  1628. 
3 Briefe  Register, iii.  230-1;  cf. J. F. Willard  in  Essays in honour of 
Julnes  rait (1933).  pp. 417-35. 
Rot. Parl., ii. 15gb. 
Finance and  Trade under Edward III, ed. Unwin, pp. 36-7. 
0  Bateson,  Records, ii.  106. 
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From 1389 to 1496 Oxford was petitioning for the exemption 
of  inhabitants  from  fifteenth~,~  and other  boroughs  were 
doing  like~ise.~  The fact  that boroughs  paid  "  tenths " 
clearly does not mean  that no inhabitants paid fifteenths. 
Various towns were gradually exempted, and their exemp- 
tions amounted to £6,000 out of  a total of  about &9,ooo, 
and to twice that sum when two tenths and fifteenths were 
granted.  The  development  of  poll-taxes  and  subsidies, 
levied on persons and not on communities, further diminished, 
by  ignoring,  the  difference  between  borough  and  shire 
taxation;  and  the  same  may  be  said  of  the increase  of 
customs, the cost of  which was passed on by the merchants 
to all consumers  alike,  and  of  unparliamentary  taxation 
such  as forced  loans,  benevolences,  and  monopolies.  In 
boroughs which were prospering, the fixed assessment based 
on  a  tenth  in 1334  must have  become  much less  than  a 
real fifteenth before the end of  the century.  On the whole 
it seems that the effect of  the difference between tenths and 
fifteenths  upon  borough  representation  has been  exagger- 
ated, certainly after 1334;  if may even be doubted whether 
a borough  ever escaped the higher rate by evading parlia- 
mentary repre~entation.~  If  it could  show good  cause,  it 
could even, while sending members to parliament and after 
being made a shire, get exemption from tenths and fifteenths 
alt~gether.~ 
Page 158  (#).  An unofficial list for 1491  has been found 
in Brit. Mus. Harleian MS.  2252, f. 28. 
Page 248 (q).  Dr.  Tait (English  Historical Review, April 
1921,  p.  253 n.) points out "  the resemblance of  the four 
Oxford City Documents (Oxf. Hist. Soc.), pp. 98-129; Purl. Petitions 
(Oxf.  Hist.  Soc.'s  Collectartea,  iii.),  pp.  87, 152. 156, 158; Stat.  12 
Henrv VII, c.  I?. 
df. Whitley,  Purl. Repres. of  Coventry, p.  20;  Chanter and Waine- 
wright, Barnstaple Records, i. 128-9,  245 ; ii.  88. 
Cf. Riess, Gesch. des  Wahlrechts, pp. 25-6;  Pasquet, Essai, p. 197. 
In  1497  the statutory exemptions  were  for the laity  "within  the 
shire of  the city of  Lincoln,"  Yarmouth and New Shoreham, while Cam- 
bridge had confirmed  its limitation to L20  for  each  tenth  and fifteenth 
enacted  by 3  Ed. IV.  These statutory exemptions  account for  a  very 
small fraction of  the L6,ooo allowable.  The universities  of  Oxford  and 
Cambridge and colleges of  Eton and Winchester were also exempted from 
the subsidy of  that year (12  Henry VII, cc.  12,  13). 
woolsacks arranged  in  a  square . . . to the  four  benches 
(scamna) which  were  a  feature  common  to English  shire 
courts  and  the  courts  of  German  towns."  In each  case 
the  arrangement  indicates  confidential  discussion  rather 
than  formal  debate  and, so far as the  shires  courts  are 
concerned,  a  much  smaller  gathering  than  a  meeting  of 
four  men  from  each  vill  and  twelve  from  each  borough 
whom  the  sheriff  summoned  (Pasquet,  Essai,  1914. 
p. 18). 
Page  304  (r).  The number  of  peerages  is considerably 
larger because  (i) there have to be added the Scottish and 
Irish  peerages  which  do not entitle their holders to sit in 
the house  of  lords, and (ii) a  number  of  peers hold  more 
than one  peerage.  Whereas  two  centuries  ago  the house 
of  commons was two  and half  times as large as the house 
of  lords,  the latter now  outnumbers  the former by  more 
than  a  hundred.  So  far  as the peers  by inheritance are 
concerned, they are now  a public meeting which  does not 
meet. 
Page  331  (s).  I  cannot  agree  with  Dr.  Holdsworth 
(Hist. Engl. Law, i. 364, n. 7) that the case to which I refer 
"  is merely  an inquiry  without  any reference  to strictly 
judicial  proceedings,"  unless  "  strictly  judicial " excludes 
all  proceedings  in  the  house  of  commons  and  therefore 
begs  the  question.  "The  bill  against  Benet  Smyth  for 
the murder  of  Giles  Rufford " was  read  first  on  6  Nov., 
1555;  on  the  18th  the  house  ordered  "  that Smyth  be 
brought  hither from  the Tower,"  and desired  two  of  the 
council to move the queen "  that Smyth and his accusers 
may be  brought  personally  to this  house."  On  the 20th 
the council ordered the lieutenant of  the Tower to conduct 
him "  there to be examined "; and on  the and  we  have 
"  the bill against Benet Smyth  judicium."  It became law 
that session  (2  and 3  Phil.  and  Mary,  c.  17).  It merely 
deprived  him  of  his  benefit  of  clergy,  but  without  that 
he  could  not  have  been  hanged;  and  the  examination 
of  the  accused  and  his  accusers  and  judicium  by  the 
house  of  commons,  if  not "  strictly judicial  proceedings," 448  INDEX 
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